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DEPARTMENT
OF HISTORY
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Foreign Soldiers in the Risorgimento and Anti-Risorgimento. A Transnational Military History of Germans in the Italian Armed Groups, 1834–1870

Ferdinand Nicolas Göhde

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to
obtaining the degree of Doctor of History and Civilization
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Abstract

This thesis compares the motives, experiences and practices of Germans in the Papal, Bourbon and Garibaldian armed groups.

It shows how solidarity was, on all political sides, increasingly conceptualized as an act by and between nations and argues that political mobilization did not necessarily directly inform the single enlistment. Recruitment activities not only combined mercenary traditions with new forms of communication and association, but they also overlapped, leading many to change between armed groups.

The study provides the first in-depth statistical analysis of these Germans based on soldiers' registers, contextualizing it with transnational soldiering across Europe; not only did Germans stay in the regular armies for quite long periods, but previous and later enlistments in other armies were common – this also holds true for the “German” Garibaldians.

Examining hitherto neglected economic incentives, the study demonstrates the plurality of political, cultural, economic and professional motives of single soldiers, thus blurring the lines of the opposition between the militarily inexperienced political war volunteer and the mercenary that is so central to the polemics of the time and “new Risorgimento historiography”.

Based on legal sources and soldiers' reports, the study analyses the every-day life of Germans in the Italian armed groups in terms of a culturally revived “new military history”, and is particularly attentive to issues of masculinity. The different institutional contexts the Germans were placed in – e.g. foreigners' corps, ministries – informed differing experiences. In contrast to the multi-national make-up of many corps, imagery of national grouping progressively superseded formal military structures, resulting in continuous comparisons of corps and nationalities and increases in “nationalizing” experiences. This goes counter to the image of foreign commitment in Italy as a cosmopolitan experience and an *a priori* positive understanding of the “transnational”. Hence, the role of foreign soldiers was crucial for the “military” Risorgimento and “revirilization”.

Für FuSuRoPiMi

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements	xxi
<u>1 Introduction</u>	<u>1</u>
1.1 German soldiers in Italy – between conceptual extremes	1
1.2 A comparative history of the Germans on the different Italian sides.....	7
1.3 Parts and chapters, sources and methods	10
<u>Part 1 – The research: the context</u>	<u>15</u>
<u>2 A military history of Germans in Italian armed groups</u>	<u>17</u>
2.1 The nationalization of European armies and the continued presence of foreign soldiers.....	17
2.1.1 The French Revolution a watershed?	17
2.1.2 Studied cases of foreign soldiering: Philhellenism, International Brigades etc.	21
2.1.3 Recent trends in both early modern and modern studies on foreign soldiers	23
2.2 (Anti-)Risorgimento historiography and foreign soldiers.....	24
2.2.1 The exaltation of foreign military “valour”	24
2.2.2 A more sober perspective – foreign soldiers in Italy in recent historiography	26
2.3 Foreign participation on the different political sides	29
2.3.1 Foreign soldiers on the pro-national side	29
2.3.1.1 The “Invasion of Savoy” 1834	29
2.3.1.2 The “State of Sicily” in 1848 and the Roman Republic in 1849.....	30
2.3.1.3 Garibaldian campaigns.....	30
2.3.2 Foreign soldiers in the Bourbon and papal armed groups.....	32
2.3.2.1 Papal Army.....	32
2.3.2.2 Bourbon Army	33
2.3.3 The numbers on foreign soldiers in the Italian armed groups.....	34
2.4 A critical history of the Risorgimento wars	41
2.4.1 The “wars of independence” – the nationalist interpretation	41
2.4.1.1 The first “war of independence” in 1848/49	42
2.4.1.2 The second “war of independence” in 1859.....	42
2.4.1.3 The third “war of independence” in 1866	42
2.4.2 Italian civil war(s)?.....	43
2.4.3 “National” wars – a “performative” perspective	47
2.5 The choice of the historiographical object: Germans on the Italian sides – a paradox?.....	49

2.5.1	<i>The point of departure: German-Italian attraction and repulsion</i>	49
2.5.2	<i>Defining “Germans” and “border cases”</i>	55
2.6	Research contexts	58
2.6.1	<i>Nationalism and Risorgimento studies</i>	60
2.6.1.1	<i>(Dis-)continuities</i>	60
2.6.1.2	<i>Cultural and social epistemologies</i>	63
2.6.1.3	<i>Discourse and political opinions</i>	64
2.6.2	<i>The “Anti-Risorgimento”: legitimism and Catholicism</i>	67
2.6.3	<i>Transnational history</i>	71
2.6.4	<i>Military history</i>	75
2.6.4.1	<i>Risorgimento history and the military</i>	77
2.6.4.2	<i>War or military history?</i>	80
2.6.4.3	<i>The cultural turn and institutions</i>	82
2.6.4.4	<i>Militarization of society/“Socialization” of the military</i>	84
2.6.4.5	<i>Definitions – the military and the soldier</i>	84
2.6.4.6	<i>Soldiers’ experiences, the history of everyday life, lifeworld</i>	86
2.6.4.7	<i>A comparative military history</i>	87
2.6.5	<i>A gender and body history of the Risorgimento armies</i>	88
2.7	Sources	90
<u>Part 2 – The enlistment: the why, the how, the who</u>		<u>93</u>
3	Political and cultural mobilization	95
3.1	<i>The feeling of injustice and the barbarian</i>	96
3.2	<i>The religious dimension</i>	99
3.3	<i>Martyrs</i>	101
3.4	<i>Personality Cults</i>	108
3.4.1	<i>International personality cults</i>	108
3.4.2	<i>National figures and personality cults</i>	111
3.5	<i>Interclassist armies as legitimating factors</i>	112
3.6	<i>Romanticism, Adventure</i>	112
3.7	<i>The role of associations</i>	114
3.7.1	<i>German Ultramontanism at the roots of recruitment for the Papal Army</i>	114
3.7.2	<i>Peter’s Pence and the Archbrotherhood of Saint Michael 1860-1870</i>	115
3.8	<i>National Legions for Italy</i>	120
3.9	<i>The “brotherhood in arms” of the peoples</i>	124
3.9.1	<i>The democratic brotherhood of peoples</i>	126

3.9.2 The cult of international brotherhood of the 1830s and 1840s	130
3.9.3 Brotherhood and the military.....	132
3.10 Conclusions.....	137

4 Recruitment143

4.1 Legal obstacles to foreign recruitment.....	143
4.1.1 Measures against the recruiters.....	145
4.1.1.1 From general bans to bans on the recruitment of domestic subjects and soldiers	146
4.1.1.2 The criminality of trial – measures against the advertising of foreign recruitments.....	147
4.1.1.3 The role of recruitment permits.....	148
4.1.2 The bans against recruits.....	149
4.1.2.1 Noble privileges in terms of military duty, emigration and foreign (military) service.....	150
4.1.2.2 Freedom of emigration and foreign military service	153
4.1.2.3 The influence of military duties on penalties.....	156
4.1.3 A biographical example – Wilhelm Plum and the baggy-style trousers.....	162
4.2 Army recruitment in nineteenth-century Italy and foreign mobilization.....	166
4.2.1 Piedmont	166
4.2.2 Papal Army	168
4.2.2.1 ‘Conditions’ of engagement, enlistment periods etc.	170
4.2.2.2 Recruitment offices.....	171
4.2.2.3 Catholic recruitment associations.....	172
4.2.3 The Kingdom of the Two Sicilies	174
4.2.4 Mazzini’s and Garibaldi’s armed groups	177
4.3 The officer corps and the traditions of nobility	181
4.3.1 Patronage and Clientele	184
4.3.1.1 The specificity of the Italian foreigners’ corps: the strong royal prerogative	184
4.3.1.2 Foreign officers of the Papal foreigners’ corps.....	185
4.3.1.3 Courts and sinecures: Foreign officers and clientele	187
4.4 Military expertise, professionalization of armies and national military “character”.....	194
4.4.1 The Prussian case	195
4.4.2 The Kingdom of the Two Sicilies	197
4.4.3 Prussia and southern Italy compared.....	199
4.4.4 Stereotypes on national “military character”	201
4.4.5 “Wanted” across the political divides: Experienced soldiers and officers	203

4.5 Pay and Provisions	205
4.5.1 Pay in the Papal Army.....	205
4.5.2 Pay in the Roman Republic 1849.....	209
4.5.3 Pay in the Garibaldian campaigns between 1859 and 1867.....	212
4.5.4 Foreign and indigenous soldiers treated differently.....	217
4.5.5 Incentives to stay.....	218
4.6 Changes of sides and mutual head-hunting	221
4.6.1 Port cities.....	221
4.6.2 Garibaldi's "foreign company"	222
4.6.3 Pay and reciprocal "headhunting" between the armies	224
4.7 Conclusions.....	227
 <u>5 Outcome.....</u>	 <u>233</u>
5.1 Germans in the pro-Unitarian armed groups.....	237
5.2 Germans in the Papal Army.....	242
5.2.1 "German" Papal Zouaves	243
5.2.2 "German" Foreign Carabineers	250
5.3 Germans in the Bourbon Army.....	256
5.4 German officers across the political divides	258
5.5 Conclusions.....	266
 <u>6 Volunteers and mercenaries: Individual motivation and the classification of warriors</u>	 <u>271</u>
6.1 Volunteers and mercenaries – a "war of concepts".....	271
6.2 What the agents themselves identified as their motives	274
6.3 The place of the volunteer in current Risorgimento historiography	275
6.4 Epistemology of the sorter: volunteers and mercenaries	279
6.4.1 Foreign origin.....	281
6.4.2 Form of recruitment.....	282
6.5 Problems of intentional explanations	285
6.5.1 Problems of proof	285
6.5.2 Intrinsic, extrinsic motives	287
6.5.3 Shared presence of different motives and overdetermination.....	288
6.5.4 "Unconscious" motives and historiography	289
6.6 Conclusions.....	290

Part 3 – The enlisted: experiences, practices, transfers293

7 Military experiences and practices295

7.1 “Experiences” and “practices” and the “history of everyday life”	295
7.2 The military: a “hyper-codified” world	299
7.3 From dawn to dusk: the history of everyday military life of the (foreign) soldier	302
7.3.1 The cornerstones of the day: From the assembly (assemblea) to the curfew (ritirata)	302
7.3.1.1 The “visita” after dawn.....	302
7.3.1.2 The parade of the “assemblea”	303
7.3.1.3 The leave (libera uscita) and the curfew (ritirata).....	305
7.3.2 The soldier’s “work”	305
7.4 Hot and cold/cool – military “emotional standards”, drill and exercise	310
7.4.1 The pan-European drill and the “machine” metaphor	311
7.4.2 Political motivation was unnecessary: The precise man	312
7.4.3 New influences: nationalism, emotions and the impassioned soldier.....	313
7.4.4 Exercising and drill in the Italian armies – the persistence of old models.....	315
7.4.5 “Democratizing” armies? Exercise and drill in the Garibaldian armies	318
7.5 Disciplinary measures and military criminal law – “indigenous” and “foreign” soldiers.....	319
7.5.1 Military criminal law and foreigners in the Papal Army	320
7.5.2 Military criminal law and foreigners in the Bourbon Army	322
7.5.3 Military criminal law and the Garibaldian campaigns	323
7.6 The performative aspects of the soldiers’ free-time.....	323
7.6.1 “Outward” order – in and after service	324
7.6.2 Drinking, Gambling and Prostitution	325
7.6.3 Desertion and its prevention	327
7.7 Officers and soldiers	328
7.7.1 Officers as “military elite”	328
7.7.2 Officers and soldiers: maintaining distance	332
7.7.3 Excursus: Rüstow and the quest for “Adeligkeit”	334
7.7.4 Officers and soldiers: keeping closeness	336
7.8 Brothers in arms, companions and comrades	339
7.9 Conclusions.....	346

8 Contemporary comparisons, circulation and transfers353

8.1 Military masculinities, corps-to-corps and individual physical interactions	353
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8.2 Foreign soldiers and their different institutional placements.....	356
8.2.1 Foreign soldiers and officers in “indigenous” corps, general staffs, and the ministry and administration.....	357
8.2.2 Foreigners in foreigners’ corps and National Legions	358
8.3 Overlapping and conflicting loyalties	362
8.3.1 Italian allegiances.....	363
8.3.2 National allegiances	364
8.3.2.1 National groups in the Italian armies	364
8.3.2.2 “Show that you are men”: foreigners’ (national) war songs	369
8.3.2.3 Italian publics and national groups of soldiers	373
8.3.2.4 Foreign soldiers and civilians.....	374
8.4 Transnational comparisons, clashes and transfers.....	377
8.4.1 Corps comparisons and national group comparisons	377
8.4.2 The main objects of comparison	379
8.5 From comparisons to change: transnational clashes and transfers	382
8.5.1 Conflict and change	382
8.5.2 Practices and change: military Turnen all’italiana	384
8.6 Conclusions.....	388
 <u>9 General conclusions</u>	 <u>393</u>
 <u>Bibliography</u>	 <u>407</u>
 <u>APPENDIX 1 – Numbers on Italian and European armies and armed groups and lists of German soldiers and officers</u>	 <u>471</u>
A1.1 Total number of soldiers in Italian and other European armies in the nineteenth century.....	473
A1.2 Number of officers and their percentage of the total army of several Italian armies and armed groups	479
A1.3 Numbers on the percentage of officers and generals from the nobility in some European armies of the nineteenth century	486
A1.4 German Officers in the Papal Army.....	488
A1.5 German Officers in the Southern Army 1860.....	495
A1.6 Ranks and strength of corps in the infantry of the Italian armed groups	498

APPENDIX 2 – German soldiers and officers on the Italian political sides – several sample biographies.....501

<i>A2.1 Joseph Alois Bach – Papal Army</i>	<i>503</i>
<i>A2.2 Xaver von Korff, genannt Schmising-Kerssenbrock – Papal Army.....</i>	<i>506</i>
<i>A2.3 Hermann Kanzler – Papal Army.....</i>	<i>509</i>
<i>A2.4 Theodor Klitsche de Lagrange – pro-Bourbon campaigns 1860-1861.....</i>	<i>514</i>
<i>A2.5 Gustav von Hoffstetter – Garibaldi’s Legion in Rome, 1849</i>	<i>516</i>
<i>A2.6 Friedrich Wilhelm Rüstow – Garibaldian Southern Army 1860</i>	<i>516</i>
<i>A2.7 Louis-Ferdinand Fix – Garibaldian Southern Army in 1860.....</i>	<i>518</i>

List of Tables

Table 2.1 – Number and percentage of foreigners in the Papal Army 1848-1870	36
Table 2.2 – Number and percentage of foreigners in the Bourbon Army 1849-1860	37
Table 2.3 – Number and percentage of foreign soldiers in the Invasion of Savoy, the Sicilian State and the Roman Republic 1834 and 1848-1849	38
Table 2.4 – Number and percentage of foreign soldiers in the Army of Piedmont 1859	39
Table 2.5– Number and percentage of foreign soldiers in the Garibaldian campaigns 1860- 1867	40
Table 4.1 - Daily pay for foreign soldiers in the papal army in 1852	207
Table 4.2 - Daily pay for soldiers in the “indigenous infantry” of the Papal Army in 1845 .	208
Table 4.3 – Several daily wages in Italy and Germany in the mid-nineteenth century	209
Table 4.4 - Daily pay for soldiers in the “National Guard” of the Roman Republic in 1849	210
Table 4.5 - Daily pay for soldiers in the Garibaldian “Italian Legion” in 1848/49	211
Table 4.6 - Daily pay for soldiers in the infantry of the Piedmontese Army in 1860.....	213
Table 4.7 – Daily pay for soldiers of the indigenous and foreigners’ corps in the Papal Army.....	217
Table 4.8 - Comparison between the pay of indigenous and foreign soldiers and officers in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies	218
Table 5.1 – Foreign and German Mazzinian and Sicilian soldiers	237
Table 5.2 – Foreign and German soldiers of the Roman Republic 1849	238
Table 5.3 – Foreign and German Garibaldians in 1859	239
Table 5.4 – Foreign and German Garibaldians in 1860	240
Table 5.5 – Foreign German Garibaldians in 1862	240
Table 5.6 – Foreign and German Garibaldians in 1866	241
Table 5.7 – Foreign and German Garibaldians in 1867	241
Table 5.8 - German soldiers in the foreign corps of the Papal Army	243
Table 5.9 - Frequency of certain places of birth and last residence of the Germans in the Papal Zouaves	246
Table 5.10 - Frequency of some reasons for leaving the two corps	256
Table 5.11 - Number of officers and their percentage in the Papal Army	259
Table 5.12 - Number of officers and their percentage in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies..	260
Table 5.13 - Number of officers and their percentage in the Sicilian Army 1848.....	261
Table 5.14 - Number of officers and their percentage in the Roman Republic 1848-49	261
Table 7.1 – The time-table of the infantry corps in the Bourbon Army	305

Table A1.1 Total number of soldiers - Papal Army, 1848-1870.....	473
Table A1.2 Total number of soldiers - Bourbon Army, 1849-1860	473
Table A1.3 Total number of soldiers - Invasion of Savoy 1834	473
Table A1.4 Total number of soldiers - Roman Republic	474
Table A1.5 Total number of soldiers - State of Sicily 1848-1849	474
Table A1.6 Total number of soldiers - <i>garibaldini</i> 1859	475
Table A1.7 Total number of soldiers - Southern Army 1860	475
Table A1.8 Total number of soldiers - <i>garibaldini</i> 1862	475
Table A1.9 Total number of soldiers - <i>garibaldini</i> 1866	475
Table A1.10 Total number of soldiers - <i>garibaldini</i> 1867	475
Table A1.11 Strength of European armies 1848	476
Table A1.12 Strength of European armies 1859	477
Table A1.13 Strength of European armies 1870	478
Table A1.14 Number of officers and their percentage - Kingdom of Sardinia.....	479
Table A1.15 Number of officers and their percentage - Kingdom of the Two Sicilies	480
Table A1.16 Number of officers and their percentage - Papal Army	480
Table A1.17 Number of officers and their percentage - Sicilian Army 1848.....	481
Table A1.18 Number of officers and their percentage - Roman Republic 1848-49	481
Table A1.19 Number of officers and their percentage - Southern Army 1860.....	481
Table A1.20 Number of officers and their percentage - <i>Cacciatori del Tevere</i> – Luigi Masi	482
Table A1.21 Number of officers and their percentage - Foreign corps of the Papal Army ...	483
Table A1.22 Number of officers and their percentage - Other European armies	484
Table A1.23 Number of officers and their percentage - Militia and part-time reserve corps	485
Table A1.24 Noble and bourgeois officers in European armies in the nineteenth century....	486
Table A1.25 Noble and bourgeois generals in European armies in the nineteenth century ..	487
Table A1.26 German officers in the foreign corps of the Papal Army	488
Table A1.27 Entries in the soldiers' registers on the German Officers (7) in the corps of the Papal Zouaves.....	489
Table A1.28 Careers of the German officers in the Zouave corps.....	490
Table A1.29 Entries in the soldiers' registers on the German Officers (21) in the corps of the Papal Foreign Carabineers (21)	492
Table A1.30 Identified German Officers in the Southern Army.....	495
Table A1.31 - Ranks in the Infantry of Italian armed groups	498
Table A1.32 - Corps, number of people and commanders in the regular army of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies (around 1859).....	499
Table A1.33 - Corps, number of people and commanders in the regular army of the Papal States (around 1859).....	500

List of Charts

Chart 5.1 - Germans in Garibaldi's foreign company of 1860: States of birth.....	242
Chart 5.2 - Nationalities of the 7,200 foreign soldiers in the Papal Army in 1870.....	243
Chart 5.3 – Nationalities of the Papal Zouaves 1861—1870	244
Chart 5.4 - Nationalities of the Papal Zouaves 21 September 1870	244
Chart 5.5 - Germans in the Papal Zouaves: States of birth	245
Chart 5.6 - Germans in the Papal Zouaves: States of last residence	246
Chart 5.7 - Germans in the Papal Zouaves: Age upon entry	247
Chart 5.8 - Professions of the German Zouaves.....	248
Chart 5.9 - Germans in the Foreign Carabineers: Countries of birth	250
Chart 5.10 - Germans in the Foreign Carabineers: States of last residence	251
Chart 5.11 - Germans in the Foreign Carabineers: Last place of residence in France	252
Chart 5.12 - Germans in the Foreign Carabineers: Last place of residence in Switzerland...	252
Chart 5.13 – German Carabineers: Most frequent professions	253
Chart 5.14 - Germans in the Foreign Carabineers: Age upon entry	254
Chart 5.15 - Papal Carabineers: Reasons for leaving.....	255
Chart 5.16 - Papal Zouaves: Reasons for leaving	255
Chart 5.17 - Bourbon foreigners' corps: origin of the soldiers captured in the Papal States, 6 January 1861	257
Chart 5.18 - Bourbon foreigners' corps: origin of the German soldiers captured in the Papal States, 6 January 1861	258

List of Images

Image 4.1 – Subscription pamphlet of the Westphalian nobility for the provision of Papal Zouaves, 1867	174
Image 4.2 - Pamphlet addressed to the “German soldiers in the service of King Francis II of Naples”, presumably from August 1860.....	226
Image 5.1. “Calendar of holy soldiers”	264
Image 7.1. Photograph – Papal Training Camp, Rocca di Papa	315
Image 8.1. Maneuver flag of one of the Bourbon foreigners’ regiments, 1859-1860	359
Image 8.2. Uniforms of papal Zouaves	360
Image 8.3 Uniforms of the officers in the Foreign Carabineers and the Papal Zouaves	361
Image 8.4 – Korff’s list of the military works in the library of the German military Casino, Rome ca. 1869.....	367
Image A2.1: Photograph of Bach in his Zouave uniform	504
Image A2.2: Photograph of Bach wearing different medals	506
Image A2.3: Photograph of Franz Xaver von Korff as an officer of the Papal Corps of the Foreign Carabineers	508
Image A2.4: Franz Xaver Graf von Korff with other German Zouaves, ca. 1868	509
Image A2.6: General Kanzler and the General Staff at Anzio, ca. 1862	513
Image A2.7: Photograph of Hermann Kanzler.....	514
Image A2.8: Photograph of Friedrich Wilhelm Rüstow in the Garibaldian “Red Shirt”	518

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1 Introduction

1.1 German soldiers in Italy – between conceptual extremes

Is this a history of volunteers or mercenaries? Of international military careers or specific commitment to Italy? Of Bavarians, Württembergers and Liechtensteiners or of Germans? Of a cosmopolitan community or national groupings? Of revolutionary groups or armies? Of German-Italian attraction or repulsion? Of national or international personality cults? Of an add-on to “national” history or of something distinct and historically relevant? Of European similarities or Italian specificity? A military history from above or one from below?

Are these stories of a tourist or of a military life? Of clashes or friendship? Of foreign or German soldiers? Of pay or sacrifice? Of brotherhood or (blood-)brotherhood of arms? Of officers or soldiers? Of military figures or democrats or democrats as soldiers? Of solidarity between humans or the solidarity of nations?

Is this about war experiences or military experiences? A comparison of the political sides or of the connections between the sides? Is this a brotherhood of Catholic peoples or do we have before us a Catholic universality? Is this mobilization or recruitment? International experience or national experience? Spontaneous movement or organized endeavour? Is this about the bans on foreign recruitment or freedom to enter foreign military service? Previous military experiences or first-time-soldiers? “Germans” imagined as barbarians or disciplined soldiers? Short-term volunteers or long-term professionals? Is this a question of national military histories or transnational military history? Linguistic practices or physical presence? National discourse(s) or a national movement? The Italian example or German images of superiority? European Civil War or national performative wars? Clashes or transfers? Is this a history between armies or a history in armies?

As the cascade of oppositions (many of these, of course, only seem like oppositions) at the beginning of this page tries to synthesize, the history of foreign soldiers – and among them Germans in the Italian armed groups of the Risorgimento between 1830 and 1870 – seems to be caught between a series of extremes. If nothing more, controversy is motivating¹ and

¹ See the emphasis on dialogue and dialectics in Antonio Gramsci, *Letters from prison*, edited by Frank Rosengarten, 2 vols., vol. 1 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 369.

extremes can be an indication that we are dealing with as yet much uncharted terrain. The list above symbolizes some of the main questions that will be addressed in this study. This thesis explores if and to what degree they were really oppositions, whether and to what extent they complemented each other.

In the formative period of the Italian Risorgimento², between the 1830s and 1870, many non-Italians, among which citizens of German states, joined the various Italian armed groups across the political spectrum. Subjects of different European countries (and sometimes beyond) were amongst those that participated in Mazzini's attempt at an "invasion of Savoy" in 1834, became soldiers of the Sicilian State or the Roman Republic in 1848-49, or joined the various Garibaldian undertakings between 1849 and 1867. Throughout this period, foreigners and again Germans, also enlisted on the opposite political side, joining for instance the Armies of the Papal States or the Bourbon Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, or the pro-Bourbon attempts to launch a counter-revolution in the 1860s.

But the question remains: which story should be told about the foreign or German soldiers that joined the armed groups of the Risorgimento? Is it a story of romanticism, of adventure and the desire to see the world? Or was theirs' really a story about the Risorgimento and Anti-Risorgimento as international movements? Perhaps it would be better to write about the European ideological families, the internationals of nationalisms, Catholics and legitimists. Better yet, rather than focusing on the foreign-Italian cases, the attention could be directed toward the life-course of soldiers that served in multiple armies in Europe and beyond, even changing political sides to do so, and in so doing accumulating both enlistment premiums as well as threats of punishment for desertion. Yet another option would be to narrate the biographies of foreign officers in terms of their international military careers, and their participation – particularly when in the higher ranks – in a world of European military notables.

It would be possible to tell a history of international bonds and connections that go beyond those of the nation, a history of crossing borders – hence, from today's perspective at least, a more or less "positive" story. Conversely, this could be a story of transnational clashes

² On the Italian Risorgimento in general see, in English, e.g., the summaries by Derek Beales and Eugenio F. Biagini, *The Risorgimento and the unification of Italy*, 2 ed. (Harlow: Longman, 2002); Christopher Duggan, *The force of destiny. A history of Italy since 1796* (London: Penguin Books, 2008); different historiographical approaches of the study of the Risorgimento are discussed by Lucy Riall, *Risorgimento. The history of Italy from Napoleon to nation-state*, 2 ed. (Houndmills, Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); on its periodization see as well, in French, Gilles Pécout, *Naissance de l'Italie contemporaine (1770-1922)* (Paris: Nathan, 1997); the Italian translation is Gilles Pécout, *Il lungo Risorgimento. La Nascita dell'Italia contemporanea, 1770-1920* (Milan: Mondadori, 1999). See also Alberto Mario Banti, *Il Risorgimento italiano* (Rome; Bari: Laterza, 2004). There is no current general overview on the Risorgimento in German.

and experiences that further delimited and reinforced (national) borders – hence a negative story to our contemporary political sensibilities. Putting aside for a moment the decisive question as to which of the two more adequately reflects historical reality, are not both versions in the end very close in their ultimate “aims”? And is it even possible to tell the one story without the other?

If one looks closely, the last question especially is equally valid for many of the possible directions and histories outlined at the beginning. At this point it would be good to bring a bit of order to these extremes and different stories.

With the history of the Risorgimento, my studies on German and Italian nationalism, and in particular on the national myths surrounding the two as my point of departure, an analysis of the presence of foreigners and especially “Germans” in the Italian armed groups of the Risorgimento seemed on the surface to approach the dimensions of a paradox, given the mobilizing force of national discourse in general, and the Italian nationalists’ image of the Austrians as “tedeschi” in particular.

With regard to the Italian soldiers, at least those on the pre-Unitarian side and more specifically those that fought with Garibaldi, the recent Risorgimento historiography seems to provide a more or less clear explanation that adheres to the general history of nationalisms: The “nationalization of religious references”³, such as self-sacrifice⁴, the metaphor of the family⁵ or the logic of honour⁶, promulgated an individual’s preparedness to die for their fatherland within a context wherein the use of “violence [was] considered morally legitimate”.⁷

As will be shown more in depth in chapter 2, the existence of Italian volunteers seemed to be a direct result of Italian national discourse(s), and their impressive numbers seemed to be one of the clearest proofs of the high penetration and assimilation of national

³ Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Dieter Langewiesche, “Nation und Religion - zur Einführung,” in eadem, eds., *Nation und Religion in der deutschen Geschichte* (Frankfurt a. M.: Campus, 2001), p. 16, this is my own translation. All translations from foreign languages into English herein are mine, if not otherwise indicated in the footnotes.

⁴ See, e.g., Oliver Janz, “Kriegstod und politischer Totenkult in der Neueren Geschichte Italiens,” *Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken* 84 (2004): pp. 360-72.

⁵ Ilaria Porciani, “Disciplinamento nazionale e modelli domestici nel lungo Ottocento. Germania e Italia a confronto,” in Alberto Mario Banti and Paul Ginsborg, eds., *Il Risorgimento*, Storia d'Italia. Annali 22 (Turin: Einaudi, 2007), pp. 100-101.

⁶ Regarding Italy, see first and foremost Alberto Mario Banti, *La nazione del Risorgimento. Parentela, santità e onore alle origini dell'Italia unita* (Turin: Einaudi, 2000); this is extended to other European cases in Alberto Mario Banti, *L'onore della nazione. Identità sessuali e violenza nel nazionalismo europeo dal XVIII secolo alla Grande Guerra* (Turin: Einaudi, 2005); with regard to the German case, see Karen Hagemann, “German Heroes. The Cult of Death for the Fatherland in nineteenth-century Germany,” in eadem, ed., *Masculinities in Politics and War. Gendering Modern History* (Manchester; New York: Manchester United Press, 2004), pp. 116-34.

⁷ Friedrich Wilhelm Graf, *Die Wiederkehr der Götter. Religion in der modernen Kultur* (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2004), p. 19.

discourse – i.e., the “mass movement” against nationalism as a project of the elites only – and/or of the (typically democratic? typically Italian?⁸) idea of war volunteering in pre-Unitarian Italy. Unfortunately, however, these Italian volunteers, though they are considered a type of proof, are not directly addressed in studies on Italian nationalism; they continue to be excluded from the research sets, even as they are in fact more or less central to the respective argumentation.

Traditionally, the nineteenth century has often been presented as a period of the decisive nationalization of European armies: in contrast with former times, the armies of the nineteenth century now seemed to be built principally or even only by national subjects, and furthermore by subjects that – independently from obligatory conscription, where it existed – seemed increasingly willing to serve the nation in this way. That foreigners continued to be present and serve as soldiers in many armies during this century has, until very recently, been overlooked by much of the historiography.⁹ Based on the nationalization-paradigm for the armies of this period, it was, to all effects, assumed that the numbers of foreigners were not significant nor were their stories relevant.

It is only in recent years that the “multinational” composition of “national” armies or the interplay between different national corps in various war campaigns of the nineteenth century – from the Russian campaign of Napoleon¹⁰ to the Crimean War¹¹ and the American Wars¹² – have caught the attention of historians once more. Many of these works adopt a narrative tone, which is one of the explanations for their published “success”. However, it seems that from an analytical perspective much remains to be done on the issue of foreign soldiering in the nineteenth century.

At first it might seem that it would be quite difficult for national discourse to function as an explanation as to why foreign soldiers would enlist in an army that was not their

⁸ Lucy Riall, “Eroi maschili, virilità e forme della guerra,” in Alberto Mario Banti and Paul Ginsborg, eds., *Il Risorgimento, Storia d'Italia. Annali* 22 (Turin: Einaudi, 2007), p. 287; Eva Cecchinato and Mario Isnenghi, “La nazione volontaria,” *ibid.*, p. 697.

⁹ But see Christine G. Krüger and Sonja Levsen, eds., *War volunteering in modern times. From the French Revolution to the Second World War* (Houndmills, Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Nir Arielli and Bruce Collins, eds., *Transnational soldiers. Foreign military enlistment in the modern era* (Houndmills, Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

¹⁰ Adam Zamoyski, *1812. Napoleon's fatal march on Moscow* (London: Harper Perennial, 2005).

¹¹ Orlando Figes, *Crimea. The last crusade* (London et al.: Penguin, 2011); see also Charles C. Bayley, *Mercenaries for the Crimea. The German, Swiss, and Italian Legions in British Service 1854 - 1856* (Montreal et al.: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1977).

¹² See, e.g., Michael Hochgeschwender, “Fág an Bealeagh. Irish volunteers in the American Civil War,” in Christine G. Krüger and Sonja Levsen, eds., *War volunteering in modern times. From the French Revolution to the Second World War* (Houndmills, Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 78-91; Stephan Huck, *Soldaten gegen Nordamerika. Lebenswelten Braunschweiger Subsidientruppen im amerikanischen Unabhängigkeitskrieg* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2011).

national army. The same seems to be true for the Italian and foreign soldiers that joined the politically opposed, legitimist armies and armed groups, among which the Papal and Bourbon Armies as well as the pro-Bourbon “political brigandage” of the 1860s.

This leads us back to the drawing board where we must face once again the black box of “motives”, insofar as many of those elaborated in nationalism studies do not seem to pertain or apply to this scenario. In so doing, a variety of possible motives for joining an army resurface. The extremes are perhaps made most visible by the articles of two authors working in the research group directed by Gilles Pécout on international war volunteering in the nineteenth century¹³: Pécout himself wrote one, and Matteo Sanfilippo the other. According to Pécout, the role of political and romantic driving forces and “collective sentiment in the international public sphere”, therefore ideas of transnational solidarity and friendship, is of paramount importance in the history of foreign soldiers both in and from Italy; having taken this perspective, Pécout considers these soldiers to be “volunteers”.¹⁴ Sanfilippo, instead, asserts that this image in itself is informed by romanticism. Therefore, according to him for more than one foreign soldier – whether it be a Garibaldian or pro-papal fighter – it would be more appropriate to “ask how much he has in common with the pre-modern mercenary or as well with subsequent developments, from the Foreign Legion (founded in 1831) to today’s private corps that add to the governmental armies.”¹⁵

It clearly makes a patent difference whether we are speaking of volunteers, mercenaries or professional soldiers. This is so because this decision to assign one of these concepts to the subject studied, whether or not one is aware of it, leads to taking a stance on: the hierarchy of values that inform the history of the nineteenth century; the hierarchy of factors between social, political and cultural history; the reach of national discourse in the case of the Italian soldiers; the reach of internationalism with regard to the foreigners; and the power of European democrats and liberals and that of the legitimists in mobilizing society in Italy and Europe.

¹³ A first outcome of the research group, of which I too was part, was the publication of a special number of the *Journal of Modern Italian Studies* in 2009. See Gilles Pécout, “The international armed volunteers. Pilgrims of a transnational Risorgimento,” *Journal of Modern Italian Studies* 14, no. 1 (2009): pp. 413-25; Grégoire Bron, “The exiles of the Risorgimento. Italian volunteers in the Portuguese Civil War (1832-34),” *ibid.*, pp. 427-44; Anne-Claire Ignace, “French Volunteers in Italy, 1848-49. A Collective Incarnation of the Fraternity of the Peoples and of the Tradition of French Military Engagement in Italy and Europe,” *ibid.*, pp. 445-60; Simon Sarlin, “Fighting the Risorgimento. Foreign volunteers in southern Italy (1860-63),” *ibid.*, pp. 476-90; Ferdinand Nicolas Göhde, “German volunteers in the armed conflicts of the Italian Risorgimento 1834-70,” *ibid.*: pp. 461-75.

¹⁴ Pécout, “The international armed volunteers,” p. 423.

¹⁵ Matteo Sanfilippo, “Fuggitivi e avventurieri: volontari nord americani tra Garibaldi e Pio IX. Una proposta di ricerca,” *Ricerche di storia politica* 10, no. 1 (2007): pp. 71-72.

The issue of motives is, hence, without doubt one of the central questions that must be addressed in a history of both Italians and foreigners that enlisted on the various Italian sides of the Risorgimento.¹⁶ The underlying reasons for its importance – in the current historiographical context – will be discussed in further detail in the coming chapters.

Some of the possible explanations for the mobilization of foreigners that have actually been advanced concern elements that could function at least as well, if not primarily, at the international level: these range from the international personality cults of Garibaldi¹⁷ or the Pope¹⁸ to the idea that there was perhaps a European Civil War¹⁹ or European Culture Wars²⁰ between revolutionary democrats/liberals and the European counter-revolution of legitimists and (at least a segment of) Catholics; similarly, the economic incentives to enlist in foreign service as well as promises of building military careers across European borders can, as will be discussed in the thesis, still function in the nineteenth century at the international level.

But the history of soldiers, of war volunteers, professional soldiers or mercenaries does not exhaust itself in the question as to “why” they joined the armies, or in the question as to “how” they were mobilized. Whether they enlisted for economic reasons or as a means to continue or begin a military career, whether they had been reached by political and cultural mobilization or less so, the initial motives can inform, but do not determine, the experiences that the soldiers would have in the armed groups; furthermore, the history of armed groups does not exhaust itself in the question as to how their members were recruited. Nor can the same be said with the regard to their application of violence, even if this remains an important

¹⁶ This has been addressed – albeit in varying degrees of intensity – in the most recent publications on foreign soldiers in Italy during the Risorgimento. See Pécout, “The international armed volunteers”; Sarlin, “Fighting the Risorgimento”; Simon Sarlin, *Le légitimisme en armes. Histoire d'une mobilisation internationale contre l'unité italienne* (Rome: École française de Rome, 2013); for a differentiation between three ideal-types of French soldiers, see Ignace, “French Volunteers in Italy”; between different waves of British “volunteers” see instead Marcella Pellegrino Sutcliffe, “British Red Shirts. A History of the Garibaldi Volunteers (1860),” in Nir Arielli and Bruce Collins, eds., *Transnational soldiers. Foreign military enlistment in the modern era* (Houndmills, Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp. 202-18. See for a discussion of these and other contributions Ferdinand Nicolas Göhde, “A new military history of the Italian Risorgimento and Anti-Risorgimento. The case of ‘transnational soldiers,’” *Modern Italy* 19, no. 1 (2014): pp. 21-39.

¹⁷ Lucy Riall, *Garibaldi. Invention of a hero* (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 2007).

¹⁸ Vincent Viaene, “The Roman Question. Catholic mobilisation and papal diplomacy during the pontificate of Pius IX (1846-1878),” in Emiel Lamberts, ed., *The Black International. L'internationale noire. The Holy See and militant catholicism in Europe 1870-1878* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2002), pp. 135-77; Christopher Clark, “The new Catholicism and the European culture wars,” in idem, ed., *Culture wars. Secular-Catholic conflict in nineteenth-Century Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 11-46; Jörg Seiler, “Somatische Solidarität als Moment ultramontaner Kommunikation. Die Inszenierung der Körperlichkeit Pius IX. in der Rottenburger Bistumszeitung,” *Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Religions- und Kulturgeschichte* 101, no. 207 (2007): pp. 77-107.

¹⁹ For the discussion of the concept within the context of the Italian wars during the period of the Risorgimento see p. 43.

²⁰ Christopher Clark, *Culture wars. Secular-Catholic conflict in nineteenth-century Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

aspect of the functions of the army. From a historical point of view, armed groups are much more than a mere instrument for the continuation of politics with other means (to cite for the umpteenth time Carl von Clausewitz), and the time an individual passes in the army can transform and change him more than the act of teaching him or her to fight and kill. And once the question of motives has been examined and somewhat resolved, our attentions may turn toward the sphere of soldierly experiences.

1.2 A comparative history of the Germans on the different Italian sides

The object of this study are the German soldiers²¹ that between 1834 and 1870 were part of different armed groups in Italy: From the “invasion of Savoy” in 1834 to the armies of the Roman Republic in 1849 and the various Garibaldian armed groups between 1849 and 1867, and also the Bourbon Army up to 1860, the pro-Bourbon “political brigandage” of the 1860s and the Papal Army up to 1870. For the purposes of this study, Germans are those individuals that were born and/or grew up in one of the states of the German Confederation (Deutscher Bund) excluding Austria.²²

The main time frame²³ of the study (1834-1870) connects the episode in which the “brotherhood of peoples” concept was put into practice at the military level when the Mazzinian Young Europe was called to action in 1834 with the last (merely symbolic) military defence of the Papal States in September 1870. The latter – together with the dismantlement of the army of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies in 1860 – marked the end of foreigners’ regiments in nineteenth-century Italy that had noticeable German presences. The year 1870 also constitutes a decisive break – from the German point of view – in the history of the *garibaldini*, when, as it is well-known, some of them left Italy to join the French side in the French-Prussian war.²⁴

The case in which Germans served as soldiers in Italian armies seems to be particularly intriguing in various regards. Immediately, the negative mutual stereotypes of the “*tedeschi*” in Italy and the “*Romanen*” in Germany come to mind. Concurrently, certain communalities and parallels specifically between Germany and Italy were already being noted

²¹ On the different available terms for the “fighter” and the choice of the word “soldiers” in this study, see pp. 84 and 279.

²² For a more in-depth discussion of the possible definitions, see p. 55.

²³ Of course this time frame has proved to be too narrow or too broad depending on the arguments touched upon in this study; therefore, the study will necessarily extend or contract the time frame of reference according to the context treated.

²⁴ See, e.g., Eva Cecchinato, *Camicie rosse. I garibaldini dall'Unità alla Grande Guerra* (Rome; Bari: Laterza, 2007), pp. 134-148.

at the time; at times the one or the other were considered the example that could and should be followed respectively by the one or the other.²⁵

This German-Italian study necessarily sheds light on other levels of analysis as well, among which the military history of the pre-Unitarian Italian armed groups and the history of foreigners enlisted in these groups²⁶, the reason being is that the specificity of the German-Italian case can only be evaluated by integrating these levels through additional comparisons. The participation of Germans and other foreigners²⁷ on the various Italian sides during the Risorgimento wars is, in turn, but one example of the wider phenomenon of participation in foreign wars during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. By concentrating on one national-Italian case, it was possible to delimit the parameters of the study to a specific group of soldiers, and in so doing allowed me to gather and study quantitative data in far more depth than would have otherwise been possible.

Despite brief mentions in the literature of single German figures fighting on the different sides in Italy²⁸, the history of these German soldiers has never before been written; therefore, their exact numbers have yet to be determined, and their placements in the military corps and their experiences have still to be analysed.

This study brings together different strands of historiographical inquiry. The history of the German soldiers in the Italian armies will be examined within the context of the history of foreign soldiering of previous and subsequent centuries. A social history of the German soldiers on the different Italian sides in terms of economic rewards, officer-soldier relationships, professionalization, and differences as well as developments in training will be

²⁵ See p. 54.

²⁶ Regarding French volunteers in the corps of the Papal Zouaves, see Jean Guénel, *La dernière guerre du pape. Les zouaves pontificaux au secours du Saint-Siège 1860-1870* (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 1998); regarding mostly its American and Canadian volunteers, see instead Charles A. Coulombe, *The pope's legion. The multinational fighting force that defended the Vatican* (Houndmills, Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); as for its Dutch volunteers, see Wim Zaal, *De vuist van de paus. De Nederlandse zouaven en het einde van de Kerkelijke Staat 1860-1870* (Nieuwegein: Aspekt, 1996); Petra van Essen, *Voor paus en koning. Een korte geschiedenis van de Nederlandse zouaven 1860-1870* (Oudenbosch: Stichting Nederlands Zouavenmuseum, 1998); see as well Jan Willem Rozema, 'Op, Neerlands jeugd! Naar't heilig, heilig Rome!' *Een studie naar enkele demografische kenmerken van de Nederlandse pauselijke zouaven 1860-1870*, unpublished master's thesis in 'History of International Relations and Global History', Erasmus University Rotterdam, Faculty of History and Science of Art, August 2010 (supervisor: Prof. Hein Klemann). For the North American soldiers that fought for the Pope and Garibaldi, see Sanfilippo, "Fuggitivi e avventurieri: volontari nord americani tra Garibaldi e Pio IX. Una proposta di ricerca," pp. 67-77; for French volunteers in the Revolution of 1848/49 see Ignace, "French volunteers in Italy"; on the European officers of the pro-Bourbon activities of the 1860s see Sarlin, "Fighting the Risorgimento"; Sarlin, *Légitimisme en armes*; for the British *garibaldini* see Pellegrino Sutcliffe, "British Red Shirts".

²⁷ Krüger and Levsen, *War Volunteering*; Arielli and Collins, *Transnational Soldiers*.

²⁸ Wolfgang Altgeld, "Giuseppe Garibaldi in zeitgenössischer Sicht von der Verteidigung Roms bis zur Niederlage bei Mentana (1848-1867)," *Risorgimento. Europäische Zeitschrift für die neuere Geschichte Italiens* 3 (1982): pp. 169-99; Anna Maria Isastia, "Volontari provenienti dall'estero nell'esercito di Vittorio Emanuele II," *Bollettino della Domus Mazziniana* 36, no. 2 (1990): pp. 135-49.

connected to the substantial historiographical fields of the new history of the Risorgimento²⁹, the historiography on nineteenth-century nationalisms³⁰, and the history of international and transnational connections in the same period.³¹ The comparative integration into this study of the Germans enlisted in the Papal and Bourbon Armies also mirrors a rising interest in the history of the “victims”, i.e. the supposed “opponents” of the Risorgimento, that has been fuelled by the anti-Risorgimento polemics in the Italian public today as well as the tendency to overlook these portions of nineteenth-century society in much of the traditional Risorgimento historiography.³² Finally, by concentrating on the motives and experiences of German members of Italian *armed groups*³³, this study, more than other studies, places itself within the context of a culturally revived “new military history” that since the 1980s has begun to flourish³⁴ by analysing the ways in which the soldier experiences his life in the military, his day-to-day life, and how his experiences were informed by general social and cultural structures and by the specificities of the military life-world, and therein pays careful attention to the issue of gender and conceptions of “masculinities”.³⁵ Differently from other publications on comparable cases this study also aims not only to provide – as difficult as it was at times to gather this data – quantitative information on the foreign (and among them German) soldiers, but to make a comparison of these numbers with those available for other countries and armies between the eighteenth and twentieth centuries, as well as make an in-depth analysis of issues such as pay, housing or the question of military careers and advancement with regard to the *whole* Italian political spectrum. The comparison of the soldier groups on the various sides (pre-Unitarian armies, “Party of Action”) should help to

²⁹ See from the substantial literature only Silvana Patriarca and Lucy Riall, eds., *The Risorgimento Revisited. Nationalism and Culture in Nineteenth-Century Italy* (Houndmills, Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); see the discussion on p. 82.

³⁰ The literature is so comprehensive that it cannot be presented here; see as more recent overviews for instance Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *Nationalismus. Geschichte - Formen - Folgen* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2001); Rolf-Ulrich Kunze, *Nation und Nationalismus* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2005); Siegfried Weichlein, *Nationalbewegungen und Nationalismus in Europa* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2006).

³¹ For a transnational history of the Risorgimento, see the recent special number of the journal *Modern Italy*, edited and introduced by Oliver Janz and Lucy Riall, "Special issue. The Italian Risorgimento. Transnational Perspectives. Introduction," *Modern Italy* 19, no. 1 (2014): pp. 1-4.

³² For an overview, see John A. Davis, "L'Antirisorgimento," in Mario Isnenghi and Eva Cecchinato, eds., *Fare l'Italia. Unità e disunità nel Risorgimento*, Gli italiani in guerra. Conflitti, identità, memorie dal Risorgimento ai nostri giorni, vol. 1 (Turin: UTET, 2008), pp. 753-69.

³³ For reasons that will be discussed later, I have consciously chosen to write a military and not a war history of the German soldiers in Italy; see the discussion of both p. 80.

³⁴ See p. 80.

³⁵ See for instance Robert W. Connell, *Masculinities*, 2 ed., (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005); Christopher E. Forth, *Masculinity in the modern West. Gender, civilization and the body* (Houndmills, Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Wolfgang Schmale, *Geschichte der Männlichkeit in Europa, 1450-2000* (Vienna; Cologne; Weimar: Böhlau, 2003); Jürgen Martschukat and Olaf Stieglitz, *Geschichte der Männlichkeiten* (Frankfurt am Main; New York: Campus, 2008).

reveal whether similar elements were in operation or whether the divergent ideological components of the sides were linked to differing motives for enlistment and/or, significantly, other German-Italian or military experiences.³⁶

1.3 Parts and chapters, sources and methods

The study is divided into three parts and nine chapters. The first part is comprised of the second chapter, which develops the guiding questions of this study and the research contexts within which it is placed. Chapter 2 discusses the choices that had to be made over the course of the research and the principal definitions from which the study set out to investigate the history of German soldiers. It then places the Italian case(s) in a more comparative European context. Lastly, the chapter will present in a more substantiated manner the main corpuses of historical sources used in the various chapters of this study and the ways in which they have been analysed.

The second part of the study comprises chapters 3 to 6, which examine the “why” and the “how” of the enlistment of German soldiers; it does so by discussing the different aspects of the German soldiers’ mobilization, recruitment and motives for joining an Italian armed group.

Specifically, chapter 3 enquires into the actual efficacy and reach of political and cultural mobilization between traditional and modern forms of legitimization and political communication across the political spectrum. It discusses the ideas surrounding the creation of “German Legions” for Italy as well as the contemporary concepts of transnational solidarity as they were used by democrats and Catholics alike. The chapter makes use of published and unpublished sources dealing with German democrats, Catholics and legitimists. Namely, the protocols of the assemblies of the German Catholic associations between the middle of the century and 1870 are analysed in order to understand the ways in which the issue of papal defence and the Papal Army was treated at the time by these groups; other Catholic publications, such as translations of novels, pamphlets and public speeches are equally taken into account here. These sources also contained information on how the mobilization and recruitment of Germans for the papal cause were more concretely organized in terms of specifically dedicated associations and subscription campaigns intended to augment the enlistments into the Papal Army. In some instances, the material preserved in the

³⁶ “[...A] comparative approach helps render the invisible visible; it aids us in questioning our own generalizations”, writes Green in Nancy Green, “Forms of Comparison,” in Deborah Cohen and Maura O’Connor, eds., *Comparison and History. Europe in Cross-National Perspective*, (New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 42.

regional archives in Germany was such that it was possible to study more in depth several of these associations and their work to recruit for the Papal Army.³⁷ With regard to the opposite political side, recruitment activities are researched by using unpublished material contained in the personal papers of two individuals in particular: Johann Philipp Becker³⁸ and Friedrich-Wilhelm Rüstow.³⁹ By looking at these sources, it is possible to see the specific ways in which, in the papal case, cultural and political mobilization, official recruitment structures, private associations and economic reasons to enlist were in fact intertwined, but hindered as well by the legal obstacles put in place against the recruitment efforts for foreign military service. Similarly, the activities of the German democratic sphere will be discussed by having a look at the letters exchanged between Becker and Rüstow with Giuseppe Mazzini, Giuseppe Garibaldi and others.

Chapter 3 not only follows the “brotherhood of peoples” up to the peace-movement of the later nineteenth century, it also shows how this concept began to spread beyond the democratic sphere in which it had for the most part been created and used; publications of German Catholicism were very useful to this end. The chapter then examines how in the military context the concept of the “brotherhood of peoples” was connected to ideas of a “brotherhood of arms”, “blood-brotherhood”, small-group cohesion and “comradeship”; the use of these concepts in the reports and writings of German soldiers across the Italian political spectrum will be analysed; and an examination of legal sources and texts written by Giuseppe Garibaldi will be made to evaluate the influences from “above” on these concepts and practices.

Chapter 4 analyses the actual methods and procedures put in place for recruitment to the Italian armed groups. It shows the significant developments that occurred in terms of the bans German states placed on the foreign enlistment of their subjects by making a comparison of legal sources from the various German states. The chapter then goes on to identify the role of the recruitment of foreigners within the context of the general modes of recruitment used by the armies of the Italian states. The tension between the *international* traditions of the nobility and the process of professionalization within the history of the (foreign) *officer* is explored, as is the connection between professionalization and the international mobility of officers. To do so, a comparative analysis was carried out of career requirements, systems of

³⁷ Archiv des Landschaftsverbands Rheinland, Düsseldorf; Landschaftsverband Westfalen-Lippe, Archivamt, Münster; Vereinigte Westfälische Adelsarchive, Münster.

³⁸ Some of the original papers in the Archiv der sozialen Demokratie, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn; I made use of the photostatic copies of papers in Bonn the originals of which may be found in the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History in Moscow.

³⁹ Dichter- und Stadtmuseum Liestal, Canton Basle-City, Switzerland.

advancements and education levels, and especially the specific ways in which the Italian armed groups enabled the continuation of military careers begun elsewhere. To be able to evaluate the possible attractiveness of economic rewards and their effect on the decision to join the Italian armed groups, a comparative analysis is conducted of the economic foundations of the foreign soldierly commitment, in order to assess the conditions on the different political sides. The economic conditions are also compared between foreigners and Italians, revealing that the traditionally differing economic treatment of the foreign soldier compared to the so-called “indigenous” soldier and officer informed polemics not only between Italian and foreign soldiers on the same political side but also between the political sides. Finally, pamphlets, decrees and soldiers’ reports are used in the last subchapter to analyse the reciprocal head-hunting between the political sides and changes of sides; this analysis revealed not only that side-changing happened more frequently than is normally acknowledged, but that both economic and political elements were used to incite the soldier to change sides in the conflict or even just military corps within the same armed group.

Chapter 5 presents the outcomes of the statistical analysis of the data on the German soldiers and officers extracted from the soldiers’ registers. Aside from providing numerical counts of foreign and German soldiers and officers on the different Italian sides, the chapter proceeds to analyse the data using as a guideline several leading questions: for example, the social origin of the soldiers in terms of age, previous professions, and regional origin; the frequency and nature of previous tours of duty in other armies and the actual amount of time served in Italy; the reasons noted for leaving the respective Italian armies. This information is then used to make a comparison of the different corps within each army. The chapter closes with a more in-depth characterization of the German *officers* on the various sides that is based on their biographies.

Chapter 6 goes on to examine the complex issue of motivation of the soldiers from another point of view, namely it concentrates on the opposition between war volunteers and mercenaries, which informs contemporary polemics and places the two on the opposite extremes of the spectrum in the historiographical analysis of the foreign soldiers in Italy in the Risorgimento.

The chapter brings together a discussion of problems of proof of motives both in historiography and (motivational) psychology with the results of the statistical analysis and biographical cases. By doing so the chapter argues that the two concepts fundamentally stand against a more pluralized conception of motivation which instead seems more adequate in many cases.

The third part of the thesis (i.e. chapters 7 and 8) drifts away from issues of motivation and reasons to enlist, and focuses instead on the experiences of the German soldiers during the time they served in the various Italian armed groups. Specifically, chapter 7 describes the daily life of the soldier and the types of “work” he was required to carry out, and it compares the Papal, Bourbon and Garibaldian armed groups in terms of training, military punishment and disciplinization as well as officer-soldier relationships. Based on the presentation of legal sources and the ensuing discussion on their importance for the general practices observed in the different armed groups, as reported in the soldiers’ accounts, the chapter argues in favour of adopting a more nuanced picture than that of a fundamental opposition of military cultures between the political sides. Lastly, the chapter assesses the differences between officers and common soldiers, and it delves into the history of concepts such as comrade, companion and brother as they were used within the specific context of the Italian armies of the nineteenth century by examining the soldiers’ own reports of their time spent in Italy as well as the written and applied military regulations.

Chapter 8 analyses how the experiences of the foreign, and specifically the German soldiers, were informed by partially conflicting, partially overlapping loyalties to their chosen Italian sovereign (or, *mutatis mutandis*, Garibaldi) and corresponding political party, to their own military corps and finally to their regional and/or national groups. By integrating the soldiers’ reports with questions regarding visibility, international as well as national military infrastructures – such as military chaplains and national military casinos – the chapter enquires to what extent the experiences of the German soldiers in Italy broke up or (re-)confirmed their national grouping. By examining actual German-Italian transfers and providing a more in depth analysis of the example of military Gymnastics, the chapter concludes by asking what the historical relevance of the German soldiers’ presence was in the Italian armed groups and the ways in which they formed an important element in the context of a specifically “military Risorgimento”.

With this brief outline of the thesis, I conclude my introduction. But before actually presenting the results of the research it is necessary that I contextualize it, present the underlying reasoning, the rationale. Otherwise, it would not be clear from whence my story comes, and how, where and why it diverges from the many other engaging narratives that have been told by other authors in this field.

Part 1 – The research: the context

2 A military history of Germans in Italian armed groups

2.1 The nationalization of European armies and the continued presence of foreign soldiers

Whatever the definition in each specific context, the presence of “foreigners” – however defined in the specific context – in European armies since the early modern period is not a new topic: the bibliography is particularly sizeable, even if overviews and comparative discussions are lacking.⁴⁰

2.1.1 The French Revolution a watershed?

In some of the older literature, the idea that the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars was the decisive watershed in the history of the foreign soldier still persists: In the previous period, the foreign “mercenary” was considered a “normal” figure in European armies. Fuelled as well by the historiographical “fashion” of the time, economic interpretations continued to take centre stage in the study of foreign soldiers during the 1950s and 1960s.⁴¹ Whether or not it was intended, these studies were basically concurrent with the “stereotype” of the pre-revolutionary “mercenary” – the defining characteristics being they were foreign and enlisted for pay – that had already been consolidated by the end of the eighteenth century.⁴² The French Revolution, instead, was seen to have led to the “nationalization” of armies, both in terms of the origin of soldiers and the motivation of these last; the presence of foreign soldiers in the “nationalized” militaries even after this period was mostly “overlooked” mostly ignored, because it did not conform to this military history narrative.

At least until 1815, the percentages of foreigners in the European armies were sizeable. In the Prussian military, for instance, the percentage of non-Prussian subjects varied between 66% in 1743, 50% in 1786⁴³ and 36.6% in 1802.⁴⁴ These Prussian numbers,

⁴⁰ At least two recent volumes regard foreign soldiering in the nineteenth century; one is entirely dedicated to “transnational soldiers”, and the other contains several articles on foreign soldiers. The first volume is Arielli and Collins, *Transnational Soldiers*; the second, Krüger and Levsen, *War volunteering*. These two publications also provide a bibliography containing recent publications on the respective cases under examination.

⁴¹ See, e.g., Victor G. Kiernan, “Foreign mercenaries and absolute monarchy,” *Past & Present* 11, no. 1 (1957): pp. 66-86, or Fritz Redlich, *The German military enterpriser and his work force. A study in European economic and social history* (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1965).

⁴² Michael Sikora, “Söldner. Historische Annäherung an einen Kriegertypus,” *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 29, no. 2 (2003): pp. 210-39; Michael Sikora, *Disziplin und Desertion. Strukturprobleme militärischer Organisation im 18. Jahrhundert* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1996), pp. 302-303. See the discussion on the concepts of “volunteer” and “mercenary” within the context of the nineteenth century on p. 271.

⁴³ These numbers are provided by Janice E. Thomson, *Mercenaries, pirates, and sovereigns. State-building and extraterritorial violence in early modern Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 29. The

however, are noticeably greater than those of other armies in the same period: In Spain, the numbers of enlisted foreigners were 25% in 1751 and 14% in 1799⁴⁵; in the Austrian army of the mid-eighteenth century approximately 20% of the soldiers were of foreign origin;⁴⁶ the number of non-Britons in the British army varied between 38% in the 1760s, 32% in 1778 and 20% in 1813 and 1816, while in France, 25% of all soldiers were foreign between 1756-1763. This number fell slightly to 22% in 1789⁴⁷, but rose to nearly 50% in the Grande Armée of 1812.⁴⁸ A decisive problem with these percentages regards, of course, the definition of the term “foreigner”. In the definition used in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, all those who were not subjects of the respective state were considered foreigners,⁴⁹ and as such they figure in the aforementioned statistics. Hence, soldiers from neighbouring areas as well as those from further away were considered “foreigners”. Peter H. Wilson, for instance, has shown that in the German armies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, their “foreign” soldiers frequently came from the empire, “from neighbouring counties and imperial cities”.⁵⁰

While statistics on foreigners in European armies after 1815 are rather scarce, they are available for this previous period, even if the definition of the term “foreigner” is somewhat

number indicating that 56% of the military were foreigners in 1786 is provided by Christopher Clark, *Iron kingdom. The rise and downfall of Prussia 1600 - 1947* (London et al.: Allen Lane, 2006), p. 306.

⁴⁴ Huck, *Soldaten gegen Nordamerika. Lebenswelten Braunschweiger Subsidientruppen im amerikanischen Unabhängigkeitskrieg*, p. 88. On the need for foreign soldiers within the context of the Prussian recruitment system see Willerd R. Fann, "Foreigners in the Prussian Army 1713-56. Some Statistical and Interpretive Problems," *Central European History* 23, no. 1 (1990): pp. 476-87.

⁴⁵ Thomson, *Mercenaries*, p. 29.

⁴⁶ Sikora, *Disziplin und Desertion*, p. 297; Michael Sikora, "Das 18. Jahrhundert. Zeit der Deserteure," in idem and Ulrich Bröckling, eds., *Armeen und ihre Deserteure. Vernachlässigte Kapitel einer Militärgeschichte der Neuzeit* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1998), p. 92.

⁴⁷ Thomson, *Mercenaries*, p. 29.

⁴⁸ Kevin Linch, "The politics of foreign recruitment in Britain during the French revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars," in Nir Arieli and Bruce Collins, eds., *Transnational soldiers. Foreign military enlistment in the modern Era* (Houndmills, Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp. 54 and 56. For the complex history of foreign soldiers and foreigners' corps in the Napoleonic army see Jean-François Brun, "Les unités étrangères dans les armées napoléoniennes. Un élément de la stratégie globale du Grand Empire," *Revue historique des armées*, no. 255 (2009): pp. 22-49. This article is part of one of two, chronologically overlapping thematic issues of the *Revue historique des armées* on foreigners in the French army – no. 255 from 2009 deals mainly with the period up to the First World War, no. 265 from 2011 addresses the period from 1870 onwards. See as well the thematic issues dedicated to the bilateral military history between France and single European countries.

⁴⁹ See already Ernst Opgenoorth, *'Ausländer' in Brandenburg-Preussen als leitende Beamte und Offiziere 1604 - 1871* (Würzburg: Holzner, 1967), p. 7. The question of who was effectively considered and counted as a foreigner in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is of course far more complex than can be traced here, precisely because the first moves toward the creation of a modern, “national” citizenship were being taken right around this time: The state was expanding its legal reach into its territory, and had begun to appropriate the traditional prerogative of the communes, i.e. townships, to define “insiders” and “outsiders”, by trend inverting the relationship between domicile and membership as a means to strengthen the importance of the latter. See, e. g., Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press, 1992); on the pre-“national” roots of citizenship, not only but especially in Prussia, see pp. 53-72.

⁵⁰ Peter H. Wilson, "The politics of military recruitment in eighteenth century Germany," *English Historical Review* 117, no. 472 (2002): p. 539.

problematic. This is not astonishing, considering the “nationalization” of the armies in terms of recruitment and origin of the soldiers was often taken for granted. More precise numbers are sometimes available only with regard to the colonial branches of the armies. In the Dutch colonial army for instance, the percentage of foreigners was about 40% between 1831 and 1909.⁵¹

For the home armies often we do not have these numbers. However, based on some in-depth studies of *officer* corps in nineteenth century armies, it is possible to detect a tendency, at least.⁵² According to Gundula Gahlen, who analysed a sample of approximately 10% of all Bavarian officers between 1823 and 1866, 9.1% of the *officers* in this period were not born in Bavaria. Many of the “foreign” officers, however, came from the German Confederation excluding Austria, and only 3.3% were from Austria or non-German states (most of which were from France). Gahlen notes a clear decline in the numbers of non-Bavarian officers from 1836 onwards, for which only 4% of the officers were of non-Bavarian origin by 1866 for instance.⁵³ Karl-Heinz Lutz has identified a similar trend in the percentages of foreign officers with regard to Baden. He has specified the percentages for different ranks of officers, which nevertheless exhibit a similar trend; the number of foreign officers dropped from double-digit percentages in the 1830s and 1840s to around 5% by the 1850s and 1860s.⁵⁴ Only with regard to the cavalry (14.3% in 1854 down to 12.7% in 1868) and staff officers (60% in 1834 down to 7.14% in 1869) does Lutz note decisively higher percentages of non-Baden officers. The numbers regarding Baden staff officers reflects the Bavarian findings, and also those for Baden, Württemberg and Hessen-Darmstadt, that there was a comparatively high percentage of foreigners among the generals. In Bavaria between 1815 and 1870, 51.7% of generals were non-Bavarians, 17% of which were not German.⁵⁵

When all of this information is considered together, it is possible to observe that while percentages of foreigners in European armies were still quite elevated in the eighteenth

⁵¹ Martin Bossenbroek, "Dickköpfe und Leichtfüße". Deutsche im niederländischen Kolonialdienst des 19. Jahrhunderts," in Klaus J. Bade, ed., *Deutsche im Ausland - Fremde in Deutschland. Migration in Geschichte und Gegenwart* (Munich: Beck, 1992), pp. 251 and 253.

⁵² The statistical information on Austrian officership, especially in the early twentieth century, provided by Deák is of no use to this study: Due to the exceptionally multinational make-up of the Austrian empire, the percentages on the respective “mother tongue” of the officers cannot give a clear indication as to which officers are truly “foreign”. See the numbers for the officers as well as those for the rank and file, based on the same definition of “first language” in István Deák, *Beyond nationalism. A social and political history of the Habsburg Officer Corps 1848-1918* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), especially pp. 178-187.

⁵³ Gundula Gahlen, *Das bayerische Offizierskorps 1815 - 1866* (Paderborn et al.: Schöningh, 2011), pp. 266, 269 and 612.

⁵⁴ Karl-Heinz Lutz, *Das badische Offizierskorps 1840 - 1870/71* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1997), pp. 69, 71, 73, 84-87.

⁵⁵ Gahlen, *Offizierskorps*, pp. 274-5.

century, a downward trend occurs for which it is possible to conclude that a process of "nationalization" of the armies took place, but this happened particularly from the 1830s and 1840s onwards, hence some decades later than the French Revolution. While Prussia was "precocious" with regard to this development – insofar as this came about directly following the decision to end foreign recruitment within the context of universal military service, a measure that was introduced in 1813⁵⁶ – the decisive reduction of foreign soldiers in most of the other European armies happened some decades later. From a quantitative perspective, this clearly calls into question the "traditional military history narrative" which identifies the "French Revolution as an important turning point in the 'nationalization' of military service."⁵⁷ Not only did the actual "nationalization" of many armies take place decades later than was often assumed, but many armies continued to have a certain percentage of foreign soldiers well into the twentieth century. Thus, the regular European armies remained "multinational", even if to a reduced degree compared to former centuries. The history of these foreign soldiers, however, has mostly been neglected. An exception is perhaps the historiography on the French Foreign Legion, which continues to be caught between opposing "positive" and "negative" views.⁵⁸ Other cases of "foreign" regiments and foreign soldiers in "regular" state armies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are already studied far less.⁵⁹ One example of this is the case of the British foreign legions in the Crimean War. After a highly controversial parliamentary and public debate, Britain, in desperate need for fresh soldiers in the Crimean War, issued a "Foreign Enlistment Bill"⁶⁰ in 1854, the aim of which was to form its own "foreign legion". Negative diplomatic responses from Switzerland and Germany on the basis of existing Swiss and German prohibitions of recruitment of their nationals on the part of foreign nations, resulted in acts of "unofficial recruitment" on the part of British authorities in these states. In the end, three legions were formed: the "British German Legion", the "British Swiss Legion" and the "British Italian Legion".⁶¹ Some 7,000

⁵⁶ Opgenoorth, *Ausländer*, p. 77.

⁵⁷ Nir Arielli and Bruce Collins, "Introduction. Transnational military service since the eighteenth century," in eidem, eds., *Transnational soldiers. Foreign military enlistment in the modern era* (Houndmills, Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. 1.

⁵⁸ See from the broad literature, e. g., Douglas Porch, *The French Foreign Legion. A complete history of the legendary fighting force* (Skyhorse Publishing: New York, 2010); Christian Koller, "Recruitment policies and recruitment experiences in the French Foreign Legion," in Nir Arielli and Bruce Collins, eds., *Transnational soldiers. Foreign military enlistment in the modern era* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp. 87-104.

⁵⁹ But see the contributions in the very stimulating anthology Arielli and Collins, *Transnational soldiers*.

⁶⁰ Not to be confounded with the "Foreign Enlistment Acts" issued in 1819 and 1870, which instead forbade the recruitment of British nationals into foreign armies.

⁶¹ Bayley, *Mercenaries for the Crimea*.

soldiers of the German and Swiss Legions were eventually sent to Üsküdar near Istanbul, but “they were too late to join the fighting in the Crimea.”⁶²

2.1.2 Studied cases of foreign soldiering: Philhellenism, International Brigades etc.

Historiography has focused mainly on cases in which foreign soldiering seemed at least to be more or less independent from the “regular” armies of the state and has almost entirely overlooked foreign soldiering in the regular armies of the states themselves. Some studies are basically confined to naming single, hitherto rather neglected cases of foreign soldiers. At times they provide a valuable foundation for more in-depth future research, one example being the case of the foreigners that fought on the different sides of Mexican history between 1810 and 1867.⁶³

The bulk of studies, however, has concentrated on a series of more well known cases: especially Philhellenism and the International Brigades in the Spanish Civil War.

Many of the studies that have been carried out see “Philhellenism” in terms of a “cultural” movement⁶⁴, while fewer studies have specifically focused on foreign soldiering in Greece as such. The more than 200 German soldiers that moved to Greece in 1821 and 1822 have been studied by Regine Quack-Eustathiades in research that also used the “memoirs” written by the subjects immediately following their Greek deployment. Her work brings to light the plurality of motives underlying the soldiers’ actual enlistment as well as the negative picture of Greece that they carried away with them.⁶⁵ Gilles Pécout, drawing on similar sources, has instead focused on Italian Philhellenism, describing a continuity that linked the Italian philhellenic combatants of the 1820s with the Italian philhellene volunteers of 1897

⁶² Figes, *Crimea*, p. 334.

⁶³ For research on the careers of several officers from German states on the different sides, see Josefina Zoraida Vázquez, “Soldados alemanes en las huestes santanistas,” *Jahrbuch für Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas* 25 (1998): pp. 415-36. For a more sound discussion of the terminology (mercenaries, filibusters, adventurers etc.), see the study on European soldiers in the liberal armies of Mexico by Lawrence Douglas Taylor Hanson, “Voluntarios extranjeros en los ejércitos liberales mexicanos 1854-1867,” *Historia Mexicana* 37, no. 2 (1987): pp. 205-37.

⁶⁴ See Christoph Hauser, *Anfänge bürgerlicher Organisation. Philhellenismus und Frühliberalismus in Südwestdeutschland* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990); Suzanne L. Marchand, *Down from Olympus. Archaeology and Philhellenism in Germany 1750-1970* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Evangelos Konstantinou, *Die Rezeption der Antike und der europäische Philhellenismus* (Frankfurt am Main et al.: Lang, 1998); Natalie Klein, *‘L’humanité, le christianisme, et la liberté’. Die internationale philhellenische Vereinsbewegung der 1820er Jahre* (Mainz: von Zabern, 2000); Michel Espagne and Gilles Pécout, eds., *Philhellénismes et transferts culturels dans l’Europe du XIXe siècle* (Paris: CNRS Éd., 2005), especially the contributions of Michel Espagne, “Le philhellénisme entre philologie et politique. Un transfert franco-allemand,” in Michel Espagne and Gilles Pécout, eds., *Philhellénismes et transferts culturels dans l’Europe du XIXe siècle* (Paris: CNRS Éd., 2005), pp. 61-75 and Gilles Pécout, “Amitié littéraire et amitié politique méditerranéennes. Philhellènes français et italiens de la fin du XIXe siècle,” *ibid.*, pp. 207-18

⁶⁵ Regine Quack-Eustathiades, *Der deutsche Philhellenismus während des griechischen Freiheitskampfes 1821-1827* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1984).

(the Red-shirts of Ricciotti Garibaldi) through cases of Greek “Philhellenism” in the ranks of Garibaldi’s army. Compared to Quack-Eustathiades, Pécout places more emphasis on the importance of more circumscribed “political passions” as the primary motivation of the volunteers. These passions “came”, according to Pécout, “in three different degrees of intensity: a humanitarian solidarity that was imbued with the spirit of 1848, a radical internationalism and a proletarian socialism that focused on the question of a popular army.”⁶⁶ He also addresses a research controversy regarding the different models of Greece between Europe and the Orient, acknowledging the “orientalizing” gaze many of the foreigners turned on Greece. This, however, was not necessarily in opposition to the idea of “a common renaissance of the Mediterranean peoples of Europe”, insofar as politics were, according to Pécout, more important for the volunteers than the controversy regarding the “ancient” Greeks.⁶⁷

The history of foreign soldiers in European armies did not end with the nineteenth century. A period that has been subject to much study is the Spanish Civil War between 1936 and 1939. It is fair to say that the “International Brigades” still hold a high level of fascination for scholars, and arouse a “popular and scholarly attention far beyond that which their numbers might appear to warrant.”⁶⁸ To prevent an excessively reductive “political” picture of these Brigades, however, some recent studies have underlined “the often complex motivations of those who volunteered”.⁶⁹ Josie McLellan, for instance, makes a distinction between the decision to volunteer and “combat motivation” and shows how the latter was not only complex in itself, but also tended to change during deployment.⁷⁰ Nir Arielli argues that the “push”-factors, such as the wish to leave states where communism was under heavy attack, and not just the (ideological) “pull” factors ought to be considered.⁷¹ Arielli also studies other aspects than individual motivation as well; in his work, he underlines the crucial importance of organizational structures, by stating that “the assistance of other individuals and organizations was almost always necessary. Such an approach inevitably deconstructs the romantic view of self-determined young men (and women, in smaller numbers), who moved

⁶⁶ Gilles Pécout, “Philhellenism in Italy. Political friendship and the Italian volunteers in the mediterranean in the nineteenth century,” *Journal of Modern Italian Studies* 9, no. 4 (2004): p. 420.

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 410.

⁶⁸ Josie McLellan, “ ‘I wanted to be a little Lenin’. Ideology and the German International Brigade volunteers,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 41, no. 2 (2006): p. 288.

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 288.

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 291.

⁷¹ Nir Arielli, “Getting there. Enlistment considerations and the recruitment networks of the International Brigades during the Spanish Civil War,” in idem and Bruce Collins, eds., *Transnational soldiers. Foreign military enlistment in the modern era* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp. 220-221.

around Europe at will that sometimes emerges from the literature on the Spanish Civil War.”⁷² Studies that have focused on one foreign component of the Brigades have highlighted, too, the “nationalizing” effect of the foreigners’ units, despite the fact that the “homogeneity” of the various “national” units constantly changed throughout the war. For instance, the experience of the Spanish Civil War was seen by American Italians as a demonstration of a “good Italy”, in contrast to “the ‘official’ image of Italians as militaristic, aggressive, and imperialist. Instead, they created an alternative definition of *italianità* centred on a filial relationship with a ‘mother’ Italy as the personification of an egalitarian tradition and of the battle for universal freedom.”⁷³ The German brigadists also seem to have used this type of logic:

“One volunteer noted that in the early days of the war, ‘there were very few who declared themselves to be ‘German’, they were Bavarians, Rheinlanders, Upper Silesians or Saxons.’ But membership of a German company or battalion, and the approval of both the Spanish population and international observers, gave the men the confidence openly to declare their nationality. [...] The volunteers were able to feel that they were rebuilding a ‘good’ national identity in the eyes of the world, keeping alive the traditions of the ‘true’ Germany, which had been obscured by Nazism.”⁷⁴

The bulk of studies on the Spanish Civil War is dedicated to the “International Brigades”, i.e. the foreign “volunteers” organized by the Comintern. Already lesser studied are the foreign volunteers that adhered to the Trotskyist and anarchist Spanish organizations. Furthermore, only recently have studies faced the task of studying the opposite, fascist side, i.e. the foreign soldiers that fought for instance in the German “Legion Condor”. Stefanie Schüler-Springorum takes a cultural historical perspective. Her research attempts to identify changes in the “image of Spain” on the part of the legionnaires before and after deployment.⁷⁵

2.1.3 Recent trends in both early modern and modern studies on foreign soldiers

Recent studies on foreign soldiering have some common traits. They show how important it is to ask not only what the motives of the individual soldiers were, but those of the “hiring” or “sending” side as well. Formal and symbolic inter- and transnational alliances may be an important reason for the integration of foreign soldiers and foreign units across the

⁷² Ibid., p. 221.

⁷³ Fraser Ottanelli, “Internationalism and the shaping of national and ethnic identity. Italian American anti-fascist volunteers in the Spanish Civil War,” *Journal of American Ethnic History* (2007): p. 23.

⁷⁴ McLellan, “I wanted to be a little Lenin,” p. 296.

⁷⁵ Stefanie Schüler-Springorum, *Krieg und Fliegen. Die Legion Condor im spanischen Bürgerkrieg* (Paderborn et al.: Schöningh, 2010).

centuries.⁷⁶ Studies show that foreign soldiering before and after the French Revolution was more multifaceted than is only implied with the differentiation between early modern “mercenaries” who enlisted only for pay and modern “volunteers” who enlisted for strictly political reasons. But a certain tension between these two ideal-types of foreign soldiering seems to subsist. How then can the British “mercenaries of the Crimea”⁷⁷ between 1854 and 1856 be reconciled with the “Soldiers of Conscience”⁷⁸ in the past case of philhellenism and the later instance of the International Brigades of the Spanish Civil War? Is it possible to so easily distinguish between “mercenaries” and “volunteers” in the case of foreigners in the Italian armed groups of the nineteenth century, to simply characterize them as “two different temporalities which were simultaneously in operation at the heart of the events unfolding”⁷⁹? Given that so many studies are still struggling with the question of motivation, less space is dedicated to an in-depth discussion of the “transnational” experiences of “mercenaries” and “foreign volunteers” alike.

2.2 (Anti-)Risorgimento historiography and foreign soldiers

2.2.1 The exaltation of foreign military “valour”

The presence of foreigners in the armed groups of the Risorgimento is not a totally new topic for traditional Risorgimento historiography. This is particularly true with regard to the armed actions under Garibaldi, and especially the “Thousand” of 1860, where presentations and papers dedicated to only one, foreign component at a time can systematically be found throughout the period following Italian unification. There are several issues with the ways in which the history of foreign soldiers in Italy has often been presented. Whether they are studies written by foreign historians dedicated to their respective national group or by Italian historians interested in a specific country of origin from which the foreign soldiers came, many studies are biased due to their attempt to prove the existence of a specific Italian-foreign “friendship” with the nation of the foreign soldiers under study. More often than not, “sympathy” of the researcher toward Italy or the respective foreign country translates into

⁷⁶ Some recent studies on pre-revolutionary foreign soldiering underline politics and especially symbolic politics behind the “exchange” of soldiers, as opposed to the mere economic view. See, e. g., Wilson, “Politics of military recruitment,” pp. 536-68 and Guy Rowlands, “Foreign service in the age of absolute monarchy. Louis XIV and his forces étrangères,” *War in History* 17 (2010): pp. 141-65.

⁷⁷ Bayley, *Mercenaries for the Crimea*.

⁷⁸ Elizabeth Roberts, *Freedom, faction, fame & blood. British soldiers of conscience in Greece, Spain & Finland* (Brighton: Sussex Academic, 2010).

⁷⁹ Marco Meriggi, “Legitimism, liberalism and nationalism. The nature of the relationship between North and South in Italian Unification,” *Modern Italy* 19, no. 1 (2014): p. 71.

“sympathy” for the foreign actors studied. This results in a “celebrative” tone to the research that conveniently suited the programmes of many historical congresses. Therefore, it is not astonishing to read that within the context of a historical congress a hundred years after the Sicilian Revolution of 1848, “some Hungarian historians”, “accompanied by some Sicilian historians, liked to lay down a laurel wreath for [the Hungarian Garibaldian officer] Tüköry. Before the herm of the hero, in a suggestive atmosphere, the last words were pronounced, exalting a glorious tradition of friendship.”⁸⁰ Here, in 1954, it was still possible to speak of the “admirable sacrifice” Tüköry had made, just as it was to still write about the “real bond between the two peoples” in 1935, wherein the “braveness” of the troops of the Hungarian colonel Dunyov in the “expedition of the Thousand” was emphasized.⁸¹

Carryovers of the idea of “national” military “braveness”, however, can still be found today. Gábor Andreides, in a recent publication of the “Institute for the history of the Risorgimento”, asserts that the “majority of Hungarian exiles fought heroically both in the Hungarian War of Independence in 1848-49 and the battles of the Italian Risorgimento.”⁸² According to Andreides, Tüköry continues to be the “intrepid Hungarian hero”⁸³, just as another Hungarian, Count Teleki was still a “likeable, emotive person, rich in humanity”.⁸⁴ Similarly, according to one Polish historian in 2013 – who used the exact same language the Hungarian historian cited above did when praising Tüköry – Francesco Nullo, an Italian participant in the Polish January Uprising of 1863, “died gloriously”⁸⁵: “in giving his life, Francesco Nullo has provided a seal of friendship and solidarity between Poles and Italians [...]”⁸⁶

Unfortunately, such a “noble” vision of the participants easily translates into taking for granted that the motives of their commitment were “noble” and that Italian-foreign experiences were “positive”. Hence, in the case of Nullo, it suffices to cite a passage from one of his speeches to his fellow Italians in Poland in 1863 to conclude that “the love of liberty was the motive that pushed Nullo to action – ‘the knight of liberty’, whose fate makes us aware of how much this inestimable valour was able to bring the two countries together.”⁸⁷

⁸⁰ Gaetano Falzone, “Memorie e tradizioni di Garibaldinismo ungherese in Sicilia,” *Rassegna storica del Risorgimento* 41 (1954): p. 367.

⁸¹ Giuseppe Tempo, “Solidarietà italo-ungherese,” *ibid.* 22 (1935): p. 111.

⁸² Gábor Andreides, “Alcuni ungheresi nelle lotte risorgimentali tra il 1859 e il 1861,” in Andrea Ciampani, ed., *L'Unità d'Italia in Europa* (Rome: Istituto per la storia del Risorgimento italiano, 2013), p. 172.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 173.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 174.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 176.

⁸⁶ Małgorzata Kiwior-Filo, “Francesco Nullo e l'insurrezione polacca del 1863,” *ibid.*, pp. 216 and 224.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 225.

From this perspective the presence of a given foreign nationality necessary had an elevated military “value” for the respective campaigns. These studies, unable (or perhaps unwilling?) most of the time to provide quantitative data to give at least an idea of the numbers of the foreigners that participated in a given conflict, necessarily depend on qualitative arguments to support their views. Hungarian historian László Pete writes, it is “an incontestable historical truth that the Hungarian participants in the Garibaldi expedition have fulfilled a particularly relevant role.”⁸⁸ Even in 2013 Andreides uses nearly the same words to conclude: “The Hungarian patriots, exiles and soldiers that participated in the expedition of Garibaldi had a particularly relevant role. The real grandeur of their contribution within the Garibaldian contingent was not determined by their number, but first and foremost by the importance of the tasks assigned to them [...]”⁸⁹

2.2.2 A more sober perspective – foreign soldiers in Italy in recent historiography

In contrast to this basically nationalist view on the military “valour” of the respective national components, the dry comment of Lucy Riall that “we must note that – with the exception of one or two officers with previous military experience – the foreign volunteers for Garibaldi were never a huge help to him and were, on occasion, a positive hindrance”⁹⁰, is indeed a breath of fresh air. Rather than perpetuating the “heroic” image produced by Garibaldi’s contemporaries, Riall and others have rightly turned this imagery into an object of historical research. Riall in her work on the “hero” shows how “the cult of Garibaldi was quite carefully conceived, constructed and publicised [...]”⁹¹ The whole “fashioning” of Garibaldi as a “romantic hero”, however, fulfilled a very real, specific, and as Riall underlines, an especially political purpose, the aim of which was to generate not only a European public that was favourable toward the project of Italian unity and independence⁹², and therefore had the intent to foster concrete material support (men, arms, money, etc.), both Italian and foreign.⁹³ Consequently, she primarily reads the numerical presence of foreigners in Garibaldian actions, for instance those in 1859, “in terms of what they reveal about the spread of Garibaldi’s popularity”.⁹⁴

⁸⁸ László Pete, "Gli ungheresi nei Mille," *Rivista di studi ungheresi* N. S. 10 (2011): p. 16.

⁸⁹ Andreides, "Alcuni ungheresi", pp.172 and 176.

⁹⁰ Riall, *Invention of a hero*, p. 301.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 271.

⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 206.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 172.

Authors that have more specifically focused on foreign soldiers in the Risorgimento and Anti-Risorgimento⁹⁵ have similarly distanced themselves from this emphasis on “military valour”. In his dissertation on the mobilization of the foreign officers involved in the pro-Bourbon “brigantaggio” between 1861 and 1863, Simon Sarlin underlines that “the international mobilisation in favour of the king of Naples merits attention not in function of its concrete results, but for what we can learn about the aspirations and considerations of its agents, about their vision of the world and their modes of commitment.”⁹⁶ Only by doing away with the tone of celebration and “valour” that tends to accompany these studies, does it become possible to acknowledge various difficulties linked to the commitment of foreign soldiers to the Italian causes. As in many other historical cases, many projects to support Italian “parties” in the end proved inconclusive and “unsuccessful”, and the celebrative history, which was oriented toward the “success stories”, was naturally less interested in them. But the history of failures is part of history *tout court*, and researching the reasons that impeded “success” can tell us as much about transnational history as the successful projects. For instance, Sarlin clearly presents the difficulties inherent to the international mobilization for the Bourbon Kingdom caused by lack of coordination and/or financial resources. Even more important were diplomatic complications, first and foremost the reluctance of the conservative powers that “consistently refused to convert their symbolic and moral backing into material and effective support [...]”⁹⁷

In fact, there was much friction linked to the soldierly engagement of foreigners on the different Italian sides. Already Ferdinand Boyer writes of offences, conflicting national feelings and personal rivalries in his study on the French *garibaldini*.⁹⁸ With regard to the Papal Army, Alessandro Mancini Barbieri has similarly highlighted the frequency of grievances made by the papal authorities about the supposedly undisciplined character of the foreign papal soldiers, among which “drunkenness, harassment of civilians and superiors as well as ‘reiterated attempts to carry out acts against nature’”.⁹⁹ Relations in the pro-Bourbon

⁹⁵ See for an in-depth discussion of recent publications on foreign soldiering in the (Anti-)Risorgimento and on other “transnational soldiers” Göhde, “A new military history”.

⁹⁶ Sarlin, *Légitimisme en armes*, p. 293.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 185.

⁹⁸ Ferdinand Boyer, “Les volontaires français avec Garibaldi en 1860,” *Revue d'Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine* 7, no. 2 (1960): p. 136.

⁹⁹ Alessandro Mancini Barbieri, “Nuove ricerche sulla presenza straniera nell'esercito pontificio,” *Rassegna storica del Risorgimento* 73, no. 2 (1986): pp. 162-163.

“guerrilla” were also conflict-laden. Sarlin notes a more or less open rivalry¹⁰⁰ between foreign officers “nominated by the monarchy and chiefs of the indigenous bands”.¹⁰¹

The negative picture of these “transnational” contacts must not be overemphasized either, especially because these recounts were partially informed by the heavy polemics between the different political sides. Perceptions of participants could also change over the course of their commitment, as Boyer demonstrates with regard to the case of a French soldier, for whom his Italian “comrades” went from being described as “savages” to “good children”¹⁰² as he passed time in their company.¹⁰³

This all shows that the question of initial motives, however important in its own right, is only one part of the history of foreign soldiers. Rather than focusing only on this aspect – as still many studies do – we should go further by proceeding with an unbiased and in-depth analysis of the transnational experiences and practices of the foreign soldiers in Italy. Instead of asking for their “military” contribution, we should ask for their historical “contribution”, insofar as the latter has both positive and negative effects on the former. The strictly “military” contribution, expressed in terms of “fighting strength”, is only one aspect of their history; but even for this specific contribution, it is not enough to simply count their numbers or to name their military rank. Concentrating on military “success” alone fails to take into account a series of historiographical issues that can be addressed by delving into the history of the “transnational soldiers” of the Risorgimento and Anti-Risorgimento. Their history can contribute to the question of communalities and differences in terms of “military culture(s)”¹⁰⁴ in the nineteenth century; to revealing how both national and legitimist movements were linked throughout Europe and what these connections meant for them; and to the analysis of how nationalization and internationalism were in fact - as paradoxical as it may seem – intimately linked. The history of foreign soldiers in Italy can provide insights into how international solidarity was conceptualized in the nineteenth century¹⁰⁵ and how it was put

¹⁰⁰ On the mutual negative images of, for instance, the Spanish general José Borges and the “brigand” Carmine Crocco see Sarlin, “Fighting the Risorgimento,” pp. 486-487.

¹⁰¹ Sarlin, *Légitimisme en armes*, p. 227.

¹⁰² This, however, brings to mind the topos of the Italians as “children”, hence implying that they are in an earlier stage of human development, which is not necessarily a “positive” opinion or view of the Italians.

¹⁰³ Boyer, “Volontaires français,” p. 139.

¹⁰⁴ See Peter H. Wilson, “Defining military culture,” *Journal of Military History* 72, no. 1 (2008): pp. 11-41. For Italy see as well Nicola Labanca, “Cultura di guerra. Note su una nuova categoria storica,” in Piero del Negro and Enrico Francia, eds., *Guerre e culture di guerra nella storia d'Italia* (Milan: Edizioni Unicopli, 2011), pp. 13-23; Enrico Francia, “Eroi, popolo e soldati. Narrative patriottico-militari nell'Italia del Risorgimento,” *ibid.*, pp. 35-60.

¹⁰⁵ See Pécout, “Philhellenism in Italy,” pp. 405-27; see as well, on „brotherhood“ – as well in an “international” dimension - Gilles Bertrand, Catherine Brice, and Gilles Montègre, eds., *Fraternité. Pour une histoire du concept* (Grenoble: CRIHPA, 2012) and my Ferdinand Nicolas Göhde, “La fraternité d’armes des peuples.

into practice in an important area, i.e. in military groups. “Transnational soldiers” are a showcase for European mobility, and their history enables us to address processes of ideological, cultural and military transfers.

2.3 Foreign participation on the different political sides

Throughout the nineteenth century we find foreign soldiers present not only in various Italian conflicts but also on the various political sides: They were part of militarily organized revolutionary attempts between the 1820s and 1850s, they tried to defend the “republics” built in Venice and Sicily in 1848 and the Roman Republic in 1849. Many also fought in the ranks of the different Garibaldian armed groups in 1859, 1860, 1866 and 1867. During the same period, foreign soldiers were also present in the regular Italian armed forces, especially in the Papal and Bourbon Armies.

2.3.1 Foreign soldiers on the pro-national side

2.3.1.1 The “Invasion of Savoy” 1834

Exiles from different countries participated in the so-called “Invasion of Savoy” that was incited by Giuseppe Mazzini during his time in Geneva in 1834.¹⁰⁶ Mazzini’s plan was to invade Savoy with small, armed groups that were to depart from four different places in Switzerland and France. Their action was intended to foster upheavals by the population and thus contribute to general revolution. Mazzini counted on the participation of the diasporas of exiles present in Switzerland (Italians, French, Poles and Germans) and unemployed Swiss workers in this attempt. But much of the operation failed before it had even really begun. Thanks to Austrian and pontifical spies that had infiltrated the Mazzinian movement, the Piedmontese government was already informed of the plans in August 1833 and ordered 9,000 soldiers to stand at the ready along the borders. Mazzini, on the contrary, could rely only on a much smaller number of participants. Still, the day before the planned invasion was to take place, it was calculated that 783 men were ready to set out, of which 160 were Poles, 70 Italians, 200 Savoyards, 35 Germans, 58 Swiss and 50 French.¹⁰⁷ In reality, the

Champ sémantique fraternel et soldats transnationaux au cours de l’(Anti-)Risorgimento. Le cas des combattants allemands,” forthcoming in a subsequent anthology edited by Catherine Brice (2014).

¹⁰⁶ See Roland Sarti, *Mazzini. A life for the religion of politics* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1997), pp. 71-95.

¹⁰⁷ Gerolamo Ramorino, *Précis des derniers événements de Savoie* (Paris: Ambroise Dupont, 1834), pp. 29-30.

participants of the invasion were organized into three groups and counted no more than 450¹⁰⁸, of which 300¹⁰⁹ reached the territory of Savoy, even if some only for a short time.

2.3.1.2 The “State of Sicily” in 1848 and the Roman Republic in 1849

Less than fifteen years later, in 1848, foreign soldiers were listed among the defenders of the “Sicilian State”, approximately 1,200 of which are French.¹¹⁰ The foreign participation in the defence of the Roman Republic in 1849 amounted to some 350 foreigners (in the sense of non-Italians) in the ranks of the “volunteer” groups, especially those of the “Garibaldian Legion”.¹¹¹ However, foreigners are present also among the 12,000 soldiers¹¹² of the “regular” military of the Republic.¹¹³ The regular army of the “Roman Republic” was created initially from the remnants of the Papal Army, 20-30% of which was still comprised of foreigners in April 1848.¹¹⁴ Despite the dismissal of many of the foreign regiments of the Papal Army in March and April 1849, nevertheless some foreign soldiers passed directly from the Papal to the Republican Army or later re-enlisted in the latter. Hence, there is a presence of foreign soldiers in the “regular” part of the army, who were enlisted in the papal or republican periods, as well as in the “volunteer” groups.

2.3.1.3 Garibaldian campaigns

In 1859, the number of Italian and foreign “volunteers” that joined the army of Piedmont was roughly 50,000. Among them were the *Cacciatori delle Alpi*¹¹⁵ and *Cacciatori degli Appennini*, with approximately 12,000 men between them,¹¹⁶ and the “Hungarian Army in Italy” with about 3,200 men.¹¹⁷ Together with the Hungarians, according to Anna-Maria Isastia, 89 foreigners were enlisted in the regular army and 82 in the volunteer formations.¹¹⁸

¹⁰⁸ These are the numbers provided by Wilhelm Prechner, “Der Savoyerzug 1834. Die Geschichte eines mißlungenen Revolutionsversuchs,” *Zeitschrift für schweizerische Geschichte* 4 (1924): pp. 459-507.

¹⁰⁹ This is the number that is normally given, but it comprises only the two groups that actually succeeded in reaching Savoy (the Ramorino and Grenoble groups).

¹¹⁰ Ignace, “French volunteers in Italy”.

¹¹¹ Giorgio Candeloro, *Storia dell'Italia moderna, Vol. III. La Rivoluzione Nazionale (1846-1849)*, 2 ed. (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1991), p. 444.

¹¹² Ibid..

¹¹³ Ibid., p. 444.

¹¹⁴ “Foreigners” is taken here to mean “non-Italians”. On the basis of the information given by Dalla Torre, the “papal foreign brigade” already provided ca. 20% of all the soldiers of the Papal Army in 1848. However, one has to add for the period between 1848 and 1870, those non-Italians – even if reduced in number – that were integrated into other papal units referred to as “indigenous” corps. Paolo Dalla Torre, “Materiali per una storia dell'esercito pontificio,” *Rassegna storica del Risorgimento* 28 (1941): p. 95.

¹¹⁵ Anna Maria Isastia, “Cacciatori delle Alpi,” in Mario Isnenghi and Eva Cecchinato, eds., *Fare l'Italia. Unità e disunità nel Risorgimento, Gli italiani in guerra. Conflitti, identità, memorie dal Risorgimento ai nostri giorni*, vol. 1 (Turin: UTET, 2008), pp. 810-11.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., pp. 810-811; the same number is given by Trevelyan and reported by Riall, *Invention of a hero*, p. 172.

¹¹⁷ Anna Maria Isastia, “Volontari provenienti dall'estero nell'esercito di Vittorio Emanuele II,” in Aldo Albónico, ed., *Studi in onore di Federico Curato*, vol. II (Milan: Angeli, 1996), p. 173. On the Hungarians see

A year later in the south of Italy, among the first “Thousand” were 33 “foreigners”, while of the roughly 21,000 men that came from the north to fight with Garibaldi there were approximately 600 English, between 300 and 500 French, 440 Hungarians, just to name the most sizeable national groups.¹¹⁹ Foreigners were also among those Bourbon soldiers that changed sides during the conflict. They were mostly part of the group of the 200 or so *Cacciatori Esteri*, which was integrated into Garibaldi’s approximately 50,000 strong¹²⁰ “Esercito meridionale”. Attilio Vigevano wrote in 1914 about this foreign Garibaldian company: there are “some hundred or more foreigners of different nationality, but mostly Swiss and Germans”, who from the Bourbon Army enlisted in the Garibaldian ranks” in May 1860; it is a “company totally comprised of” Bourbon soldiers, “clothed, armed and provided with Bourbon uniforms and equipment, that marches and fights against the Bourbons.”¹²¹

Garibaldi’s campaign in 1862, which was headed for Rome, is particularly interesting with regard to foreign soldiers; this is because in the case of the Hungarians, those that still fought in the Hungarian Legion of the Italian Army, now found that they had to fight former “comrades” who remained faithful to Garibaldi and those that had defected over to him on the battlefield. After the campaign of 1860, the “Hungarian Legion” was integrated into the regular Piedmontese and then Italian Army. As part of the regular forces, they were also used to suppress “brigandage” in southern Italy. They were, hence, present in Campania when Garibaldi landed in Sicily in July and again in Calabria at the end of August 1862. Tensions in loyalty among the Hungarians – between the Piedmontese Army and Garibaldi – led to cases in which soldiers changed allegiance from the former to the latter¹²², before the remnants of the Legion were ordered to return to Piedmont in mid-August.¹²³ Apart from the Hungarians,

Attilio Vigevano, *Legione ungherese in Italia, 1859-1867* (Rome: Libreria dello Stato, 1924). Both the *Cacciatori Garibaldini* and the “Hungarian Army” were official, even if special, corps of the army of Piedmont.

¹¹⁸ Isastia, “Volontari provenienti dall'estero”.

¹¹⁹ Numbers for the English (Trevelyan) and the French (Boyer) are listed in Riall, *Invention of a hero*, pp. 267, 440 e 441.

¹²⁰ Federico Torre, “Relazione del Maggiore Generale Federico Torre, direttore generale delle leve, bassa-forza e matricola al signor ministro della guerra sulle leve eseguite in Italia dalle annessioni delle varie provincie al 30 settembre 1863,” *L'Italia militare. Rassegna mensile* 1 (1865): p. 294.

¹²¹ “[.U]n centinaio e più di stranieri di diversa nazionalità, ma nella maggior parte svizzeri e tedeschi [...], una compagnia composta tutta di borbonici, vestita, armata ed equipaggiata con uniformi e con dotazioni borboniche, che marcia e combatte contro il Borbone.” Attilio Vigevano, *La compagnia estera garibaldina nella campagna del 1860. Estratti dai fascicoli de 'La nuova rivista della fanteria'* (Rome: Stamperia Reale D. Ripamonti, 1914), p. 3

¹²² Before the majority of Hungarians was shipped to Alessandria some 150 soldiers deserted at Salerno and tried to reach Garibaldi according to Vigevano, *Legione ungherese*, p. 132. Instead, there were only 20 Hungarians in Garibaldi’s ranks according to Francesco Guida, “Frigyesi, Gusztáv Suták,” in Mario Isnenghi and Eva Cecchinato, eds., *Fare l'Italia. Unità e disunità nel Risorgimento*, Gli italiani in guerra. Conflitti, identità, memorie dal Risorgimento ai nostri giorni, vol. 1 (Turin: UTET, 2008), p. 868.

¹²³ On the history of the legion in southern Italy in 1862 see, e.g., Vigevano, *Legione ungherese*, pp. 106-133.

there are only single isolated foreign presences. The same is also true for the Garibaldian campaigns of 1866 and 1867, where single German presences were counted in the ranks.¹²⁴

2.3.2 Foreign soldiers in the Bourbon and papal armed groups

2.3.2.1 Papal Army

Many more foreigners were to be found in the ranks of various corps of the Papal Army.¹²⁵ Conscription was abolished in 1815 after which the army depended entirely on voluntary enlistment. It was already after the withdrawal of the Austrian troops from the Papal States in 1831 that the decision was taken to hire Swiss regiments. These “foreign regiments” consisted mainly of Swiss nationals, though soldiers from southern Germany were also present.¹²⁶ In 1860 and 1861 the foreign corps underwent significant reorganization, namely the Papal Army created three foreign corps between 1861 and 1870: the regiment of the Papal Zouaves, the “Carabinieri esteri”, and the “Roman Legion” or “Legion of Antibes”.¹²⁷ The percentage of foreigners varied between a low 21% in 1848 and a particularly high 42% in 1860.

The regiment of the Papal Zouaves was created in 1861.¹²⁸ The corps had a precedent in French colonialism. In fact, the word “Zouaves” comes from the name of the Berber tribe of the Zouaoua, which initially provided militias for the Ottoman Army. After the capture of Algiers in 1830 some of these militias fought on the side of the French, before being integrated into the formation of the Tirallieurs, which consisted of Arabic and Turkish soldiers. Because of its origin some referred to this group as “Turkos”. As an elite-corps, they participated for instance in the Crimean War (1854-1856).

In 1860, Belgium and France formed a corps of soldiers called *Tirallieurs franco-belges* and sent it to Italy for the defence of the Papal States. On 1 January 1861, the

¹²⁴ See p. 241.

¹²⁵ See Emiel Lamberts, ed., *The Black International. L'internationale noire. The Holy See and militant Catholicism in Europe 1870-1878* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2002); Coulombe, *Pope's legion*; Guénel, *Dernière guerre du pape*; Mancini Barbieri, “Nuove ricerche”.

¹²⁶ Baden, Bavaria and Württemberg figure frequently, together with various Swiss cantons. This is the result of a rapid skimming of the following soldiers’ registers: ASR, Fondo Ministero delle Armi, Matricole, vols. 1603-1623. It was impossible for this study to analyse in depth all soldiers’ registers. I have concentrated on a comprehensive analysis of the foreign papal soldiers between 1860 and 1871. For the statistical analysis, see chapter 5 below.

¹²⁷ Of note here is the predominantly Irish “battalion of St. Patrick” between 1860 and 1862, with a strength of about 1,100 in 1860, of which only some 60 remained in the Papal Army until 1862. See, e. g., Coulombe, *Pope's legion*, pp. 59 and 95.

¹²⁸ Guénel, *Dernière guerre du pape*; Coulombe, *Pope's legion*.

Tirallieurs Franco-belges were merged into the so-called “Papal Zouaves”. Between 1861 and 1870 the corps saw almost 9,000¹²⁹ enlistments from soldiers of 25 different countries.¹³⁰

Roughly half of the Foreign Carabineers regiment, founded in May 1860 and with a total strength of 1,262 men by 20 August 1870, was comprised of Germans.¹³¹ Between 1861 and 1870 there were approximately 4,100¹³² enlistments.

The “Roman Legion”, or “Legion of Antibes”, with a strength of 1,410 soldiers in 1870, was a corps of mainly French soldiers. Concurrent to the official withdrawal of the French troops from Rome in 1866 in accordance with the French-Italian convention of September 1864, Napoleon III “authorized the recruitment of a ‘foreign legion’ to be sent for the defence of the Papal States”.¹³³ This troop was incorporated into the regular Papal Army under the name “Legione Romana” or “Legione di Antibo” (heretofore referred to, as above, with the English names), this last name was given because the recruitment office was located in Antibes. In July 1870, the “Roman Legion” counted 1,215 soldiers altogether.¹³⁴

2.3.2.2 *Bourbon Army*

Foreign corps also existed further south. Since 1827, a section of the Bourbon Army was made up of four regiments of Swiss soldiers.¹³⁵ Their service was based – as in other cases of Swiss mercenaries – on capitulations between Swiss cantons and the country of employment. The last Bourbon-Swiss capitulations had expired in 1854, a situation that was resolved by a direct agreement between the King Ferdinand II and the Swiss military leaders consisting in a continuation of Swiss deployment for another five years. In 1859, however, new capitulations were necessary, but that very year the Swiss federal government issued decisive laws to finally and effectively ban the long tradition of Swiss mercenaries.¹³⁶ This change was

¹²⁹ The registers of the common soldiers of the regiment between 1861 and 1870 exceed 10,000 entries, but excluding re-enlistments and annulations there are, according to Jean Guénel, 9,000. Guénel, *Dernière guerre du pape*, p. 40. In order to give an exact number, an analysis of re-enlistments and double entries would be necessary.

¹³⁰ On the “Papal Zouaves” see *ibid.* and Coulombe, *Pope's legion*.

¹³¹ See the analysis of the composition of the corps in chapter 5.2.2.

¹³² There are more than 4,900 entries in the soldiers’ registers of the “Carabinieri esteri”. If a similar percentage of re-enlistments, double and cancelled entries as was the case of the Zouaves is used, the resulting number ought to correspond to the number given in the text above.

¹³³ Guénel, *Dernière guerre du pape*, p. 89.

¹³⁴ *Almanach de Gotha. Annuaire diplomatique et statistique pour l'année 1871*, vol. 108 (Gotha: Justus Perthes, 1871), p. 656.

¹³⁵ Tommaso Argiolas, *Storia dell'esercito borbonico* (Naples: Edizione scientifiche italiane, 1970), pp. 65-67.

¹³⁶ On the Swiss tradition of foreign soldiering, see first and foremost the very instructive Philippe Henry, “Fremde Dienste,” in: *Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz*, <http://www.hls-dhs-dss.ch/textes/d/D8608.php> (last accessed: 21/03/2013). For a broader discussion see Hans Rudolf Fuhrer, *Schweizer in 'Fremden Diensten'. Verherrlicht und verurteilt* (Zurich: Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 2006). For the Papal Swiss Guard see the “uncelebratory” Urban Fink, Hervé de Weck, and Christian Schweizer, eds., *Hirstenstab und Hellebarde. Die päpstliche Schweizergarde in Rom 1506-2006* (Zurich: Theologischer Verlag, 2006). Still fundamental is a series

symbolized in the Bourbon case by the decision of the canton of Bern to forbid the use of the Bernese bear in the flag of one of the Bourbon regiments. Furthermore, the Swiss government meditated upon the possibility of withdrawing the citizenship of those of its subjects that continued to work as mercenaries. On 15 May 1859, these tensions led to an upheaval of the Swiss regiments in Naples¹³⁷, wherein those Swiss who remained loyal to their ‘customer’ fought their rebellious comrades. Later on, the Swiss regiments were reorganized as “foreign regiments” under such remaining Swiss officers as Johann Lucas von Mechel.¹³⁸ The rank and file were filled by the Swiss soldiers that chose to remain in southern Italy and new recruits, fresh from Austria and southern German states. As an integral part of the regular Bourbon Army, they took part one year later in the wars subsequent to Garibaldi’s landing in Sicily.

Other foreigners, however, were engaged in the less regular part of the Bourbon defence after 1861: In several places such as the Abruzzi region, the Bourbon government supported the creation and guidance of groups of legitimist fighting groups, a “guerrilla with the official seal of the dynasty”.¹³⁹ The legitimist guerrilla underpinned the so-called “brigantaggio politico”, which continued to call into question the newly erected Italian state throughout the early 1860s, before being cruelly suppressed by Italian government troops. The Bourbon government, which continued to operate after the creation of the Kingdom of Italy, first in Gaeta and later in Roman exile, supported these groups from September 1860 onwards and well into 1863. It sent out a phalanx of officers, consisting of former officers of regular Bourbon troops such as Francesco Luvarà, as well as a handful of foreign colonels such as the Alsatian Teodule Emile de Christen, the Spanish José Borjés and the Prussians Theodor Friedrich Klitsche de la Grange and Karl Graf Kalkreuth, especially brought in to guide the heterogeneously composed armed groups in operation.

2.3.3 *The numbers on foreign soldiers in the Italian armed groups*

The percentage of foreign soldiers in the Italian armed groups of the 19th century varies considerably between the political sides. Furthermore, the exact numbers given in the literature and sources sometimes differ significantly; when they do coincide, the footnotes

of earlier works: Henri Ganter, *Histoire du service militaire des régiments suisses à la solde de l'Angleterre, de Naples et de Rome* (Geneva: Ch. Eggimann, 1896); Albert Maag, *Geschichte der Schweizertruppen in französischen Diensten während der Restauration und Julirevolution (1816-1830)* (Biel: Verlag von Ernst Kuhn, 1899).

¹³⁷ For the “revolt of the Swiss”, see e.g. Raffaele De Cesare, *La fine di un regno. Vol. II* (Rome: Newton Compton, 1975), pp. 20-23.

¹³⁸ See Giancarlo Boeri, Piero Crociani, and Massimo Fiorentino, *L'esercito borbonico dal 1830 al 1861. Vol. I* (Rome: Ufficio Storico dello Stato Maggiore dell'Esercito, 1998), pp. 69-71.

¹³⁹ Gigi Di Fiore, *I vinti del Risorgimento. Storia e storie di chi combatté per i Borbone di Napoli* (Turin: Utet, 2004), p. 104. See especially Sarlin, *Légitimisme en armes*.

show that this is more often due to one author copying from another than from original counts. For the pro-Italian side especially, exact numbers are sometimes quite hard to obtain: In some cases there is a lack of reliable sources for the soldiers that fought with Mazzini and later on with Garibaldi¹⁴⁰. At times, the soldiers' lists were never appositely created or have been lost, or were created only (much) later, often omitting part of the information pertaining to each single soldier. Hence, there are only partial numbers with regard to *foreign* soldiers in the ranks of the *garibaldini*. At others there is only information on some national components, as is the case with the "Hungarian Legion"¹⁴¹ or the Garibaldian, "800-strong 'British Legion'"¹⁴².

¹⁴⁰ In the case of the *garibaldini*, this depends obviously on the degree to which they were formally linked to states' armies, especially the Piedmontese Army.

¹⁴¹ Vigeveno, *Legione ungherese*.

¹⁴² Pellegrino Sutcliffe, "British Red Shirts," p. 202.

Table 2.1 – Number and percentage of foreigners in the Papal Army 1848-1870

<i>Army</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Total number of soldiers</i>	<i>Number of foreigners</i>	<i>Percentage of foreigners</i>
Papal	4/1848	ca. 16,000 ¹⁴³	ca. 3,400 ¹⁴⁴	ca. 21%
Papal	1859	ca. 15,300 ¹⁴⁵	ca. 3,600 ¹⁴⁶	ca. 24%
Papal	8/1860	ca. 23,300 ¹⁴⁷	ca. 9,800 ¹⁴⁸	ca. 42%
Papal	1867	ca. 13,300 ¹⁴⁹	ca. 5,000 ¹⁵⁰	ca. 38%
Papal	1870	ca. 13,800 ¹⁵¹	ca. 5,500 ¹⁵²	ca. 40%

¹⁴³ Dalla Torre, "Materiali," p. 95.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 95.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 98. In 1860, the Gotha Almanac gives 15,239 for 30 June 1859; instead Torre counts 16,894 soldiers. *Almanach de Gotha. Annuaire diplomatique et statistique pour l'année 1860*, vol. 97 (Gotha: Justus Perthes, 1860), p. 658; Torre, "Relazione," p. 270.

¹⁴⁶ The following two concur: Dalla Torre, "Materiali," p. 98 and *Almanach de Gotha. Annuaire diplomatique et statistique pour l'année 1860*, 97, p. 658. 4,000 foreigners is the count of Mancini Barbieri, "Nuove ricerche," p. 164.

¹⁴⁷ Dalla Torre, "Materiali," p. 99. Torre counts 22,820 soldiers in Torre, "Relazione," p. 275; while Vigeveno counts 22,000 in Attilio Vigeveno, *La fine dell'esercito pontificio. Con 27 illustrazioni e tavole a colori e 7 carte e piani topografici* (Rome: Stabilimento poligrafico per l'amministrazione della guerra, 1920), p. 14.

¹⁴⁸ Dalla Torre, "Materiali," p. 99. 8,000 foreigners were counted by Mancini Barbieri, "Nuove ricerche," p. 181.

¹⁴⁹ *Almanach de Gotha. Annuaire diplomatique et statistique pour l'année 1868*, vol. 105 (Gotha: Justus Perthes, 1868), p. 816.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 816.

¹⁵¹ *Almanach de Gotha. Annuaire diplomatique et statistique pour l'année 1871*, 108, p. 656.

¹⁵² Ibid., p. 656. 7,200 foreign soldiers were roughly the half of the Papal Army in 1870 according to Vigeveno, *La fine dell'esercito pontificio*, p. 123.

Table 2.2 – Number and percentage of foreigners in the Bourbon Army 1849-1860

<i>Army</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Total number of soldiers</i>	<i>Number of foreigners</i>	<i>Percentage of foreigners</i>
Two Sicilies	1849	ca. 48,900 ¹⁵³	ca. 6,200 ¹⁵⁴	13%
Two Sicilies	1859	ca. 88,200 ¹⁵⁵	ca. 7,900 ¹⁵⁶	9%
Two Sicilies	1860	ca. 99,400 ¹⁵⁷	ca. 4,200 ¹⁵⁸ (01/08/1860)	4%

¹⁵³ *Almanach de Gotha. Annuaire diplomatique et statistique pour l'année 1850*, vol. 87 (Gotha: Justus Perthes, 1850), p. 354. The Correlates-of-War-Project has recorded 46,000 soldiers. "Correlates of war - National material capabilities, Version 4," http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/Capabilities/NMC_v4_0.csv (last accessed: 21/02/2014). On the project, see J. David Singer, "Reconstructing the correlates of war dataset on material capabilities of states, 1816-198," *International Interactions* 14 (1987): pp. 115-32.

¹⁵⁴ *Almanach de Gotha. Annuaire diplomatique et statistique pour l'année 1850*, 87, p.354.

¹⁵⁵ Torre, "Relazione," p. 271.

¹⁵⁶ Albert Maag, *Geschichte der Schweizertruppen in neapolitanischen Diensten 1825-1861* (Zurich: Schulthess, 1909), p. 474 and passim. The Gotha Almanac of 1860 records similar numbers for 1858: 7,500 foreign soldiers of 92,600 in total. *Almanach de Gotha. Annuaire diplomatique et statistique pour l'année 1860*, 97, p. 435.

¹⁵⁷ Torre, "Relazione," p. 275. The Correlates-of-War-Project indicates that there were 92,000 soldiers in 1860; neither Torre nor the Correlates specify the month these numbers pertain to.

¹⁵⁸ Maag, *Schweizertruppen in neapolitanischen Diensten*, p. 530; the same number, most probably taken from Maag, is mentioned by Riccardo Blaas, "L'Austria e le truppe straniere del re delle Due Sicilie," in *Atti del XXXVI Congresso di storia del Risorgimento Italiano, Salerno 19 - 23 ottobre 1957* (Rome: Istituto per la storia del Risorgimento italiano, 1960), p. 88. Still at the end of June 1860, there were only 2,812 foreign soldiers enlisted in the Bourbon Army, since the recruitment process was still underway, according to Maag, *Schweizertruppen in neapolitanischen Diensten*, p. 487.

Table 2.3 – Number and percentage of foreign soldiers in the Invasion of Savoy, the Sicilian State and the Roman Republic 1834 and 1848-1849

<i>Army; armed group</i>	<i>Total number of soldiers</i>	<i>Foreign soldiers</i>
Invasion of Savoy – Mazzini 1834	783 (Planned for 2 February 1834) of which 573 (for which nationalities are given) ¹⁵⁹	303 ¹⁶⁰ = 53%
State of Sicily 1848		ca. 1,200 French ¹⁶¹
Roman Republic 1849		
Regular army	ca. 12,000 ¹⁶²	[Papal Army in 1848: ca. 21%]
of which		
Swiss Battery		ca. 100 ¹⁶⁶
Volunteers, Civic Guards	ca. 7.000 ¹⁶³	ca. 350 ¹⁶⁷ = ca. 5%
of which		
Polish Legion		ca. 200 ¹⁶⁸
Foreign Legion		ca. 120 ¹⁶⁹
Fallen soldiers	ca. 1,000 ¹⁶⁴	ca. 25 ¹⁷⁰ = ca. 3%
Total	ca. 19,000 ¹⁶⁵	

¹⁵⁹ Ramorino, *Précis*, pp. 29-30.

¹⁶⁰ *Ivi.*

¹⁶¹ Ignace, "French volunteers in Italy," pp. 445, 455.

¹⁶² Candeloro, *Storia dell'Italia moderna III*, p. 444.

¹⁶³ *Ivi.*

¹⁶⁴ Marco Severini, *La Repubblica romana del 1849* (Venice: Marsilio, 2011), p. 151.

¹⁶⁵ Candeloro, *Storia dell'Italia moderna III*, p. 444.

¹⁶⁶ Amedeo Tosti, "La campagna del 1849," in *Il Generale Giuseppe Garibaldi* (s. l.: Stato Maggiore dell'Esercito - Ufficio Storico, 2007), p.83.

¹⁶⁷ Candeloro, *Storia dell'Italia moderna III*, p. 444.

¹⁶⁸ Tosti, "La campagna del 1849," p. 83.

¹⁶⁹ *Ivi.*

¹⁷⁰ Severini, *La Repubblica romana*, p. 151.

Table 2.4 – Number and percentage of foreign soldiers in the Army of Piedmont 1859

<i>Army; armed group</i>	<i>Total number of soldiers</i>	<i>Foreign soldiers</i>
Volunteers enlisted in Turin until 25 march 1859	ca. 20,000 ¹⁷¹ of which	239 ¹⁷⁵ = 1%
- Integrated into the regular army	10,119 ¹⁷²	1.2% ¹⁷⁶
- <i>Cacciatori delle Alpi</i> – Garibaldi	ca. 4,200 ¹⁷³	82 ¹⁷⁷ = 2%
Hungarian Army in Italy	ca. 3,200 ¹⁷⁴	ca. 3,200 = 100%

¹⁷¹ Louis Le Varenne, *Les chasseurs des Alpes et des Apennins. Histoire complete de la guerre de l'indépendance italienne en 1859. Avec un appendice contenant les noms de tous les volontaires qui ont pris part a la guerre de l'indépendance italienne en 1859* (Florence: Le Monnier, 1860), p. 306.

¹⁷² Virgilio Ilari, *Storia del servizio militare in Italia. Dall'ordinanza fiorentina di Machiavelli alla costituzione dell'esercito italiano, 1506-1870*, Collana del Centro militare di studi strategici (Rome: Rivista militare, 1989), p. 360.

¹⁷³ Ilari, *Storia del servizio militare*, p. 360. 4,200 is the number recorded for enlistments in Turin, and is often erroneously mistaken as the total number of the *Cacciatori delle Alpi*. In fact, the corps seemed to have reached between 9,500 and 12,000 men, according to the figures of Trevelyan and Garibaldi as reported by Riall, *Invention of a hero*, p. 172.

¹⁷⁴ Vigeveno, *Legione ungherese*, p. 55.

¹⁷⁵ Le Varenne, *Les chasseurs des Alpes*, p. 306.

¹⁷⁶ Ilari, *Storia del servizio militare*, p. 360.

¹⁷⁷ Isastia, "Volontari provenienti dall'estero," *passim*.

Table 2.5– Number and percentage of foreign soldiers in the Garibaldian campaigns 1860-1867

<i>Army; armed group</i>	<i>Total number of soldiers</i>	<i>Foreign soldiers</i>
Northern volunteers of the Southern Army of Garibaldi 1860	ca. 21,000	Min. 1,220 ¹⁸³ = 6%
- First “Thousand”	1089 ¹⁷⁸	Max. 33 ¹⁸⁴ = 3%
- Later arrived volunteers of which	Ca. 20,000 ¹⁷⁹	
- Hungarian Legion	215-448 ¹⁸⁰	215-448 ¹⁸⁵
- British Legion	ca. 800 ¹⁸¹	ca. 800
<i>Cacciatori Esteri</i> (ex-Bourbon soldiers)	ca. 200 ¹⁸²	ca. 200
<i>garibaldini</i> 1862	ca. 5,000 ¹⁸⁶	ca. 20 Hungarians ¹⁸⁷
Hungarian Legion (Regular Army of Piedmont)	ca. 900	ca. 900 ¹⁸⁸
<i>garibaldini</i> 1866	ca. 40,000 ¹⁸⁹	
<i>garibaldini</i> 1867	ca. 12,000 ¹⁹⁰	

¹⁷⁸ Donato Miani-Calabrese, "Lineamenti strutturali del gruppo demografico dei Mille," *Statistica [Bologna]* 4 (1960): p. 563.

¹⁷⁹ Riall, *Invention of a hero*, p. 216.

¹⁸⁰ Vigeveno, *Legione ungherese*, pp. 79 and 104.

¹⁸¹ Pellegrino Sutcliffe, "British red shirts," p. 202.

¹⁸² "Alla ricerca dei garibaldini scomparsi," http://archiviodistatotorino.beniculturali.it/work/garb_search.php (last accessed: 05/01/2013).

¹⁸³ Riall, *Invention of a hero*, passim.

¹⁸⁴ Among them, however, 14 are noted as coming from “Italian Tirol”, 1 from “Savoy”; the others are 4 Hungarians, 3 Austrians, 3 from Nice, 2 from Switzerland and respectively 1 from Corsica, Corfu, France, England, Africa and America. Miani-Calabrese, "Lineamenti strutturali," p. 562.

¹⁸⁵ Vigeveno, *Legione ungherese*, pp. 79 and 104.

¹⁸⁶ Cecchinato, *Camicie rosse*, p. 73.

¹⁸⁷ Guida, "Frigyesi," p. 868.

¹⁸⁸ Vigeveno, *Legione ungherese*, pp. 105 and 132.

¹⁸⁹ Cecchinato, *Camicie rosse*, p. 109.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 118.

Only the Papal Army seems to stand out as a singular case, because counter to the tendency the percentage of foreigners continued to rise from between 21% in 1848 to a singularly high 42% in 1860. The other Italian armies and armed groups seem to develop more or less in the same direction as most of the other European armies. The percentage of foreigners in the army of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies is still 13% in 1849, but falls to 4% by 1860. The percentages of foreigners, for instance, in the “volunteer” units of the Army of the Roman Republic (ca. 5% foreigners), the initial Garibaldian Thousand (ca. 3%) and amongst the other *garibaldini* that subsequently departed from northern Italy (ca. 6%) are quite similar. These percentages reveal that the supposedly outstanding international fascination with Garibaldi did not result in an exceptionally high percentage of actual foreign participation, the moment these numbers are comparable to the 5% foreign presence, which was the standard for many other contemporary armies.¹⁹¹ The numbers for the *garibaldini*, however, are to be handled with special care, since it is unclear in many instances the basis upon which they were calculated; this consideration takes into account that in some instances registers were not kept, or the information therein was not reliably recorded and in others the soldiers’ registers were used little to estimate these numbers.

2.4 A critical history of the Risorgimento wars

2.4.1 The “wars of independence” – the nationalist interpretation

In order to better understand the different contexts in which these foreign soldiers were placed, it helps to take a critical look at the Italian wars in this period. The various wars on Italian soil in the 19th century¹⁹² have, in conventional historiography, basically been divided into two groups: Three of them – the Piedmont-Austrian wars of 1848/49 and of 1859 and the Italian-Austrian war of 1866 – have been understood in the conventional historiography to be “guerre d’indipendenza”, i.e. wars of independence. The other group of wars, which does not fit into the Italian-Austria context, somehow constitutes the “rest” in conventional

¹⁹¹ See Appendix I, Table A.1.21, p. 484.

¹⁹² With regard specifically to the Risorgimento wars, see the Italian literature that follows. For a quick overview see the quite valuable Marco Scardigli, *Le grandi battaglie del Risorgimento* (Milan: RCS Libri, 2010); for more detailed information, the best works remain Piero Pieri, *Storia militare del Risorgimento. Guerre e insurrezioni* (Turin: Einaudi, 1962) and the series written by Giorgio Candeloro: *Storia dell’Italia moderna*, and specifically for this study Giorgio Candeloro, *Storia dell’Italia moderna, Vol. II. Dalla restaurazione alla rivoluzione nazionale (1815-1846)*, 10 ed. (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1981); Candeloro, *Storia dell’Italia moderna III*; Giorgio Candeloro, *Storia dell’Italia moderna, Vol. IV. Dalla rivoluzione nazionale all’Unità (1849-1860)* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1980); Giorgio Candeloro, *Storia dell’Italia moderna, Vol. V. La costruzione dello stato unitario (1860-1871)*, 2 ed. (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1989)

historiography. Placed within this second group was the Sicilian-Neapolitan War of 1848/49, in which a revolutionary movement that fought for the independence of Sicily from the Kingdom of Naples was intertwined with Italian national aspirations.¹⁹³ In 1860, the Garibaldian undertaking of the so-called Expedition of the Thousand in Sicily and southern Italy, which resulted in a war between Garibaldians and the armies of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies and the Pope, is also included in this group. Another is Garibaldi's attempt to free Rome and the Lazio, but he was stopped by the Piedmontese Army. The last was the event in 1870, when Italian troops conquered Rome against a more symbolic resistance of the Papal Army and confined the Pope to the Vatican City.

2.4.1.1 The first "war of independence" in 1848/49

On 23 March 1848, Charles Albert (Carlo Alberto), King of Sardinia, declared war against Austria. "Volunteers" from throughout Italy participated in this war. Savoy was initially able to occupy Austrian Milan, but was later defeated at Custoza between 23 and 25 June 1848. In 1849, broke out again, lasting three days between 20 and 23 March 1849; this skirmish led to the total defeat of Savoy at Novara.

2.4.1.2 The second "war of independence" in 1859

After the Piedmontese government had established a secret alliance with France under Napoleon III, which provoked an Austrian ultimatum that was then rejected, Austria declared war on April 1859. After some victories of the French-Piedmontese side at Solferino and San Martino on 24 June, France decided to end the war by signing an armistice with Austria at Villafranca, wherein Austrian Lombardy was to be ceded to France. This last then handed over the region to the Piedmontese monarchy.

2.4.1.3 The third "war of independence" in 1866

On 20 June 1866, Italy – having made a secret alliance with Prussia, which was engaged in a war against Austria in Germany – declared war on Austria as well. The Italian army was defeated at Custoza and Lissa. Only Garibaldi, with a contingent of the *Cacciatori delle Alpi*, won a victory against Austria just north of Lake Garda. After the Prussians won in the battle of Königgrätz/Sadowa, Austria was forced to cede Veneto to France, which in turn handed it over to the Italian kingdom.

¹⁹³ On the Sicilian revolution in general, see Raffaele De Cesare, *La fine di un regno. Vol. I* (Rome: Newton Compton, 1975), pp. 11-23 and Candeloro, *Storia dell'Italia moderna III*, pp. 118-130, 142-143, 220-240, 350-359.

Some historians speak of a “fourth war of independence”, which consisted for them in the First World War and led to the annexation of Trentino and Südtirol/Alto Adige.

All three (or four) wars of independence were thus waged against Austria. In retrospect, they seemed to have been the fulfilment of what Mazzini had already taught in 1832: “OUT WITH THE BARBARIAN: WAR ON THE AUSTRIANS!”¹⁹⁴ These wars seemed to have been national wars in the sense that they led to a unification of the national territory. But labelling the wars of independence as national wars is a nationalist interpretation in itself. Instead, the annexations were the result of a cession of regions by Italian allies. Italy was – with the exception of Garibaldi’s campaign in 1866 –defeated every single time by Austria in these wars. In terms of war, the (step-by-step) territorial unification of Italy came about as the result of the victories of Italy’s allies, France in 1859 and Prussia in 1866, or more precisely the Italian use of opportunities created by foreign victories.

2.4.2 *Italian civil war(s)?*

Against the backdrop of Austrian-Italian opposition, a portion of the wars¹⁹⁵ that broke out in nineteenth-century Italy were very much intra-Italian wars, wars between different Italian armies and armed groups: The small wars between revolutionaries such as Mazzini and the troops of the respective Italian states, the Sicilian-Neapolitan war of 1848/49, the War between Garibaldians and Bourbons in 1860, the war between Garibaldians and Italian troops in 1862, the short war between the Papal Army and the Italian troops in 1870, can all be seen from a civil war perspective.¹⁹⁶ Although the “civil war” is one of the least theorized categories of war, several publications in the existing literature propose some defining features. These criteria make a distinction between civil wars and other types of war such as the conventional inter-state war, i.e. war between states, and the extra-systemic war, in other words a war in which the combating groups transcend state boundaries.¹⁹⁷ Whereas the

¹⁹⁴ “FUORI IL BARBARO: GUERRA ALL’AUSTRIACO!”. Giuseppe Mazzini, “D’alcune cause che impediscono finora lo sviluppo della libertà in Italia,” in *Scritti editi ed inediti di Giuseppe Mazzini*, vol. 2 (Politica vol. 1) (Imola: Cooperativa tipografico-editrice Paolo Galeati, 1907 [1832]), p. 203, capital letters in the original.

¹⁹⁵ On the polarizing consequences of the use of the word “war” for individual and collective acts of violence see Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, *Gewalt und Politik im Europa des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2012), pp. 30-34.

¹⁹⁶ For the interpretation of the nineteenth-century wars in Spain as one “long” civil war see Jordi Canal, “Une guerre civile longue et persistante. Liberalisme, anti-liberalisme et violence politique en Espagne au XIX^e siècle,” *Mélanges de l’Ecole Française de Rome. Italie et Méditerranée* 114, no. 2 (2002): pp. 679-93; Jordi Canal, “Guerra civile e controrivoluzione. Spagna ed Europa del sud durante il XIX secolo,” *Memoria e Ricerca*, no. 21 (2006): pp. 133-56.

¹⁹⁷ My text adheres to the conceptualization as expressed in Meredith Reid Sarkees, Frank Whelon Wayman, and J. David Singer, “Inter-state, intra-state, and extra-state wars. A comprehensive look at their distribution over time, 1816-1997,” *International Studies Quarterly* 47, no. 1 (2003): pp. 49-70.

category of inter-state wars underlines the conflict between two different “containers” or states, and hence tends to neglect the internal conflicts within the states, the category of civil war does the opposite, calling our attention to antagonist structures within a given community.¹⁹⁸ Moreover, civil war breaks with the presupposition on the part of the state that it has the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence. During a civil war, members of society instead attempt to resolve their conflicts through the use of violence, and hence do not confine themselves to the legally predisposed state mechanisms of conflict resolution. Furthermore, in a civil war, the state goes from being the sole possessor of the legitimate use of violence to “just” *another* party of the conflict.¹⁹⁹ Under the category of civil war, one can subsume all kinds of armed conflicts that are fought within the “container” of a given state, an aspect made even clearer by the German word used to indicate civil war, “Bürgerkrieg”: The term indicates a war that is fought between different “Bürger”, i.e. different citizens of one single political community. When the notion of civil war is applied to the Wars of the Risorgimento the inner-Italian conflicts stand out. Instead of automatically subsuming the Wars of the Risorgimento into a category of conflicts that were exclusively fought only against foreign enemies such as Austria, the internal conflicts that were played out at least during some of the Risorgimento wars can be highlighted. For instance, the period between 1830 and 1870 was characterized by a consistent stream of failed as well as successful revolutionary attempts, which often saw the engagement of revolutionary armed groups with the state’s “weapons” of counterrevolution. As sociologist Peter Waldmann has aptly noted, “the distinction between civil war and revolution is not an easy one.”²⁰⁰ It is possible to note, however, that revolutions very often were linked in one way or another to either inter- or intra-state wars, which helped to “radicalize” the revolutions.²⁰¹ In my view, when events are spoken of as a revolution, the counter-revolutionary side of the story tends to get overlooked.

¹⁹⁸ This category also touches upon the issue of the definitions given by those actors and their opponents that are linked to the “state’s discursive monopoly on violence”. Haupt, *Gewalt und Politik*, p. 15. So in this case, in which a “double-bind” in the “discursive monopoly on violence” (between the existing states and the nation) was verified, that which for the nationalist is the famous Mazzinian phrase “in nome della patria e de’ nostri martiri, sia guerra all’Austria” was legitimate war as well as revolution (legitimizing war from the viewpoint of the nation), for the Austrian government of Lombardy-Venetia was illicit insurrection. On the “double-bind” of the traditional (sovereign-tributary-loyalty) and the “modern” (loyalty to the nation) in the revolutions of 1848 see Nikolaus Buschmann, “Treue und Verrat. Zur Semantik politischer Loyalität in Deutschland von den Befreiungskriegen bis zur Weimarer Republik,” in Manuel Borutta and Nina Verheyen, eds., *Die Präsenz der Gefühle. Männlichkeit und Emotion in der Moderne* (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2010), pp. 129-51.

¹⁹⁹ Irene Etzersdorfer, *Krieg. Eine Einführung in die Theorien bewaffneter Konflikte* (Vienna; Cologne; Weimar: Böhlau, 2007), pp. 81-82.

²⁰⁰ Peter Waldmann, “Civil Wars,” in Wilhelm Heitmeyer and John Hagan, eds., *The international handbook of violence research* (Dordrecht; Boston; London: Kluwer Academic, 2003), pp. 291-308.

²⁰¹ Andreas Herberg-Rothe, *Der Krieg. Geschichte und Gegenwart* (Frankfurt am Main; New York: Campus, 2003), p. 38. On the “totalizing” effect of Civil Wars see also Roman Schnur, “Zur Theorie des Bürgerkrieges.

If we take the example of the war of 1860, it is generally narrated only from the point of view of Garibaldi's Thousand. The Garibaldians increased from more than one thousand men at the time they embarked in Genoa to nearly 20,000 men (and some women) by the time they crossed the Strait of Messina due to the continuous influx of northern as well as southern Italians to the cause. In Sicily and southern Italy, Garibaldi's troops encountered a numerically much larger official Bourbon Army; this last counted 100,000 men in total, of which approximately half were posted in Sicily and the other half on the continent. Between 1861 and 1863, the annexation of the south of Italy was called into question by the "political brigandage", a tactic that was supported by the Bourbon King during his Roman exile. The history of these and other opponents of Italian unification has often been neglected.

The armed conflicts between nationalists and the Papal States prior to 1870 can also be seen as intra-Italian conflicts. These conflicts occurred during, within and in connection with a European-wide conflict: The "European Culture Wars", in the words of Christopher Clark, were "the conflict between anticlerical and Catholic/Ultramontane forces"²⁰² and were characterized by a radicalization of rhetoric. In the case of Italy, the aspiration to take Rome from the Pope and to make it the capital of Italy was – especially after 1848/49 – directly connected to a heightened form of anticlericalism, which is emblematically embodied by the case of Garibaldi, who defined the Catholic Church in 1861 as "a contagious and perverted sect".²⁰³

Another important issue linked with the concept of civil war is that this form of war violates the premise that the state has the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence or force. An example of such are the actions planned by Mazzini and his followers, which consisted in insurgencies that aimed to incite a general revolution, actions that were then suppressed by the various governmental troops. The picture is in some way puzzling with regard to the Garibaldian undertakings. In some cases, e.g. in 1859 and 1866, he led corps of the *Cacciatori delle Alpi*, which were official special units of the Piedmont or Italian Armies; the legitimization of their use of violence was derived indirectly from the state's monopoly on the use of violence, which was transferred from the state to his fighting units. The expedition of the Thousand, though, was not an *officially* backed action on the part of the Piedmont

Bemerkungen über einen vernachlässigten Gegenstand," *Der Staat* 19, no. 3 (1980): pp. 341-66, especially pp. 356-357.

²⁰² Clark, "The new Catholicism," p. 36.

²⁰³ "[...] setta perversa e contagiosa [...]". Giuseppe Garibaldi, "Alla associazione operaia di Napoli, Malatino 28 aprile 1861," in *Edizione nazionale degli scritti di Giuseppe Garibaldi. Epistolario. A cura di Giuseppe Fonterossi, Salvatore Candido, Emilia Morelli*, 14 vols., vol. 6 (Milan: Cappelli, 1983), p. 93.

government. In 1862, Garibaldi tried to reach Rome from the newly constituted Italian regions of Sicily and Calabria in the south. As Christopher Duggan has narrated the event:

“Already on 3 August the king had issued a proclamation urging Italians not to support Garibaldi. But the hope had been that this was merely a plot to keep Paris happy and that Victor Emanuel was secretly planning to repeat the trick of 1860: let Garibaldi advance and then step in at the last moment, take Rome and ‘save’ the Pope from the clutches of rebels. In reality, though, the government was too frightened of Napoleon to risk such a dangerous game. [...] On 20 August martial law was declared in southern Italy, and a few days later a column of 3,500 troops under Colonel Pallavicini was dispatched to halt the rebels [...] On the morning of 29 August [...] they [Garibaldi’s 2,500 men] came in sight of Pallavicini’s troops [...]. Strict orders were given to hold fire: Garibaldi had no wish to shed ‘fraternal blood’. But Pallavicini was a professional Piedmontese officer with instructions to treat the volunteers as insurgents; he sent his bersaglieri in action, shooting as they raced forward. [...] Garibaldi was hit twice.”²⁰⁴ In this case, Garibaldi’s actions violated the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence of the newly erected Italian state, which only two years before he had helped to create.

For at least some incidents during the Wars of the Risorgimento we can acknowledge that the *garibaldini* challenged the right that the existing states had on the use of violence. Moreover we are dealing with intra-Italian fighting that was being carried out between different regular and less regular, “volunteer” forces. Two of the criteria that define the concept of civil war have hence been fulfilled. But there is another criterion that leads to ambiguity in the Italian case to such an extent that perhaps the notion of civil war must be dismissed altogether. According to the concept of civil war, the war takes place within a single container, i.e. that the war is an intra-state war that takes place in the territory of one state and wherein all of the combatants are not only members of this last, they are at the same time members of the opposing fighting groups. A civil war, therefore, is a war between rival groups that have the same citizenship. Interpreting the Risorgimento as a civil war, in that it is too much of a forced interpretation, has hence been rejected by Gabriele Ranzato in an Italian anthology on the issue of civil, or “fratricidal wars”: He essentially states that in both the past and the present it was recognized that even after Italy was created there were no Italians. As

²⁰⁴ Duggan, *The force of destiny*, pp. 245-246.

such he asserted that the conditions for civil war were not met because not only was there no state, there was no nation.²⁰⁵

The Risorgimento was, however, at least in part, a massive inner-Italian conflict between differing ideological positions. While it is possible to take for granted this ideological contraposition when assessing the motives of the “leading” figures, an analysis of the motives underlying the entry into the war on the part of each individual soldier is of course another question, the moment the latter does not necessarily have to correspond (totally) to the former. The notion of civil war, however far it may be from being totally adequate in describing the Risorgimento Wars, does help to overcome an analysis that heretofore has been very one-sided – in its focus on the nationalist groups – and therefore encourages a far more serious analysis of the opposing factions than has been carried out thus far.

2.4.3 “National” wars – a “performative” perspective

The notion of “national wars” may be sustained particularly with regard to the various waves of Italian “volunteers” in these conflicts, insofar as unification and the building of a national Italian state may have – subjectively – been the aim in this case. In 1848/49 for instance, the Italian war volunteers were accompanied into war by the massive production of national songs, such as “*Fratelli d’Italia*”, which exalted national brotherhood; drew upon multiple Italian nationalized myths including the Genoese Balilla, the Florentine Ferruccio, the Lombard League and the Sicilian Vespers; and, in its refrain, called on the “brothers” to be ready to die in the name of the Italian nation. The refrain asked them to die in a military campaign, a campaign – the song was composed in 1847²⁰⁶ – that was clearly directed against what was perceived by the patriots as the “hereditary enemy of Italy”, Austria.

Wars that aim to unify supposedly national territory are labelled “national wars”; this stems from the idea that unification will be the result of these wars. Based on recent studies wherein aspects of the military are examined – e.g. acting out gender roles – the expression “national wars” can be seen from a performative perspective.

The expression “national war” may be associated with multiple meanings. At the basic level – as I already have noted – wars that aim to unify supposedly national territory can be

²⁰⁵ Gabriele Ranzato, “Un evento antico e un nuovo oggetto di riflessione,” in Gabriele Ranzato, ed., *Guerre fratricide. Le guerre civili in età contemporanea* (Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1994), pp. ix-lvi, p. xxvii.

²⁰⁶ For the context of Mameli’s song, and the fact that its content heavily downplays the history of regional conflicts between the pre-unity Italian regions and states (for instance, the Genoese child “Balilla” could have thrown his pebble in 1746 as well against Piedmont, ally of Austria) see, e. g., Emilio Costa, Giulio Fiaschini, and Leo Morabito, eds., *'Fratelli d'Italia'. Goffredo Mameli e Genova nel 1847* (Savona: Sabatelli, 1998).

labelled a “national war” because of the idea that unification will result by means of those wars. But in recent studies, another important concept of “national wars” surfaces whereby the national validity of military struggle itself is emphasized. As American historian Silvana Patriarca observed²⁰⁷, the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were characterized by the widespread foreign as well as Italian perception of the Italian nation as being backward, a backwardness that contrasted heavily with another perception of a former historical Italian supremacy. The Italian population was, according to this view, characterized by indolence, by laziness and a moral degeneration that led to the feminization of Italian men. The highly emblematic eighteenth- and still nineteenth-century phenomenon of the “*Cicisbeo*” – the “*Cavalier servente*” or professed gallant and/or lover of a married woman, who was considered effeminate because of his predisposition for luxury, theatre and his inclination for fashion – became a symbol of the effeminate Italian.²⁰⁸ Consequently, in the nineteenth century deliberate “politics of masculinization” were seen as an attempt to remedy the feminization of Italian men. According to this view, one important place in which the practice of re-masculinization ought to have taken place was in fighting. By military actions, Italian men would not only be educated to be real men, but they could at the same time show to themselves, the Italian nation and the world at large that they were making a comeback. It is no coincidence that the period and the movement that aimed to unify Italy was already at the time referred to as the “*Risorgimento*”, i.e. regeneration. The term insinuated that there was a return to their “natural condition”, not only that as foreign rule was overthrown there was a return to Italian rule, but also that the Italian people had or were undergoing a process of revival or resurrection. The latter logic points to the performative aspect of war itself. War, from this perspective, is waged as a form of communication to the world (and, not least, to the foreign comrades present in the Italian armed groups themselves) that masculinity was “restored”.

²⁰⁷ Silvana Patriarca, “Indolence and regeneration. Tropes and tensions of Risorgimento patriotism,” *American Historical Review* 110, no. 2 (2005): pp. 350-79; Silvana Patriarca, *Italian vices. Nation and character from the Risorgimento to the republic* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

²⁰⁸ For an in depth analysis of the phenomenon of the “*cicisbeo*”, see Roberto Bizzocchi, “Una nuova morale per la donna e la famiglia,” in Alberto Mario Banti and Paul Ginsborg, eds., *Il Risorgimento*, Storia d'Italia. Annali 22 (Turin: Einaudi, 2007), pp. 69-96.

2.5 The choice of the historiographical object: Germans on the Italian sides – a paradox?

2.5.1 The point of departure: German-Italian attraction and repulsion

My interest in the history of Germans in the Italian armed groups of the Risorgimento was initially piqued based on the nationalism studies I previously carried out. Research on Italian nationalism as well as my own work on the Italian national myth of the Balilla had revealed the central role that the negative image surrounding “tedeschi” (Germans) played in the process that emotionally charged and injected Italian nationalism with aggression. “Germans” that fought on the Italian sides, from this point of view, seemed nearly a paradox. How, then, can the participation of “Germans”, especially on the pro-national Italian sides, be reconciled with the particularly negative image of the Germans that was prevalent in Italy at the time? The word “tedeschi” was used consistently, at least from the 1830s onwards, to refer to the “Austrians”, which were seen – due to their dominance over important parts of the peninsula – by Italian nationalists as the main hindrance to and enemy of Italian unification, as well as the foundation of the conservative reaction in Europe. The negative image that was built around the designation “tedeschi” reached similar levels as that which the Germans had built around the idea that the French were their “hereditary enemy”.²⁰⁹ As in the latter case, the “creators” of myths did not hesitate to foment negative emotions against the “enemy”.²¹⁰ The Habsburg Empire came to be considered the “expansionist force” of the “Germans”²¹¹, and as such “ascended” to the role of *the* enemy of Italy. But the “Germans” were seen not only as a military enemy and a hindrance to Italian unification, but were downright “demonized” as

²⁰⁹ On the “enmity” between France and Germany see, e.g., Michael Jeismann, *Das Vaterland der Feinde. Studien zum nationalen Feindbegriff und Selbstverständnis in Deutschland und Frankreich 1792-1918* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1992). Nikolaus Buschmann, *Einkreisung und Waffenbrüderschaft. Die öffentliche Deutung von Krieg und Nation in Deutschland 1850-1871* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2003), pp. 219-240. In terms of national myths linked to the “Franzosenhass” see, e.g., Monika Flacke, “Deutschland. Die Begründung der Nation aus der Krise,” in eadem, ed., *Mythen der Nationen. Ein europäisches Panorama* (Munich; Berlin: Koehler & Amelang, 2001), pp. 101-28. For the directly opposed myths of Hermann and Vercingetorix, see Charlotte Tacke, *Denkmal im sozialen Raum. Nationale Symbole in Deutschland und Frankreich im 19. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1995), especially pp. 29-76

²¹⁰ Many recent works stress the intimate relation between images of the self and the other. Hetero-stereotypes, from this perspective, first and foremost negatively encapsulate that which constitutes the auto-stereotype. Although this is undoubtedly true, the *effects* that these stereotypes could have on transnational relationships runs the risk of being forgotten when the focus is directed toward this analytical aspect. It is hence important to underline that “prejudice, cliché or stereotype [...] severely limit the individual range of action and movement of those evaluated in this way”, as formulated by Roberto Sala and Patrick Wöhrle, “Fremdheitszuschreibungen in der Einwanderungsgesellschaft zwischen Stereotypie und Beweglichkeit,” in Oliver Janz and Roberto Sala, eds., *Dolce Vita? Das Bild der italienischen Migranten in Deutschland* (Frankfurt am Main; New York: Campus, 2011), p. 19.

²¹¹ Enzo Collotti, “I tedeschi,” in Mario Isnenghi, ed., *I luoghi della memoria. Personaggi e date dell'Italia unita*, (Rome; Bari: Laterza, 1997), p. 69.

“barbaric”. Through this use of language, the memory of the “barbarian invasions” of the Italian peninsula in the fourth and fifth century AD was linked to the dominant role of the Austrians in nineteenth-century Italy.²¹² The image of the Germans as “barbarians”, fuelled especially by a negative reading of Tacitus’ Germania, was not confined to the German-Italian case, however; it is found frequently throughout Europe and informs hetero-stereotypes in various countries.²¹³ In Italy, “barbarian” was a word that was applied to different peoples as well, and consequently different historical situations were perceived as similar anti-barbaric struggles. Nevertheless, due to the contemporary predominance of Austrian domination in Italy, the anti-“Germanic” struggle takes centre stage in the nineteenth century. In 1832 Mazzini refers to a series of Italian myths, from the battle of Legnano (1176) and the Sicilian Vespers (1282), to Masaniello (1647) and Balilla (1746).²¹⁴ Compared to other conflicts it was easier for some of these references to be interpreted²¹⁵ as conflicts between opposing forces of “Germans” and “Italians”, while in others other foreign-Italian opposition seemed to be central. Nevertheless, Mazzini focuses on the battle against Austria, concluding: “Say to them: It is up to you to imitate these acts [...S]tretch your hand to Lombardy: here are the men that perpetuate your servitude; stretch it to the Alps: there are your borders – and send the cry: OUT WITH THE BARBARIANS: WAR TO THE AUSTRIANS.”²¹⁶

The image of the “Austrians” as “barbarians” also informed albeit more narrowly the Italian view of the Austrian military. Carlo Botta in his widely diffused “Storia d’Italia”²¹⁷, when writing about the history of Genoa in 1746, designates the Austrian soldiers as

²¹² Alberto Mario Banti, “Le invasioni barbariche e le origini delle nazioni,” in idem and Roberto Bizzocchi, eds., *Immagini della nazione nell’Italia del Risorgimento* (Rome: Carocci, 2002), p. 30.

²¹³ See, e. g., the mutual denigration as “barbarians” in the German-French perceptions studied by Jeismann, *Vaterland der Feinde*.

²¹⁴ See for an overview on Italian national myths Ilaria Porciani, “Italien. ‘Fare gli Italiani,’” in Monika Flacke, ed., *Mythen der Nationen. Ein europäisches Panorama*, 2 ed. (Munich; Berlin: Koehler & Amelang, 2001), pp. 199-222.

²¹⁵ In fact, they were “made to be seen”. The historical inadequacy of referring to the Austrians as “Germans” in 1746 – “forgetting” as well that the Austrians were allied with the Piedmontese in this case – or the Anjou as “French” in 1282 from our historiographical point of view is obvious. But as Banti has rightly underlined, historical adequacy was not the issue, because the historical events were only important to nationalism as “figures, or the anticipations of an event that still should happen, the liberation of the nation [...]” Banti, *La nazione del Risorgimento*, p. 76.

²¹⁶ „Ditegli: sta in te l’imitare quegli atti [...S]tendete la mano alla terra Lombarda: là stanno gli uomini, che perpetuano il vostro servaggio: stendetela all’Alpi: là stanno i vostri confini: - e mandate il grido di FUORI IL BABARO: GUERRA ALL’AUSTRIACO!” Mazzini, “D’alcune cause,” p. 202-3, graphic highlighting in the original.

²¹⁷ The Italian histories of Carlo Botta figure in the “Risorgimento canon” to which many contemporaries referred to according to Banti, *La nazione del Risorgimento*, p. 45. Due to censorship at place, Botta’s history of Italy until 1789 was a best-seller for the Swiss editors at Lugano (Ruggia) and Capolago (Tipografia Elvetica), see Maria Iolanda Palazzolo, *I libri, il trono, l’altare. La censura nell’Italia della Restaurazione* (Milan: Franco Angeli, 2003), pp. 28 and 123-1226.

“tedeschi” and ascribes to them a particular harshness and avarice.²¹⁸ As Alberto Banti has noted, it was especially in Italian memories of contemporary events that the “role of the protagonist was given to the Austrian soldier”, who was “responsible for public beatings of naked women, unnecessary violence, unreproducible humiliations” of civilians.²¹⁹ In the memoirs written by Cesare Correnti on the Ten Days of Brescia in 1849, as reported by Banti, there are horrible descriptions of Austrian soldiers forcing “wives and children” not only to watch the Austrians set living men on fire, but “to swallow [...] the lacerated viscera of their sweethearts” as well.²²⁰ A special place in this barbarian imagery (as well as of that of the national “traitor”) is reserved – as Banti has shown – for rape. According to him, the issue of interethnic love and especially sexual relationships is central to national discourse. He believes that there is a real “obsession” with rape in nineteenth century narrations,²²¹ because it violates not only the honour of the Italian women but of the Italian men as well, insofar as it shows that they were unable to defend “their” (compatriot) women from such assaults.²²² “Barbarian” cupidity towards Italian women constitutes not only a threat to Italian “honour” but also to the Italian “ethnos”. The “barbaric” foreigners, hence, participate in a logic where “the evil ones become irremediably so, and the fact their soul is black is demonstrated by their wild inclination to sadistic sexual perversion.”²²³

Equating “Austrians” with “tedeschi” progressively gained traction also beyond the Italian territories of the empire. We find the motto “Morte ai tedeschi” on the walls, for instance in 1846 Florence and Ravenna²²⁴. In 1847, a Genoese newspaper presented the “Germans” as both the historical and contemporary “natural enemy”.²²⁵ “Death to the Germans! eternal scourge of Italy and her sons” figures still in 1862 in the libretto of Giuseppe Verdi’s *“La forza del destino”* (The Force of Destiny).²²⁶

The negative image of the Germans was noted in Germany as well, leading for instance in 1837 to the warning given to Germans travelling to Italy to avoid – on the basis of

²¹⁸ Carlo Botta, *Storia d'Italia continuata da quella del Guicciardini sino al 1789*, vol. 7 (Turin: Pomba e Comp., 1852), pp. 217 and 232.

²¹⁹ Banti, *La nazione del Risorgimento*, p. 177.

²²⁰ “[...] le mogli e i figliuoli [...]” “[...] di far inghiottire [...] le sbranate viscere dei loro dilette.” Cit. from *ibid.*, p. 179.

²²¹ Banti, *L'onore della nazione*, p. 245.

²²² See Banti, *La nazione del Risorgimento* and Banti, *L'onore della nazione*.

²²³ Banti, *L'onore della nazione*, p. 254.

²²⁴ Adolfo Colombo, “La tradizione di Balilla a Genova nel 1846,” in Adolfo Colombo, ed., *Goffredo Mameli e i suoi tempi* (Venice: La Nuova Italia, 1927), p. 243.

²²⁵ Giuseppe Antonio Papa, “Il centunesimo anniversario del 10 dicembre 1746 in Genova,” in Emilio Costa, Giulio Fiaschini and Leo Morabito, eds., *‘Fratelli d'Italia’. Goffredo Mameli e Genova nel 1847* (Savona: Sabatelli, 1998), pp. 232-40.

²²⁶ Second act, second scene.

the “German-Italian national hatred” (contemporary citation) – revealing their German origin; more specifically they should avoid presenting themselves as “Austrians” and instead declare themselves to be Prussian.²²⁷

At first, the participation of Germans in the Italian struggles of the Risorgimento might seem equally implausible, given the negative stereotypes of Italians diffused in Germany.²²⁸ Already the “*Italiensehnsucht*” (or longing for Italy) of the Germans (or better: the learned Germans) in Winckelmann and Goethe’s time combined the interest in the historic sites of Italy with a rather negative image of the inhabitants of the peninsula. The enlightened theories on the effects of climate on “national character” had contributed to shape the perceptions Germans had regarding the psychological traits of the Italians.²²⁹ Already in the nineteenth century, these perceptions were increasingly transposed into the idea that there were not only behavioural, but also physiological differences between the “races”.²³⁰ Those pictures were related to the perception of the south of Europe as an inner-European, “oriental” and “feminine” other for North-Europeans.²³¹ The Italians were described as cowardly, lazy, effeminate, superstitious, to cite only a few of the most recurrent attributes.²³² The idea that the north of Europe was relatively progressive as opposed to the backward, even “decadent”, Italy and southern Europe took centre stage. This picture very much informed the “journey to

²²⁷ Wolfgang Altgeld, *Das politische Italienbild der Deutschen zwischen Aufklärung und europäischer Revolution von 1848* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1984), p. 193.

²²⁸ The literature on German imagery of Italy and the Italians is particularly rich. On perceptions in the nineteenth century, see first and foremost the articles republished in Jens Petersen, *Italienbilder - Deutschlandbilder. Gesammelte Aufsätze* (Cologne: SH-Verlag, 1999). For a recent summary, which draws on Petersen and especially Wolfgang Altgeld, see Christof Dipper, “Traditionen des Italienbildes in Deutschland,” in Oliver Janz and Roberto Sala, eds., *Dolce Vita? Das Bild der italienischen Migranten in Deutschland* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2011), pp. 39-61.

²²⁹ Attilio Brilli, *Il viaggio in Italia. Storia di una grande tradizione culturale* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2006), pp. 278-286.

²³⁰ Banti, “Le invasioni barbariche,” p. 36. The debate over whether racism was a different (and/or later) phenomenon than nationalism, or whether instead “racism did not ‘actually’ mean something totally different from nationalism” (Sarasin) cannot be traced here; but the thesis of difference perhaps implicitly informs the idea that Italy was a “*nazione volontaria*” (voluntary nation), if by that a supposedly “voluntaristic” concept of the nation – as opposed to an “ethnic” nationalism – is evoked. See, together with Banti, e. g., Philipp Sarasin, “Die Wirklichkeit der Fiktion. Zum Konzept der ‘imagined communities’,” in idem, *Geschichtswissenschaft und Diskursanalyse* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2003), p. 176.

²³¹ Hans-Dietrich Schultz, “Italien und der Mittelmeerraum im geographischen Diskurs des 19. / 20. Jahrhunderts,” *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 45 (1997): pp. 696-717; Friethjof Benjamin Schenk, “Mental Maps. Zur Konstruktion von geographischen Räumen in Europa seit der Aufklärung,” *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 28, no. 3 (2002): pp. 493-514; Wolfgang Müller-Funk and Birgit Wagner, *Eigene und andere Fremde. 'Postkoloniale' Konflikte im europäischen Kontext* (Vienna: Turia & Kant, 2005); for the „longue durée“ see, e.g., Dieter Richter, *Der Süden. Geschichte einer Himmelsrichtung* (Berlin: Wagenbach, 2009).

²³² See, e. g., Altgeld, *Das politische Italienbild*, pp. 7, 21, 75, 91. We find elements of these characterizations again in the perception the Italians have of themselves, thus demonstrating the frequent overlap between hetero- and auto-stereotypes; see Patriarca, “Indolence and Regeneration,” pp. 350-79.

Italy”²³³, which developed from the aristocratic “Grand Tour” at the beginning of the nineteenth century.²³⁴ The inhabitants of the peninsula often figured here only as an ingredient of the “picturesque” – which necessarily included decadence and decay²³⁵ – if not as sexually attractive elements exactly because of their “alterity”.²³⁶ This was linked to a growing German sense of superiority with regard to Italy²³⁷, which seems to be resurfacing in our present debates on the “euro-crisis”, with its revival of the fable of the ant and the grasshopper. As Wolfgang Altgeld has shown for the period leading up to 1848, despite differences across the political spectrum, this negative image held in Germany – and also elsewhere – of the “national character” of the Italians was relatively consistent. In the words of Christoph Dipper, it formed the “basso continuo” of the German conception of the Italians.²³⁸ Given these particularly negative images of the “other” – the negative German image of the Italians as well as the negative picture of the “Germans” in Italy – the existence of Germans “fighting” in the Italian ranks seems like it would be a very improbable outcome.

But the respective reciprocal negative images of the “other” were, of course, only half of the story. On the other end of the spectrum lay the positive images²³⁹ that at times replaced – though, only for a while – the negative ones; and often the negative and positive images were related to each other sometimes in complex manners. This can be clearly shown, for instance, in the case of the image Germans had of Italians between the 1830s and 1870s.²⁴⁰ As opposed to the “basso continuo” of the negative picture – that in one way or another informed every position with regard to Italy – positive Italian images were far more dependent on political position. We do not find, however, a clear pattern that runs along party lines but rather “conflicting positions within the single camps” that sometimes led to quite “paradoxical

²³³ Underlining not only communalities, but also decisive differences between the “Grand Tour” and the “Journey to Italy” in terms of the characterization of the Italians, and seeing Goethe’s *Italienische Reise*, published in the late 1810s, as the turning point between the European “Grand Tour” and the “Italian journey” is Brilli, *Il viaggio in Italia*, pp. 40, 49, 59.

²³⁴ See, e. g., *ibid.*.

²³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 269.

²³⁶ Robert Aldrich, *The seduction of the Mediterranean. Writing, art and homosexual fantasy* (London; New York: Routledge, 1993), p. 9.

²³⁷ Altgeld, *Das politische Italienbild*, p. 340.

²³⁸ Dipper, “Traditionen des Italienbildes,” p. 57.

²³⁹ Both the negative and positive images and the historical change from the former to the latter in the case of German characterizations of Italian immigrants are highlighted in Oliver Janz and Roberto Sala, “Einleitung,” in *eidem*, eds., *Dolce Vita? Das Bild der italienischen Migranten in Deutschland* (Frankfurt am Main; New York: Campus, 2011), pp. 7-8.

²⁴⁰ For the Italian perception of the Germans and the extremes, see Collotti, “I tedeschi,” and for a more nuanced picture see instead Stefan Malfèr, “Immagini dell’altro. Austriaci e italiani,” in Alberto Mario Banti and Paul Ginsborg, eds., *Il Risorgimento*, Storia d’Italia. Annali 22 (Turin: Einaudi, 2007), pp. 849-854.

alliances of opinions.”²⁴¹ Nevertheless, positive images of Italy were very much confined to the liberal and democratic half of the German political spectrum. On this side of the political spectrum, moreover, there is a contemporary perception that a "parallel", in terms of political and national aspirations, existed between Germany and Italy.²⁴² But such ideas were often rapidly tempered by geopolitical considerations. For those that did not adhere to a strict “*kleindeutsche*” (the lesser German solution) or anti-Austrian position “Italy” and “Germany” could, already at the bilateral, German-Italian level, be seen to be in direct opposition to one another. This became clear within the context of the “question of Trento” as discussed in the Frankfurt national assembly as well as in the parliaments at Vienna and Innsbruck in 1848.²⁴³ In the same vein, Austria’s holdings in Italy could still be interpreted in later times as necessary for an “adequate German position in the middle of Europe” to exist.²⁴⁴ Perceptions of Italy also changed, when it was considered within the context of triangular, and even quadrangular geopolitical situations. If Austria and especially France were brought into the picture, the perspective could change significantly. This was especially the case in 1859 after France and Piedmont had formed their alliance in January of the same year. By this point in Germany many not only discussed what was happening in Italy, they also began to deliberate their possible direct participation in the imminent war. Among the more obvious and expected positions were those put forth by pro-Austrian, anti-Italian and anti-French conservative groups, which defended "monarchic legitimacy", many of which – together with others – were proponents of the greater German solution, who propounded "defending the Rhine at the Po".

Then there are others, such as Friedrich Engels, who was pro-Austrian because he was anti-French and anti-Bonapartist, and Ferdinand Lasalle who may have been anti-Austrian because of his pro-German and anti-reactionary stance.²⁴⁵ With Garibaldi’s expedition in 1860 and the subsequent formation of the Italian nation state German opinion once again reflected the position of its main political “parties”. Even more important is the fact that these events in Italy were for short periods able to drown out this negative “basso continuo”.

Liberals and democrats saw in 1860, more or less unbelievably, that not Germany, but Italy “had made it” first. Until 1870, hence before the Franco-Prussian war once again

²⁴¹ Jörn Leonhard, "Initial oder Modell? Die Perzeption des italienischen Risorgimento in Deutschland seit 1850," *Jahrbuch für Liberalismus-Forschung* 17 (2005): p. 206.

²⁴² See, e.g., *ibid.*

²⁴³ See the various respective petitions in Sergio Benvenuti, *L'autonomia trentina al Landtag di Innsbruck e al Reichstag di Vienna. Proposte e progetti 1848-1914* (Trento: Società di studi trentini di scienze storiche, 1978), pp. 15-23.

²⁴⁴ Dipper, "Traditionen des Italienbildes," p. 45.

²⁴⁵ See, e. g., Leonhard, "Initial oder Modell?," pp. 199-214, especially pp. 206-210.

profoundly changed the “mental maps” of Europe²⁴⁶, the image of the Italians in Germany was very much divided into two groups: the kleindeutsch-liberal-democratic praise of Italian unification and the Catholic-conservative-großdeutsch criticism.

2.5.2 Defining “Germans” and “border cases”

This study considered “Germans” to be those individuals born and raised in one of the states of the “German Confederation” (Deutscher Bund, 1815-1866) with the exception of Austria. The study is, however, well aware of the different possible definitions of the term, as well as the respective problems linked to any one of these possible concepts.

The chosen definition is for instance problematic already at a formal level. Whereas other studies on foreign soldiers in Italy in the early and mid-nineteenth century can (or at least do) quite easily speak of “French” or “British” soldiers in Italy, to use the terms “Germans” and “Italians” is of course much more problematic. This is so because in Italy and Germany the nation-state was still in its embryonic stages in this period. In strictly formal terms, there were no “German” or “Italian” subjects until the formation of the Kingdom of Italy in 1861 or the “Deutsches Reich” in 1871. Therefore, in terms of formal “citizenship” reference can only be made to those of the pre-national, existing states: When thinking of it from this point of view, we are not dealing with a German subject but with a citizen of the principality of Liechtenstein (part of the German Confederation) for instance, and until 1847 the British Army would, if considered at the same formal level, be comparable to the Army of the Duchy of Lucca.

The definition chosen for this study, however, adheres at least partially to a formal criterion, insofar as it encompasses those individuals born and/or raised in one of the states of the German Confederation²⁴⁷, with the exception of Austria. Therefore, what is decisive for this study is not the question as to whether the individuals were in possession of something like the “citizenship” of a state, but whether they were born or lived there in their early years; in terms of the historical and political debate over citizenship law, this study chooses a combination of “ius soli” and an early “naturalization”, by underlining the place of birth as well as the time spent in the territory of the given state. This definition is also partially based

²⁴⁶ How far such images actually informed the soldiers who were fighting remains to be seen for this case as well as in others. A negative answer to the question with regard to the First World War is given for instance by Oliver Janz, *14 - Der große Krieg* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2013), p. 98, according to which “hardly any soldier saw barbarians or the hereditary enemy in the men that were lying opposite to him in the trenches”.

²⁴⁷ Included therefore are also soldiers that came from other states of the German Confederation that would not be part of the German nation-state when it was instituted in 1871, such as Luxembourg, Limbourg and Liechtenstein. On this basis, the definition has been used in a “strict” manner, *including* soldiers from the part of Luxembourg that in 1839 was ceded to Belgium, *if* they were born or lived there up to this date.

on the analysis of the soldiers' registers, in which the following information on "origin" of the soldiers is normally given: the place of birth, the last residence and often information on previous military engagements, and therefore the time spent in different territories.

The primary reason for the exclusion of Austria in this definition – but of course not in terms of its historical role in Italy and for the "German" soldiers studied – lays in its function as a direct warring party in Italy. The research interest is *not* about soldiers enlisting in the army of their "own" country of origin. It is for this reason that Austrians in the Austrian army are excluded.²⁴⁸ The Austrian army did not consist, however, in Austrians alone; there were "Italians" and soldiers from states of the German Confederation in the Austrian ranks as well. Some of the Germans in this study, for instance, were at one time soldiers in the Austrian army. Despite many similarities and interdependencies, however, subjects of other German states that fought in the Austrian ranks have been excluded. To include them would have been to divert too much attention from the German-Italian (military) relations upon which the study focuses; it would have inserted the study far too much into the context of German history alone, right into the heart of the historiographical debate about the formation of the German nation state, which revolved partially around a *großdeutsche* (with Austria, or at least its' German-speaking territories) and *kleindeutsche* solution (with neither Austria nor its predominantly "German" territories). It is however important for my study to underline that I do not believe that the *großdeutsche* solution was historically impossible, nor that the "*kleindeutsche*" outcome was "natural". I also do not believe that the idea that the contemporaries of the early and mid-nineteenth century had of "German" individuals necessarily excluded (German) Austrians.

In fact, caution must be taken not to read the past through the lens of the historical outcome of this process. At the same time however, it would be wrong to neglect or overlook elements that, vice versa, pushed toward the "*kleindeutsche*" solution.²⁴⁹ This study tries to take the German complexities in this regard into consideration. The important role that Austria played, for instance, for Catholic Prussians will be equally taken into account as the "slippery slope" inherent in the construction of the term "tedeschi" as the word assigned to

²⁴⁸ A history of the Austrian soldiers in the Italian campaigns remains to be written, and in particular the history of Italians in Austrian service; but on the perspective of members of the Austrian army in Venice and the Italians, see Piero Brunello, ed. *Rivolta e tradimento. Sudditi fedeli all'imperatore raccontano il Quarantotto veneziano* (Mestre: StoriAmestre, 2012). See, as well, Piero Brunello, "Austriaci a Venezia," in Stefano Petrunaro, ed., *Fratelli di chi. Libertà, uguaglianza e guerra nel Quarantotto asburgico* (Santa Maria Capua Vetere: Edizioni Spartaco, 2008), pp. 17-41.

²⁴⁹ For a finely nuanced discussion of the problem in these terms see Dieter Langewiesche, "Deutschland und Österreich. Nationswerdung und Staatsbildung in Mitteleuropa im 19. Jahrhundert," in idem, *Nation, Nationalismus, Nationalstaat in Deutschland und Europa* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2000), pp. 172-89.

mean the Austrian enemy in Italy, the effects of which also could apply to the soldiers from other German states as well.

At the same time, just because the nineteenth century was the formative period not only of the nation state, but of national identity at least in Italy and Germany, one of the aims of the study is to see how closely the soldiers that have been identified by this chosen definition regarded *themselves* as Germans, but also whether they identified with regional identities, which could be seen as opposed or, instead, linked to the idea of the nation. Furthermore, the study explores the intertwined effects of self-image and the external images that were triggered by German-Italian contact. In the end, the study should reveal as well, what these “German” soldiers had or did not have in common, and looks at the specificity of German soldiering in comparison to other foreign-Italian cases. The longer the soldiers were away from Germany, the more we must ask the level of their “Italianization”, in terms of their integration into the Italian society. Some of the foreign soldiers lived abroad or in Italy for quite a long time. Some married Italian women, and some were “naturalized” and/or tried to join the new Italian Army. Furthermore, some tried to actively “Italianize” themselves, for instance when the Bourbon officer Ludwig Richard Zimmermann undersigned the dedication of his book as “Luigi Riccardo”.²⁵⁰

Every definition, however refined, leads to disputable inclusions and exclusions. On the basis of my definition, for instance, a series of cases will not be considered in depth. For instance, the sons of binational German-Italian couples who were born in Italy and entered Italian armed groups will not be discussed. A specific example of this is Enrico Mayer, born in Livorno to a German father and a French mother, who took part as a volunteer in the first Italian War of Independence in 1848: Mayer did not obtain his Italian citizenship until 1860. As a result of his kinship, he played a key role as mediator between the Italian, German and, in this case, also French sides.²⁵¹ Among the cases that are included in our sample, are special cases, “borderline cases” that are, as always, particularly interesting and revealing. Among the Papal Zouaves, for instance, we find sons of Italians that emigrated to Germany, among which the three brothers Leopold, Alfred and Heinrich Marzorati from Aachen.²⁵² Another “borderline case” is the Mazzinian Harro-Paul Harring. Born in Danish Schleswig in 1798, Harring studied painting first in Copenhagen and then in Dresden, where he first came into

²⁵⁰ Ludwig Richard Zimmermann, *Erinnerungen eines ehemaligen Briganten-Chefs* (Berlin: Hausfreund-Expedition, 1869), p. II.

²⁵¹ See Arturo Linaker, *La vita e i tempi di Enrico Mayer. Con documenti inediti della storia della educazione e del Risorgimento italiano 1802-1877*, 2 vols. (Florence: G. Barbera, 1898).

²⁵² The three were all sons of Alfredo Marzorati and Christina Rasch, according to the matriculation numbers 802, 4621 and 5209 of the Papal Zouaves.

contact with the German *Burschenschaften* (student associations). He wrote and published both in Danish and German, as well as in other languages. While he was trying to establish nation states, he himself led a life very much *between* the national groups.²⁵³

2.6 Research contexts

A comparative study of German soldiers *across* the Italian political spectrum must necessarily incorporate very different strands of historiography. Already studies that have concentrated more narrowly on foreign participation on one Italian side, or those dedicated to one foreign-Italian case, be it on the pro- or anti-Unitarian side, must necessarily depart from the historiography on nineteenth-century Italy as well as one or more other “national” historiographies. For various aspects of the history of foreign soldiers in Italy we have to change between, as well as bring together, different “traditional” historiographies.

Furthermore, given the various aspects involved in the history of the foreign participants under scrutiny, we must change historical perspective. Thus, it seems obvious from the start, that “national history” at least partially informs the reasons as to why Germans left for Italy. Ute Frevert pointed out that “the European actions of solidarity for the independence movements between 1820 and 1870 were highly motivated by domestic political concerns: Either they served, as in Great Britain, for purposes of self-scrutiny, or, as with Germany, to stimulate their own aspirations for unification.”²⁵⁴ Similarly, Lucy Riall underlined in reference to the foreign soldiers under Garibaldi, that “internal politics and preferences had always played a significant role in defining foreign support for Garibaldi: resistance to Napoleon III in the case of France; and a strident Protestantism [...] in the case of Britain and the USA”.²⁵⁵ Rather than just “national” reasons to enlist or to hire foreigners in Italy, perhaps we are also dealing with specifically “transnational collective sentiments”, with ideas of “international friendship and fraternity”²⁵⁶ that transcended the “national” in that it constituted “non-national” elements of motivation as well. Some authors ask us to view foreign participation in the Risorgimento or Anti-Risorgimento as episodes in the continuity of different “European”²⁵⁷ movements, from an “international of nationalists” and/or

²⁵³ See for more information on Harring p. 272.

²⁵⁴ Ute Frevert, *Eurovisionen. Ansichten guter Europäer im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer, 2003), p. 76.

²⁵⁵ Riall, *Invention of a hero*, p. 301.

²⁵⁶ Pécout, “Philhellenism in Italy,” pp. 405-27.

²⁵⁷ “European” first of all in scope, but perhaps as well in terms of identity. In the latter direction, but without discussing the issue, seems to tend Sarlin, *Légitimité en armes*, pp. 133-186. See on the complex issue of something like a “European” identity Frevert, *Eurovisionen*. See as well, albeit for a different period, Guido Müller, “Jenseits des Nationalismus? ‘Europa’ als Konzept grenzübergreifender adlig-bürgerlicher Elitendiskurse

democrats to the “international” of legitimists and (Ultramontane) Catholics. This perspective necessarily requires a return to the history of political “ideologies” in the nineteenth century; therefore, a comparative study such as this must take into account the history of the different and contrasting ideologies present at the time. The history of German (and Italian) Catholicism, but also of German “Protestantism” – as far as it informed the pro-national foreign soldiers – and the historiography on monarchism and legitimism are as important for this study as nationalism studies and the history of the political “centre” and the “left”.

If we move away from the perspective of the issue of motivation and direct our attention toward the experiences and practices linked to the foreign soldiers, still other historiographical contexts come into play. On the one hand it seems fair to assume that the longer the foreigners remained in Italy, the more “Italian” history per se has an influence on them. On the other hand, the study will argue that we need to “dirty our hands” far more with military history if we wish to fully understand the experiences of these soldiers. Moving into the sphere of military history is a particularly delicate matter: A “military history” of the *garibaldini* and especially of the “regular” armies of other pre-Unitarian states than Piedmont, remains very much to be written.²⁵⁸ This information is necessary however, as it will be argued, the moment not just the transnational experiences are asked for, but also the clashes, transfers and hybrid “innovations” that were generated by the foreign-Italian military commitment. Indeed, the question of eventual specificities in the history of foreigners, or even more narrowly of Germans in the armed groups of the Italian Risorgimento and Anti-Risorgimento, can only be addressed once an understanding of the history of non-foreign soldiers in these groups has been acquired. The same may be said for the question of possible transnational transfers, for which it is necessary to a certain degree to have an idea – even if only as an analytical “construct” – of a “before” and an “after”. In other words, a comparison must be made. Rather than highlighting the differences and problems between comparative and transnational history in terms of “Galton’s problem”, here as elsewhere, the aim is to see how comparisons, transnational perspectives and especially “entangled histories” are intimately linked: “In order, as a historian, to recognize what is happening during a transfer, one must compare the following: the position of the object under investigation in its old context with that in its new context, the social origins of the intermediaries and of the affected parties in one country with those of another, terms in one language with those of another, and

zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen,” in Heinz Reif, ed., *Adel und Bürgertum in Deutschland*, vol. 2 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2001), pp. 235-68.

²⁵⁸ Therefore, I am advocating here a “military” or “new military history” declination of the seminal work written by Marco Meriggi, *Gli stati italiani prima dell'unità*, 2 ed. (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2011).

finally the interpretation of a phenomenon within the cultural context from which it comes with that in which it has been introduced.”²⁵⁹

2.6.1 Nationalism and Risorgimento studies

Recently, the “Risorgimento” has once again become a very much debated historical object, scientifically²⁶⁰ and politically.²⁶¹

2.6.1.1 (Dis-)continuities

One node of the scientific debate centres on the question of the (dis-)continuities of nationalism with national identity in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, especially during Italian fascism: Positions that assume central continuities go hand in hand with a strong

²⁵⁹ Johannes Paulmann, cited from Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Jürgen Kocka, "Comparison and beyond. Traditions, scope, and perspectives of comparative history," in eadem, eds., *Comparative and transnational history. Central European approaches and new perspectives*, p. 20.

²⁶⁰ See Alberto Mario Banti and Paul Ginsborg, "Per una nuova storia del Risorgimento," in eadem, eds., *Il Risorgimento*, Storia d'Italia, Annali 22 (Turin: Einaudi, 2007), pp. xxiii-xli; Patriarca and Riall, *The Risorgimento revisited*. For a critical discussion of the “new” Risorgimento historiography see also Lucy Riall et al., "Leggere la nuova storia del Risorgimento. Una visione dall'esterno. Una discussione con Alberto M. Banti," *Storica* 13, no. 38 (2007): pp. 91-132; Gianluca Albergoni, "Sulla 'nuova storia' del Risorgimento. Note per una discussione," *Società e Storia* 120 (2008): pp. 349-66; Luca Mannori, "Il Risorgimento tra 'nuova' e 'vecchia' storia. Note in margine ad un libro recente," *ibid.*: pp. 367-79; Lucy Riall and Axel Körner, "Introduction. The new history of Risorgimento nationalism," *Nations and Nationalism* 15, no. 3 (2009): pp. 369-401; Lucy Riall, "Nation, 'deep images' and the problem of emotions," *ibid.*: pp. 402-09; Axel Körner, "The Risorgimento's literary canon and the aesthetics of reception. Some methodological considerations," *ibid.*: pp. 410-18; David Laven, "Why patriots wrote and what reactionaries read. Reflections on Alberto Banti's *La nazione del Risorgimento*," *ibid.*: pp. 419-26; Maurizio Isabella, "Emotions, rationality and political intentionality in patriotic discourse," *ibid.*: pp. 427-33; Catherine Brice, "Alberto M. Banti. A historian of politics?," *ibid.*: pp. 434-38; John F. Breuilly, "Risorgimento nationalism in the light of general debates about nationalism," *ibid.*: pp. 439-45; Alberto Mario Banti, "Reply," *ibid.*: pp. 446-54; Alberto Mario Banti, "Entretien avec Catherine Brice," *Revue d'histoire du XIXe siècle* 44 (2012): pp. 17-27; Gilles Pécout, "Pour une lecture méditerranéenne et transnationale du Risorgimento," *ibid.*, no. 1: pp. 29-47; Lucy Riall, "Guerre et nation dans l'Italie du Risorgimento," *ibid.*: pp. 49-64; Silvana Patriarca, "Une émotion patriotique. La honte et le Risorgimento," *ibid.*: pp. 65-83; Catherine Brice, "Monarchie, état et nation en Italie durant le Risorgimento (1831-1870)," *ibid.*: pp. 85-100; Simon Sarlin, "L'effondrement de l'Italie pré-unitaire. L'exemple du royaume des Deux-Siciles," *ibid.*: pp. 101-14; Maria Pia Casalena, "Femmes et Risorgimento. Un bilan historiographique," *ibid.*: pp. 115-25; Daniele Menozzi, "L'historiographie catholique face au Risorgimento," *ibid.*: pp. 139-50; Massimo Baioni, "Mémoires publiques du Risorgimento dans l'Italie libérale. Un parcours historiographique," *ibid.*: pp. 151-61.

²⁶¹ From “Garibaldi – cretino” (Umberto Bossi, 2007) to the description of the Italian patriots as a band of muddle-headed free-masons with the aim of “liberating Italy from Catholicism” according to Angela Pellicciari, *Risorgimento ed Europa. Miti, pericoli, antidoti* (Verona: Fede & Cultura, 2008). The annexation of the South is described as an “invasion” by Fulvio D'Amore, *Viva Francesco II. Morte a Vittorio Emanuele! Insorgenze popolari e briganti in Abruzzo, Lazio e Molise durante la conquista del Sud 1860-1861* (Naples: Controcorrente, 2004). For an attempt to write a slightly less polemic history of the “victims” see the publications of Gigi di Fiore, for instance his Gigi Di Fiore, *Controstoria dell'Unità d'Italia. Fatti e misfatti del Risorgimento* (Milan: RCS Libri, 2007). For a short discussion of especially the Catholic invectives against the Risorgimento, see Massimo Baioni, "La 'bugia risorgimentale'. Revisionismo in mostra," in idem, *Risorgimento conteso. Memorie e usi pubblici nell'Italia contemporanea* (Reggio Emilia: Diabasis, 2009), pp. 233-41. For a critical and pondered discussion of the south Italian “anti-risorgimental” polemics in particular, see Salvatore Lupo, *L'unificazione italiana. Mezzogiorno, rivoluzione, guerra civile* (Rome: Donzelli, 2011).

criticism of an orientation that focuses on “Risorgimento values” today.²⁶² Alberto Mario Banti has claimed the existence of a “national discourse” that according to him was common to the two classical pro-Unitarian “factions”, democrats and liberals. Furthermore, he stresses that rather than viewing the nation as a “voluntary” association of people, “national discourse” very much placed the idea of “kinship” between the members of the national community at its centre and, therefore, the nation was considered a form of extended family. According to Banti, this biological and ethnic definition of the nation had already begun to spread from the French Revolution onwards, and was a position accepted as well by the “left”. Whereas in his first book on the issue he concentrated on “national discourse” only in Italy²⁶³, in a subsequent publication he tries to demonstrate that a similarly constructed “national discourse” also operated in other European countries during the same period.²⁶⁴ For other authors, positions of this kind are anachronistic in that they read the early and mid-nineteenth century through the lens of “the chauvinism and authoritarianism of the end of the nineteenth century”.²⁶⁵ In contrast to Banti, they place more emphasis on the *democratic* contents of national discourse²⁶⁶ or hypothesize the parallel and opposing existence of at least two national discourses, a democratic and a liberal one, during the Risorgimento.²⁶⁷

This discussion, however, is basically in line with debates on other “national” nationalisms and nationalism studies in general. Much of the older literature on nationalism is informed by various “typologies” of nationalisms. Some authors have underlined more or less contemporarily existing, though very different forms of nationalism. Friedrich Meinecke’s differentiation between a German *Kulturnation* (a nation based on the sharing of a common culture) and a French *Staatsnation* (a nation more or less based on the political will of its members to build a nation-state) is to be collocated here, and still today informs the dichotomy between a supposedly typically German “*ius sanguinis*” and a French “*ius soli*”.²⁶⁸ Typology also informed the idea of a supposedly distinct difference between a “progressive, emancipatory”, “liberal” nationalism – sometimes even termed appositely as “Risorgimento

²⁶² See the use of the Risorgimento memory in the official 150th anniversary (obviously its history has yet to be written), e. g., Giorgio Napolitano, *Una e indivisibile. Riflessioni sui 150 anni della nostra Italia* (Milan: Rizzoli, 2011). A critic of the official dimension is Alberto Mario Banti, “Dell’uso pubblico del Risorgimento, e di un’antologia di documenti,” in idem, *Nel nome dell’Italia. Il Risorgimento nelle testimonianze, nei documenti e nelle immagini* (Turin: Einaudi, 2010), pp. V–XVII; Alberto Mario Banti, “Benigni e Fratelli d’Italia. Dubbi su una lezione di storia,” *Il Manifesto*, 20/02/2012.

²⁶³ Banti, *La nazione del Risorgimento*.

²⁶⁴ Banti, *L’onore della nazione*.

²⁶⁵ Riall, “Eroi maschili,” p. 287.

²⁶⁶ See for instance how cosmopolitan visions fuelled by the experience of exile seem to differ from later official national discourse in Agostino Bistarelli, *Gli esuli del Risorgimento* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2011).

²⁶⁷ Riall, “Eroi maschili,” p. 286.

²⁶⁸ Brubaker, *Citizenship*.

nationalism” in the European historiographies²⁶⁹ – and a conservative, chauvinistic, “integral” form. In many cases the typology was considered the basis upon which the idea of a historical development was formed: According to this position, there was a decisive shift in the late nineteenth century from a basically “left wing” to a “right wing” nationalism. These positions go hand in hand with the emphasis that is placed on the differences between nationalism in the nineteenth century and the nationalism inherent in Italian fascism or German national-socialism; according to these authors, early and mid-nineteenth century nationalism is essentially different from racism, simply because they make a distinction between what they consider to be a basically “voluntaristic” nationalism, characteristic of the early and mid-nineteenth century, and an “ethnic” nationalism, which developed only subsequently.

Many doubts, however, have been expressed with regard to the thesis of a stark difference between “left” and “right”, earlier and later nationalisms. In Germany for instance, Dieter Langewiesche argued against the “pedagogy of concepts”, against pitting a “good” nation against “bad” nationalism, “good” patriotism against “bad” nationalism, as well as a “good” nationalism against a “bad” nationalism. Instead, he emphasizes that nationalism “comprises [...] and delivers both: participation and aggression”, even if “in different dosages in the different societies and in different historical times”. According to Langewiesche, it is hence misleading to “make a demarcation between an only emancipatory, still innocent national thinking of early times against a degenerated nationalism of later times.”²⁷⁰ It is enough to think of the “Franzosenhass” (“hatred of the French”) of Ernst Moritz Arndt in 1813, the German songs on the Rhine in the 1840s²⁷¹, Friedrich Ludwig Jahn’s vision of a “great Germany” which incorporated “Switzerland, Holland and Denmark”²⁷² or the aforementioned construction of the “Germans” as “barbarians” in Italian nationalism to call into question this “good-bad” divide: “As in the case of the other nationalisms”, writes Hans-Ulrich Wehler, “the element of a fundamentalist enmity against a supposedly ‘hereditary enemy’ was constitutively part of German nationalism from the beginning, which [however], due to its close relationship with early liberalism and already with national-democratic ideas saw itself as a philanthropic reform movement.”²⁷³ Banti’s emphasis on the European “ubiquity” of ethnic nationalism as well as on its continuity from the early nineteenth to the

²⁶⁹ See, e.g., Peter Alter, *Nationalismus* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1985), p. 33.

²⁷⁰ Dieter Langewiesche, *Nation, Nationalismus, Nationalstaat in Deutschland und Europa* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2000), pp. 39-40.

²⁷¹ Kunze, *Nation*, p. 39.

²⁷² Wehler, *Nationalismus*, p. 68.

²⁷³ Ibid., p. 68.

early twentieth century²⁷⁴, seems to be only the last, even if highly controversial, slap in the face to the positive visions of nationalism.

Instead of discussing all the nodes of the substantial debates on Italian nationalism²⁷⁵ and Banti's contribution, I will concentrate on two points that in my view merit further discussion, and which are particularly important for the object of this study. First, it seems that the issue of continuities between the nineteenth century and the past (i.e. previous centuries) is still underexplored; we will see how much pre-nineteenth century traditions continued to inform the armies and armed groups of the nineteenth century. Second, it is opportune to discuss the analytical concepts, including an assessment of the pros and cons of the concept of "discourse" with regard to established concepts such as political opinions or ideologies as well as their differences: In these terms, for instance, it will be argued that the postulation whereby national discourse can sufficiently and directly explain national movements is highly problematic.

2.6.1.2 Cultural and social epistemologies

Part of the contentiousness of the "new" historiography of the Risorgimento is associated with its transition toward a more cultural analysis. With this change, a series of new objects and new analytical conceptions took hold. Some of these conceptions rendered the already established ones problematic, among which "subjectivity", "conscience", "intentions", "experience" or the supposed opposition between "production" and "reception". Were Risorgimento historiography to continue treating new theoretical paths on issues like resistance, conflict, pluralities and change, it would enable this branch to maintain its strong relationship with international debates, "foreign" methodologies and cross-cultural comparisons – a reality that doubtlessly has been very prolific for Risorgimento historiography over the last two decades. The theoretical possibilities created by concepts such as "production of practices", the crossover between different discourses, or slightly subversive performative repetition have not by any means been exhaustively treated. A clear demonstration of these shifts can be made in the case of "private" writing²⁷⁶ and the

²⁷⁴ Banti is, however, not alone. Sarasin, for instance, also identifies a strong relation between nationalism and racism; Philipp Sarasin, *Geschichtswissenschaft und Diskursanalyse* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2003), especially pp. 163 and 176.

²⁷⁵ I will leave out for instance Catherine Brice's criticism, which "challenges" Banti "indirectly" by calling into question the supposedly clear-cut conception of the "family" which in Banti's account functions as the basis and model for the national community. See Catherine Brice, "Métaphore familiale et monarchie constitutionnelle. L'incertaine figure du roi 'père' (France et Italie au XIXe siècle)," in Gilles Bertrand, Catherine Brice and Gilles Montègre, eds., *Fraternité. Pour une histoire du concept* (Grenoble: CRIHPA, 2012), pp. 157-85. For more on the debate about Risorgimento nationalism, see footnote no. 260.

²⁷⁶ See, e. g., Massimo Baioni, *Patria mia. Scritture private nell'Italia unita* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2011).

“experience” of subjects, where, in contrast to a tradition in which experiences are seen as expressions of a kind of pure individual subject, some historians continue to emphasize that the importance of social and cultural guidelines must not be forgotten or overlooked, nor should the links between the “self-writing” with the fulfilment of collectively constructed roles, be they “private” or “public”. Indeed, much of the current historiographical production has shown how the Risorgimento affected the “private” sphere as well as the “public” sphere, to such an extent that the two can no longer be separated.²⁷⁷

2.6.1.3 Discourse and political opinions

On the basis of well-established views on what was quite a difficult and long process of “nationalization” in the European societies, a heated debate erupted over the characterization of the Risorgimento as a “mass movement”.²⁷⁸ One of the reasons this debate was so fierce seems to reside in the fact that – on both “sides of the debate” – two historical objects were too easily confuted. I think that it is important to distinguish conceptually between “national movements” and “national discourse” – regardless of whether this distinction is made with reference to Germany or to Italy. The national movement is characterized by its well-known open or secret associations, the structures that allow us to speak – a bit anachronistically – of the political “parties” of democrats, liberals or monarchists in the nineteenth century. The second object is constituted by the pan-European “national discourse”: Pan-European is not to be understood in the sense of a “European identity”, but rather because “national discourse” was, despite significant differences, similarly constructed within each nation throughout Europe²⁷⁹. The point is, however, that these two historical objects, “national movements” and “national discourse”, do not completely overlap, and hence we cannot directly derive the strength of the pro-Unitarian movements from a study of “national discourse” or vice-versa. The studies on the forms of organization, the media, the political-ideological positions and the networks of the national movement are by no means obsolete. Why is this so?

First, it would be good to remember that the introduction of the term “discourse” into the field of nationalism studies only really makes sense if we describe at least partially another “reality” with the term that cannot fully be grasped using just the existing terms such

²⁷⁷ See, e. g., Laura Guidi, “Donne e uomini del Sud sulle vie dell'esilio 1848-60,” in Alberto Mario Banti and Paul Ginsborg, eds., *Il Risorgimento*, Storia d'Italia. Annali 22 (Turin: Einaudi, 2007), pp. 225-52; Luisa Levi d'Ancona, “Padri e figli nel Risorgimento,” *ibid.*, pp. 153-79.

²⁷⁸ The debate over the phrase from Banti and Ginsborg, wherein the Risorgimento was described as a “mass movement” seems, to me, the result of over-hastily equating – on both sides of the debate – two distinct historical objects (discourse/movement) one with the other. The phrase in Alberto Mario Banti and Paul Ginsborg, “Per una nuova storia del Risorgimento,” *ibid.*, p. xxxiii.

²⁷⁹ On European circulation in the construction of the single national “identities” see Anne-Marie Thiesse, *La création des identités nationales. Europe XVIIIe-XXe siècle* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1999).

as “nationalism” or “national movement”. Banti in “La nazione del Risorgimento” explicitly links his considerations to Michel Foucault – as well as others, such as Propp – by quoting him, or by being inspired by him for instance in chapter headings (e.g. “Archaeology of national discourse”). Nevertheless, in his second book Banti uses other words as well, among which “*discorso risorgimentale*” or “nationalism”. In my opinion, however, it is important to emphasize that “national discourse” is a distinct concept from others such as “nationalism” and “national movement”, and hence for me the conflation of the various concepts – whether in Banti’s work or in that of other authors – is highly problematic.

This is so precisely because several theoretical assumptions are connected to the concept of “discourse” that might prove very useful for empirical research. Speaking of a “national discourse” in the Foucauldian sense means something different or “more” than just the plurality of empirically existing linguistic “utterances” on the nation (states). These “utterances” according to Foucault – he differentiates between “utterances” (“*énonciation*”) and “statements” (“*énoncé*”) – are not the “discourse” itself, but only the necessary empirical objects for the study of “discursive formations”. “Discourse”, in other words, comes through in these utterances, but is something (at least partially) different from them. The aim of an analysis of “discourse” is to elucidate the respective boundaries of what factually *can* be said at a certain historical point, and what cannot. At the same time, the penetration of society by “discourse” also means – and this is an important node in the Foucauldian theory of power – that it becomes extremely difficult to express oneself outside certain forms of speech or to do certain things in other ways than is required by “discourse” without being utterly dismissed.

According to Peter Schöttler, Foucault therefore focuses, “instead of on domination-free and tolerant communication, [...] focussing on invisible and non-violent coercions, which pervade society or parts thereof and provoke, such that only that which is normally said, is what culturally and historically could be said.”²⁸⁰ In other words, discourse – in this theoretical sense – is a historical “*a priori*”, beyond which the single speaker cannot say anything, without running the risk of being regarded as odd. The subject, in this conception, is informed very much in an unconscious way by discourse as structure; in fact Foucault speaks of the “positive unconscious of knowledge”²⁸¹, which is historically variable.

It is on this theoretical basis that a transposition of the political-historical differences between liberals and democrats into two or even more contemporarily existing “national

²⁸⁰ Peter Schöttler, “Wer hat Angst vor dem linguistic turn?,” *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 23 (1997): p. 137.

²⁸¹ Michel Foucault, “Prefazione all’edizione inglese di *The Order of Things*,” in idem, *Follia, scrittura, discorso* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1996), p. 243.

discourses”, namely a democratic “national discourse” and a liberal one, is not entirely convincing. Not because the differences between liberals and democrats were not important for understanding Italy in this period. On the contrary, the political differentiation into these “parties” is central in many regards, in terms of their differing political ideas on state-formation, or in their use of the media, the forms of their associations etc. But the concept of “limits” to what can be said” does not cleave so much to the idea of contemporarily existing, totally opposed positions on the same object (the “nation”), if one is not prepared to suppose the existence of a segmentation of society into “containers” that hardly communicated, if at all, with each other. The heuristic value of the concept of “discourse”, hence, is diminished, if it is used as a label for the different political “opinions”. As discussed above, the decisive differences between liberals and democrats are not being called into question in terms of their ideas on the concrete construction of the nation-state, mine is simply a request to intensify the debate on the theoretical concepts we all use in our day-to-day research activities.

The theoretical changes that have occurred in the study of European nationalisms during the few last years, from nationalism as a political ideology to national discourse, without doubt are a push in the direction toward asking which discursive elements are common to the different “parties”. Perhaps we are dealing with communalities in terms of the symbols used by different sides, but that take on different meaning: As Lucy Riall has underlined, “the meaning of symbols can change while their outward (linguistic or visual) structure remains the same”²⁸² But perhaps we are actually dealing with communalities in the form of common discourse as well. This then leads to – going beyond Banti’s position as well– the question if “national discourse” has penetrated into the political “camps” that have traditionally been seen as opposed to nationalism in the form of a political programme of (this kind of) state-formation.²⁸³ Hence, a new phase of reflection must be made with regard to the relations between “national discourse” and the various political “programmes”. The aim of this study, with its comparative perspective, is – despite other interests - to contribute to this debate.

²⁸² Riall, “Eroi maschili,” p. 67.

²⁸³ Due to the distinction established here between “discourse” and “movement”, this perspective reveals itself to be different from studies on proponents of national unification in Italian Catholicism as well.

2.6.2 The “Anti-Risorgimento”: legitimism and Catholicism

Anti-Fascist Resistenza and the Risorgimento²⁸⁴ are the two most important fundamental myths of modern, united and republican Italy. The separatist Northern League (Lega Nord) has tried to directly attack these myths. In September of 2007, Umberto Bossi, the leader of the Northern League, referred to Garibaldi as “an imbecile”. For Bossi it was an error to follow the Piedmontese monarchy and Garibaldi, who presented himself as a man of the people but at the same time was, as Bossi underlined, paid by the Piedmontese monarch. In reference to the 1847 written song “Brothers of Italy” (Fratelli d’Italia) – which has been the official anthem of the Italian Republic since 1946 – Bossi added: “We do not want to be the slave of Rome.”²⁸⁵ Along the same lines, groups of “loyal Bourbon subjects” have engaged in book publications²⁸⁶, in conferences such as the “traditionalists’ conference of the loyal city of Gaeta” (“convegno tradizionalista della fedelissima città di Gaeta”) that held a “dinner with a Bourbon menu” and also a “mass of intercession for his majesty, Ferdinand II of Bourbon” in the Basilica di Santa Chiara in Naples (2009). Networks of Catholics with their respective websites, at times in harmony with either the southern or the Leagues’s interpretation, do not accept the defeat of the Pope’s territorial sovereignty following the destruction of the Papal States in 1870 – which resulted in the confinement of the Pope to the Vatican City – and try to reinterpret the Risorgimento as a “Civil War” between mostly loyal Roman Catholics or Italians and a small number of anti-religious or anti-Catholic disturbed free-masons. Ironically, these positions do not take into consideration that they are strengthening rather

²⁸⁴ As Massimo Baioni has shown, after 1943 nearly all political forces, from the monarchists to the Catholics and the left (despite Gramsci), believed that they could not do without claiming their continuity with the pre-fascism Risorgimento. The result was both a celebrative “use” of the Risorgimento on the part of the different political sides and fierce competition to hold leading positions in the institutions dedicated to the history of the Risorgimento – as Baioni makes clear, for instance, with regard to the Risorgimento museum of Turin. Massimo Baioni, *Risorgimento conteso. Memorie e usi pubblici nell’Italia contemporanea* (Reggio Emilia: Diabasis, 2009), on the “use” of the Risorgimento in republican Italy see especially pp. 87-108; and on the case of the museum of the Risorgimento in Turin, see pp. 190-241. The “celebrative” tone typical of Risorgimento memory, of course, as in other cases, often masks the use of history for political purposes. In recent years, for example, the memory of the Risorgimento was employed against the secessionist plans of the Northern League. Banti insists on the parallels between Italian and “Padanian” nationalism, arguing that by celebrating the Risorgimento – promoted in particular by the former Italian president Carlo-Azeglio Ciampi – the world-view of the Northern League, rather than being countered is actually reinforced. See Banti, “Dell’uso pubblico del Risorgimento,” pp. c-xvii, especially p. xiv. For similar reasons, Banti is also critical with regard to the recitation of the Italian national anthem by Roberto Benigni during the Sanremo Music Festival in February 2011, see the article Banti, “Benigni e Fratelli d’Italia”. Maurizio Crozza’s monologue during the 2014 Sanremo Festival, we could add, by focusing on the Italian role in world history since the Romans – “we taught the Europeans beauty when they were still painting their huts with sausages.” – and by imbuing his speech with the idea that there has been a supposedly “national” Italian history since ancient times, underlining Italian “valour” and “contributions”, is not very far from nationalism either.

²⁸⁵ “Noi non vogliamo essere schiava di Roma”. Citation taken from Adalberto Signore and Alessandro Trocino, *Razza padana* (Milan: Rizzoli, 2008), p. 327.

²⁸⁶ Of the vast production, see e.g., D’Amore, *Viva Francesco II*.

than weakening the idea that there is only one single Italian “container” (see the discussion of the concept of “civil war” above). One of the main exponents of this train of thought, the historian Angela Pellicciari, regularly publishes invectives against the usual interpretations of the Risorgimento in journals like “La Padania” or “Studi Cattolici” under polemical titles such as “The Dirty Linen of the Thousand”.²⁸⁷

Within the context of historiography, less instrumental but challenging interpretations nonetheless, such as those of the Neapolitan journalist Gigi Di Fiore, consistently push for a “history of the victims” of the Risorgimento to be researched, a history that would take into account the often neglected opposition to unification in the nineteenth century.²⁸⁸ In terms of content, these publications are in fact mostly variations of the two arguments identified by John Davis as characteristic of “anti-risorgimental” literature: The first of these assumptions consists in claiming that wide strata of society, were not favourable toward the “Risorgimento”, but remained loyal to the monarchies and the papacy. The second, instead, sees the Risorgimento as the work of a small elite of “Jacobins, masons and liberals, which aimed to destroy the papacy and menace religion.”²⁸⁹

These harsh polemics formulated by contemporary “anti-risorgimental” authors that are more than less external to academia, necessitate a historiographical reconsideration of the various opponents of national unification.²⁹⁰ In terms of quantity of works, the primary focus of Risorgimento historiography has always been directed toward the pro-Unitarian sides of the Italian political spectrum, often leaving the topic of the “opponents” to historians that work outside the narrower field of Risorgimento studies, or to those that study the opponents only as such: i.e. as adversaries of national unification and nationalism.

The nineteenth-century “Anti-Risorgimento” was formed primarily of legitimist supporters of the monarchies and the defenders of the Papal States.²⁹¹ Legitimist and pro-papal positions and actions, however, were closely linked. Simon Sarlin clearly shows how exponents of both the pro- and the Anti-Risorgimento believed that the “Roman question”

²⁸⁷ See, e.g., the essays in Pellicciari, *Risorgimento ed Europa*.

²⁸⁸ Di Fiore, *I vinti del Risorgimento*; Di Fiore, *Controstoria*; Gigi Di Fiore, *Gli ultimi giorni di Gaeta. L'assedio che condannò l'Italia all'unità* (Milan, 2012).

²⁸⁹ Davis, “L'Antirisorgimento,” p. 755.

²⁹⁰ The topic of the “opponents” is slowly being given space even in the more strictly scientific arena, see for instance the very interesting publication of texts written by “loyal” soldiers of the Austrian army in 1848/49 in Brunello, *Rivolta e tradimento*; I thank Elena Iorio for informing me of the book and of providing me with a copy. Even some of the Risorgimento museums (to be found all over Italy) are latterly trying to give space to the opponents, see, e.g., the first part of the exhibition in Palermo’s Risorgimento museum, newly arranged for the 150 year anniversary festivities (seen in July 2012).

²⁹¹ Davis, “L'Antirisorgimento,” p. 753.

was closely connected to the case of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.²⁹² These two were also connected at the organizational and even personal level, from the committees that sustained the Papal and Bourbon Armies and armed groups²⁹³ to soldiers that changed sides from the Papal to the Neapolitan Army²⁹⁴, or, later to the pro-Bourbon “guerrilla” groups.²⁹⁵

It is from the perspective of a “new political history” and the suggestions of cultural history that I would propose the history of the opponents to be integrated into the proper mainstream of Risorgimento historiography. Interest in a more general picture of the political culture of the nineteenth century that asks for differences and communalities across the political spectrum, would not only provide the possibility of asking again how important the political divides actually were, but also to evaluate – which is important for the political discussion of today as well - whether the Catholic and legitimist sides really provided alternatives to nationalist culture, and if so, what form these alternatives took on. In doing so, we can discover for instance some “modern” aspects of legitimism and Catholicism²⁹⁶ – such as their use of media and their communication with the public²⁹⁷ – a “modernity” of the opponents to Italian unification that nevertheless is an equally “problematic” modernity in its continuities with later times. My research project aims therefore to explore the mobilization, military practices and effects linked to the armies of the different sides, hence broadening the view from the pro-Unitarian party to the – mostly unexplored – Catholic and Bourbon Armies.

A look at the century from the perspective of political movements, factions, and parties tends to prompt us to detect any potential differences that may be linked to the political programmes of the opposition. From the perspective of “culture”, the picture is more complicated. Without doubt, national discourse was informed by cultural borrowings from religious and other traditional fields. The astonishing quantity of structural communalities between “nationalism” and “religion” has rightly been underlined in nationalism studies; they were so many, in fact, that some see “nationalism” as a type of “political religion”.²⁹⁸ The

²⁹² Sarlin, *Légitimisme en armes*, p. 92.

²⁹³ Ibid., pp. 140-143, 171.

²⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 207.

²⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 208.

²⁹⁶ See Paolo Colombo, “Monarchia/Repubblica,” in Alberto Mario Banti et al., eds., *Atlante culturale del Risorgimento. Lessico del linguaggio politico dal Settecento all’Unità* (Rome; Bari: Laterza, 2011), p. 317. On the “modernity” of Catholicism see Clark, “The new Catholicism,” p. 45.

²⁹⁷ For an example, see the performative aspects linked to the “cult” of Pius IX analyzed by Seiler, “Somatische Solidarität”.

²⁹⁸ From the broad literature, together with the other titles mentioned here, see the very instructive Graf, *Die Wiederkehr der Götter*; a proponent of viewing “nationalism” as “religion”: Wehler, *Nationalismus*, especially pp. 27-35. In opposition to an oversimplified interpretation of nationalism as a “political religion”, the following authors demanded a more circumscribed history of the interconnections, but also of the limits, of the mutual relations between both objects: Haupt and Langewiesche, “Nation und Religion - zur Einführung”.

“sacralization of the nation” went hand in hand with the conceptualization of national history as a “holy text”; national rituals and festivities were very much inspired (as well) by churchly liturgies; and “Christology” clearly informed the image of national heroes and heroines. But the relation between religion and nationalism is far more complicated. The interweaving issues of religious confession with nationalism in Germany²⁹⁹ for instance informed the already mentioned debate on the “kleindeutsche” or “großdeutsche” solution.³⁰⁰ Were the former to have prevailed, the predominant role of Prussia and of Protestantism would have prevailed, and therefore it is not astonishing that Catholics primarily sided with Austria and, in terms of national unification, took the “großdeutsche” perspective. The topic of discursive relations between religion and nationalism becomes even more complicated when possible transfers from the opposite direction – i.e. the transposition of nationalist content to religion as opposed to the transposition of religious content to nationalism discussed above – are taken into account. The confrontation between religion or the denominations and nationalism sometimes fostered the development of partially new cultural forms with which religion reacted to what was possibly an all too successful nationalism. However, it is possible to see that alongside a nationalization of the Catholic³⁰¹ and legitimist opposition, there was also a “nationalization of the contents of Christian faith”.³⁰² These complex relationships are the reason why, as Gilles Pécout has stated, “the anti-liberal volunteers who made the Antirisorsimento an original and distinct element of the international counter-revolution have to be seen as one of the most dynamic and original aspects of the international volunteer movement.”³⁰³

²⁹⁹ Olaf Blaschke, “Das 19. Jahrhundert: Ein zweites konfessionelles Zeitalter?,” *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 26 (2000): pp. 38-75.

³⁰⁰ See, from the older, but still valuable historiography on German Catholicism: Karl Buchheim, *Ultramontanismus und Demokratie. Der Weg der deutschen Katholiken im 19. Jahrhundert* (Munich: Kösel, 1963); Karl-Egon Lönne, *Politischer Katholizismus im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986); Jonathan Sperber, *Popular Catholicism in nineteenth-century Germany* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Wilfried Loth, *Deutscher Katholizismus im Umbruch zur Moderne* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1991). More recent work on German Catholicism is found in: Thomas Mergel, “Ultramontanism, liberalism, moderation. Political mentalities and political behaviour of the German Catholic Bürgertum 1848-1914,” *Central European History* 29 (1996): pp. 151-74; Wolfgang Altgeld, “Christentum, Revolution, Nation. Geschichtliche und zeitgeschichtliche Auseinandersetzungen in der Formierung des deutschen Katholizismus,” *Historisches Jahrbuch* 121 (2001): pp. 501-12. A European scope is presented by Clark, *Culture wars*; Viaene, “The Roman Question”; Martin Papenheim, “Il pontificato di Pio IX e la mobilitazione dei cattolici in Europa,” *Rassegna storica del Risorgimento* 88 (2001): pp. 137-46.

³⁰¹ Barbara Stambolis, “Nationalisierung trotz Ultramontanisierung oder: ‘Alles für Deutschland. Deutschland aber für Christus’. Mentalitätsleitende Wertorientierung deutscher Katholiken im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert,” *Historische Zeitschrift* 269 (2009): pp. 57-97.

³⁰² Haupt and Langewiesche, “Nation und Religion - zur Einführung,” p. 16.

³⁰³ Pécout, “The international armed volunteers,” p. 423.

2.6.3 Transnational history

It cannot be said that the international dimension was neglected by Risorgimento studies. Classic Risorgimento historiography has always been attentive to the international dimension in the exact sense of the term, which looks at the role of the other European states in the Risorgimento process. Furthermore, much recent historiography on nationalism has shown the massive circulation throughout Europe of national myths and constructions. These mutual borrowings and adaptations might, at first, seem to produce a paradox: Whereas national myths claimed to be “national”, they were in fact far less “national” than those constructing the myths wanted the public to believe. The respective national literatures informed the others precisely in their national themes and the elements of their myths (the parallel between “gavroche” in France and “Balilla” in Italy comes to mind here), so much so that Anne-Marie Thièsse could speak of the “Cosmopolitisme du national”.³⁰⁴ These transfers were based on the European-wide circulation of cultural “products”. The information guaranteed by periodic publications, with their correspondents in European capitals, only added to this. The cultural elites that read these publications were at the forefront of the construction and diffusion of national myths, thus ensuring that there were borrowings and adaptations. The role of European cultural circulation played in the formation of national myths is, however, only one aspect of the general, seemingly “paradoxical” finding that, in fact, as Gilles Pécout has written, “[i]n Europe’s long nineteenth century, no cause was more international than that of the nation.”³⁰⁵ Even that which in some definitions is considered as ‘transnational’, i.e. the relations between non-state actors from different national societies, has been noted by Risorgimento historiography. Unfortunately, the actual presence of foreigners in the Italian Risorgimento was often evaluated separately or on the side and was used to demonstrate or prove the international solidarity for and hence the legitimacy of the struggle for unification; these studies, however, did not substantially add anything to the understanding of the workings of national history. This is problematic insofar as the conflict-laden nature of many of these Italian-foreign relations tends to be forgotten. New research, however, has begun to make the attempt to account for these issues, especially in the field of exile-studies.³⁰⁶

What we mean by the term “transnational” merits some explanation³⁰⁷ the moment it is used in very different senses within the literature.³⁰⁸ The sociologist Ludger Pries for example

³⁰⁴ Thièsse, *La création des identités nationales*, p. 66.

³⁰⁵ Pécout, “The international armed volunteers,” p. 413.

³⁰⁶ See, e.g., Maurizio Isabella, *Risorgimento in exile. Italian émigrés and the liberal International in the post-Napoleonic era* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Bistarelli, *Gli esuli del Risorgimento*.

³⁰⁷ I am re-proposing in this paragraph what I wrote already in Göhde, “A new military history,” pp. 27-28.

gives a “narrow” definition of “transnational”; he reserves the word exclusively in reference to enduring “transnational spaces”, which develop their own systems of symbols, their own language, their own values, and a new identity that supersedes national groupings.³⁰⁹ In stark contrast, historian Kiran Patel’s definition is one in which “transnational” contact does not totally supplant national groupings.³¹⁰ He believes that the term “transnational” is anchored in the concept of the nation and has argued that it should be used only for those situations that transcend national boundaries in which national grouping, be it in terms of the nation-state or national identity, retains an important role. Using the term “trans-national” in lieu of “transnational” might make Patel’s distinction clearer; the hyphen accentuates both semantic dimensions of the term. While “trans” refers to the dynamics that occur beyond national borders and to the processes of perception, transfer and interweaving, “national” reminds us of the role of national groupings as part and parcel of these dynamics. To rely exclusively on the term “transnational” (without the hyphen), in the sense of transcending the nation, encourages us as historians to underrate the role of the nation. This leads to the risk that the impact that the “idea” of the nation had since the nineteenth century will be obscured. Indeed, the role the nation played in the perceptions of the actors that are being studied, even while these last were in communication with other national groups should not be ignored or overlooked: “If the nation does not play any role in the imagination of actors [...] a trans-‘national’ history does not make much sense.”³¹¹

To form an adequate picture of foreign soldiering it is equally important not to forget about the frictions and fractions that often were linked to foreign-Italian contact. Taking into consideration the clashes and polemics linked to the foreign commitment is a necessary antidote against the formation of an *a priori* positive view of that which is “transnational”. Kiran Patel characterizes this as the “translation of the utopian potential” from the “international” to the “transnational”, but rightly warns against the risk of forgetting that transnational constellations are not void of cultural misunderstandings, relations of power and

³⁰⁸ See for the discussion of the transnational, together with the literature cited below, Gunilla-Friederike Budde, Sebastian Conrad, and Oliver Janz, eds., *Transnationale Geschichte. Themen, Tendenzen und Theorien* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006) and Jürgen Kocka and Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, eds., *Comparative and transnational history. Central European approaches and new perspectives* (New York; Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2009).

³⁰⁹ Ludger Pries, *Die Transnationalisierung der sozialen Welt. Sozialräume jenseits von Nationalgesellschaften* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2008); Ludger Pries, "Transnational social spaces. Which units of analysis, reference and measurement," in idem, *Rethinking transnationalism. The meso-link of organizations* (London; New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 1-20.

³¹⁰ Kiran Klaus Patel, "Überlegungen zu einer transnationalen Geschichte," *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 52 (2004): pp. 626-45.

³¹¹ Margrit Pernau, *Transnationale Geschichte* (Stuttgart: UTB, 2011), p. 37.

violence or social inequality. He concludes that “without a value-neutral [the Weberian “wertneutral”], social-historically informed concept of transnationality no critical transnational history is possible.”³¹² In the same vein, Margrit Pernau has underlined that “mobility transcends boundaries, but it also generates [...] boundaries.”³¹³ These tensions will be taken into account in this study of the German soldiers.

Existing transnational networks had an important influence on the decision to volunteer for a foreign war. At the same time, the commitment was itself an intrinsic part of the “networking”. Therefore, the human networks formed by the democrats with their hubs in exile³¹⁴ in Zurich, London, Paris or Brussels or those of the Catholics, the extent of which reached all the way to the individual parishes will be taken into consideration.

As the study transitions from the topic of mobilization and recruitment to the experiences and practices linked to the military commitment of the foreign participants, other issues typical of the “transnational perspective” will be addressed. Generally speaking, the relationship between other forms of (international) mobility³¹⁵ and the Risorgimento must still in part be analysed; only the “Grand Tour”, the “journey to Italy”³¹⁶, and the attraction Italy and Greece held for gay men³¹⁷ have been addressed by historians. The “orientalizing gaze” foreigners turned toward Italy, especially that of foreigners and Italians in regard to southern Italy, was intimately linked to these forms of mobility, even if the concrete dimension remains to be clarified: In contrast to the colonial imagery of the times, many foreigners did not equate southern Italy with Africa, but saw it instead as a “half-way” point between Europe and its neighbouring continent to the south (or to the “east”). Many southern Italians themselves – as part of the new Italian administration – partook in creating the “southern question”.³¹⁸ The analysis of foreign-Italian “perceptions” will be accompanied by an examination of the effects promoted by these practises on the translation processes in a broader sense³¹⁹, as well as on

³¹² Patel, “Überlegungen,” pp. 626-45

³¹³ Pernau, *Transnationale Geschichte*, p. 87.

³¹⁴ See Bistarelli, *Gli esuli del Risorgimento*; Isabella, *Risorgimento in Exile*; for German exiles of the nineteenth century remains central the work of Wolfgang Schieder, *Anfänge der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung. Die Auslandsvereine im Jahrzehnt nach der Julirevolution von 1830* (Stuttgart: Klett, 1963).

³¹⁵ See Patrizia Gabrielli, ed. *In viaggio per una causa* (Rome: Carocci, 2010). At the same time, the history on migration of the European “poor” must be integrated, see again Leslie P. Moch, *Moving Europeans. Migration in Western Europe since 1650* (Bloomington; Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2003).

³¹⁶ Brilli, *Il viaggio in Italia*.

³¹⁷ See, e.g., Aldrich, *The seduction*.

³¹⁸ Marta Petrusiewicz, *Come il Meridione divenne una questione. Rappresentazioni del Sud prima e dopo il Quarantotto* (Soveria Manelli: Rubbettino, 1998).

³¹⁹ For the translational perspective on history, see Douglas Howland, “The predicament of ideas in culture. Translation and historiography,” *History and Theory* 42, no. 1 (2003): pp. 45-60.

the circulation processes and on the failed and successful cultural transfers³²⁰ regarding ideological, national or military assets. Furthermore, the history of transnational contact or social space, which existed alongside the emergent national societies will be examined: Was there, for example, a feeling of “trans-national camaraderie in arms”?³²¹

Finally, given the background generated by the existing works with a “transnational perspective” on the Risorgimento and Anti-Risorgimento³²², a study of foreign soldiers that were physically present in Italy must necessarily look into the specificities of their *physical* presence for transnational processes as well. In other words, the actors that were *physically present* as a *specific* “medium” for such transfers must be addressed. This type of analysis leads directly to “body history” within the context of gender history³²³, and to issues of “performativity” in particular.³²⁴ Studies that look at the (mutual) staging of military groups – within one single army or between opposed armies³²⁵ – provide insights into the communicative and “performative” aspects of military life that specifically consisted in frequent rituals of “visibility”, from parades to reviews. Furthermore, there is a number of new military histories that focus for instance on military training, military clothing or body

³²⁰ See, e.g., Sebastian Conrad and Shalini Randeria, "Geteilte Geschichten. Europa in einer postkolonialen Welt. Einleitung," in eadem, eds., *Jenseits des Eurozentrismus. Postkoloniale Perspektiven in den Geschichts- und Kulturwissenschaften* (Frankfurt am Main; New York: Campus, 2002), pp. 9-49; Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmermann, "Penser l'histoire croisée. Entre empire et réflexivité," *Annales HSS* 58 (2003): pp. 7-36.

³²¹ Of the actual problems connected to experiencing a “transnational emotional community” in comparison to the imagination foreigners had of what it would be like before travelling to Italy, see Pellegrino Sutcliffe, "British Red Shirts," p. 212. Regarding the concept of “camaraderie in arms”, albeit in a different era, see Thomas Kühne, "Kameradschaft. 'Das Beste im Leben des Mannes'. Die deutschen Soldaten des Zweiten Weltkrieges in erfahrungs- und geschlechtergeschichtlicher Perspektive," *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 22 (1996): pp. 504-29.

³²² See, most recently, Janz and Riall, "Introduction," pp. 1-4 and the other contributions in this issue.

³²³ See, e. g., Maren Lorenz, *Leibhaftige Vergangenheit. Einführung in die Körpergeschichte* (Tübingen: Ed. diskord, 2000). A history of masculinities with a particularly strong focus on the male body has been published by Forth, *Masculinity in the modern West*.

³²⁴ For “performativity” in another Risorgimento context, see the paradigmatic research of Carlotta Sorba, who analyzes the practices of nationalists as expressions in terms of a “melodramatization of politics”, from the practices of theatregoers in the opera-house to the theatricalization of rituals, festivities and clothing. See Carlotta Sorba, *Teatri. L'Italia del melodrama nell'età del Risorgimento* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2001); Carlotta Sorba, "Il 1848 e la melodrammatizzazione della politica," in Alberto Mario Banti and Paul Ginsborg, eds., *Il Risorgimento*, Storia d'Italia. Annali 22 (Turin:Einaudi, 2007), pp. 481-508. See as well, e.g., Alessio Petrizzo, "Spazi dell'immaginario. Festa e discorso nazionale in Toscana tra 1847 e 1848," *ibid.*, pp. 509-39; Gian Luca Fruci, "Il sacramento dell'unità nazionale. Linguaggi, iconografia e pratiche dei plebisciti risorgimentali (1848-70)," *ibid.*, pp. 567-605. More in general, on “performativity”, see, e. g., Doris Bachmann-Medick, *Cultural Turns. Neuorientierungen in den Kulturwissenschaften* (Reinbek near Hamburg: Rowohlt, 2006), pp. 104-143; Uwe Wirth, ed. *Performanz. Zwischen Sprachphilosophie und Kulturwissenschaften* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2002); Erika Fischer-Lichte, *Performativität. Eine Einführung* (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2012).

³²⁵ See Scott Hughes Myerly, *British military spectacle. From the Napoleonic Wars through the Crimea* (Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press, 1996).

mutilations in wars³²⁶, to which we should give a “transnational twist” by analysing circulation and transfers in the mentioned regards.

2.6.4 Military history

Military history, however, is very much absent from the newest historiography on Italian nationalism, the Risorgimento and foreign participation in it. This may be a result of the particularly difficult status “military history” holds with regard to general historiography. There is a long tradition where the history of war(s) has been written for the purpose of a “scientification” of war itself and can be traced back to the early modern history of Europe at least. As such, military history was integrated into the broader “war sciences”.³²⁷ It was institutionalized very much by the military organizations themselves. The Prussian general staff, for instance, had a “historical/war historical department” (“historische/kriegsgeschichtliche Abteilung”) since 1816; Piedmont created a “Historical Bureau of the Army” (Ufficio storico dell’esercito) in 1853; and Italy, in addition boasted such centres for the Italian Navy as of 1913 and the Air Force since 1926.³²⁸ This early institutionalization of “military history” has contributed to the perception that this last is a form of “warmongering”, a perception that partially continues to persist today. University history, until very recently, has mostly held its distance from the field of military history. The affixed adjective “military” has seemed to many a sort of “Arcanum” that has had to be given a wide berth.³²⁹ Therefore, military history has been traditionally written by authors who work within military institutions themselves. In Italy, for instance, their predominance – according to Piero Del Negro – lasted well into the 1960s, and is marked by the “hegemony” of Piero

³²⁶ See, from the growing literature, e. g., Kevin McSorley, ed. *War and the body. Militarisation, practice and experience* (London; New York: Routledge, 2013).

³²⁷ For the German case, see Jutta Nowosadtko, *Krieg, Gewalt und Ordnung. Einführung in die Militärgeschichte* (Tübingen: edition diskord, 2002), especially pp. 27 and 44-56. For Italy, the Union Catalogue lists nineteenth century manuals of “storia militare” (military history) produced by the military academies of Modena and Naples; there are no results for Turin.

³²⁸ As “Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt” in West Germany (from 1957) or the “Militärgeschichtliches Institut” in East Germany (from 1954) and as the three different “Uffici storici” (history bureaus) in Italy, they continue their work even today. For Germany, see *ibid.*, pp. 57-74. For Italy, see for instance Silvia Trani, “Gli archivi degli uffici storici e dei musei delle Forze armate. Appunti per una discussione,” *Le carte e la storia* 12, no. 1 (2004): pp. 40-47; Silvia Trani, “Die militärgeschichtlichen Forschungsämter der italienischen Streitkräfte,” *Archivalische Zeitschrift* 89 (2007): pp. 241-73.

³²⁹ The variegated history of the relations between official military historiography and the university-based discipline cannot be recounted in depth here, but for West Germany, see Wolfram Wette, “Militärgeschichte zwischen Wissenschaft und Politik,” in Thomas Kühne and Benjamin Ziemann, eds., *Was ist Militärgeschichte?* (Paderborn et al.: Schöningh, 2000), pp. 49-71. For East Germany see instead Jürgen Angelow, “Forschung in ungelüfteten Räumen. Anmerkungen zur Militärgeschichtsschreibung der ehemaligen DDR,” *ibid.*, pp. 73-89. For Italy I have not found a critical study on the relationship between the military history bureaus and university historiography.

Pieri.³³⁰ Pieri's "*Storia militare del Risorgimento*" (Military History of the Risorgimento), published for the first time in 1962, is the only comprehensive military history of the Risorgimento to date³³¹; this publication, however, is still very much interested in the history of strategies, tactics and in particular in the description of battles.

But there are some exceptions to this general rule. Already in the nineteenth century, several university-based historians including Ludwig Quidde or Hans Delbrück opened the debate on "militarism" and/or "militarization". This debate led to a continuous stream of publications, the sheer number of which was surpassed in the field of military history only by books on the First World War. Regarding the history of these concepts, militarism as a term was used to designate a whole governmental system. At times it was considered separate and distinct from the term "militarization", which in this case signified the formation of politics or society according to military needs and ideas, while at others the two terms were used synonymously. Historians such as Otto Hintze and Gerhard Ritter used "militarism" as a relational term for pondering the weight of the military organizations in relation only to the state, whereas others like Hans-Ulrich Wehler or Ludwig Quidde also focused on the social and economic relations of the military with the rest of the society. Until recently, a gap existed in the periods of time that were taken into consideration: Whereas "social militarization" has been rejected by many recent authors as a description for eighteenth century Prussian history, an entire series of studies on "militarism" – including the works of Wolfram Wette – have confined the concept to the late nineteenth and twentieth century, hence reinforcing Ritter's view wherein he denies the links between imperial militarism and its (Prussian) prehistory.³³² For Italy, an issue of the journal "Memoria e ricerca", in the declared attempt to explore new connections, the title of the issue echoes the "Ritterian" conceptualization of the term, confining it to state-military relations, and reproduces his disregard for the early and mid-nineteenth century by 'Europeanizing' Ritter's conception of a late development of "militarism".³³³

³³⁰ Piero Del Negro, "L'età moderna. Eserciti e guerre," in idem, ed., *Guida alla storia militare italiana* (Naples et al.: Edizione Scientifiche Italiane, 1997), p. 97.

³³¹ Pieri, *Storia militare del Risorgimento*, 2nd edition 1969, 3rd edition 1979. But see, in addition, the elder bibliography provided in Alberto Maria Arpino, "Studi militari sull'età del Risorgimento," in Piero Del Negro, *Guida alla storia militare italiana* (Naples et al.: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1997), pp. 123-33.

³³² Instead of others, see the most recent publication of Wolfram Wette, *Militarismus in Deutschland. Geschichte einer kriegerischen Kultur* (Darmstadt: Primus, 2008).

³³³ See the title "Armi e politica" and the different subtitle ("Esercito e società...") of no. 28 of "Memoria e Ricerca". As "various grades of cultural and social militarization between 1870 and 1914" this exclusion of the early and mid-nineteenth century is confirmed by Marco Mondini, "Militarismo e militarizzazione. Modelli nazionali nel rapporto tra armi e politica nell'Europa contemporanea," *Ricerca e memoria*, no. 28 (2008): p. 13.

It is only in the late 1980s that the *war* history of the Risorgimento begins a slow reconditioning, exemplified best by Mario Isnenghi's seminal work "*Le guerre degli Italiani. Parole, immagini, ricordi 1848 – 1945*" (The wars of the Italians. Words, images, memories 1848-1945), with its focus on the cultural history of wars in Italy.³³⁴

2.6.4.1 *Risorgimento history and the military*

A more circumscribed *military* history of the Risorgimento, however, is mostly non-existent. But a series of issues in recent Risorgimento historiography "cry" out, so to say, for a more detailed look at military institutions. In the newest historiography publications, participation in the Risorgimento wars is taken as one of the most important effects of national discourse.³³⁵ This is particularly so for the figure of the "war volunteer", which takes centre stage. But what, in my opinion, seems to have been overlooked thus far is the fact that this Risorgimento activity was mediated through *military institutions*. Furthermore, since Italian "decadence" was said to be noticeable first and foremost in the Italian lack of military abilities, and since this "Risorgimento" was intended to improve this aspect in particular³³⁶, the Risorgimento must have been a *military* "Risorgimento" as well. The concept of Italian military "degeneration" was primarily constructed as a delay in comparison with northern European countries and armies in particular. Italy to a great extent directed its proof of "regeneration" toward other nations; the "bravery" that was manifested by Italian soldiers was presented as much to the foreigners in the Italian armies as to the audiences in the rest of Europe.³³⁷

This was principally due to the fact that these foreigners, the foreign soldiers in particular, were the ones who published books and newspaper articles in their own countries. In this regard, it is enough to think of the phalanx of European authors that wrote about their Garibaldian adventure in 1860 – from Alexandre Dumas and Wilhelm Rüstow to Jessie White

³³⁴ Mario Isnenghi, *Le guerre degli Italiani. Parole, immagini, ricordi, 1848 - 1945* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2005), first edition 1989.

³³⁵ See, for instance, the forms of nationalist practice underlined by Banti and Ginsborg, "Per una nuova storia del Risorgimento," p. xxiv. As Catherine Brice has rightly argued, Banti's interest, like that of other authors, focuses in the last instance on political mobilization, see Brice, "Alberto M. Banti," pp. 434-38.

³³⁶ Patriarca, "Indolence and Regeneration," pp. 350-79.

³³⁷ Hence this assumes the "triangular" characteristics of "indirect communication" with an exterior observer. For the triangular character of this type of communication as a "speaking à-part", see Albrecht Koschorke, "Ein neues Paradigma der Kulturwissenschaften," in Eva Eßlinger et al., eds., *Die Figur des Dritten. Ein kulturwissenschaftliches Paradigma*. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2010), p. 26. A publication challenging the widespread idea that political communication is interrupted by violent actions and discussing the communicative and political implications of violence in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is Haupt, *Gewalt und Politik*, especially pp. 63-90. It highlights that "collective violent acts [...] are generally connected with communication" (p. 63) and that "violent organisations cannot survive and violent actions cannot happen without the material, logistical and moral support of a 'radical milieu'. The values of the latter form the frame of reference of the violent actors" (p. 85).

Mario – and the numerous newspaper correspondents from the Italian battlefield – such as the German Hans Wachenhusen, the Hungarian Ferdinand Eber or the Englishman Charles Stuart Forbes (these last two were part of the Garibaldian Army just as Dumas and Rüstow had been).

Furthermore, rather than presuming an opposition exists between revolutionaries and military figures, it is important to understand that many of the revolutions that characterized for instance the 1820s broke out and flourished especially in military settings – e.g. the pronouncement of General Rigo in Spain; the support given to the Carbonari by the regiments of the Neapolitan Army in 1820; and in Piedmont, the revolution “had been confined almost entirely to the army”.³³⁸ Most of the Italian (as well as other European) attempts at insurrection during the 1820s and 1830s saw military personnel take centre stage, from the Neapolitan general Guglielmo Pepe in southern Italy to the Piedmontese captain Anibale Santorre di Santarosa in Piedmont in 1820, from the Piedmontese officer Carlo Bianco di Saint-Jorioz – who had published a widely circulating book on guerrilla combat as a form of national insurrectional warfare in 1830³³⁹ – and the Napoleonic officer Gerolamo Ramorino during the Mazzinian attempt to invade Savoy in 1834, to the Austrian officers Attilio and Emilio Bandiera in their Calabrian episode of 1844. The fact that legitimist armies, both in terms of military and more strictly police interventions, were at the forefront in repressing insurrections and revolutions “focused the minds of patriots on military problems.”³⁴⁰ From their continuous failings, pro-Risorgimento leaders learned the lesson that they had to improve their *military* organization.

Of course the question arises as to how much the organizational forms adopted by the pro-Unitarian side differed from or adhered to those of the “regular” armies of the states. According to Lucy Riall and Adrian Lyttelton, for instance, the military and war practices of the “irregular”, Garibaldian armed groups differed considerably from those of the “regular” armies of the time. In contrast to the latter, the Garibaldian way of making war was, according to Lyttelton, a “popular and democratic style of war”, characterized by the “downplaying of distinctions of rank – the constant intercourse between the leader and his followers and his place in the front ranks of the battle, the neglect of the formal rituals of discipline in drill and

³³⁸ Duggan, *The force of destiny*, p. 85.

³³⁹ Carlo Bianco di Saint-Jorioz, “Della guerra nazionale d’insurrezione per bande, applicata all’Italia [Malta, 1830],” in Francesco Peruta, ed., *Giuseppe Mazzini e i democratici* (Milan: Ricciardi, 1969), pp. 39-75.

³⁴⁰ Duggan, *The force of destiny*, p. 118.

dress”³⁴¹ Lucy Riall similarly believes that the “military culture” of the *garibaldini* was basically different from the regular armies: “The Italians vindicated their honour and masculinity by making war, but as volunteers, they refuted the codes of conduct, social rank, seniority, even the norms of war.”³⁴² Between the regular and irregular armed groups, she sees this as “conflicts between military cultures”, which furthermore “reflected and reinforced in their turn the rival discourse regarding the nation”.³⁴³ This, however, is a vision somewhat in conflict with the argument made by the military historian Giorgio Rochat, who on the basis of a narrow and neat definition of terms, stated that “Garibaldi’s [wars] were never guerrilla or peoples’ wars”, even if they had some of the characteristics typical of “peoples’ wars”, “primarily with regard to recruitment”.³⁴⁴ A clear-cut divide between “regular” and “irregular” armed groups seems unlikely as well if the fact that the two were often related to each other is taken into account. Pro-Unitarian activities from the 1840s to the 1870s were increasingly “concerted” with the efforts of the regular armies: Volunteers in the Italian-Austrian wars of 1848 and 1849 fought not only for the nation, but often as well in the name of or even officially on behalf of their respective governments (whether they were monarchist or revolutionary), and many of these regiments were deployed together with the various regular regiments present at the time. The Garibaldian troops of 1859 and 1866 were detached, but were nevertheless in fact an official part of the Piedmontese/Italian Army. And the Southern Army amassed by Garibaldi in 1860 not only heavily relied on Piedmontese Army regulations, he handed over the south to the Piedmontese State and Army, wherein the complex relationship between the “volunteers” and the regular army was symbolized in the complicated story of the absorption of the Garibaldian soldiers into the new Italian Army.³⁴⁵ All these elements call for a comparative military history of the Italian armed groups that also integrates the debates on military history in other European historiographies.

³⁴¹ Adrian Lyttelton, “The hero and the people,” in Silvana Patriarca and Lucy Riall, eds., *The Risorgimento revisited. Nationalism and culture in nineteenth-century Italy* (Houndmills, Basingstoke; New York: 2012), p. 46.

³⁴² Riall, “Guerre et nation,” p. 58.

³⁴³ Ibid., p. 63.

³⁴⁴ Giorgio Rochat, “Il genio militare di Garibaldi,” in Filippo Mazzonis, ed., *Garibaldi condottiero. Storia, teoria, prassi* (Milan: F. Angeli, 1985), pp. 88-89.

³⁴⁵ See, e.g., Massimo Mazzetti, “Dagli eserciti pre-unitari all’esercito italiano,” *Rassegna storica del Risorgimento* 59 (1972): pp. 563-92; Cecchinato, *Camicie rosse*, pp. 5-55.

2.6.4.2 War or military history?

Those positions in the international debate on militarism³⁴⁶ that focused on the relations between military organizations and society are directly linked with the more recent redefinitions of military history, which have been proposed under such titles as “new military history” or “war and society”-approach³⁴⁷ or “(neue) Militärgeschichte in der Erweiterung”³⁴⁸ (“[new] military history in extension”). The English-speaking historiography does not differentiate between “war history” and “military history”, and therefore the “war and society”-approach is equated with the “new military history”.³⁴⁹ However, it seems to me that there are decisive differences (among communalities) between the approaches that focus on “war” and those that concentrate instead on “military” matters. In the case of Risorgimento historiography, much has been written over the last few years on the role war has played in national discourse, its role in the cultural and political driving forces of the Risorgimento activists or – more recently – with regard to the legitimist and papal mobilization. But even beyond Italy’s borders, nationalism studies have often been linked to the discussion of “war”, and hence have addressed, so to speak, the “bigger” societal question, especially against the backdrop represented by the “totalization of war” concept, which pulls ever more parts of society into the orbit of war and war making. War, from this perspective, progressively became a “state” that encompassed the whole of society. For these “bigger” questions, military history seemed to be too small in scope, especially when confined to classic military history topics such as strategy, tactics or the mere organizational details of the armies. It is right to criticize *such* a military history. But fortunately, the “new military history” took great steps in the direction of a cultural history of military institutions.³⁵⁰ How soldiers were “eating and starving, obeying, deserting, dying [...] or the front brothel was used”, for example, not only interested military historians³⁵¹, it began to interest them a great deal in these last few years.

³⁴⁶ Volker Rolf Berghahn, *Militarism. The history of an international debate 1861-1979* (Leamington Spa, Warwickshire: Berg, 1981).

³⁴⁷ See, e.g., Jeremy Black, *Rethinking military history* (London et al.: Routledge, 2004), pp. 49-55.

³⁴⁸ Thomas Kühne and Benjamin Ziemann, “Militärgeschichte in der Erweiterung. Konjunkturen, Interpretationen, Konzepte,” in eadem, eds., *Was ist Militärgeschichte?* (Paderborn et al.: Schöningh, 2000), pp. 9-46.

³⁴⁹ See, e.g., Colins Jones, “New military history for old? War and society in early modern Europe,” *European Studies Review* 12 (1982): pp. 97-108. See as well Black, *Rethinking military history*, p. 49.

³⁵⁰ See, e.g., Anne Lipp, “Diskurs und Praxis. Militärgeschichte als Kulturgeschichte,” in Thomas Kühne and Benjamin Ziemann, eds., *Was ist Militärgeschichte?* (Paderborn et al.: Schöningh, 2000), pp. 211-27. This following publication does not express any clear concept of “culture” and therefore is very traditional: Jeremy Black, *War and the cultural turn* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012).

³⁵¹ The opposite is taken for granted by Bernd Hüppauf in his “foundation” for a history of war, which he opposes to “military history”. His is, as the citations make clear, a very antiquated picture of military history

In this reasonable shift away from “classic” military history, however, one runs the risk of “throwing the baby out with the bath water”: There are still good – and even “new” – reasons not to confine oneself to the “discourse of war” in society at large, but to research the military institutions themselves. If, as argued above, the “wars of independence” cannot be seen as the direct causal explanation of Italian independence, and even if unity could have been the motivating factor underlying a soldier’s decision to enlist, one must ask what other meaning this military commitment could have had, and especially what role membership in the institution of the military played for the soldiers – and as mediated by them – for society at large. This becomes even more necessary, given that the duration of actual combat, as with many wars in the nineteenth century, was quite short in Italy. The word “volunteers” seems to implicitly suggest that a more or less short period of time is spent in the ranks, i.e. only the time that is strictly necessary to fulfil an imminent, concrete and specific “goal”. One of the questions of this study is whether membership in the military was really as short as the term seems to imply. In any case, we can assume that the longer the membership, the more the soldier would be influenced by the specificities of the military as an institution. Furthermore, as military sociology has underlined, it is especially during times of peace, when the military can be described as a “cold organization”, that the military is informed by the society at large as an “environment” and, in these states, also reciprocally informs society: “The rigidity of military socialisation and the scope of military institutions [...] are based in the necessities of war, but they are effective as well in the military everyday life in peacetime.”³⁵² In other words: The socio-cultural role of the military goes well beyond acts of violence; one may, with good reason, ask for a “history of war that speaks of killing”³⁵³, but the socio-cultural relevance of *military* institutions is not confined to this, nevertheless central, function; Foucault’s studies on the military as an institution of “disciplinization” come to mind here.

What sometimes runs the risk of being forgotten in “war history” is the fact that despite the more or less intensive penetration of “war” into society on the whole, a large portion of violent acts are nevertheless executed within the context of specific, precisely military institutions; and that modern warfare is (also) characterized by institutions specifically created to carry out at least part of the violent practices. These institutions are just

indeed, which renders his philippica all the more disappointing. Bernd Hüppauf, *Was ist Krieg? Zur Grundlegung einer Kulturgeschichte des Kriegs* (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2013), p. 256.

³⁵² Martin Elbe and Gregor Richter, “Militär. Institution und Organisation,” in *Militärsoziologie. Eine Einführung*, ed. Nina Leonhard and Ines-Jacqueline Werkner, 2 ed. (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2012), p. 259.

³⁵³ Michael Geyer, “Von einer Kriegsgeschichte, die vom Töten spricht,” in Thomas Lindenberger and Alf Lüdtke, eds., *Physische Gewalt* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1995), pp. 136-61.

as much the result of “discourse” as the other elements of the “culture of war”. And like them, they are only reproduced – or not reproduced – in practice.

2.6.4.3 *The cultural turn and institutions*

Since the “cultural turn” that also underpins the “new Risorgimento history”, many studies have focused on aspects of the language that the actors employed when speaking of Italy, the nation or the Risorgimento (which is, as we know, a contemporary concept). Much of the research within this specifically cultural Risorgimento historiography adheres to the “linguistic turn”; in doing so, considerable achievements have been reached by calling into question already established “certainties” of (social) Risorgimento history by basically inverting the causal relations between “social” reality and the linguistic “concepts” of the contemporaries at that time. The “cultural turn” was in fact very much informed by language philosophy and linguistics. But even if it is appropriate to emphasize the role of language – especially in the case of history, in which the role of textual artefacts is paramount – there is still a risk that the analysis will be confined to the “linguistic” utterances of historical actors. As Doris Bachmann-Medick in recognizing the “linguistic turn” as *the* “mega-turn”, she underlines that the “turns” that would follow (such as the “iconic” or “performative turn”) have begun “reintroducing step by step the dimensions of culture, lifeworld, history and especially practice, and by that concentration only on language in the linguistic turn have been overshadowed, even suppressed.”³⁵⁴ In the same vein, Peter Burke in his summary on “cultural history” goes well beyond an analysis of just language, by also placing emphasis on “rituals, material culture, and the history of the body or of emotions.”³⁵⁵ The point that I wish to make here is that there is no reason to exclude organizations/institutions from a genuinely cultural historiographical programme. Interestingly, the role Foucault attributed to institutions goes against the conception for which “discourse” is narrowly boiled down to a question of “language”: “Seldom is Foucault’s assumption received, for which such contexts of speech form solid relations with institutions so that the production of sense and social situation of the participants of discourse are intimately linked.”³⁵⁶ Foucault was highly interested in institutions, as his books on the birth of the clinic or the birth of the prison so clearly testify; his book *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* also discusses the institution of the military and uses military sources in order to shed light on the processes of “disciplinization”.

³⁵⁴ Bachmann-Medick, *Cultural Turns*, p. 36.

³⁵⁵ Peter Burke, *What is cultural history?* (Cambridge; Malden: Polity Press, 2004).

³⁵⁶ Lutz Raphael, “Diskurse, Lebenswelten und Felder. Implizite Vorannahmen über das soziale Handeln von Kulturproduzenten im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert,” in Wolfgang Hardtwig and Hans-Ulrich Wehler, eds., *Kulturgeschichte heute* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1996), p. 170.

Over time, Foucault was very interested in more than just the “outspoken”, as becomes clear in his concept of the “dispositif”³⁵⁷, which is the entirety of “discourses, institutions [...] laws, administrative measures, scientific statements [...], in short, the said as much as the unsaid”; these are the elements that constitute the dispositif, which is “the system of relations that can be established between these elements.”³⁵⁸ The aim is to bring together language, linguistic as well as non-linguistic practices and institutions, because their interweaving is the cause for the effects of “power”. Therefore, according to Foucault, institutions should be analysed in their relation to those forms of power and knowledge that, however, transcended them.³⁵⁹

The military is both a (formal) organization and an institution in the sociological sense. It is an organization, insofar as it serves – from the top-down perspective – a certain goal by organizing human resources, in this specific instance, in the use of violence or force. But the goals of the human elements of a given organization do not necessarily have to correspond to this ultimate, overarching goal. The “military” organization is characterized by a high level of “formal”, hence normative rules, that are codified for instance in general service regulations or laws and decrees that range anywhere from the supply of food, to payments or to military criminal law. At the same time, the military constitutes an “institution” in the wider sociological sense: “An institution is a set of behaviours patterned according to one or more variously codified and differentially enforced rules [...]”³⁶⁰ These rules govern the behaviour of the people within the institution and their interactions with each other and result in the condition for which “the practices of the other in a certain situation is – to a certain degree – expectable”.³⁶¹ For the members of an institution, these last form to a certain degree a kind of “world” that is not identical to everyday life in society at large. An analysis that fails to incorporate the role of military institutions, hence, runs the risk of “forgetting” that this specificity is a “lifeworld” in and of itself.

2.6.4.4 Militarization of society/“Socialization” of the military

Another important question is whether “belligerence” and even “militarism” was inherent in the worldviews of the different factions of society already in the early and mid-nineteenth

³⁵⁷ For more on this concept, see e.g., Andrea D. Bührmann and Werner Schneider, *Vom Diskurs zum Dispositiv. Eine Einführung in die Dispositivanalyse* (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2008).

³⁵⁸ Michel Foucault, “The confession of the flesh,” in Colin Gordon, ed., *Michel Foucault. Power/knowledge. Selected interviews and other writings 1972-1977* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), p. 194.

³⁵⁹ Michel Foucault, “The subject and power,” in Paul Rabinow and Hubert L. Dreyfus, eds., *Michel Foucault. Beyond structuralism and hermeneutics* (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1982), pp. 208-26.

³⁶⁰ Joseph Burke, “Institution,” in George Ritzer and J. Michael Ryan, eds., *The concise encyclopedia of sociology* (Malden; Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2011), p. 321.

³⁶¹ Gerhard Göhler, “Institution,” in idem, Matthias Iser and Isa Kerner, eds., *Politische Theorie. 22 umkämpfte Begriffe zur Einführung* (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2004), p. 210.

century. Christian Jansen wrote about the “specific bourgeois, liberal and even democratic alternative militarism”, which was “based on different values” than those characteristic of aristocratic-elitist militarism, “but time and again amalgamated with it [...]. [...] The militarization of European societies during the nineteenth century [...] was created not only ‘from above’ but a decisive portion was created by society itself, especially as a result of the rising, bourgeois middle class.”³⁶²

Whereas much has been written on military-to-civilian influences, for instance in the “militarization” debate³⁶³, less attention has been paid to the inverse, i.e. civilian-to-military influences.³⁶⁴ Instead, the point of departure of many traditional and even most of the recent military histories still tends to be the unquestioned supposition “that war making can be placed in a tidy little box of information that stands alone, unconnected on some essential level to the vicissitudes of its cultural context.”³⁶⁵ Only a few studies have researched the cultural responses from inside the armies that were triggered by general cultural change in terms of conceptions of nationhood, gender or a general “moralization” of war.

2.6.4.5 Definitions – the military and the soldier

The term “military institutions” chosen in this study takes on a broader acceptance than the usual definition given of “military” as authorized by and dependent on a state. The activities of military organizations in this wider sense can be differentiated ideal-typically from the “direct” forms of combat carried out by individuals and groups according to the following factors, which essentially amount to a space that is by trend separate from that of civilian life:

- 1) The implementation of a clear hierarchy of command from the top down linked to the differentiation into higher and lower ranks that are attributed with significantly differing levels of “power”.
- 2) The deliberate integration of military expertise and military knowledge into the organization, even that which results from past armed conflicts characterized by

³⁶² Christian Jansen, "Einleitung. Die Militarisierung der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft im 19. Jahrhundert," in idem, ed., *Der Bürger als Soldat. Die Militarisierung europäischer Gesellschaften im langen 19. Jahrhundert. Ein internationaler Vergleich* (Essen: Klartext, 2004), pp. 4 and 11.

³⁶³ From the comprehensive literature see, e. g., Berghahn, *Militarism*; Wette, *Militarismus in Deutschland*; Mondini, "Militarismo e militarizzazione".

³⁶⁴ See the exemplary work of Ute Frevert, even if perhaps she equates “bourgeois” thinking too easily with the concept “civil” (i. e. anti-military): Ute Frevert, *A nation in barracks. Modern Germany, military conscription and civil society* (Oxford; New York: Berg, 2004).

³⁶⁵ Susan R. Grayzel, "Across battle fronts. Gender and the comparative cultural history of modern European war," in Deborah Cohen and Maura O'Connor, eds., *Comparison and history. Europe in cross-national perspective* (New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 82.

significantly different aims and purposes. This can take the form of imitating regulations between politically differently collocated military organizations or the deliberate co-optation of military experts from other armies.

- 3) The tendency to divide the organization into different corps or sections that are differentiated from one another by their different fighting techniques and/or tactical purposes.
- 4) The more or less continuous armament of large numbers of fighters. The single fighter does not fight with what is on hand, but with a weapon that has been provided more or less centrally from a stockpile of a more or less reduced number of types of weapons.
- 5) The compulsive organization of time, with fixed events repeated at regular intervals, mostly on a daily basis. A tendency for the group to form “a place of residence and work where a large number of like-situated individuals, cut off from the wider society for an appreciable period of time, together lead an enclosed, formally administered round of life.”³⁶⁶
- 6) A separate system of disciplinization and punishment, symbolized in the issue or use of special military criminal codes.
- 7) The separation from civilians by means of signs and symbols, in particular by wearing uniform clothing.³⁶⁷

Of course, not always all aforementioned factors were fulfilled completely by the armed groups that this study takes into consideration. The case of the invasion of Savoy in 1834 is but one example. But even here, where factors 6 and 7 were absent, factors 1 to 5 were more or less present: military leaders of the various national corps of exiles present in the conflict as well as those chosen to oversee the whole operation were specifically chosen on account of their previous military expertise (factor 2). Even if all of the participants were to fight in terms of “infantry” tactics, various national corps and combinations thereof were previously assigned different tactical aims – including distorting the state’s police and military forces to rousing popular revolt (factor 3). Furthermore, arming these forces had been organized in advance by providing large quantities of the same weapons (factor 4). With regard to the other armed groups examined in this study, the aforementioned factors were also more or less

³⁶⁶ Erving Goffman, *Asylums. Essays on the social situation of mental patients and other inmates* (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1961), p. xiii.

³⁶⁷ For a recent discussion on how to define the “soldier” that goes beyond the usual definitions that are linked to the “legitimate use of violence”, but instead includes “irregulars” as well, see Kevin Lynch and Matthew McCormack, “Defining soldiers. Britain’s military c. 1740-1815,” *War in History* 20, no. 2 (2013): pp. 144-59.

fulfilled. The questions “how far” and “in which way” this was the case, opens interesting paths of historiographical inquiry, for instance with regard to the conception that there was a supposedly greater level of democratization (factor 1) in the Garibaldian army of 1860 than was present in the state's armies, or even with regard to the search for military expertise throughout Europe that was present in both state and non-state (see the invasion of Savoy, or, though more complicated, the expedition of the Thousand in 1860) military organizations of the time.

2.6.4.6 Soldiers' experiences, the history of everyday life, lifeworld

Within the context of the “New Military History” and a “Military History from Below” recent historiography has tried to catch up with these dimensions of the experience of soldiers. The initial impetus for this alteration in the approach to military history sprang from a growing unease with the traditions of classic military history (history of battles, strategies and tactics) and, since the 1980s, from the stimulus provided by the “history of everyday life” (Alltagsgeschichte). In the beginning, those authors trying to write a history of daily life predominantly used a rather simple approach, basically retelling what the historical subjects themselves had recounted.³⁶⁸ This was a departure from a naïve understanding based on how experience was (and even now is) considered in everyday speech, and it considered “individual experience as the expression of personality and [... as] independent from social guidelines.”³⁶⁹ Subsequently, more theoretically informed approaches were chosen that took into account the fact that individual actions and experiences are at least partially informed by collective structures, be they economic, social or cultural. Different epistemological theories have made claims regarding the nature of experience, from the sociological-social psychological “frame analysis” developed by Erving Goffman to the theories on discourse for instance by Joan W. Scott to Niklas Luhmann's systems theory. Under the topic of concrete action, Alltagsgeschichte could provide insight into the question of how cultural “meaning” was literally put into practice in two ways: i.e., how “meaning” was attributed to practice on the one hand, and how practices were animated by “meaning” on the other. Within this framework, recent military histories tend to highlight how the “concrete” experiences and the

³⁶⁸ In the field of military experiences from the German literature see for instance, Karl J. Mayer, *Napoleons Soldaten. Alltag in der Grande Armée* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2008).

³⁶⁹ Ute Planert, “Zwischen Alltag, Mentalität und Erinnerungskultur. Erfahrungsgeschichte an der Schwelle zum nationalen Zeitalter,” in Nikolaus Buschmann and Horst Carl, eds., *Die Erfahrung des Krieges. Erfahrungsgeschichtliche Perspektiven von der französischen Revolution bis zum Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Paderborn et al.: Schöningh, 2001), p. 51.

everyday life of soldiers individually were in line with the general frames of war³⁷⁰, or how they were coined by collective ideas, discourses and ideologies. And if we draw on the “practice turn” in historiography³⁷¹ it is possible to see how specific discourses were (re-)produced and altered in the everyday lives of soldiers. Repeated practices are, according to some authors³⁷², the place within which historical change occurs wherein a “performance” is capable of slightly altering and therefore subverting a given historical meaning. Practices in this sense include non-verbal communication, such as visual signs, emotions and – particularly important for the military – physical behaviour.

2.6.4.7 A comparative military history

Military historiography should be open to transnational and comparative analysis³⁷³ more than it has until now. The predominance of the national focus on military history is mainly caused by two reasons: the first is linked with the specific traditions of this field, and the second is based on features of the past itself. The institutionalization of military historiography contributed to narrowing the perspective to the national armies. In the German case, the debate on ‘militarization’ was initially a specific manifestation of the *Sonderweg*’s debate, wherein the supposed uniqueness of “Prussian militarism” was defended. Hence, a comparative argument of sorts was made, but an explicit comparison with other national cases was not really carried out. Even Wolfram Wette in his recent book on militarism focuses on the German case; he adds only a few short comparative remarks in a three-page chapter about France³⁷⁴, citing one of the exceptions to the dearth of comparisons in this field, namely, the work of Jakob Vogel on German and French militarism.³⁷⁵ Another reason for this national focus is caused by the past itself: At least from the 1830s and 1840s onwards, the armies had

³⁷⁰ Overemphasizing a seemingly quite unhistorical, mainly social psychological “war frame” in the sense that “war is war” is the debated work of Sönke Neitzel and Harald Welzer, *Soldaten. On fighting, killing and dying. The secret Second World War transcripts of German POWs* (London: Simon & Schuster, 2012).

³⁷¹ Gabrielle M. Spiegel, ed. *Practicing history. New directions in historical writing after the linguistic turn* (New York: Routledge, 2005).

³⁷² See, e. g., Judith Butler, “Subjection, resistance, resignification,” in eadem, *The psychic life of power. Theories in subjection* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2007), pp. 83-105; Sarasin, *Geschichtswissenschaft und Diskursanalyse*, pp. 10-60.

³⁷³ From the comprehensive literature, see Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Jürgen Kocka, eds., *Geschichte und Vergleich. Ansätze international vergleichender Geschichtsschreibung* (Frankfurt a. M.; New York: Campus, 1996); Kocka and Haupt, *Comparative and transnational history*.

³⁷⁴ Wette, *Militarismus in Deutschland*, pp. 75-78. On p. 21 he criticizes the lack of systematic comparisons of “militarisms”.

³⁷⁵ Jakob Vogel, *Nationen im Gleichschritt. Der Kult der 'Nation in Waffen' in Deutschland und Frankreich 1871-1914* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1997).

been progressively and increasingly nationalized in terms for instance of recruitment³⁷⁶ and the legitimation of war. However, the correct diagnosis of the nationalization trend of European armies in the nineteenth century resulted in the infelicitous neglect of the interconnections between different national armies in many campaigns and even more so the continuity of the presence of foreign groups and/or single foreigners in the various national armies. Only very recently has interest in the known examples of a clear “multi-nationality” of nineteenth century campaigns seemed to have been renewed, as may be demonstrated by the success of narrative works for instance on the 1812 Napoleonic campaign or the Crimean War.³⁷⁷

2.6.5 A gender and body history of the *Risorgimento* armies

Already in the eighteenth century images of gender roles were crucial within the armies: For the French case, the importance of the evocation of women as “enemies of discipline” was decisive for unit cohesion, and through the creation of the anti-ideal of the “effeminate” soldier it was possible to ensure that duties were carried out.³⁷⁸ As in other fields, the question arises: how much – in a kind of militarization in the eighteenth and nineteenth century – did the military topoi inform the ascending national discourses? There is no doubt that nineteenth century nationalisms were heavily gendered, just as there is no doubt that images of masculinity were important for life in the military.

Two important cases can be made that add nuance to the position that identifies the *Risorgimento* with a conception according to which men and women were assigned to strictly “separate spheres”: First, it is important not to reproduce a gendered hierarchy of practices inherent in nationalism in the practices of current historiography, by adopting the nineteenth century view that female practices were “only” auxiliary; instead, many of these practices, even those located within the confinements of nineteenth century gender roles were in fact central. Without them there would have been neither (counter-)revolution nor war, be it on the pro- or on the anti-*Risorgimento* side. The crucial role of women in the *Risorgimento*, however, is still an under-researched topic, despite a number of important conferences and

³⁷⁶ For the history of military conscription in Germany see Frevert, *A Nation in Barracks*; for pre-unitary Italy see Ilari, *Storia del servizio militare*; for Italy after unification see Domenico Quirico, *Naja. Storia del servizio di leva in Italia* (Milan: Mondadori, 2008).

³⁷⁷ See, e. g., Zamoyski, *1812*; Figes, *Crimea*; with special emphasis placed on troopers E. Kleßmann, *Die Verlorenen. Die Soldaten in Napoleons Rußlandfeldzug* (Berlin: Aufbau Verlag, 2012).

³⁷⁸ Naoko Seriu, “Du féminin dans le discours militaires au XVIIIe siècle,” *Genre et Histoire. Revue électronique de l'association Mnemosyne*, no. 1 (2007), <http://www.genrehistoire.fr/document.php?id=103> (last accessed : 03/11/2008).

publications that have been dedicated to this topic.³⁷⁹ Alongside this argumentation, however, it has been noted that some female practices of the nineteenth century transcended the boundaries of the “separate spheres”. In doing so, these authors push for a revision of the predominant interpretation of the gender issue in Risorgimento historiography, whether by challenging the existing interpretations of nineteenth century gender discourse and/or by calling attention to the differences between the existing discourse and actual female and male practices. Much empirical and analytical work remains to be done in this field, however. With regard to women participating as soldiers in the Risorgimento wars, for instance, a closer look at practices and mutual perceptions could help to clarify how much their presence destabilized the consolidated gender dichotomy of the time: for instance in the case of women dressed as men, it could be argued that not every act of “cross-dressing” was necessarily subversive.³⁸⁰

Another argument against an overly strict vision of gender hierarchy in the Risorgimento could be deduced from positions in the sphere of masculinities. At least at the dawn of the nineteenth century, masculinity still seems to have been seen as hugely “problematic”, rather than heroic and perfect.³⁸¹ Here, yet another reason could be found for the existence of the “politics of masculinization” in the nineteenth century.

Ute Frevert observed that the army of the nineteenth century was a “school of men” because it was a male organization and a “school of masculinity”, insofar as it taught men to behave in a certain (and no other) way that was regarded as “manly”.³⁸² Masculinity was not only measured by assessing moral attitudes and psychological character, but also by behavioural criteria that were linked mostly with bodily practices. As “schools of masculinity”, the armies taught lessons that consisted to a high degree in exercises aimed at controlling the body, suppressing bodily needs as much as possible, developing physical strength, and integrating each individual soldier’s body into a military simultaneity with those of the others.

³⁷⁹ See Nadia Maria Filippi, “L'altra metà dell'800. Nuove genealogie per il Risorgimento,” *Il Manifesto*, 02/12/2012; I thank Giulia Calvi for the indication. Out of the new publications, see, e.g., Simonetta Soldani, “Il Risorgimento delle donne,” in Alberto Mario Banti and Paul Ginsborg, eds., *Il Risorgimento*, Storia d'Italia. Annali 22 (Turin: Einaudi, 2007), pp. 183-224; a collection of female voices is Elena Doni et al., eds., *Donne del Risorgimento* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2011); see as well the works cited in the article of Nadia Maria Filippi.

³⁸⁰ Laura Guidi, “Patriottismo femminile e travestimenti sulla scena risorgimentale,” *Studi Storici* 41, no. 2 (2000): pp. 571-87.

³⁸¹ Christoph Kucklick, *Das unmoralische Geschlecht. Zur Geburt der Negativen Andrologie* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2008).

³⁸² Ute Frevert, “Das Militär als 'Schule der Männlichkeit'. Erwartungen, Angebote, Erfahrungen im 19. Jahrhundert,” in eadem, ed., *Militär und Gesellschaft im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1997), p. 145.

The study of the German soldiers in Risorgimento Italy will therefore analyse the various Italian armies as groups of men, an analysis which due to the relational character of gender conceptions, cannot be carried out without delving into the practical and discursive role women held. Although women were often officially excluded (by military criminal law and service regulations) from the narrower circles of soldiers, for instance in the barracks, there were exceptions: when some soldiers entered the military and war they brought their wives along.³⁸³ Due to the real actual presence of women, however, one might ask whether it is right to use the concept of “homosocial groups”³⁸⁴ for the armies studied here. However a sort of “male Arcanum”, where women were present only seldom in “flesh and blood”, did indeed exist. A study of armies as “homosocial groups” however, could also shed light on the interplay between hegemonic and marginal conceptions of masculinity.³⁸⁵

2.7 Sources

In the State Archive in Rome, I consulted all of the volumes pertaining to all the foreign regiments of the Papal Army since the 1830s. The information in these volumes abounds, as will be demonstrated in this study. In the same Roman archive, organizational material on the Papal Army and its foreign regiments in particular, was consulted. In Naples, I was able to analyse the correspondence between the last Bourbon king, Francesco II, and the officers that led the various legitimist ‘guerrilla’-groups that fought in 1860 and 1861; these documents are part of the “Archivio Borbone” housed in the State Archive in Naples. I have yet to return to Naples to collect the information in the army registers, which unfortunately were inaccessible when I was there in 2009. In Liestal Switzerland (Archive of the Canton of Basle Landschaft) I was able to consult the personal estates of the Garibaldian Friedrich Wilhelm Rüstow as well as copies of the estates of Johann Philipp Becker. In Münster, the descendants of the Papal Zouave Franz von Korff gave me access to his personal estates; in Düsseldorf I was able to study the workings of regional recruitment structures for the Papal Army in Prussian Rhineland. In Basle, I was able to study the rich archives of the “foreign regiments” of the

³⁸³ Lucy Riall, “Men at war. Masculinity and military ideals in the Risorgimento,” in eadem and Silvana Patriarca, eds., *The Risorgimento revisited. Nationalism and culture in nineteenth-century Italy* (Houndmills, Basingstoke-New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp. 160-164.

³⁸⁴ For the concept of “homosociality” see Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, *Between men. English literature and male homosexual desire* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985). See as well, e.g., Martschukat and Stieglitz, *Geschichte der Männlichkeiten*, especially chapter 7, pp. 112-136; for the use of the concept in “Queer Studies” and the “queer reading” of texts see Andreas Kraß, ed., *Queer denken. Gegen die Ordnung der Sexualität (Queer Studies)* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2003).

³⁸⁵ Connell, *Masculinities*.

Bourbon Army from 1859 to 1860 that General Johann Lucas von Mechel brought home with him to Switzerland.

The sources for the thesis can be grouped as follows: First, the participant lists. They provide an important foundation upon which the reconstruction of the socio-biographical background of the German soldiers was based. Second, archival material on the organization of recruitment and the army in general, and any such material that mirrored army life has been analysed. Third, the archives in Germany provided not only personal estates, but contained organizational data regarding the more general background of mobilization and recruitment as well. Fourth, a long list of published works of the soldiers, for instance the writings of the Mazzinian Haring, the Garibaldians Rüstow and Haug, the papal soldier Eickholt, the German papal military chaplain Anton de Waal, the Papal Minister of Arms, Hermann Kanzler or the Bourbon officer Klitsche de la Grange have been used, as well as contemporary publications on the German soldiers by other authors. Together with corresponding Italian sources these documents have rendered it possible to investigate the key issues of the research project pertaining to this trans-national space of contacts.

Overview of the sources

Army registers

Legal sources

Administrative material of the Italian armies; Ministries of War

Archival sources on the German organization of recruitment

Publications and ego-documents of German participants

Mirroring publications of Italian/other foreign participants

Objects (photographs, military decorations)

Part 2 – The enlistment:

the why, the how, the who

3 Political and cultural mobilization

Much has been written in recent years on the issue of cultural and political war mobilization in the nineteenth century. Nationalism studies in particular, for Germany as well as for Italy and elsewhere, have highlighted the strong connection between national discourse and the legitimization of and mobilization for (national) wars.³⁸⁶ Recent studies however have also analysed the form and content of the mobilization of the various opponents to national unification. Counter to the view wherein the emphasis was placed almost exclusively on the strictly political opposition to liberalism and nationalism, these studies reveal how the “success” of these last stimulated legitimist and Catholic opponents to adopt new and even “modern” forms of political communication.³⁸⁷

This valuable historiography forms the basis of the following chapter. But given the subject is the mobilization of “foreigners” for the Italian “parties”, a partially different perspective from that of the existing literature must be taken. It seems quite obvious that Italian nationalism as a whole can only explain with great difficulty the mobilization of foreigners to the cause. Similarly, German nationalism can explain the mobilization in favour of the Italian case only if the discursive elements linking the two nations are found. Only in doing so can the seeming paradox of the “internationalism of nationalism” in the nineteenth century be elucidated. At the same time, there are elements in the political communication of the two sides – the nationalists and the opposition – that could operate/behave in an “international” or “transnational” manner. The following chapter will examine these issues from a comparative perspective.

³⁸⁶ From the general literature, see e. g., Daniel Moran and Arthur Waldron, eds., *The people in arms. Military myth and national mobilization since the French Revolution* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Frank Becker, *Bilder von Krieg und Nation. Die Einigungskriege in der bürgerlichen Öffentlichkeit Deutschlands 1864-1913* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2001); Buschmann, *Einkreisung und Waffenbrüderschaft*; Nikolaus Buschmann and Dieter Langewiesche, eds., *Der Krieg in den Gründungsmythen europäischer Nationen und der USA* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2003); Jörn Leonhard, “Nati dalla guerra e macchine da guerra? Nazione e stato nazionale nell’età del bellicismo fino al 1871,” *Ricerche di storia politica* N. S. 9 (2006): pp. 31-52; Riall, “Guerre et nation,” pp. 49-64.

³⁸⁷ For the modern forms of communication in monarchism see Volker Sellin, *Gewalt und Legitimität. Die europäische Monarchie im Zeitalter der Revolutionen* (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2011); for the modern forms in Catholicism instead Clark, “The new Catholicism”. More in depth – especially with a view on renewed practices of piety in the same time-span - see Sperber, *Popular Catholicism*.

3.1 *The feeling of injustice and the barbarian*

One of the main ways in which violence is legitimized is by making the distinction between an offensive manoeuvre (normally conceived of as an illegitimate action) and a defensive manoeuvre (normally considered to be a legitimate action). Therefore, when Umbria and the Marche were transferred from the Papal States to the Piedmontese after these last won the battle of Castelfidardo in 1860, many Catholics interpreted the action as an act of “robbery”; they did not consider it to be legitimate. The Pope himself spoke of this as an act of “robbery”, of “snatching away” in the allocution “*Novos et ante*” he gave on 28 September 1860 before the consistory.³⁸⁸ This assertion was taken up by Catholics all over the world. In 1861, the thirteenth “general assembly of the catholic associations of Germany” in Munich voted, passing an address that protested the “robbery of the Holy See”³⁸⁹, the “eldest, most honourable and most legitimate possession in the world”³⁹⁰. The address went on to underline the legitimate reasons for the Papal States to exist in that they guaranteed the independence of the pope from “any [...] worldly power”.³⁹¹ The annexation of significant parts of the Papal States to Piedmont (i.e. Italy) was not only considered a “robbery”, but an assault on the concept of legitimate “property” that would lead to the “endangerment of the inviolability of every property, the overthrow of every right, the downfall of the thrones, the death of the liberty of the people and the ruin of Christian society.”³⁹² These words basically conformed to what the Pope had said in his allocution of September 1860, in which he underlined that, if no action was taken against the “impious usurpation”³⁹³ of his lands by the Piedmontese Army, “there would henceforth be no security for any legitimate right.”³⁹⁴ According to the Pope, the defence of these rights is the nexus that ought to bind together the Pope and the monarchs: “All sovereigns must therefore be persuaded that their cause is intimately connected with ours

³⁸⁸ “Ecclesiae bona diripere”. “*Novos et ante*. Allocutio habita in concistorio secreto die XXVIII septembris MDCCCLX,” in *Pii IX pontificis maximi acta. Vol. III (acta exhibens quae ad ecclesiam universam spectant)*, vol. 3 (Rome: Ex Typographia bonarum artium habita facultate, 1864), p. 184.

³⁸⁹ “[...] Beraubung des hl. Stuhles [...]” “Adresse der Generalversammlung der katholischen Vereine an den hl. Vater,” in *Verhandlungen der dreizehnten Generalversammlung der katholischen Vereine Deutschlands in München am 9., 10., 11. Und 12. September 1861. Amtlicher Bericht* (Munich: Verlag von J. G. Weiß, 1862), p. 85.

³⁹⁰ “[...] den ältesten, ehrwürdigsten und rechtmäßigsten Besitz der Welt [...]” Ibid., p. 84.

³⁹¹ “[...] unabhängig [...] von jeder [...] weltlichen Macht [...]” Ibid., p. 84.

³⁹² “[...] die Gefährdung jeglichen Besitzes, den Umsturz alles Rechtes, das Hinsinken der Throne, das Grab der Völkerfreiheit und den Untergang der christlichen Gesellschaft.” Ibid., p. 85, graphical emphasis in the original.

³⁹³ English translation taken from the newspaper article “The Italian Revolution. The Papal Allocution” *New York Times*, 19/10/1860: p. 2. “[...] impiam usurpationem [...]”. “*Novos et ante*,” p. 180.

³⁹⁴ “The Italian Revolution. The Papal Allocution,” p. 2. “[...] nulla deinceps legitimi cuiusque iuris firmitas as securitas poterit consistere.” “*Novos et ante*,” p. 187.

and that in coming to our assistance, they are providing equally for the preservation of their own rights and of ours.”³⁹⁵ After this assertion, the Pope then sent out a call for the sovereigns of Europe to “lend their assistance”.³⁹⁶

In Germany, during the Catholic assemblies of 1867, the seminary professor Christoph Moufang held speeches in Münster and Cologne entitled “The battle over Rome and its consequences for Italy and the world”³⁹⁷ in which he tried to mount support for the Pope amongst German Catholics. In Münster, Moufang claimed the independence and liberty of the Papal States were a “right of Catholic Christendom” in contrast to the theiving attacks of the “Italian revolution”.³⁹⁸ A year before, in Cologne, Moufang asserted that the Pope embodied the “idea of justice”, because he sustained the right to property, and in so doing he fought for universal justice, for “the rights of everybody. When he says: what I do possess, as Pope, as King, as private citizen, nobody is allowed to take from me, neither the Emperor in Paris nor the Italian nation nor a congress of princes. What is mine is mine, and he who takes it is a thief. Therefore, he is protecting and defending the rights of everybody.”³⁹⁹

While in the case of the Papal States a real military attack occurred in 1860, and therefore they were able to legitimate their position quite easily, the pro-Unitarians had to apply another type of strategy of legitimization. Nationalists tried to present the domination of their nation by a foreign state as a kind of ‘structural violence’, as Galtung conceptualized it, that prevented the national population from fulfilling their putative national needs. Thus, according to Italian nationalists Austria was the aggressor and not the Italian nationalists, who were waging war on it. By claiming the legitimacy of the right to national self-determination, military attacks that were generally negatively connoted took on positive connotations when the nationalists were perceived to defend a right, and this right in particular. At the same time, not faced with the problem of an immediate military attack from the enemy, in order to justify their actions nationalists turned to describing the other forms of violence the foreign

³⁹⁵ “The Italian Revolution. The Papal Allocution,” p. 2. “Itaque omnibus Supremis Principibus persuasum esse debet, Nostram cum Ipsorum causa plane esse coniunctam, eosque suum Nobis auxilium afferentes Nostrorum aequae ac suorum iurium incolumitati esse prospecturos.” “Novos et ante. Allocutio habita in concistorio secreto die XXVIII septembris MDCCCLX,” “Novos et ante,” p. 188.

³⁹⁶ “The Italian Revolution. The Papal Allocution,” p. 2. “[...] opem Nobis [...] velint impendere.” “Novos et ante,” p. 188.

³⁹⁷ Christoph Moufang, *Der Kampf um Rom und seine Folgen für Italien und die Welt. Zwei Reden gehalten auf den Katholiken-Versammlungen zu Münster und Cöln am 2. December 1867 und 27. Januar 1868 von Dr. Christoph Moufang, Domcapitular und Regens am bischöflichen Seminar in Mainz* (Mainz: Franz Kirchheim, 1868).

³⁹⁸ “[...] Rechte der katholischen Christenheit“, „[...] italienischen Revolution [...]“. Ibid., p. 1.

³⁹⁹ “[...] Idee der Gerechtigkeit [...]“ “[...] das Recht aller. Wenn er sagt: das, was ich habe und besitze, als Papst, als König, als Privatmann, das darf mir Niemand nehmen, weder der Kaiser in Paris, noch die italienische Nation, noch ein Congreß von Fürsten, mein ist mein, und wer es nimmt, ist ein Räuber, - so schützt und vertheidigt er damit das Recht eines Jeden.” Ibid., p. 18.

dominators supposedly committed. And the nationalists were very good at highlighting all sorts of foreign aggressions: the Austrians were accused of committing acts of robbery, damaging land and property, and raping Italian women. This approach is directly linked to the strategy of slandering the adversary as much as possible. The *tedeschi*, i.e. the Germans – a term that was widely used by Italian nationalists in reference to the Austrians – therefore, were depicted as barbarians, that came, as one nationalist put it, “from who knows which forest in Germany.”⁴⁰⁰

The element of denigration is particularly important: If the adversary is excluded from civilized humankind, not least by accusing him of having committed many uncivilized forms of violence, the “battle” may be perceived and framed as being one of “civilization” against the “uncivilized”.

Liberals and democrats at times also described Catholicism to fall “outside” the bounds of “civilization”. As Manuel Borutta has underlined, already since the Enlightenment, “Catholicism was ‘orientalised’ by progressive Europeans, excluded from the universal process of history and civilisation, and explicitly associated or identified with ‘primitive’ and ‘static’ cultures in Africa, America and ‘the Orient’.” The syllabus of errors from 1864 or the dogma of papal infallibility from 1870 only confirmed and reinforced an already established view among German liberals, who saw “in Catholicism an outmoded, alien and grotesque religion that was incapable of progress and belonged to a lower level of civilisation that therefore had to disappear.”⁴⁰¹ In Italy, Garibaldi was at the forefront of at least anti-clerical, if not anti-Catholic⁴⁰² polemics. As aforementioned, he decried the “religion of the priests” in Rome in 1861. In 1870, his novel “*Clelia, or the government of the monk*” came on the market, divulging and commenting on the concupiscence of a cardinal for a Trasteverian

⁴⁰⁰ „[...] ich weiß nicht aus welchem Wald Deutschlands [...]“ Giuseppe Ricciardi, “Balilla, ovvero la cacciata degli austriaci da Genova nel 1746 [debut performance in 1859],” in idem, *Opere scelte*, vol. 7 (Balilla, Torquemada, Maria Maddalena, I due Candidati) (Naples: Dalla stamperia del Vaglio, 1870), p. 27. Of note here is the negative reading of the topos of the “uncivilized” inhabitants of a forest and the positive role the forest plays in German nationalism; both images of course draw on Tacitus. See Tacke, *Denkmal im sozialen Raum*, pp. 63-67; Albrecht Lehmann, “Der deutsche Wald,” in Etienne François and Hagen Schulze, eds., *Deutsche Erinnerungsorte*, vol. 3 (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2002), pp. 187-200.

⁴⁰¹ Manuel Borutta, “Settembrini’s world. German and Italian Anti-Catholicism in the age of the culture wars,” *European studies* 31 (2013): pp. 54-55. For a broader discussion of Anti-Catholicism, see the German dissertation of Manuel Borutta, *Antikatholizismus. Deutschland und Italien im Zeitalter der europäischen Kulturkämpfe* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2010). See as well the other contributions in the same thematic issue of *European Studies* in 2013.

⁴⁰² According to Borutta, speaking of anti-clericalism with regard to the Italian case overshadows the fact that – despite the many differences compared to Germany, for instance – anti-Catholicism was inherent in the former. See Borutta, “Settembrini’s world,” p. 51.

girl.⁴⁰³ Anti-clerical – or even anti-Catholic – sentiment was also expressed by some of the Garibaldian soldiers. The German Garibaldian Rüstow, a protestant, wrote in 1860: “It goes without saying – a truth every reasonable human being understands offhand, that a church regime can never fulfil the requirements to which the civilized nations of the new Europe are entitled. Theocracy, which cannot err [...] excludes absolutely any progress [...].”⁴⁰⁴

3.2 The religious dimension

The “religious” dimension, here, took on the form of confessional legitimizing speech. Inflicting losses to Papal territorial authority was a good way to strengthen German cultural Protestantism. Conversely, applying this type of logic to the opposite side, in the event pro-Catholic proponents were to win the war against the Italian revolutionaries, the position of Catholicism would be strengthened in Germany, as well. Especially in Germany, confessional viewpoints were intimately linked to the European Culture Wars.

But despite this confessional tone, the religious aspect was an important ingredient of the mobilization efforts made on all sides in a much wider sense. Military violence was often legitimized with arguments that relied on the purportedly divine origin of the state order put forth by the various sides.

Many legitimists and monarchists still saw the various aggressions carried out by the Mazzinians, Garibaldians and the Italian army to be an assault on the sovereignty of the old monarchs, which was believed to have been conferred by God. They justified the violence they ordered to suppress nationalist aggressions by resorting to the traditional idea of the divine right of kings. At the time, most monarchs,⁴⁰⁵ as well as a segment of their supporters continued to invoke the topos that kingship was conferred “by the grace of God”. In the circles of those that joined the Bourbon royal family in Roman exile after the capitulation of Gaeta in February 1861, Simon Sarlin has identified two distinct factions, the “constitutionalists” and the “ultras”,⁴⁰⁶ which closely mirrored similar monarchist factions in

⁴⁰³ Giuseppe Garibaldi, *Clelia. Il governo del monaco (Roma nel secolo XIX). Romanzo storico politico* (Milan: Fratelli Rechiedei editori, 1870).

⁴⁰⁴ “Es verstand sich außerdem von selbst die Erklärung, deren Wahrheit jeder vernünftige Mensch ohne Weiteres begreift, daß ein kirchliches Regiment niemals die Bedingungen erfüllen kann, auf deren Erfüllung die civilisirten Völker des neuen Europas den vollen Anspruch haben. Die Theokratie, welche nicht irren kann [...], schließt den Fortschritt absolut aus [...]” Friedrich Wilhelm Rüstow, *Der italienische Krieg 1860 politisch-militärisch beschrieben. Mit 7 Karten und Plänen. Des 'italienischen Krieges' zweiter Band* (Zurich: Friedrich Schultheß, 1861), p. 10.

⁴⁰⁵ Despite resorting partially to “modern” forms of legitimization as well, traditional monarchs, as well as Napoleon and Napoleon III drew on the divine right of kings to legitimate their power, according to Sellin, *Gewalt und Legitimität*, pp. 3, 71, 79.

⁴⁰⁶ Sarlin, *Légitimisme en armes*, p. 48.

other countries. With regard to the “ultras”, at least, tradition “was indeed the only watchword capable of galvanizing the masses attached to their king and their religion.”⁴⁰⁷

Monarchical legitimism and that of the king-pope were often intimately linked, both at the level of mobilization and at the factual level of, for instance, cases of soldiering in their respective armies. At least from 1860 onwards, when the Papal States were physically attacked, Rome intensified its efforts to mobilize Catholics throughout Europe and beyond to defend the Papal States. In 1860, Pius IX sent out a call to arms to the Catholics of the world. This attempt may be traced to a Belgian ecclesiastic with a military background, Xavier de Mérode, who became the pro-Minister of Arms in 1860: de Mérode developed the idea of a ‘ninth crusade’, wherein all the Catholics of Europe would be called to defend the territory of the Holy See. In France and Belgium the message was further propagated by a group of bishops; soldiers, money and arms were also sent from these two countries to Rome. In the German states, the ‘brotherhoods of Saint Michael’ were created to organize similar support for Rome. In the defence of the Papal States, typically legitimist thoughts were further enhanced by a specifically theological elaboration to explain the underlying reason for why territorial power had been bestowed upon the Pope by God: namely, it guaranteed his freedom, and hence independence, from other worldly monarchs.⁴⁰⁸

This argument figured in the catholic writings that urged Catholics to support the military defence of the Pope through the procurement of money and soldiers. One professor from the theological faculty of Salzburg in his tract entitled “Why does the holy father need an army?” published in German in 1868 and translated into Dutch the same year⁴⁰⁹ – wrote that God had ‘indicated clearly, that his governor on earth [...] should not be the subject of any earthly king.’⁴¹⁰

It was debated whether the legitimacy upon which papal rule was established over the Papal States stemmed from the worldly or the religious-theological foundation; this occurred not only in non-Catholic circles, but also within Catholicism as well. Some tried to keep the issue in the shadows: The concept of “property” as it was often used in regard to the argument of the “robbery” of the Papal States is in a certain way able to circumvent the question of whether this property was in itself legitimate. The debated “nature” of the legitimacy of the

⁴⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 49. It remains unclear to me which of the two “factions” was in the majority according to Sarlin.

⁴⁰⁸ Massimo de Leonardis, “Motivazioni religiose e sociali nella difesa del potere temporale dei papi (1850-1870),” *Rassegna storica del Risorgimento* 69 (1982): pp. 182-200.

⁴⁰⁹ Georg Mössinger, *Waarom heeft de paus een leger noodig?* (Haarlem: van den Heuvel; Katholiek-Nederlandsche Brochuren-Vereeniging, 1868).

⁴¹⁰ „Dadurch gab Gott deutlich zu erkennen, daß sein Statthalter auf Erden [...] nicht der Unterthan irgend eines irdischen Königs sein soll.“ Georg Mössinger, *Wozu braucht der heilige Vater eine Armee? Den Katholiken Deutschlands und Österreichs beantwortet* (Salzburg: J. Oberer's Buchhandlung, 1868), p. 10.

Papal States was alluded to in an address given by the German Catholic Assembly of 1861 to the Pope. Therein an ambivalent position was expressed according to which the worldly possessions of the Pope are characterized as follows: "although worldly, they are provided to the Church and are a necessary condition ordered by God" so that the Pope may fulfil his various roles.⁴¹¹

The religious dimension was very important for the other sides of the conflict as well. One example in particular is of Mazzini and Mazzinianism. As Simon Levis Sullam has argued, part of Mazzini's argument lay in the idea that the nation was an institution planned by God: "its existence depended therefore above all on God. And the sovereignty as well as the historical role that the nation is called upon to realize, is the people's, but it derives from God: that is to say, it does not derive from below, but from above."⁴¹² The international solidarity between members of different nations was partially based on the conviction that not only their own nation-state but the nation-states of others would be the fulfilment of a divine plan.

3.3 Martyrs

In 1860, immediately following the battle the myth of the "martyrs de Castelfidardo" had begun to circulate, first in France and then progressively and ever more rapidly to the rest of the Catholic world.⁴¹³ In a series of Catholic pamphlets released in 1867, the fresh news of the victory of the Papal soldiers in the battle of Mentana (3 November) were expressed using terminology that was similar to that of the adversary: "Out of the tombs of Mentana and Monte Rotondo drifts air of spring and resurrection, because the blood of the martyrs never flows in vain in the church."⁴¹⁴ Despite the "birth right" of religion, so to say, to the topos of

⁴¹¹ „[...] den weltlichen Besitzstand desselben als eine von der Vorsehung der Kirche gewährte, wenn auch irdische Unterlage betrachten, welche da die nothwendige, von Gott angeordnete Bedingung ist, daß der Stellverteter Christi sein [...]" *Verhandlungen der dreizehnten Generalversammlung der katholischen Vereine Deutschlands in München am 9., 10., 11. Und 12. September 1861. Amtlicher Bericht*, (Munich: Verlag von J. G. Weiß, 1862), p. 84.

⁴¹² Simon Levis Sullam, "'Fate della rivoluzione una religione'. Aspetti del nazionalismo mazziniano come religione politica (1831-1835)," *Società e storia*, no. 106 (2004): p. 724.

⁴¹³ Anatole de Segur, *Les martyrs de Castelfidardo* (Paris: Ambroise Bray, 1861), Dutch translation of 1861, Italian translation of 1862.

⁴¹⁴ „Aus den Heldengräbern von Mentana und Monte Rotondo weht Frühlings- und Auferstehungsluft, denn das Blut der Martyrer fließt niemals vergeblich in der Kirche.“ Andreas Niedermayer, *Die Streiter für den apostolischen Stuhl im Jahre 1867* (Frankfurt am Main: Verlag für Kunst und Wissenschaft; Katholischer Broschüren-Verein, 1867), p. 36.

the martyr, this closely reflected the words used in Garibaldi's anthem: "The tombs are uncovered, the dead come from afar, / The ghosts of our martyrs are rising to war [...]." ⁴¹⁵

As with nationalism, fiction pieces played an important role in mobilizing Catholics as well. ⁴¹⁶ From 1862 onwards several publishers as well as Catholic newspapers in Germany presented a translation of a novel by the Italian priest Antonio Bresciani under the title "*Olderich, der päpstliche Zuave*". ⁴¹⁷ Bresciani was co-founder and editor of the Jesuit journal 'La Civiltà Cattolica', a journal "that was born precisely to counterbalance the very successful press of the opposition, and to cultivate a public opinion that was faithful to the "good cause". ⁴¹⁸ Even if many Catholics believed that novels were even more "evil" than Romanticism itself ⁴¹⁹, the overwhelming success of the novel led Bresciani to appositely design a series of novels for the "Civiltà Cattolica". Given that the novel seemed to be the medium of the day, he sought to create "good ones", including passions, but only of "the noble, pure, generous" sort. ⁴²⁰ The novel "Olderico" was first published in 1861 in episodes in the journal, but the following year it was printed again in book form in Italian; at the same time it was translated into several European languages, among which French and German. In Germany, different editions by several publishers were put on the market and sold in mostly Catholic cities like Regensburg, Münster and Paderborn. ⁴²¹

Bresciani supposedly directly quotes real letters of Papal Zouaves, which were taken from French and Belgian newspapers as well as private sources. He then incorporates them into the conventional plot of a novel. ⁴²² The main characters of the novel are the young

⁴¹⁵ "Si scopron le tombe, si levano i morti / i martiri nostri son tutti risorti!" English version in George Macaulay Trevelyan, *Garibaldi and the Thousand, May, 1860* (London et al.: Longmans, Green and Co., 1916), p. 82. Italian version for instance in Stefano Pivato, *Bella ciao. Canto e politica nella storia d'Italia* (Rome; Bari: Laterza, 2005), p. 19.

⁴¹⁶ I do not take into consideration the novel of Philipp Wasserburg, *Silvio. Ein Roman aus den Tagen von Mentana*, 2 vols. (Mainz: Kirchheim, 1873), for the reason that it was published only in 1873 and therefore after the period examined in this study; the novel had never been published previously in other formats, namely in the periodical press.

⁴¹⁷ Carol E. Harrison sees the topoi of the novel as defining features of the "real" Papal Zouaves, see Carol E. Harrison, "Zouave stories. Gender, Catholic spirituality, and French responses to the Roman Question," *Journal of Modern History* 79, no. 2 (2007): pp. 274-305.

⁴¹⁸ Nicola Del Corno, "Letteratura e Anti-Risorgimento. I romanzi di Antonio Bresciani," *Memoria e Ricerca: Rivista di Storia Contemporanea* 24 (2007): p. 23.

⁴¹⁹ Ibid., p. 22.

⁴²⁰ Ibid., pp. 23-24.

⁴²¹ Antonio Bresciani, *Oderic, der päpstliche Zuave. Historischer Roman. Mit einer Biographie des Verfassers* (Münster: Druck und Verlag der E. L. Braun'schen Buchdruckerei, 1862); Antonio Bresciani, *Olderich, der päpstliche Zuave* (Regensburg: Manz, 1862); Antonio Bresciani, *Olderich, der päpstliche Zuave. Erzählung aus dem Jahre 1860* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1864). Because this chapter deals with the mobilization of Germans, the emphasis has been placed on the German translations; as basis I used the edition from Regensburg.

⁴²² Harrison, "Zouave stories"; Del Corno, "Letteratura e Anti-Risorgimento. I romanzi di Antonio Bresciani," pp. 21-32.

Olderich⁴²³ from Brittany and Jakobine⁴²⁴, who “grew up together”, because their families were friends; but later “this brotherly affection changed step by step into passionate love, which, though based on mutual respect and virtue, never went beyond that which is allowed.”⁴²⁵ The novel begins with the announcement of the marriage between the two and a letter arrives revealing to Jakobine that Olderich has decided to travel to Rome, to join – “for the defence of the states of the Holy See” – the ranks of General Lamoricière.⁴²⁶ Throughout the book, Jakobine vacillates between states of heavy sorrow or even what we today would call deep depression⁴²⁷ for the departure of her lover and the dangers he must face and pride for having a “martyr” as a bridegroom. In these internal battles, Jakobine at times berates herself for feeling upset by Olderich’s departure and for fearing that he could die. But what always wins out in the end are her religious beliefs and pride. At the beginning of the novel a nun explains not only why she should not chastise herself for her “weakness” but also that “those young men” defending the Pope are martyrs “before the Lord”.⁴²⁸ The novel, following the narration of Jakobine’s inner struggles, goes on to relate Olderich’s experiences in Italy. The novel goes on to strategically alternate long historical accounts – for instance on the papal General de Pimodan – with the evolution of the story of the two protagonists; the author does so also to increase the suspense surrounding the moment in which Olderich is purportedly fatally wounded and Jakobine’s reaction once she finds out about it.

In the end, Olderich does not die but is saved; the novel ends upon Olderich’s return after a convalescent stay in an Italian peasant’s home. Though the novel ends before the wedding, it ends with the promise of one, that and the promise of “a new, happy family”⁴²⁹ Bresciani’s novel is characterized by a series of repeated topoi throughout. Olderich, before meeting the pontiff, prays in the Chapel of the Confession in St. Peter’s Basilica, “with all my ardour to the great saint to provide me with the ardent spirit that provided the martyrs with the power to sacrifice their blood and their lives to the tyrants in the name of their belief. Today

⁴²³ “Olderico” in the Italian version Antonio Bresciani, *Olderico ovvero il Zuavo pontificio. Racconto del 1860* (Rome: Civiltà Cattolica, 1862); “Oderic” in the German version from Münster Bresciani, *Oderic*; “Olderich” in the edition from Regensburg mainly used here Bresciani, *Olderich*.

⁴²⁴ In the Italian original, she is called “Giachelina”; she figures as “Jakobine” in the edition from Regensburg Bresciani, *Olderich*, passim; as “Jacqueline” instead in the edition from Münster Bresciani, *Oderic*, passim.

⁴²⁵ “Da beide Familien durch innigste Freundschaft verbunden waren. [...] später doch änderte und wuchs mit ihnen diese geschwisterliche Neigung und verwandelte sich allmählig in glühende Liebe, die jedoch, begründet auf gegenseitiger Achtung und Tugend, die Grenzen des Erlaubten nie überschritt.” Bresciani, *Olderich*, p. 5-6.

⁴²⁶ „[...] wir stellen uns zur Vertheidigung der Staaten des heiligen Stuhles den Fahnen Lamoricière’s.“ Ibid., p. 14.

⁴²⁷ “Der Körper ist unbeweglich, stumm, fast versteinert, denn die Seele ist in ein grund- und grenzenloses Schmerzensmeer untergetaucht und versenkt.” Ibid., p. 219.

⁴²⁸ „Diese jungen Leute sind vor den Augen des Herrn Märtyrer [...]“ Ibid., pp. 22-23.

⁴²⁹ Harrison, “Zouave Stories,” p. 283.

the church is treated with hostility by the tyranny of the Godless; today, too, she will find her martyrs who will triumph over new tyrants.”⁴³⁰ Throughout the book, papal soldiers are portrayed to have shed their blood for their religion, as martyrs, which ensured for them “the secure way to heaven”⁴³¹.

One scene relates a conversation between generals Lamoricière and Pimodan. Lamoricière praises the Zouaves, noting that they were used to studying⁴³² and therefore intelligent enough to understand by themselves what their leaders wanted. At the same time, they fought “for a holy cause”, dying for the Pope and the church, and they knew that this was “martyrdom” for the testimony of Christ.⁴³³ In his chapters describing the battle of Castelfidardo of 1860, where many indeed lost their lives and the Papal Army was defeated by the Piedmont troops of General Cialdini, Bresciani wrote: “[... We do] have one name for all of them that is so glorious that even the angels themselves could envy it, it is that of martyrs.”⁴³⁴

A key feature ascribed to the Zouaves of all countries was their “tender” age. For instance Bresciani writes of those who fought in 1860: “Some of them were only seventeen to eighteen years old and they had never left their home [before]. Their soul was much stronger than their body.”⁴³⁵ Bresciani uses such descriptions as the “young men’s great solemn souls”, the “noble, young people”, the “young volunteers”.⁴³⁶ To be young was associated with being pure: Bresciani considered them to be living in an essentially impure century, in a “dirty century” characterized by a “new general flood of sins”, an epoch of “carnal lust” and “immorality.”⁴³⁷ These “youths” are said to have shouted, as they loaded their rifles, “I, at the whistle of the first bullet, I will fire and reload my carbine to shoot again and I will say: Hail Jesus! Hail Maria!”⁴³⁸

⁴³⁰ “[...]it aller Gluth flehte ich zu dem großen Heiligen, mir diesen glühenden Geist, der den Märtyrern die Kraft, ihr Blut und ihr Leben zum Zeugniß des Glaubens den Tyrannen zu opfern, gab, zu verleihen. Heute wird die Kirche von der Tyrannei der Gottlosen angefeindet; auch heute wird sie ihre Märtyrer, die über ihre neuen Tyrannen siegen, finden.” Bresciani, *Olderich*, p. 58.

⁴³¹ “[...]V]on heiliger Gluth für den Kampf, der ihnen einen sicheren Weg zum Himmel erschloß.” Ibid., p. 269.

⁴³² For the actual social composition of the German Papal Zouaves, see chapter 5.2.1.

⁴³³ „Endlich kämpfen die unsern für eine heilige Sache; [...] daß dieses Zeugnis ein Martyrthum ist [...]“ Bresciani, *Olderich*, p. 171-172.

⁴³⁴ “[...]Wir] haben für sie alle Einen [sic] Namen, der so rühmlich ist, daß die Engel selbst ihn beneiden könnten, den Namen Märtyrer!” Ibid., p. 328.

⁴³⁵ “Mehrere aus ihnen waren nur siebzehn bis achtzehn Jahre alt und hatten nie das Vaterhaus verlassen. Ihre Seele war viel stärker als ihr Körperbau.” Ibid., p. 242.

⁴³⁶ Ibid., pp. 118, 171, 207.

⁴³⁷ “Unser schmutziges Jahrhundert [...] in dieser neuen, allgemeinen Sündfluth [...] sich in verworfenen Fleischeslusten wälzt und im Schlamme der Unmoral dahin schwimmt.” Ibid., p. 207.

⁴³⁸ “Diese Jünglinge ... riefen: ‚Ich, beim Pfeifen der ersten Kugel, werde ich, während ich feure und meinen Karabiner lade, um wieder zu feuern, sprechen: Es lebe Jesus! Es lebe Maria!’” Ibid., p. 245. For the tradition of

But idealism is not enough to win a war. In fact, Bresciani often comments the lack of military training of these youths: And though they "possessed more noble-mindedness, self-sacrifice and good will than had skill with arms and experience in military exercises, they had still to adapt to camp life."⁴³⁹ Sometimes, Bresciani presents religious fervour as a hindrance to good fighting, and propounds a more cool-headed approach towards the war. He asserts that having more experience at warfare would have been better⁴⁴⁰: "This heroic youth was admittedly full of enthusiasm and good will; but they have never before participated in any war and do not know what words such as turn about face in time, to disperse, to gather, to fight in the wedge, square, echelon, flank and front formations mean."⁴⁴¹ The lack of experience lay, as Bresciani wrote, at the basis of consistent efforts to improve military education, for instance by integrating experienced Swiss veterans from the Papal Army into the regiments of the Zouaves: "Nearly all of Lamoricière's volunteers understand nothing of war; to educate them as quickly as possible, the General took the greater part of their officers and non-commissioned officers including the corporals from the legions of veterans to distribute them amongst the companies of new arrivals."⁴⁴²

The cause of the fighting is depicted in terms of a crusade, a parallel which Bresciani let Olderich himself feel upon his arrival to the harbour of Civitavecchia, where he is imbued with a "holy interior joy" that is comparable "to the feeling with which the hearts of the crusaders of the middle-ages such as Godfrey, Bohemond, Richard the Lionheart were filled".⁴⁴³

Much space in the novel, including a special chapter, is dedicated to the courage of the mothers of the Zouaves. Much like Olderich's fiancée, Jakobine, the mothers in the novel, at times, oscillate between their motherly attachment to their sons and their religious beliefs. On the surface, sending their sons to fight seems to contrast with the strong motherly bonds

"Viva Maria"-fighters against the French Revolution see Giovanni Assereto, "I 'Viva Maria' nella Repubblica Ligure," *Studi Storici* 39, no. 2 (1998): pp. 449-71.

⁴³⁹ "[Sie] besaßen viel mehr Edelmuth, Aufopferung, Muth und guten Willen, als Geschicklichkeit in den Waffen und Erfahrung in militärischen Uebungen; an sein Lagerleben mußten sie sich erst gewöhnen." Bresciani, *Olderich*, p. 118.

⁴⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 265-266.

⁴⁴¹ "Diese heldenmüthige Jugend war zwar voll Eifer und gutem Willen; aber sie hatte noch nicht einer Waffenthat begewohnt und wußte nicht, was die Worte a tempo wenden, sich ausdehnen, sich sammeln, im Kegel, im Viereck, stufenweis, in der Seite, von vorn kämpfen sagen wollten." Ibid., p. 271. I am very grateful to Margot Wylie for finding the right English words for these military commands.

⁴⁴² "Fast alle Freiwilligen Lamoricière's [sic] verstanden nichts vom Kriege; um sie so schnell als möglich zu unterrichten, nahm der General aus den Legionen der Veteranen einen großen Theil ihrer Offiziere und Unteroffiziere bis zu den Corporälen herab und vertheilte sie in die Compagnien der neu Angekommenen [...]" Ibid., p. 273.

⁴⁴³ "[Er] empfand [...] eine solche heilige innerliche Freude, daß sie nur jenem Gefühl an die Seite zu stellen ist, womit die Herzen der mittelalterlichen Kreuzfahrer, wie Gottfried, Bohemund, Richard Löwenherz, als sie den Boden des heiligen Landes betraten, erfüllt waren." Ibid., p. 44.

underlined by the recent exaltations of motherhood in Catholicism. The veneration of Mary, as expressed in the dogma of the Immaculate Conception and the Blessed Virgin Mary of 1854, was closely connected to this exaltation of motherhood; but, it must be noted, Mary had also sacrificed her son. The act of sending their sons into the battle in Rome was, therefore, legitimized by the rationale that these sons belonged to God: “By delighting us with children Divine Providence only entrusts them to us, only to refund them on its demand.”⁴⁴⁴ And in another passage, a mother writes: “But are those children not just a pledge in our hands, which God entrusted to us, to ask them back at his own discretion?”⁴⁴⁵ Hence, it is possible that the mothers “themselves call upon their children to enter such a fight”.⁴⁴⁶ In the book, the Pope’s cause against the “revolution” is equated with God’s cause. By sending their children to fight, these mothers are now perceived as the perfect examples of fortitude winning over motherly feelings: “What belief! What devotion to God! What grace of heart! What courage! What knightly souls!”⁴⁴⁷ Were their sons to fall in battle, the mothers in Bresciani’s novel would take pride from being the “mothers of martyrs.”⁴⁴⁸ Bresciani specifically writes about one mother: “Her sorrow was silent, nearly gleaming, and she seemed to say: I am a happy mother, my son is in heaven, and for the sake of Christ he was killed.”⁴⁴⁹

But the act of giving back their children to God by providing soldiers for the Papal Army did not signify that the primary role of mothers was forgotten: Indeed, this was to watch over the purity of their sons. Hence, Bresciani includes recounts of the letters that mothers sent to Rome asking their friends to monitor their children’s lifestyles. As Bresciani seems to cite from one mother’s letter: “I do not think that at Rome there are only saints. Quite the contrary, I am convinced that in the Eternal City young, tender, and easily reachable souls, are exposed to many temptations.”⁴⁵⁰ Therefore, they requested that friends keep an eye

⁴⁴⁴ “Indem uns die göttliche Vorsehung mit Kindern beglückt, vertraut sie uns dieselben nur an, damit wir sie auf Verlangen zurückerstatten [...]” Ibid., p. 75.

⁴⁴⁵ “Doch sind diese nicht in unsern Händen ein Unterpfand, welches Gott uns anvertraute, um es je nach Gutdünken wieder zu fordern?” Ibid., p. 337.

⁴⁴⁶ “[Sie] fordern selbst ihre Kinder auf, in solchen Kampf zu ziehen.” Ibid., p. 73.

⁴⁴⁷ “Welcher Glaube! Welche Hingabe in Gott! Welche Herzensanmuth! Welcher Muth! Welch ritterliche Seelen!” Ibid., p. 343.

⁴⁴⁸ „[...]daß die Mütter dieser armen Jünglinge sich wie die Mütter der ersten Märtyrer gezeigt haben [...]“ Ibid., p. 341.

⁴⁴⁹ “Ihre Trauer war ruhig, fast strahlend, sie schien zu sagen: ich bin eine glückliche Mutter, mein Sohn ist im Himmel, für die Sache Christi ward er getödet” Ibid., p. 335.

⁴⁵⁰ “Ich glaube nicht, daß es in Rom nur Heilige gibt; ich bin im Gegentheil überzeugt, daß in der ewigen Stadt die Jugend, zarte, leicht empfängliche Seelen großen und zahlreichen Lockungen ausgesetzt sind.” Ibid., p. 77.

on their sons in order to keep them, as Bresciani writes, “as noble and chaste as they themselves have sent them to the Holy Father.”⁴⁵¹

Bresciani also places emphasis on the supposed fact that many Zouaves came from noble families, or in his words, “nearly all were as noble as they were rich”.⁴⁵² In Bresciani’s book a general comments with a figure of speech on the fallen soldiers of Castelfidardo: “What names! One could believe one was reading an invitation list to one of the court balls at the times of Louis XIV.”⁴⁵³ The author goes on to emphasize the dichotomy between the life befitting a noble’s standing and meagre camp life: at home, Bresciani wrote, they have a “crowd of servants”; here, they “work like day labourers”.⁴⁵⁴

This exaltation of the noble origins of the Zouaves in terms of status and souls contrasts sharply with the way they were characterized by the Garibaldian and Italian enemy. Bresciani’s novel also speaks of this: “Such men, the admiration of the Catholic world, the fame of their happy fatherland, it is they that one dares call a crowd of mercenaries, hypocrites, rabble without roof and home, a horde of foreign drunkards, paid cowardly murderers that one must eradicate like wild animals.”⁴⁵⁵ Bresciani cites other, similar characterizations that he took from speeches from the Italian General Fanti for instance.⁴⁵⁶ By supposing the economic motives of the pro-papal soldiers, the pro-national forces directly attacked the foundation upon which the images of martyrdom and sacrifice were based. Economic disinterest was an important ingredient in the topos of “sacrifice”. The German Catholic Mössinger wrote about the papal Zouaves, stating that they “often served at their own expense”.⁴⁵⁷ The distinction between differently motivated foreign soldiers was a consistent feature of the *contemporary* polemics between the political sides of the Risorgimento: whereas one army’s “own” foreign soldiers were often described as ideal-driven and noble-minded, those of the opposing side were demonized as “mercenaries”.⁴⁵⁸

⁴⁵¹ “[...] sie ihnen so edel und keusch zu bewahren, wie sie selbst dieselben dem heiligen Vater gesandt.” Ibid., p. 77.

⁴⁵² Ibid., p. 207.

⁴⁵³ “Welche Namen! Man könnte glauben, eine Einladungsliste für einen großen Hofball zur Zeit Ludwigs XIV. zu lesen!” Ibid., p. 319.

⁴⁵⁴ “[...] haben sie eine Schaar Bedienten”, “[...] hier arbeiten sie wie Tagelöhner” Ibid., p. 102.

⁴⁵⁵ “[..S]olche Männer, die Bewunderung der katholischen Welt, der Ruhm ihres glücklichen Vaterlands, diese sind es, welche man einen Haufen Söldlinge, Heuchler, Gesindel ohne Dach noch Heimath, eine Horde fremder Trunkenbolde, bezahlte Meuchler, die man gleich wilden Thieren ausrotten muß, zu nennen wagt!” Ibid., pp. 207-208.

⁴⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 208.

⁴⁵⁷ “Sie dienten sehr häufig auf eigene Kosten [...]”. Mössinger, *Wozu braucht der heilige Vater eine Armee?*, p. 19.

⁴⁵⁸ See the chapter from p. 271 onwards; with regard to this aspect see also Göhde, “German volunteers in the armed conflicts of the Italian Risorgimento 1834-70”.

3.4 Personality Cults

3.4.1 International personality cults

On all sides, single figures were subject to a process of heroization. This is how Garibaldi's international reputation was established⁴⁵⁹, and likewise how the cult of the Pope was increasingly amplified. The situation in which the last Bourbon monarchical couple was forced to withdraw to the fortress in Gaeta in early September 1860 was, similarly to the processes applied to Garibaldi and the Pope, used to highlight their sufferings and sacrifices. Lucy Riall's analysis of how Garibaldi's image was contemporaneously constructed and diffused alongside each of his actions is exemplary. She has underlined the rather active role that Garibaldi had in "fashioning" his own public image, and she has stressed the practical aims that this image was intended to fulfil in mobilizing various forms of support for the Italian "hero".⁴⁶⁰ Similar processes of "personalization" are also evident on the opposing political sides. But in this case, such "modern" forms of communication were a rather new "weapon". For the kings and the Pope to appropriate this "role of the charismatic hero" and to provide them also with a "plebiscitary" legitimation⁴⁶¹, was risky according to Volker Sellin, because this move in itself was a "symptom of a crisis" of the dynastic legitimation of authority; but "charisma remains ever a revolutionary force even in the hands of a dynastic sovereign. If it fails, he cannot return to the old guise of traditional legitimacy."⁴⁶²

With regard to the pontiff, the establishment of a cult of the currently reigning Pope must be considered within the context of the "Romanization" of the Catholic Church in the nineteenth century. The Ultramontane Catholic factions were those, in particular, who pushed to re-establish an orientation towards Catholic hierarchy and toward the reintroduction of the monarchical principle into the church. In opposition to the Episcopalian tendencies that were very much a mark of the eighteenth century, the nineteenth century saw the rise of a countermovement that aimed to establish the absolutism of the pope and his policy over the role of bishops and "national churches", these last being Gallicanism in France, Febronianism in Germany, or Josephinism in Austria.⁴⁶³ One of the most important ways in which this shift

⁴⁵⁹ See first and foremost Riall, *Invention of a hero*.

⁴⁶⁰ *Ivi*.

⁴⁶¹ Sellin, *Gewalt und Legitimität*, p. 273.

⁴⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 284.

⁴⁶³ Georg Denzler, *Das Papsttum. Geschichte und Gegenwart*, 3 ed. (Munich: Beck, 2009), p. 93.

See for the French, German and Italian case still Lönne, *Politischer Katholizismus* as well as Clark, "The new Catholicism," especially pp. 18-23. See as well Papenheim, "Il pontificato di Pio IX".

of power over to the Pope manifested was through the use of symbolic policies.⁴⁶⁴ More than ever before, a religious cult of the actual Pope was established. Partially new religious practices informed “devotions to the person of the Pope”⁴⁶⁵, which were increasingly able to function as a direct bridge between Catholic lay people, especially the non-bourgeois strata of the confession, and the Roman centre.⁴⁶⁶ In the novel “Olderic”, the relationship between the Pope and the masses, as well as between the Pope and his soldiers, is depicted in terms of a father-son relationship. During a ceremony, the masses are said to give Pius IX “the name of a father and a king by shouting unanimously: ‘We want our Pope, cheers to our Pope-king!’”⁴⁶⁷ In fact, the frequency with which the Roman administration organized events that were linked to the institution of the papacy increased, and the administration actively tried to transform them into mass gatherings. In 1867, for instance, the Pope announced that there would be a celebration of an anniversary set for 29 June: 1800 years had passed since the death of the martyrs Peter and Paul in the year 67. Roughly 150,000 pilgrims adhered to the call from Rome, among which 500 bishops and 20,000 clergymen.⁴⁶⁸ “[F]or the first time in the history of the papacy, the Pope extensively used public audiences”⁴⁶⁹, and now public appearances had become an important ingredient in these modern forms of personal cult of the Pope. The imagery of “suffering”, “martyrdom” and “sacrifice” were particularly effective in terms of political communication here and elsewhere. During the German catholic assemblies of 1867, the seminarian Christoph Moufang underlined that the Pope should not be a worldly king “that always has peace on earth and an unsullied possession and an undisturbed reign. No! He should have, as others that carry a crown, his burden and his cross.”⁴⁷⁰ In a long passage the author supports the cult of Pius IX. He states “I might still experience that he, as a canonized Saint, will be venerated on the altars.”⁴⁷¹

⁴⁶⁴ Papenheim, “Il pontificato di Pio IX”; Denzler, *Das Papsttum*; Seiler, “Somatische Solidarität”.

⁴⁶⁵ Clark, “The new Catholicism,” p. 21.

⁴⁶⁶ Lönne, *Politischer Katholizismus*, pp. 30 and 80. The bourgeois strata of Catholicism were instead more reluctant, and sometimes took even clearly anti-Ultramontane positions. See for the discussion of the concept of Catholic bourgeoisie Oded Heilbrunner, “Wohin verschwand das katholische Bürgertum? Der Ort des katholischen Bürgertums in der neueren deutschen Historiographie,” *Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte* 47, no. 4 (1995): pp. 320-37. For a comparison of the Catholic middle class milieus of Prussian Rhineland and south-western Germany see instead Mergel, “Ultramontanism, liberalism, moderation,” pp. 151-74.

⁴⁶⁷ “[Es] gab ihm den Namen eines Vaters und Königs, indem es einstimmig schrie: Wir wollen unsern Papst, es lebe unser Papstkönig!” Bresciani, *Olderic*, p. 51.

⁴⁶⁸ Giacomo Martina, *Pio IX (1867-1878)*, vol. 3 (Rome: Editrice Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 1990), p. 39.

⁴⁶⁹ Seiler, “Somatische Solidarität,” p. 77.

⁴⁷⁰ “Der Papst sollte nicht ein König sein auf Erden, der immer Frieden hätte, und einen ganz ungetrübten Besitz und ein ungestörtes Herrscherthum. Nein! er sollte mit Anderen, die auch Kronen tragen, seine Bürde und sein Kreuz haben.” Moufang, *Der Kampf um Rom*, p. 6.

⁴⁷¹ “[I]ch denke, ich könnte es noch erleben, dass er als canonisierter Heiliger auf den Altären verehrt wird.” Ibid., p. 24.

According to Moufang, the fact that the Pope is persecuted and suffers because of the battles he must face only contributes to the love that is felt for him by Catholics. As Jörg Seiler has shown, the image of the suffering Pope was very much fuelled by accentuating the corporality of the Pope; the effect was intensified by the fact that he was the first Pope that could be – and was – photographed. The result was, according to Seiler, the establishment of a kind of “somatic solidarity” between the Pope and especially the lay people.⁴⁷² This corporal and emotional kind of joint suffering, of joint feelings and mirrored emotions is for instance evident in the address that the general assembly of the catholic associations sent to the Pope in 1861: “We share with you the pain brought about from the suffering and persecution [...], we share with you the outrage [...] we are scandalized about the perfidy and malice [...]”⁴⁷³ These forms of communication were more modern than they were old; according to Christopher Clark “the result – in the short term at least – was a drastic personalization of authority that knew no contemporary parallel and anticipated in some respect the totalitarian cults of the twentieth century.”⁴⁷⁴

The topos of sacrifice and the idea of “martyrdom” were present on all political sides.⁴⁷⁵ Ernst Haug, General of the Roman Republic in 1849, for instance, dedicated his Roman memoirs to Mazzini with the following words: “You know how brotherly I suffer your pain with you [...]”⁴⁷⁶ These topoi were very pronounced in the cult that came to be formed around the Bourbon monarchical couple, especially after they pulled back to Gaeta, although they could only partially inform the engagement of foreign soldiers given that the cult developed after many of them had already arrived in southern Italy.⁴⁷⁷ All of these “mythical” figures aroused a certain degree of fascination abroad. They helped to create well beyond the bounds of Italy the “desire to participate in the epic of the Italian nation”⁴⁷⁸, or, with regard to the opposite side, the desire to contribute to “the powerful array of opposition that the Italian national movement encountered in Europe”.⁴⁷⁹

⁴⁷² Seiler, “Somatische Solidarität,” p. 78.

⁴⁷³ “[W]ir theilen mit Dir den Schmerz über die Leiden und Verfolgungen [... W]ir theilen mit Dir die Entrüstung [.E]s empört uns die Heimtücke und Arglist [...]” *Verhandlungen der dreizehnten Generalversammlung der katholischen Vereine Deutschlands*, pp. 83-84.

⁴⁷⁴ Clark, “The new Catholicism,” p. 23.

⁴⁷⁵ Lucy Riall, “Martyr cults in nineteenth-century Italy,” *Journal of Modern History* 83 (2010): pp. 277-84.

⁴⁷⁶ “Du weißt, wie brüderlich ich Deinen Schmerz mit leide [...] Die Zeit wird bald kommen, welche die dräuende Kainskeule den Völkern entwindet, wo Nord und Süd im Bruderkusse den alten Hader sühnt und die völkerschaftlichen Familien der Menschheit ihre irdliche Bestimmung erkannt haben werden.” Ernst Haug, *Des Republikaners Schwertfart* (Bremen: Franz Schlotdmann, 1851), p. ix and xi.

⁴⁷⁷ Sarlin, *Légitimisme en armes*, pp. 199-200.

⁴⁷⁸ Pellegrino Sutcliffe, “British Red Shirts,” p. 209.

⁴⁷⁹ Sarlin, “Fighting the Risorgimento,” p. 482.

3.4.2 National figures and personality cults

At times, it was possible some of these figures lent themselves to a specific European state or regional context as well. This was the case with the wife of the last Bourbon king, Marie Sophie of Bavaria.⁴⁸⁰ The anthology of poems dedicated to her and published in 1861 in Munich, with a page at the beginning of the book announcing an “album of Gaeta”, and a dedication to the “heroine of Gaeta”, is most emblematic.⁴⁸¹ In the foreword, the “sacrifice and dedication” of Marie Sophie is highlighted, as is her role in holding up morale amongst the Bourbon troops present at Gaeta and especially her care for the wounded in the military hospital⁴⁸²; an etching of this last was added. The poems contain variations of these topics throughout; but of course the case of Marie Sophie is used to highlight German as well as Bavarian patriotism. At times Marie Sophie is depicted as a German: this is so in the poem entitled “A German woman”, where she is depicted as a “German princely daughter”⁴⁸³; in another poem, her “German” loyalty is emphasized, a loyalty that ensures she stays with her husband “until death” do them part.⁴⁸⁴ Other poems call attention to the fact that Marie Sophie came from Bavaria; often, however, allusions to Bavaria and Germany are to be found alongside one another in the same poem: “From Bavaria's old dynasty you come / from which produced more than one real German woman / more than one courageous ancestor.”⁴⁸⁵

Similarly, for papal mobilization, the fact that the papal Minister of Arms, Hermann Kanzler, came from Baden was frequently highlighted especially in German publications: “Already on the 15th of November [1867], 450 members of the Catholic Casino in his [Kanzler's] hometown Bruchsal sent him an address full of warmth and ardour and expressed properly their thankfulness, their joy and their just pride. General Kanzler is indeed today the

⁴⁸⁰ On her see Franco Valsecchi, “Marie Sophie. Königin von Neapel,” *Zeitschrift für bayerische Landesgeschichte* 44, no. 1 (1981): pp. 381-96; Sarlin, *Légitimisme en armes*, especially pp. 199-200.

⁴⁸¹ „Gaeta-Album“; „Der Heldin von Gaeta“. Johann Baptist Vogl and Friedrich Wolf, eds., *Gedichte an Ihre Majestät Marie Sophie, Königin beider Sicilien, geb. Herzogin in Bayern. Mit dem Porträt Ihrer Majestät der Königin beider Sicilien* (Munich: s. n., 1861).

⁴⁸² See, e. g., the poem by Edward Dorer-Egloff, “Die Krankenwärterin,” in *ibid.*, pp. 16-17, as well as the engraving of Marie Sophie in the military hospital, on the insert between pp. 16 and 17.

⁴⁸³ „[.]Die deutsche Fürstentochter“ Heinrich von Höfen, “Eine deutsche Frau,” *ibid.*, p. 6.

⁴⁸⁴ „Die Deutschen üben Treue“; „Ich bleibe bis zum Tode zur Seite, Gatte, Dir!“ Edward Dorer-Egloff, “Der Kronenwechsel in Gaeta,” *ibid.*, p. 15.

⁴⁸⁵ “Aus Bayern's altem Herrscherhause bist, / Das mehr als eine echte deutsche Frau, / Das mehr als einen tapfern Ahnherren zählet.” Gilardone, “An die Heldin von Gaeta,” *ibid.*, p. 40.

pride of Catholic Germany.”⁴⁸⁶ Another pamphlet stated: “The commander of the papal army, Kanzler, is – for the glory of the German name – a German, born in Bruchsal in Baden.”⁴⁸⁷

3.5 Interclassist armies as legitimating factors

Another important topos that all sides used was their supposed social inclusiveness in terms of the social origins of soldiers. Even legitimists had learned that a supposedly social inclusive “approbation” of their cause was an important device in the “fight” to win the public opinion’s favour. The number of supporters was important, but particularly so was the fact that they came from all strata of society. Hence, even the legitimists were keen to show – at least in their political communications – that theirs was also a “peoples’ war”⁴⁸⁸, fought by soldiers convinced of the legitimist cause. In his report to the Pope on the battle of Mentana in 1867, for instance, the papal Minister of Arms Kanzler underlined “the competition with which all Catholic nations wanted to be represented in your troops, and how many families (from the most illustrious to the most humble) pushed to enlist their own children.”⁴⁸⁹ Here, as elsewhere, legitimism and Catholicism had begun to move towards new forms of legitimization, in this case popular consent. In this sense, the volunteer was a potentially “democratic” figure that according to these texts also existed on the conservative side, wherein “democratic” was intended to mean wide-reaching consensus, as in being socially inclusive. This confirms the theses that there was an astonishing ability on the part of monarchism (Volker Sellin) and European Catholicism (Christopher Clark) to modernize.

3.6 Romanticism, Adventure

In this endeavour to create consensus, Romantic culture played a major role, with its tendencies towards the exceptional, the individual and the adventurous, and a quest for the

⁴⁸⁶ „Schon am 15. November haben 450 Mitglieder des katholischen Casino’s in seiner Vaterstadt Bruchsal eine mit Wärme und Innigkeit verfasste Adresse an ihn abgesendet und in derselben ihrem Dank, ihrer Freude und ihrem gerechten Stolz geziemenden Ausdruck gegeben. General Kanzler ist ja heute der Stolz des katholischen Deutschlands“ Niedermayer, *Die Streiter*, p. 7.

⁴⁸⁷ „Der Befehlshaber der päpstlichen Armee, Kanzler, ist zum Ruhme des deutschen Namens ein Deutscher, aus Bruchsal in Baden gebürtig.” Möisinger, *Wozu braucht der heilige Vater eine Armee?*, p. 23.

⁴⁸⁸ Of course this is not (or at least not necessarily) a “peoples” war in the strict sense of the word, the “form of war characterized by the *direct* support of the majority of the population, which assumes an essential role in the fields of logistics, intelligence and partially as well of the military”: Rochat, “Il genio militare di Garibaldi,” p. 88, the italics are mine.

⁴⁸⁹ “[...] la gara con coi tutte le Nazioni cattoliche volevano essere rappresentate nelle Sue truppe, e come tante famiglie (dalle più illustri alle più umili) aspiravano all’onore di farvi ascrivere i proprii figli.” Hermann Kanzler, *Rapporto alla Santità di Nostro Signore Papa Pio IX. felicemente regnante del generale Kanzler pro-ministro alle armi sulla invasione dello Stato Pontificio nell'autunno 1867* (Rome: Coi tipi della Civiltà Cattolica, 1868), p. 61.

“exotic”. Assuming that the aim of the engagement was primarily to go to warrant that secondary factors were that this war was located abroad in another country – in Italy – and specific armed forces were involved. If, on the other hand, the aim of the engagement was primarily to go abroad, and joining an Italian army was a good opportunity to do so, this may be interpreted as the desire to do something exceptional, which is normally referred to as “adventurism”. The two “explanations”, “appraisal of war” and “appraisal of the exceptional experience”, are linked to important discursive formations of nineteenth century. Adventurism,⁴⁹⁰ as a form of escapism was a decisive part of Romanticism: “The romantic individual was not satisfied with its condition; he pined for the desire to be *different* and *elsewhere*. He did not content itself with everyday life, he sought out the exceptional and, if possible, the sublime.”⁴⁹¹

Many reports by German soldiers – from all political sides – often hinted that partaking in the conflict in Italy would provide a kind of additional “dividend” or benefit, i.e. the possibility of visiting Italy. Enlistment seemed to some to be an (especially economically advantageous) way to see the world, including Italy and/or Rome. Before they were deployed, some seemed to have entertained such “touristic” intentions⁴⁹²; at least these last were amongst the reasons given by some of the German soldiers for their move to Italy. For them, the possibility of visiting Rome and the Papal States was an important incentive – to be able to visit classical and/or religious sites. The first of the two is evident in Gustav von Hoffstetter’s writings, a soldier who fought in the ranks of the Roman Republic in 1849. He describes his fighting in Rome with allusions to antiquity; by committing to fight on the side of the Roman Republic, the “dream of his youth” to fight on the Campus Martius with “Roman younglings” was coming true.⁴⁹³ The second of the two is confirmed by papal officer Korff, who frequently sent home devotional images he had picked up in various Roman churches.⁴⁹⁴

⁴⁹⁰ See Sylvain Vernayre, *La gloire de l'aventure. Genèse d'une mystique moderne* (Paris: Aubier, 2002).

⁴⁹¹ Paul Ginsborg, “Romanticismo e Risorgimento. L'io, l'amore e la nazione,” in idem and Alberto Mario Banti, eds., *Il Risorgimento*, Storia d'Italia. Annali 22 (Turin: Einaudi, 2007), p. 7.

⁴⁹² See for other aspects of the “tourist analogy” in regard to soldiers, albeit in a different period, Bart Ziino, “A kind of round trip. Australian soldiers and the tourist analogy,” *War and Society* 25, no. 2 (2006): pp. 39-52. The denomination of parts of the British *garibaldini* in 1860 as “excursionists” was initially legally motivated, but informed their view of their commitment in Italy too, see Pellegrino Sutcliffe, “British Red Shirts,” pp. 207-208.

⁴⁹³ “Meine Jugendträume, in denen ich oft auf dem Marsfelde mit den römischen Jünglingen um den höchsten Preis gerungen [...], die schönen Träume des Jünglings zu verwirklichen.” Gustav von Hoffstetter, *Tagebuch aus Italien 1849* (Zurich: F. Schulthess, 1851), p. 7.

⁴⁹⁴ See the postcards and prints of images of saints in his personal estates, Vereinigte Westfälische Adelsarchive (VWA), Nachlaß Franz Xaver von Korff gen. Schmising-Kerssenbrock, Bri. N. XVI.

3.7 The role of associations

3.7.1 German Ultramontanism at the roots of recruitment for the Papal Army

The mobilization and recruitment of Germans for the Papal Army was connected to activities of German Catholicism, especially its “Ultramontane” factions. The word ‘Ultramontanism’ was originally an expression of denigration for those who were, in the eyes of others, too favourable toward Rome, “across the mountains”. Still today, the expression is used for those who “look southwards from north of the Alps [...] to get answers from Rome in nearly all questions having to do with religious beliefs or mores”.⁴⁹⁵ The word was used first in France to make a distinction with Gallicanism, which recalling the “Episcopalian” traditions of the French Catholic Church, aimed to establish a national Church that was less influenced by Rome. An anti-Gallican movement developed in the 1820s, with such exponents as Félicité de Laménais, that saw the Pope as the primary guarantee of the liberty of the church and was therefore named by his opponents to be an “ultramontane”, gazing toward the south of the Alps. In Germany, the creation of a Rome-oriented faction of Catholicism was facilitated by state-church conflicts. In 1837 the actions taken by the Pope and the Bishop of Cologne against theological professors clashed with the position upheld by the Prussian government that these last were civil servants. At the same time, a debate surfaced about how to handle interfaith marriages in Prussian Rhineland. Both led to the so-called “Cologne Event” (“Kölner Ereignis”) or “Cologne turmoil” (“Kölner Wirren”), culminating in the imprisonment of the Bishop of Cologne on the part of the Prussian authorities. The imprisonment of the Bishop resulted in the mobilization of a large portion of Catholic lay people.⁴⁹⁶

However, from what we know of the church historian Ignaz von Döllinger, there were still important segments of Catholic society, especially Catholic lay circles – for instance at the universities – that doubted not only the dogmas of infallibility and jurisprudence of the Pope but also, like Döllinger himself, the necessity for the Pope to have a mundane state. In this sense, Ultramontanism was only one of the political and theological positions that existed in German Catholicism at the time: “Against the self-stylization of Ultramontanism as an expression of Catholic unity, Ultramontanism has itself only ever been a faction, and for a

⁴⁹⁵ Denzler, *Das Papsttum*, p. 93.

⁴⁹⁶ Lönne, *Politischer Katholizismus*, pp. 77-80.

long time only a small ‘radical minority’⁴⁹⁷. Non- or even anti-Ultramontane positions, such as the continued preponderance of enlightened visions of Catholicism, were expressed for instance in the so-called Hermesianism of the professors at the Catholic universities, the very same group against whom the Cologne Bishop had stirred discontent among the students in the 1830s.

What is important here is the fact that Ultramontanism was increasingly able to directly reach the non-bourgeois strata of society. The bourgeois class, however, seemed to remain more hostile to its principles, a fact that is often overlooked given that bourgeois Catholics were frequently not included in research sets on Catholicism.⁴⁹⁸

In other words: Mobilization in support of the Papal Army seems to have been an element of German Ultramontanism, though Ultramontanism did not go unquestioned, and important segments of German Catholicism (especially within the universities) did not adhere to this authoritarian orientation towards the Pope.

From 1848 onwards, Catholic associations burgeoned in Germany: On 23 June 1848 the “Association of Pius for religious liberty” (“Piusverein für religiöse Freiheit”) was founded in Mainz; similar organizations were built in the same year in Aachen, Cologne, Bonn and Koblenz, in Hessen and then in Silesia and Tyrol. The second cathedral festival held in Cologne (“Kölner Dombaifest”) on 14 August 1848 was used to organize the first assembly of German Catholic associations, the first “Katholikentag”, which was then held on 3 October 1848 in Mainz. Here the various catholic associations presented themselves. For instance Adolf Kolping held a speech on the new Catholic associations for journeymen, associations which in 1862 already counted 60,000 members. At the Catholic general assembly in Regensburg in 1849, some had already begun to speak of the duty of all Catholics to protect the Pope and the Holy See, to “cover this place with our bodies and souls.”⁴⁹⁹

3.7.2 Peter’s pence and the Archbrotherhood of Saint Michael 1860-1870

At the beginning of 1860 in Ireland the first attempts were made to reintroduce Peter’s Pence. The name Peter’s pence was originally used in relation to sums paid by the Anglo-Saxon

⁴⁹⁷ Harald Mergel, “Für eine bürgerliche Kirche. Antiultramontanismus, Liberalismus und Bürgertum 1820-1850. Rheinland und Südwestdeutschland im Vergleich,” *Zeitschrift für die Geschichte des Oberrheins* 144 (1996): p. 401.

⁴⁹⁸ See as a critique of this lacuna *ivi*.

⁴⁹⁹ „[...] um diesen Ort mit unsern Leibern und Seelen zu decken.“ *Verhandlungen der dritten Generalversammlung des katholischen Vereines Deutschlands am 2., 3., 4. u. 5. Oktober 1849 in Regensburg. Amtlicher Bericht*, (Regensburg: Pustet, 1849), p. 23.

kings to Rome, a practice that was kept until the advent of the Anglican Church, which was financed by a tax levied on the subjects. Contemporaneously to the recruitment of Irishmen for the Papal Army, the Peter's pence was reintroduced, though this time it was bound to the troops.⁵⁰⁰

In March 1860 the *Historisch-Politische Blätter* published a long article on the Peter's pence. The editor Johann Edmund Jörg wrote about the activities in Ireland, Vienna, and Westphalia as signs that not only petitions but material support as well was being organized by the Catholics: "The more the external power of the papacy must do without the crumbling support of diplomacy, the deeper it is rooted in the hearts of the Catholic people. This is the great turn that is going on around us."⁵⁰¹ Already in the first months of 1860, pastoral letters from German bishops were written in support of the Holy See containing lists of signatures against the policies of Cavour. The Archbishop of Vienna, Cardinal Rauscher, also took up the idea of collecting money for the Pope. The Viennese "Archbrotherhood of the holy archangel Michael" was officially founded as a prayer association, the aim of which was to collect the Peter's Pence. In the statutes of a St. Michael association in Freiburg from 1891, it was said: "The association of the Holy Archangel Michael, founded in Vienna in the year 1860 by pious Catholics, and approved by the Holy Father Pius IX the 7th of March 1860, has the aim to work to strengthen genuine Catholic convictions, especially for the sustainment and defence of the Apostolic See in Rome as the centre of Catholic unity. The members oblige themselves to say devout prayer [...], and those who are able to do so will give alms of at least five pfennigs monthly."⁵⁰² On 9 March 1860, the Pope began granting indulgences, which were to be handed over to the members of the associations. The first St. Michael's associations outside Austria were built in Westphalia, in Münster and Paderborn, and in November 1860 they were built in Cologne and Trier upon pastoral decree from the bishops of the two dioceses.

⁵⁰⁰ Buchheim, *Ultramontanismus und Demokratie*, p. 107.

⁵⁰¹ "Wenn die äußere Macht des Papsttums fortan vielleicht der morschen Stützen der Diplomatie entbehren muß, so wurzelt es um so tiefer in den Herzen des katholischen Volkes. Das ist die große Wendung, welche um uns her vorgeht." Cit. from *ibid.*, p. 109.

⁵⁰² "Der Verein des Heiligen Erzengels Michael, von frommen Katholiken zu Wien im Jahre 1860 gegründet und vom Heiligen Vater Pius IX. den 7. März 1860 genehmigt, hat zum Zweck, für die Belebung echt katholischer Gesinnung, insbesondere für die Erhaltung und Verteidigung des Apostolischen Stuhles in Rom als des Mittelpunkts der katholischen Einheit zu wirken. Die Mitglieder verpflichten sich zu andächtigem Gebet [...], und die es vermögen, leisten eine freiwillige milde Gabe von mindestens fünf Pfennigen monatlich." Cit. from *ibid.*, p. 107.

The choice to institute associations connected to Saint Michael was significant for three reasons. Michael was a “military saint, the leader of the hosts of heaven”.⁵⁰³ In the Book of Revelation of the New Testament, Michael fights the dragon (Rev 12, 7); Joan of Arc is said to have received visions of the Archangel Michael instructing her to liberate France; and in modern times Saint Michael is increasingly represented in military clothing, such as armour or a mail shirt.⁵⁰⁴ Despite the fact that “cults” of Saint Michael existed in many countries, in nineteenth-century Germany he was increasingly transformed into a quintessential “German” saint. Already after the so-called Wars of Liberation we find in the work of authors and artists the underlying idea that there was “a tradition of the archangel in German history. Already at the beginning of the nineteenth century [... many were] sure, that the archangel Michael has had a role as national patron since earliest times”.⁵⁰⁵ But it was not just as a “German” saint that Michael came to be seen. He also continued to be seen as a saint that fought “evil”, which led in the 1840s to the use of his image *against* revolution, in protection of the divine right of kings. In this sense Saint Michael was seen “as guarantor of a greater German-Germanic [großdeutsch-germanischen] unity [...]”.⁵⁰⁶ In sum, he was seen as a “German”, a militant, if not a “warrior” saint⁵⁰⁷ with anti-revolutionary, “großdeutsche” attributes by organized Catholicism in Germany, and especially for Ultramontanism, he was a near perfect symbol.

In 1862, the general assembly of the Catholic associations was held in Aachen. On the evening before the official session opened, the seminary professor Christoph Moufang gave a speech that came to be known as the “men’s speech”, in which he claimed that there was a need for ‘real men’ in the Catholic movement to take up the battle for the national equality of Catholicism, as well as the fight for the independence of the Pope. During the assembly a declaration was voted to found an association for the publication of inexpensive (not more than nine Kreutzers) ‘contemporary pamphlets’ (‘Zeitgemäße Broschüren’) which then became very popular in Germany. In the final resolution it was stated that the Catholics were not enemies of progress but did abominate revolution. They protested their denigration as anti-patriotic, which was linked to being labelled as ‘Ultramontanes’, and declared that the “devotion to the Holy See has never compromised the greatness and glory of the

⁵⁰³ Leo Braudy, *From chivalry to terrorism. War and the changing nature of masculinity* (New York: Vintage books, 2005), p. 76.

⁵⁰⁴ Annemarie Brückner, “Michaelsverehrung,” in *Theologische Realenzyklopädie*, ed. Gerhard Müller and Horst Balz, vol. 22 („Malaysia – Minne“) (Berlin et al.: de Gruyter, 1992), pp. 721-722.

⁵⁰⁵ Maja Galle, *Der Erzengel Michael in der deutschen Kunst des 19. Jahrhunderts* (Munich: Utz Verlag, 2002), p. 58. For the subsequent transformations of the saint into a German-Prussian, anti-French and militaristic symbol up to World War I see *ibid.*, pp. 114-168.

⁵⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 166.

⁵⁰⁷ Braudy, *From chivalry to terrorism*, p. 76.

fatherland.”⁵⁰⁸ With regard to the Pope, they claimed he should be in full possession of his worldly dominion and declared that – because of the enduring challenges to the Pope’s dignity, liberty and independence – it was necessary to pay the Peter’s pence, which the members of the Catholic Associations should continue to do and encourage others to do so as well.

In November and December 1867, large Catholic assemblies were held in Mainz, Münster and Cologne. The general assembly of the Catholic associations in Germany, resembled that year in Mainz, passed an address stating that, “in the face of the actual dangers, the maintenance of the [Papal] Army, which is necessary to protect the person of the Holy Father and his subjects, is a common matter of the Catholic world”⁵⁰⁹; in Münster, an address by the general assembly of the diocese repeated these words. The assembly went on to resurrect the confraternity of St. Michael, “whose task it is to incite praying for the Holy See and to collect the Peter’s Pence from its members”; and it proposed that others should take up membership. All this activity was, as they explained, necessary because “the conservation of the worldly possessions of the Holy See” guarantees “the freedom, dignity and independence of the head of the Catholic church.”⁵¹⁰

The issue of the Papal Army was taken up as well by Christoph Moufang in the speeches he held during the Catholic assemblies in Münster and Cologne in 1867 and 1868. Although he acknowledged the fact that the first popes did not possess their own mundane state, Moufang perceived that later popes had been endowed with this territory by God, whereby their temporal and religious power was merged. Because of this, any requisition of papal terrain was seen as an action that went directly against God’s will, Moufang drew also on the “myth of the battle of Castelfidardo” by underling that the little army of the Pope fought courageously in 1860. He went on to say that it had been the “more than highly clever” September Convention that had suggested: “the Pope should build himself his own army.”⁵¹¹ Even if it was small, this little but ‘real’ army, as Moufang explained – without however

⁵⁰⁸ “[...] daß die Ergebenheit gegen den Heiligen Stuhl zu keiner Zeit die Größe und Herrlichkeit des Vaterlands beeinträchtigt hat.“ “Entschließung der Generalversammlung katholischer Vereine Deutschlands [1862],” in Dietmar Stübler, *Deutschland - Italien 1850 - 1871. Zeitgenössische Texte* (Leipzig: Leipziger Universitäts-Verlag, 2007), p. 186.

⁵⁰⁹ “Angesichts der gegenwärtigen Gefahren ist die Erhaltung der Armee, deren der heilige Vater zum Schutze seiner Person und seiner Unterthanen bedarf, eine gemeinsame Angelegenheit der katholischen Welt. Es ist eine Ehrensache für jede Nation, in dieser Armee vertreten zu sein: deutsche Männer können ihr Leben keiner edleren Sache weihen.” N. N., “Kirchliche Rundschau,” *Der Katholik. Zeitschrift für katholische Wissenschaft und kirchliches Leben* 47 (1867), p. 767.

⁵¹⁰ Ibid., p. 768.

⁵¹¹ “Der überkluge September-Vertrag von 1864 hat festgesetzt, daß der Papst sich eine eigene Armee bilden solle.” Moufang, *Der Kampf um Rom*, p. 7.

mentioning the name of the battle of Mentana that had been fought some months before – was able to win a war against the Italian and Garibaldian troops. Nevertheless, the possibility that the Pope would once again be attacked was great enough that Moufang foresaw a kind of final battle between the 'revolutionary' forces and the forces of 'law'. Moufang went on to propose three activities to the Catholics in Germany: to pray, give alms and protest, for instance by signing a petition to the Prussian king. In Cologne, Moufang gave an even more militant speech, stating right from the outset that compared to times of peace, it was “even nicer to enter into battle for the holy cause of religion.”⁵¹² He went on to describe himself and his listeners as "Ultramontanists".⁵¹³ He then characterised the battle of Pius IX against the revolution as being one of ideas: “the idea of justice”, “the idea of the independence of religious authority”, and the “idea of unity and togetherness of all peoples in Christendom”.⁵¹⁴ To Moufang, Pius IX embodied the idea of justice because he sustained the right of property. The idea of independence of the spiritual authority was being challenged by the revolutionary forces, because, as Moufang claimed, their aim was not so much to make Rome the capital of Italy as it was “principally to destroy religion by depriving the highest religious authority of its independence”.⁵¹⁵ Moufang went on to describe that the idea of unity of all people in Christendom would manifest in the support of all nations for the Papal Army, especially by sending soldiers: “Look at these youth; from all countries they have come running; but those are no Frenchmen, Italians, Belgians, Germans etc., that are loyal sons of the mother Church.” By shedding their blood together, they formed a “blood-bond among all Catholics.”⁵¹⁶ Moufang reached the conclusion that the Germans – as had the French, the Spanish, the Belgians and the Dutch – should engage in the fight by providing money, prestige, prayers, blood and sacrifice: “There is nothing greater than to contribute to great things and to engage the best, what every human has, his life and blood, for a great cause.”⁵¹⁷ Enclosed in the printed version of his speeches is a “Programme of the Catholic people’s policy in the Roman question”, which is far more moderate in its suggestions than Moufang’s actual speeches

⁵¹² “[..N]och schöner, für die heilige Sache der Religion in den Kampf zu treten.” Moufang, *Der Kampf um Rom*, p. 15.

⁵¹³ “[U]ns Ultramontanen [...]“ Moufang, *Der Kampf um Rom*, p. 16.

⁵¹⁴ “Idee der Gerechtigkeit“, p. 18; “Idee der Unabhängigkeit der religiösen Idee“, p. 19; “Idee der Einheit und der Zusammengehörigkeit aller Völker in der Christenheit“, p. 21. Ibid., p. 18-21.

⁵¹⁵ “[..H]auptsächlich deswegen, um die Religion zu vernichten, indem man der höchsten religiösen Autorität ihre Unabhängigkeit nimmt.” Ibid., p. 20.

⁵¹⁶ “Sehen Sie sich diese Jünglinge an; aus allen Ländern sind sie herbeigeeilt; aber das sind keine Franzosen, Italiener, Belgier, Deutsche u.s.w., das sind treue Söhne der einen Mutter aus der ganzen Welt” ; “Blutsverwandschaft unter allen Katholiken” ibid., p. 21.

⁵¹⁷ “Es gibt ja nichts Größeres, als zu großen Dingen mitzuwirken, und das Beste, was der Mensch hat, sein Leben und Blut, für eine große Sache einzusetzen.” Ibid., p. 25.

were. The programme calls for a guarantee of the territory of the Pope as it was delimited at that time and develops a programme of “neutrality” of the Papal States, which is best translated as the military inviolability by other states. Were this measure to be guaranteed, this inviolability would render unnecessary the “assertion of this right by force of arms” and would make possible “the reduction of the Papal Army to a minimum sufficient to guarantee the internal order” as well as the reduction or even end of the sacrifices made on the part of the Catholics to contribute to the finances of the Papal States.⁵¹⁸ In sum, this “neutrality” would “allow” the Pope “to execute his mission of peace and to lay aside the sword and to elevate his hand only for blessing.”⁵¹⁹

3.8 National Legions for Italy

The aforementioned general assembly of the Catholic associations in Germany that reassembled in Mainz in 1867 voted an address within which it stated: “in the face of the actual dangers, the maintenance of the [Papal] Army, which is necessary to protect the person of the Holy Father and his subjects, is a common matter of the Catholic world. It is a point of honour for every nation to be present in this army; German men could dedicate their lives to nothing nobler.”⁵²⁰

The battle of Montelibretti on 13 October 1867 was instantly “mythologized” on the Catholic side. On 20 October 1867, just seven days after the battle had concluded, the French Catholic newspaper “L’Univers”⁵²¹ wrote: “this military action is one of the most beautiful that one can imagine, and the military feats of the Catholic world are enriched by a sublime page.”⁵²² The journal narrated little anecdotes of single soldiers in the Zouaves who were of different nationalities: an English corporal, “Colingrivy” (Alfred Collingridge from Oxford, register no. 2915); a Belgian corporal Mercier; a Roman “clairon” (hornist/trumpeter) called Mimi; a Dutch “De Jonghe” (the “terreur des Garibaldiens”; Pieter Jong). Regarding the Bavarian Joseph Alois Bach, the journal wrote: “Sergeant-Major Bach, a German-Swiss, was

⁵¹⁸ “[...] Behauptung dieses Rechts durch Waffengewalt [...]”, “[...] Verminderung der päpstlichen Armee auf ein Minimum, welches zur Aufrechterhaltung der Ordnung im Inneren ausreicht [...]” Ibid., pp. 28-29.

⁵¹⁹ “[...] ihm gestatten, seine erhabene Mission des Friedens zu erfüllen, das Schwert beiseite zu legen und seine Hand nur zum Segen zu erheben.” Ibid., p. 29.

⁵²⁰ “Angesichts der gegenwärtigen Gefahren ist die Erhaltung der Armee, deren der heilige Vater zum Schutze seiner Person und seiner Unterthanen bedarf, eine gemeinsame Angelegenheit der katholischen Welt. Es ist eine Ehrensache für jede Nation, in dieser Armee vertreten zu sein: deutsche Männer können ihr Leben keiner edleren Sache weihen.” N. N., “Kirchliche Rundschau,” p. 767.

⁵²¹ I got the information on an article about Montelibretti in “L’Univers” from Joseph Powell, *Two years in the pontifical Zouaves. A narrative of travel, residence, and experience in the Roman states* (London: R. Washbourne, 1871), p. 6.

⁵²² “On verra que ce fait d’armes est un des plus beaux qui se puissent imaginer et que les fastes militaires du monde catholique s’enrichissent d’une page sublime.” *L’Univers*, 20/10/1867: pp. 1-2.

particularly conspicuous. He was bathed in blood, but it was the blood of the enemy. He himself had not received a single scratch.”⁵²³ This anecdote about “bloodied” Bach found its way – together with some of the other stories – into “The Crusaders of Saint Peter”, which was published in 1868 in “La Civiltà Cattolica”. Here, following the example of “L’Univers”, the anonymous narrator proved quite capable of “catering” to the needs of the different nationalities present among the Zouaves by singling out the “bravery” of individual national soldiers: the French Arthur Guillemin and Urbain de Quélen, the Dutch Pieter Jong and the German Joseph Alois Bach.

Bach is described in “The Crusaders” as “a Bavarian with a grave appearance, of cool and implacable courage, for whom danger is a spur”. He was said to have shot “in the Prussian way” by his comrades, i.e. shooting while lying on the ground, and to have had “heroic determination”.⁵²⁴ But the story about Bach also travelled from the centre to the “periphery”, from Rome to Germany. In the Bavarian Catholic weekly “St. Josephsblatt” a short story appeared in December 1867 called “The courageous Palatine”, which also recounted Bach’s “bloodbath”.⁵²⁵ Again, the same episode was also found in the German narration “The Fighters for the Apostolic See in the year 1867”, authored by Andreas Niedermayer, which was published in 1867 in the abovementioned popular Catholic series of pamphlets. Here, the episode of Bach is wrapped up with the transcription of a telegraph, that according to Niedermayer Bach sent home the day after the battle: “Sepperl [pet-name for Joseph] well and healthy; have become officer on the battlefield.”⁵²⁶

The stories about the papal soldiers were linked in some narrations to the typical topos of asymmetrical forces in battle, for instance that 86 papal soldiers “won” against a much greater enemy force, as was said of the battle of Montelibretti. Making an implicit reference to the entire Garibaldian force – and hence mistakenly taking the total number of Garibaldians (roughly 1200) for the actual number (approximately 300) – that were present at Montelibretti, the English papal Zouave Joseph Powell wrote in 1871: “This engagement and victory, having thus been won against such fearful odds as *thirteen* to *one*, is worthy of being

⁵²³ Powell, *Two years in the pontifical Zouaves*, p. 7. In the original French, the passage reads as follows: “Le sergent-major Bach, Suisse allemande, semblait s’être trempé dans un bain de sang. C’était du sang ennemi: il n’avait pas une égratignure.” *L’Univers*, 20/10/1867, p. 1.

⁵²⁴ “Bach, un bavarese di aspetto severo, di quel coraggio freddo e implacabile, cui il rischio è sprone [...]” (p. 160); “Egli poi tirava coricato a terra, il che i camerati suoi dicevano tirare alla prussiana [...]” (p. 162); “[...] l’eroica determinazione [...]” (p. 165). “I Crociati di San Pietro. Scene storiche del 1867,” *La Civiltà Cattolica* ser. 7, vol. IV (1868).

⁵²⁵ “Der tapfere Pfälzer,” *St. Josephsblatt. Illustrierte Monatsschrift für Belehrung und Unterhaltung des christlichen Volkes* (1867): pp. 187-88.

⁵²⁶ “Tags darauf konnte er an seine Eltern in der bairischen Rheinpfalz telegraphieren: Sepperl wohl und gesund; auf dem Schlachtfeld Offizier geworden.” Niedermayer, *Die Streiter*, p. 22.

ranked by the side of the most glorious achievements recorded in history, for although the engagement may not have been so very important in its immediate results – on account of the small number of men engaged on both sides – yet it is not always on account of its results that an achievement is immortalised – witness the devotion to death of Leonidas, and three hundred Spartans, at the pass of Thermophylæ – but it is heroism and valour which cause a brilliant action to shine with lustre, and to adorn, in vivid colouring, the page of history.”⁵²⁷

Bach’s “heroism” was acknowledged by the conferral of a special “honorary sword”, that from his home region of the Rheinpfalz (“Rhenish Palatinate”, part of Bavaria at that time), was sent to him in Rome the following year.⁵²⁸

The widespread plans to create either one or several military corps for foreign nationalities in Italy followed the same logic that was applied when nationally diversified stories were developed in this period. Underpinning these plans for “national legions” was not only the exaltation of solidarity with the respective Italian parties, but almost always the idea that such legions would serve a purpose for their own nation. The Italian experience was seen as a type of preparatory pilot for (counter-)revolutionary war in the countries of origin.

The invasion of Savoy that was planned by Mazzini in 1834, originated out of the idea to bring together national “regiments” of the various exiled Diasporas present in Switzerland. The initial military organization began precisely with these different national groups. Therefore, for instance, “the Polish in Switzerland began to organize militarily [...] in the spring of 1833” and the military organizations they assembled in exile were called “companies of the Polish Republic”. Equally, the German exiles were asked to create a “German corps”.⁵²⁹ The provision of “national legions” for the different Italian armed groups was a very widespread idea. This holds true not only for the pro-Unitarian side, from the Hungarian and Polish Legions in 1848 to the failed projects by Johann Philipp Becker to form a “German Legion” for Italy in 1848/49 and 1860-1861, but also on the other side of the political spectrum. In all of these cases it seems to have been the dominant desire to build battalions of more or less “homogenous” nationality.

⁵²⁷ Powell, *Two years in the pontifical Zouaves*, p. 9.

⁵²⁸ In 1870 he still had this sword with him, at the moment when Rome was taken by the Italians, according to *Der italienische Raubzug wider Rom im September 1870. Von einem Augenzeugen*, (Münster: Russell's Verlag, 1871), p. 144; Jakob Knauber, *Der päpstliche Offizier Joseph Alois Bach (1838-1912) aus Rülzheim, Pfalz* (Landau-Queichheim: St. Josef, 1935), p. 20.

⁵²⁹ « Mes camarades les Polonais, en Suisse, s'organisèrent militairement dès notre arrivée, au printemps de 1833, pour entretenir plus d'ordre et de régularité. » ; « compagnie de la république polonaise » ; « corps allemand ». Paul Harro Harring, *Mémoires sur la Jeune Italie et sur les derniers événements de Savoie, par un témoin oculaire*, 2 vols., vol. 1 (Paris: Librairie de M. Dérivieux, 1834), p. 7.

The presence of other nationalities functioned as the accelerator for these plans. The presence of other nationalities had been noted with regard to the Papal Army and was transformed into an argument: “Should Germany and Austria lag behind these nations? I think Germany and Austria, because of their history, should have preceded the other countries.”⁵³⁰ Another commentator took this observation a step further: “It is really high time, that we, so many millions of Catholics in Germany, participate strongly in the greatest battle of our times, that we give from our property, what we can spare, and that we provide a ‘German Legion’ for the glorious fighters for the Apostolic See.”⁵³¹

National grouping remained central even in texts that were dedicated to multinational corps. The periodical Catholic Historisch-politische Blätter, for instance, in a fine example of European cultural circulation, published in 1868 a German translation of a French report on the Dutch group of soldiers within the multinational Papal Zouaves, together with a German translation of their Dutch song. Here, the commitment of Dutch soldiers to the papal defense was presented as a “heroic” national deed and the sign of a purportedly typical Dutch tradition of providing “martyrs” for the Catholic Church; the Dutch were described here according to the way national discourse in the nineteenth century understood the nation to be an extended family and a type of biological kinship: “It is always and everywhere this way in the life of the church. A family has given to heaven an apostle, a martyr, a crusader, and therefore God laid into the blood of this kin in some way a germ of motivating force, which sooner or later will give rich fruits. A people exsanguinates itself in the great battles for its religion; one day we will see burgeon from its womb strong and heroic souls.”⁵³²

In the aforementioned song of the Dutch Zouaves, to fight for the Pope was portrayed as a national deed, wherein much nostalgia for the “old Bataver” was conveyed: “For him, we left

⁵³⁰ „Soll Deutschland und Oesterreich hinter diesen zurückbleiben? Ich glaube, Deutschland und Oesterreich hätten vermöge ihrer Geschichte den andern Ländern vorangehen sollen.“ Möisinger, *Wozu braucht der heilige Vater eine Armee?*, p. 25.

⁵³¹ “Es ist wahrhaftig Zeit, daß auch wir, so viele Millionen Katholiken in Deutschland, uns energisch an dem größten Kampf der Gegenwart betheiligen; von unserm Gute geben, was wir entbehren können und eine ‚Deutsche Legion‘ einreihen unter die glorreichen Streiter für den apostolischen Stuhl!” Niedermayer, *Die Streiter*, p. 36.

⁵³² “So geht es immer und überall im Leben der Kirche. Eine Familie hat dem Himmel einen Apostel, einen Martyrer, einen Kreuzfahrer geschenkt, und Gott dafür in das Blut dieses Geschlechtes gewissermaßen einen triebkräftigen Keim gelegt, der früher oder später herrliche Frucht bringen wird. Ein Volk verblutet in den großen Kämpfen für seine Religion; eines Tages wird man seinem Schooße starke, heldenmüthige Seelen entsprossen sehen.” N. N., “Die holländischen Zuaven im päpstlichen Heere,” *Historisch-politische Blätter für das katholische Deutschland* 61 (1868): p. 672.

you, strand, / reclaimed from the sea and the tide, / for him, oh sweet homeland, / we splatter our blood.”⁵³³

3.9 The “brotherhood in arms” of the peoples

Another element common to the texts that pushed for an international mobilization for the Italian parties were the concepts that specifically highlighted international bonds. In fact, internationalism has a history in the same manner that nationalism does. Collocated within this category are earlier concepts including the idea of Christian brotherhood, “cosmopolitanism” or “world citizenship” (Immanuel Kant) and “universal brotherhood”, but also “brotherhood of the peoples” or “humanity”, which, instead, are central features in many nineteenth-century texts.⁵³⁴

The Christian “brotherhood in Christ of all believers” concept was translated by thinkers of the Enlightenment into the concept “cosmopolitanism”. The enlightened idea of “cosmopolitanism” secularized the Christian concept. In at least some of these enlightened visions, the “citizenship of the world”⁵³⁵ was considered automatic. There was no need for intermediation by smaller collectivities nor was there a need for the “fraternization” between humans. Christoph Martin Wieland was a proponent of this position.⁵³⁶ But, according to the philosopher Bertram Kienzle, this conception can also be found in Immanuel Kant. Kienzle maintains that the conception of a federation of states that is normally associated with Kant based on his essay “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch” (“Zum Ewigen Frieden”) of 1795 is only the second best option Kant provided in solution to the situation of perpetual wars. It is only in the event that it is not possible to establish a “world republic” that a federation of the states and international law step in; however, they are “a negative surrogate of the positive idea of a world republic, which [however] encounters opposition by the peoples.”⁵³⁷ This, real or imagined⁵³⁸, idea of automatic world citizenship became increasingly “unpopular in the early nineteenth century among most European patriots and

⁵³³ “Für ihn verließen wir dich, Strand, / Entrungen Meer und Fluth, / Für ihn, o süßes Heimathland, / Verspritzt unser Blut!” Ibid., p. 682.

⁵³⁴ For a more detailed discussion of the topic see my forthcoming Göhde, “La fraternité d’armes des peuples. Champ sémantique fraternel et soldats transnationaux au cours de l’(Anti-)Risorgimento. Le cas des combattants allemands” in an anthology edited by Catherine Brice. The following paragraphs are based on this publication.

⁵³⁵ Axel Horstmann, “Kosmopolit, Kosmopolitismus,” in Joachim Ritter and Karlfried Gründer, eds., *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie* (Basle et al.: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1976).

⁵³⁶ Cit. from ibid., p. 1161. The “Weltbürgertum” of Wieland is problematic from another point of view. It is problematic because he does not include all human beings, but only those he considers to be “rational”.

⁵³⁷ Cit. from ibid., p. 1161.

⁵³⁸ The connection between patriotism and cosmopolitanism around 1800 is instead underlined, for instance, in Andrea Albrecht, *Kosmopolitismus. Weltbürgerdiskurse in Literatur, Philosophie und Publizistik um 1800* (Berlin; New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2005).

liberals.”⁵³⁹ As Fulvio Conti has emphasized, already Jean-Jacques Rousseau “left no space for cosmopolitanism”⁵⁴⁰

The federalist-fraternizing version of international brotherhood, for instance, may be found in the texts and rituals that are connected to the “diffusion” of the French Revolution in Europe. But as occurred in the case of “national” brotherhood in France, the “international” brotherhood was quickly attributed a more political, revolutionary and “aggressive” twist. A “second” brotherhood had already been attached to the French national brotherhood and was based on the differentiation between “good” and “bad” subjects, i.e. between those that undoubtedly took sides with the revolution and the republic and those who did not. This second “brotherhood” is directed against a clear enemy: the European counter-revolution; it is at the same time, however, politically exclusive, “rejecting all actors who do not authentically profess themselves to belong to the revolutionary movement.”⁵⁴¹ The rather complex interplay between different “brotherhoods” – the national brotherhood already conceptualized as “natural”⁵⁴² and the revolutionary brotherhood – is quite evident here. The concepts and rituals of “fraternization” aim to discriminate or make a distinction between who is and who is not part of the revolutionary “brotherhood”. “Fratricide” becomes comprehensible when looking at it from the perspective of the “natural” national brotherhood: to murder a “traitor” is to kill a *national* brother, not a brother in the revolutionary sense: “Be my brother or I will kill you” (“Sois mon frère ou je tue!”) or – possibly only from 1848 onwards, “And if you do not want to be my brother, / I will bash your skull in.” (“Und willst Du nicht mein Bruder sein, / so schlag ich dir den Schädel ein.”)⁵⁴³

It is important to bear in mind this complex relationship between “brotherhoods” in the endeavour to understand the international declinations of “brotherhood”. The more aggressive, revolutionary “brotherhood” was already present during the French invasion of

⁵³⁹ Maurizio Isabella, “Mazzini’s internationalism in context. From the cosmopolitan patriotism of the Italian Carbonari to Mazzini’s Europe of nations,” in Christopher Alan Bayly and Eugenio F. Biagini, eds., *Giuseppe Mazzini and the globalisation of democratic nationalism 1830-1920* (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 39.

⁵⁴⁰ Thierry Ménissier, “République et fraternité. Une approche de théorie politique,” in Gilles Bertrand, Catherine Brice and Gilles Monègre, eds., *Fraternité. Pour une histoire du concept* (Grenoble: CRIHPA, 2012), p. 46. Rousseau sees cosmopolitanism as a “loss of identity, degradation, abandonment of virtues” (“perdita di identità, degradazione, abbandono della virtù”) according to Banti, *L'onore della nazione*, p. 116.

⁵⁴¹ Gilles Montègre, “La fraternité révolutionnaire. Discours et pratiques entre France et Italie,” in idem, Catherine Brice and Gilles Montègre, eds., *Fraternité. Pour une histoire du concept* (Grenoble: CRIHPA, 2012), p. 86.

⁵⁴² Many other authors tend, instead, to “temporalize” the various conceptions of brotherhood. On the naturalistic conception of the nation that was present already in the French revolution see Banti, *L'onore della nazione*, pp. 131-132.

⁵⁴³ Lutz Röhrich, “Bruder,” in idem, *Lexikon der sprichwörtlichen Redensarten*, vol. 1 (Freiburg: Herder, 1991), p. 269-270.

non-French territories in November 1792. When this fact is taken into consideration, it is possible to understand the “voluntaristic” outlook of the idea of fraternization with other peoples. Like any individual, any people is free to decide whether or not it wishes to become part of the militant political brotherhood, but in the event it chooses not to, it must face the, even potentially lethal, consequences. Hence, the “right of self-determination” is contemporary to an international “principle of counter-intervention”.⁵⁴⁴ In reality, however, the ways in which the French conquered parts of Europe grew progressively more distant from the right to self-determination. The idea of international brotherhood, however, was so pervasive that it was increasingly used by the opponents of the revolution and the French as well. From Königsberg, Baron vom Stein wrote in 1813 that “the Russian armies were received as brothers and liberators” by the Prussians.⁵⁴⁵ Similarly, the idea of “brotherhood” was expressed in the treaty of the Holy Alliance in 1815 in relation to the bonds between the reactionary monarchs. The treaty declared that “the Three contracting monarchs will remain united by the bonds of a true and indissoluble fraternity [...]”.⁵⁴⁶ The choice of these words, however, closely reflects the formula used in the Fête de la Fédération of 14 June 1790 (“to remain united by the indissoluble bonds of fraternity”⁵⁴⁷). But in the case of the Holy Alliance, these words are transposed and applied to the international level and in reference to the allied monarchs; nevertheless, this specific “brotherhood” was, in an authoritarian-paternalistic manner, extended also to their respective peoples.⁵⁴⁸

3.9.1 *The democratic brotherhood of peoples*

Despite this “usurpation” on the part of the political enemy⁵⁴⁹, liberals and democrats continued to make use of the idea of “the brotherhood of peoples”, especially in the 1830s and 1840s, but in concomitance with other terms and concepts. This is exemplified in the way in

⁵⁴⁴ Isabella, “Mazzini's internationalism in context,” p. 49. Hence, this is a revolutionary declination of a principle hold by the Holy Alliance of 1815 (intervention by the big powers).

⁵⁴⁵ “[...] die Russischen Heere als Brüder und Befreyer empfangen [...]” Cit. from Georg Heinrich Pertz, *Das Leben des Ministers Freiherrn vom Stein*, vol. 3 (Berlin: Verlag von G. Reimer, 1851), p. 286.

⁵⁴⁶ English citation provided by Wilhelm W. Grewe, *Fontes historiae iuris gentium*, vol. 3 (Berlin; New York: de Gruyter, 1992), p. 107.

⁵⁴⁷ « [...] demeurer unis à tous les Français par le liens indissolubles de la fraternité [...] » Mona Ozouf, “Fraternité,” in eadem and François Furet, eds., *Dictionnaire critique de la Révolution française* (Paris: Flammarion, 1988), p. 732.

⁵⁴⁸ Wolfgang Schieder, “Brüderlichkeit,” in Otto Brunner, Werner Conze and Reinhart Koselleck, eds., *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1972) p. 572.

⁵⁴⁹ We are dealing here with a “transpartitic” version of the rather common phenomenon of mutual borrowings between “enemies” that is described with regard to the inter- and transnational level by Martin Aust and Daniel Schönplüg, eds., *Vom Gegner lernen. Feindschaften und Kulturtransfers im Europa des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts* (Frankfurt; New York: Campus, 2007).

which Giuseppe Mazzini handles the issue of inter- and transnational bonds. Mazzini, like other authors of his time⁵⁵⁰, does not abandon altogether the concept of “brotherhood”, but often goes on to speak of “humanity” in its place instead. By using the latter, Mazzini distances himself from “cosmopolitanism”, which he believed held connotations of “disregard for national diversities.” According to him, the *ubi bene, ibi patria* [of cosmopolitanism] is an immoral absurd”.⁵⁵¹ In the motto of the Young Europe association (“Liberté, Egalité, Humanité”) the word “humanity” is attributed the place that “brotherhood” occupied during the French Revolution. But Mazzini also makes use of variants of the word “brotherhood”, among which “human brotherhood” or “brotherhood of peoples”. A rather complex usage of the word “brotherhood” can be found in the texts that were directly connected to the Young Europe. In fact, there are four different variations of the term – the brotherhood of humankind, the brotherhood of associations, the brotherhood of individuals, and the brotherhood of collectivities.

Mazzini applies the word “brotherhood” to the inter- and intra-association bonds of Young Europe and also to the whole of humankind. In other words, he combines the two traditional uses of the word, the universal and corporative.⁵⁵²

But Mazzini again duplicates these two meanings attached to the word, because with regard to both the universal and the corporative levels, it is possible to place emphasis on the brotherhood of individuals (of human beings in general; or, more circumscribed, of just the members of Young Europe) or on the brotherhood between national collectivities (of the nations in general; or of the national associations that comprised Young Europe in particular). Thereby, as aforementioned, four partially differing, qualified concepts of brotherhood can be distinguished. The first two conceptions revolve around the concept of brotherhood at the *universal* level (universal-individual; universal-collective), whereby humankind is considered a “law of God”. On the one hand, universal brotherhood has an “individualist” acceptance: “By the law of God and Humanity all men are *free* – all men are *equal* – all men are

⁵⁵⁰ Georgios Varouxakis, "'Patriotism', 'cosmopolitanism' and 'humanity' in Victorian political thought," *European Journal of Political Theory* 5 (2006): pp. 100-18.

⁵⁵¹ “ [...] l'assurdo immorale ubi bene ibi patria [...]” Giuseppe Mazzini, “La Santa Alleanza dei Popoli [1849],” in *Scritti editi ed inediti di Giuseppe Mazzini*, vol. 39 (Imola: Galeati, 1924), p. 214.

⁵⁵² See Sandro Chignola, “Fraternité. Pour l'histoire du concept,” in Gilles Bertrand, Catherine Brice and Gilles Montègre, eds., *Fraternité. Pour une histoire du concept* (Grenoble: CRIPHA, 2012), p. 29; Marco Meriggi, “Fraternité/Brüderlichkeit. Le ambivalenze della ricezione tedesca (1789-1815),” *ibid.*, p. 112; for the interplay between the concepts of universal and corporative with regard to the freemasons see Fulvio Conti, “I fratelli e i profani. La massoneria e l'idea di fratellanza fra Sette e Ottocento,” *ibid.*, pp. 137-55.

brothers”.⁵⁵³ On the other hand, universal brotherhood can be seen from an inter-national perspective, which Mazzini describes in a phrase that rigorously mirrors the previous one: “By the law of God and Humanity all peoples are *free* – all peoples are *equal* – all peoples are *brothers*”.⁵⁵⁴

The following two conceptions refer to the “corporative” level, i.e. the level of “association(s)” (corporative-individual; corporative-collective). But here, as before, a distinction is made within corporative brotherhood between the “individual” and the “national” levels. On the one hand, there is the individual acceptance: “There will be brotherhood between the initiates of Young Europe. All will have a double set of duties to carry out, and rights to exercise”.⁵⁵⁵ And on the other hand, there is the “national” version, the brotherhood between the national committees: It is they that “form the brotherhood”, they that “fraternize”.

According to the acts and statutes of Mazzini’s Young Europe (1834), Italians and foreigners become brothers by way of the nations they belong to. Even if the statute of the organization mentions the brotherhood of all men under God’s law, in the case of the organization itself the Italians, Poles, Germans etc. become brothers *only* by way of their national associations. There is no possibility, then, to become a member of Young Europe if not by means of one’s respective nation. This national “mediation” of the formation of “brotherhood” is also central for Mazzini’s conception of the “universal brotherhood” of humankind. The conferral of brotherhood via national mediation is reminiscent of the exclusively 'derivative character' of the "brotherhood" the peoples enjoyed via the Holy Alliance that existed between the reactionary monarchs. The Holy Alliance served as a blueprint for Mazzini, more than is often acknowledged. Indeed, the Holy Alliance informs his conception of “brotherhood” even with regard to the (important) conceptual *details*. He mentions this himself, when in 1849 in an article entitled “The Holy Alliance of Peoples” he writes: “The treaty of 1815 [...] was the first acknowledgment of the power of a new and until then unheeded element, an enforced homage paid to the solidarity of the nations, to the unity

⁵⁵³ “Par la loi de Dieu, et de l’Humanité tous les hommes sont *libres* – tous les hommes sont *égaux* – tous les hommes sont *frères*” Giuseppe Mazzini, “Instructions générales pour les initiateurs [Statuto della Giovine Europa, French version / Melegari; 1834],” in *Scritti editi ed inediti di Giuseppe Mazzini*, vol. IV (Scritti politici vol. III) (Imola: Galeati, 1908), art. 8, p. xi, italics in the original.

⁵⁵⁴ “Par la loi de Dieu, et de l’Humanité tous les peuples sont *libres* – tous les peuples sont *égaux* – tous les peuples sont *frères*” *ibid.*, art. 16, p. xii, italics in the original.

⁵⁵⁵ “Il y aura fraternité entre tous les initiés de la Jeune Europe. Tous ils auront une double série de devoirs à accomplir, et de droits à exercer.” *Ibid.*, art. 24 of the “Instructions générales pour les initiateurs”, p. xi; Article 6 of the act of brotherhood is also similar: Giuseppe Mazzini, “Atto di fratellanza della Giovine Europa,” in *Scritti editi ed inediti di Giuseppe Mazzini*, vol. IV (Imola: Cooperativa Tipografica-Editrice Paolo Galeati, 1908), p. 6.

of European life; it was a false and tyrannous application of a true principle, of that principle which is the soul of our belief, which declares the collective life of humanity. It was our part to give that principle its legitimate application [...].”⁵⁵⁶ In the following passages, Mazzini literally replaces the word “princes” (monarchs) with “peoples”: “It was the part of democracy, in opposition to the banner upon which the men of 1815 had inscribed *God and the Princes*, boldly to raise on high the banner bearing the device of *God and the People[s]*.”⁵⁵⁷ And shortly thereafter he underlines: “Nations are the citizens of humanity, as individuals are the citizens of the nation.” According to Mazzini, the nation is the “intermediate term between humanity and the individual [...]. Without the nation there can be no humanity [...].”⁵⁵⁸ Nations are the constitutive parts of humanity, and the individual consequently is indirectly incorporated into humanity only as a result of this last’s membership to a nation. Nations (or national associations) decide whether or not to cultivate the fraternization with other nations. The national associations were to send only one delegate to the Central Committee of Young Europe⁵⁵⁹; the single individual member has no decisional power on this level, but only has the right to make “proposals”.⁵⁶⁰ Mazzini’s conceptualization implied that at this organizational level “fraternization” between single individuals of different nationality was not possible, nor was it possible between a single individual and another nation.

In its entirety this conceptualization even at the inter-national level for the most part conforms to what George L. Mosse has written on the concept of friendship and nineteenth-century nationalism, namely that the nation – or in this case the brotherhood of nations on the corporative level - restricts and dictates who one’s friends (and, hence, one’s brothers in a metaphorical sense) can be.⁵⁶¹

⁵⁵⁶ English citation taken from Giuseppe Mazzini, “The Holy Alliance of Peoples [1849],” in *Life and writings of Joseph Mazzini*, 6 vols., vol. 5 (Autobiographical and political) (London: Smith, Elder, & Co. 1891), p. 268. The original version is to be found in Mazzini, “La Santa Alleanza dei Popoli [1849],” on p. 205.

⁵⁵⁷ Mazzini, “The Holy Alliance of Peoples [1849],” p. 268. The original version is to be found in Mazzini, “La Santa Alleanza dei Popoli [1849],” p. 209. In the English version, the “s” has been omitted, but in the Italian version, Mazzini explicitly states “Dio e i Popoli”. The graphical stress is in the original.

⁵⁵⁸ The English quote is taken from Mazzini, “The Holy Alliance of Peoples [1849],” p. 273-274. The original version is to be found in Mazzini, “La Santa Alleanza dei Popoli [1849],” p. 214.

⁵⁵⁹ Giuseppe Mazzini, “Statuto della Giovine Europa [1834],” in *Scritti editi ed inediti di Giuseppe Mazzini*, vol. IV (Scritti politici vol. III) (Imola: Galeati, 1908), art. 23.

⁵⁶⁰ Ibid., art. 37.

⁵⁶¹ George L. Mosse, “Friendship and nationhood. About the promise and failure of German nationalism,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 17 (1982): pp. 351-67. In the army, a homologous shift from “free” individual choice to determination from the outside was at stake with regard to the use of the words “friendship” and “cameraderie”. See Ute Frevert, *A nation in barracks. Modern Germany, military conscription and civil society* (Oxford; New York: Berg, 2004), pp. 184-185.

At the same time, the national associations and the nations can be “traitors” according to Mazzini. Therefore, it is legitimate to fight against the “peoples that violate the law of God and Humanity”.⁵⁶²

This is not just the “principle of counter-intervention” as in “nations disposed to help each other in the name of solidarity and brotherhood”⁵⁶³, but it also asserts the right to fight *nations* that acted against “la fraternité humaine”.

3.9.2 *The cult of international brotherhood of the 1830s and 1840s*

The appellative “brother” is frequently used in democratic circles as well as between exponents of different “nations” at least up to the revolutions of 1848/9. Ernst Haug, General of the Roman Republic in 1849, for instance, dedicates his Roman memoirs to Mazzini with the following words: “You know how brotherly I suffer your pain with you [...] Soon times will come which will wrest the club of Cain from the peoples, when north and south in the brotherly kiss will expiate the old quarrel and the national families of mankind will realize their mundane destiny.”⁵⁶⁴

To apply the appellative “brother” to an international context is but one sign of the “international brotherly cult”⁵⁶⁵ of the 1820s to 1840s, which, however, always originates from the idea of a brotherhood of peoples. This “transnational” cult is also based on a bountiful artistic production, that is found largely in Romantic literature and art, from the - as well (homo-)erotically⁵⁶⁶ inspired - Philhellenism and Philitalism of Lord Byron or August von Platen to the “Polophil” songs of the 1830s and 1840s that were popular for instance in Germany.⁵⁶⁷ This “international brotherly cult” reaches its apex right around the time of the revolutions in 1848/49, i.e. the “spring of the peoples”. But the revolution is also a time when this idea of international solidarity is called into question by the heavy tensions between the “nations”, which lead to “oblique fronts. In the battle for or against new nation states all of a sudden revolutionaries from different nations were standing against each other in a hostile way, and on the other hand, in the sign of common national-political claims, alliances were

⁵⁶² « [...]Peuples qui violent la loi de Dieu, et de l'Humanité ». Mazzini, « Instructions générales, » art. 50, p. xviii.

⁵⁶³ Isabella, "Mazzini's internationalism in context," p. 49.

⁵⁶⁴ “Du weißt, wie brüderlich ich Deinen Schmerz mit leide [...] Die Zeit wird bald kommen, welche die dräuende Kainskeule den Völkern entwindet, wo Nord und Süd im Bruderkusse den alten Hader sühnt und die völkerschaftlichen Familien der Menschheit ihre irdliche Bestimmung erkannt haben werden.” Haug, *Des Republikaners Schwertfahrt*, pp. ix and xi.

⁵⁶⁵ Schieder, “Brüderlichkeit,” p. 573.

⁵⁶⁶ Gabriela Brudzyńska-Némec, “Polenbegeisterung in Deutschland nach 1830,” *Europäische Geschichte Online (EGO)*(2010), <http://www.ieg-ego.eu/brudzynskanemecg-2010-de>, last accessed: 21/08/2013, para. 19-24.

⁵⁶⁷ Ivi.

built between revolutionaries and anti-revolutionary governments.”⁵⁶⁸ This is particularly true for the German case; two instances exemplify this: the emblematic, negative decisions taken in the Frankfurt national assembly with regard to the Poles; and the negative decisions of the Frankfurt and Vienna assemblies over the German-Italian question of Trentino.⁵⁶⁹

Around the same time, the idea of international brotherhood is taken over by the growing labour movement; for many, the international solidarity of labourers is the quintessential realization of the “brotherhood of peoples”. The concept of international brotherhood on the political left, however, remains strongly anchored in the concept of the nation. Karl Marx, despite his attempt to spark the revolution of the labouring class, “without ever reflecting on why”, never called into question “the continued existence of the nation even after the revolution [...]”. In short, Marx continues to use the category of the nation without his own good reasons for that use.”⁵⁷⁰

Nevertheless, socialism could in some way be conceived as a competitor to nationalism/internationalism, insofar as it could substitute “national solidarity with class solidarity”.⁵⁷¹ Giuseppe Mazzini, for instance, while sympathetic to the political organization of labourers, and having expressed his own views on more circumscribed social policies, feared these forces would draw the attention away from the democratic and national aims that he advocated. And vice versa, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, despite the fact that “the existence of the nation-state was crucial” for them as well⁵⁷², they took a stance against Mazzinian aims because in their view they abstracted the “masses” and extracted them from proletarian revolution. This seems to be the context within which they began to move away from the concept of “brotherhood”, which for them carried too much of an interclassist connotation, and moved toward such concepts and terms as “proletariat” and later “solidarity”.⁵⁷³

Nevertheless, the idea of the “brotherhood” of free peoples – or those yet to be freed – survived well into the liberal, democratic and socialist peace movement of the second half of

⁵⁶⁸ Langewiesche, *Nation, Nationalismus, Nationalstaat*, p. 226.

⁵⁶⁹ On the petitions from Trentino, see Benvenuti, *L'autonomia trentina*, pp. 15-23.

⁵⁷⁰ Joan Cocks, “Touché! Marx on nations and nationalism,” *Socialism and Democracy* 11, no. 2 (1997): p. 64. On Marx and nations see also Benedict Anderson, *Imagined communities* (London; New York: Verso, 2006), pp. 3-4; Otto Dann, *Nation und Nationalismus in Deutschland 1770-1990* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1996), p. 123; on Engels “proudly German” see Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and nationalism since 1780. Programme, myth, reality* (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 34-35.

⁵⁷¹ Hagen Schulze, *Staat und Nation in der europäischen Geschichte* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1994), p. 270.

⁵⁷² Magaly Rodríguez García, “Early views on internationalism. Marxist socialists vs liberals,” *Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire* 84, no. 4 (2006): p. 1054; see as well Sandi Cooper, “The impact of nationalism on European peace movements and liberal internationalists 1848-1914,” *Peace & Change* 6, no. 1-2 (1980): pp. 23-36.

⁵⁷³ Schieder, “Brüderlichkeit,” pp. 577-578.

the century. Opposition to this “federalist” conception of humankind was, if at all, to be noted among anarchists.⁵⁷⁴ According to Michael Bakunin, for instance, both the Mazzinian and Garibaldian “nationalism” was nothing more than a “bourgeois patriotism”.⁵⁷⁵

Until the end of the century, nationalism and internationalism, as well as war and peace, would not be considered totally opposed concepts by many. This is still evident in the interconnected history of the “First International”, the “International Workingmen’s Association” (1864-1872) and the peace congresses of the same period.

Many of the participants believed that institutions for the peaceful settlement of conflict between nations, along with other ideas for the future of “Europe” or “humanity”, could be introduced *only once* “tyranny” (monarchism, occupation by foreigners) had been overthrown. These beliefs are evident for instance in the programme proposed by Garibaldi while he was the honorary president of the “Congress of peace and liberty”, which already hinted at the problem in the title. Garibaldi proposed a programme with 12 items: “1. All nations are sisters; 2. War between them is impossible; 3. Any disputes arising between nations should be judged by a congress; [...] 12. Only a slave has the right to wage war against the tyrant.”⁵⁷⁶ As Maurizio Degl’Innocenti has written, for “Garibaldi, a peaceful international order is the arrival point, but it implicated first and necessarily a process of liberation and emancipation against any tyranny (political, social or religious). Against the tyrant, against the oppressor, for their own freedom and that of the people, for the independence of the nation, the war is not only admissible but necessary. This was the theme of the just war.”⁵⁷⁷

3.9.3 *Brotherhood and the military*

Words taken from the field of “brotherhood” as well as from the broader semantic field of similar concepts were particularly important within the context of military groups. Armies were one of the most important means with which to put into practice the concepts of solidarity and brotherhood. The textual artefacts of international mobilization drew heavily on precisely this combination of “brotherhood of peoples” with a “brotherhood” put into

⁵⁷⁴ National convictions were to be found, however, in the case of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon as well. See Carl Levy, “Anarchism, internationalism and nationalism in Europe 1860-1939,” *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 50, no. 3 (2004): p. 333.

⁵⁷⁵ Maurizio Degl’Innocenti, “Garibaldi, l’Internazionale e la questione sociale,” in idem, *Garibaldi e l’Ottocento. Nazione, popolo, volontariato, associazione* (Manduria; Bari; Rome: Piero Lacaita Editore, 2008), p. 125.

⁵⁷⁶ Cit. from Alfonso Scirocco, *Garibaldi. Citizen of the world* (Princeton; Woodstock: Princeton University Press, 2007), p. 370. The Italian version is to be found in Alfonso Scirocco, *Garibaldi. Battaglie, amori, ideali di un cittadino del mondo* (Rome; Bari: Laterza, 2001), pp. 360-361.

⁵⁷⁷ Degl’Innocenti, “Garibaldi, l’Internazionale e la questione sociale,” p. 120.

practice. Baden revolutionary, Johann Philipp Becker, wrote in November 1860 to Garibaldi that his initiatives of 1848/49 put into practice the “brotherhood of peoples”: So as not to leave the brotherhood and solidarity of the peoples a dead word, in 1849 I concluded treaties with the provisory Sicilian and Roman governments, relative to organizing a German and Swiss legion.⁵⁷⁸ Even if, for reasons of time, Becker’s initiative led only to the presence of a few German soldiers in the ranks, he returns to the “brotherhood of peoples” again in 1861 with his call “To the Germans” to form a “German legion” in the event a new Garibaldian activity should arise. As he reveals in a letter to Marx, such a “German legion” should also serve the aim “of having ready a well-organized military corps accustomed to war” in the event of a “revolution” in Germany.⁵⁷⁹ According to Becker, Austria was the common enemy of the Italians, the Germans – and so here he adopted a *kleindeutsche* (i.e. lesser Germany) position out of political concerns – the Hungarians, the Poles and the “meridional Slavs”. By becoming “friends with each other”, these nations could “become sincere allies in the future.” Becker concludes his appeal to the Germans with the words “Long live Germany free and united! Long live Italy! Free and united! Long live the Alliance of Nations!”⁵⁸⁰ On 22 March 1861, Federico Bellazzi – who was part of the committee that was planning future military actions in Lazio and Veneto – wrote a reply to Becker, applauding him for having expressed his favourable vote “for the unity and liberty of Germany and Italy and the Alliance of the Nations.” Bellazzi closed his letter with the traditional formula: “to health and brotherhood”.⁵⁸¹

The topos of the “brotherhood of peoples” was also used on the opposite political side. The Catholic publicist Andreas Niedermayer uses a mix of international and interclassist solidarity in his “The Fighters for the Apostolic See in 1867”, which was published in the aforementioned widely diffuse series of German “Catholic pamphlets”: “Every day brings

⁵⁷⁸ « Pour ne pas laisser la fraternité et la solidarité des peuples un mot mort j’ai conclu 1849 traités relatifs, avec les gouvernements provisoires sicilien et romain, d’organiser une légion allemande et suisse. » Cit. from Franco della Peruta, “Democratici italiani e democratici tedeschi di fronte all’unità d’Italia 1859-1861,” *Annali dell’Istituto Gianciacomo Feltrinelli* 3 (1960): p. 115.

⁵⁷⁹ “[..U]m ein gut organisirtes, kriegsgewohntes, revolutionsgiriges Armeekorps für eine deutsche Revolution zur Verfügung zu haben.“ Johann Philipp Becker, “Brief an Karl Marx, Neapel 15. Januar 1861,” in Rolf Dlubek, ed., *Marx-Engels-Gesamtausgabe (MEGA), vol. 3/11, Briefwechsel Juni 1860 bis Dezember 1861* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 2005), no. 197, pp. 304-308.

⁵⁸⁰ “[..C]on fatti amici gli uni degli altri per diventar in avvenire sinceri alleati. [...]” “Viva Germania libera ed unita! Viva Italia! Libera ed unita! Viva l’Alleanza delle Nazioni”. Johann Philipp Becker, “Ai Tedeschi”, International Institute of Social History, Johann Philipp Becker Papers, add. 2; this citation is taken from the Photostatic copy of the original in the Archiv der Sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Bonn.

⁵⁸¹ “[..F]ar plauso al voto da lei espresso per l’unità e libertà della Germania e della Italia e per l’Alleanza delle Nazioni. [...]” “Salute e fratellanza.” Associazione dei Comitati di Provvedimento, Preside Garibaldi, Comitato Centrale, Genova, Federico Bellazzi a Johann Philipp Becker, Genova 22 marzo 1861, International Institute of Social History, Johann Philipp Becker Papers, D I 69. The citation is taken from the Photostatic copy of the original in the Archiv der Sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Bonn.

new confirmations of the heroism in the army of Pius IX, in which, united in the defence of the same ethic values, princes of royal blood fought alongside the Rhenish journeyman, the French and Belgian nobleman alongside the son of a shepherd and peasant from Switzerland and Holland.”⁵⁸² But he also saw the Pro-Minister of Arms Hermann Kanzler, a general from Baden, as the “pride of German Catholicism”. He went on to underline that in terms of “cold blood, security, rigour and military tactics” the best corps was that of the Papal carabineers, “to which many Germans belong”. And although it is somewhat in contradiction to the international character of the Papal Army that he had previously underlined, Niedermayer expressed that German Catholics should form a “German Legion, wherein the best and most noble German youth would serve as a guard for the Pope against the Italian bandits.”⁵⁸³ Similar slippage between the universal unity of Christendom or Catholics and nations is also evident in Moufang’s writings, such as when he speaks of the “idea of unity and cohesion of all peoples in Christendom”.⁵⁸⁴ According to Moufang, in the last 20 to 30 years “an idea, which has its truth” was taking root. But, he asserted that this idea “of nationality has been enormously falsified”.⁵⁸⁵

War is one of the forms in which the “brotherhood of peoples” is put into practice. At the same time, common fighting is seen to be the basis for the more circumscribed idea of “brotherhood of arms”, which establishes reciprocal duties that go beyond a single military campaign. Already at the individual level, to fight together in this period was often perceived to be the beginning of a special loyalty between soldiers that continued in time following the first fight together. Friedrich Wilhelm Rüstow in his memoirs on the southern Garibaldian campaign addressed his “comrades in arms” when he wrote: “As I stood with you, the sword at my side, as long as there was something for us to do, and for your good, as I wanted, I want now, returning to my own fireside, to continue to fulfil with my pen the duties that the brotherhood of arms impose.”⁵⁸⁶

⁵⁸² „Jeder Tag bringt neue Beweise von Heroismus in dieser Armee Pius IX., in welcher Prinzen von königlichem Geblüt mit dem rheinischen Handwerksgesellen, der französische und belgische Edelmann mit dem Hirten- und Bauernsohn aus der Schweiz und aus Holland vereint für die Vertheidigung der gleichen sittlichen Güter kämpften.“ Niedermayer, *Die Streiter*, p. 33.

⁵⁸³ „General Kanzler ist ja heute der Stolz des katholischen Deutschlands“ „Sieht man auf die Kaltblütigkeit, Sicherheit, Festigkeit und militärische Taktik, so ist die beste Truppe in der Armee des hl. Vaters das Jägerbataillon, das größtentheils aus Schweizern besteht und zu dem auch sehr viele Deutsche gehören“ Ibid., p. 8. Niedermayer ends his book with another plea for the formation of a “German Legion”, ibid., p. 36.

⁵⁸⁴ „Idee der Einheit und der Zusammengehörigkeit aller Völker in der Christenheit“.

⁵⁸⁵ „Man hat in den letzten 20-30 Jahren eine Idee, die auch Wahrheit in sich hat, zur Geltung gebracht, aber gewaltig verfälscht, die Idee der Nationalität.“ Moufang, *Der Kampf um Rom*, p. 21.

⁵⁸⁶ „Wie ich treu bei euch ausharrte, den Degen an der Seite, so lange es etwas für uns und etwas für euer Wohl – wie ich es verstand – zu thun gab, so will ich jetzt, an den heimischen Herd zurückgekehrt, auch mit der Feder

The idea of duties of loyalty that stem from a “brotherhood of arms” was also actively applied to the nations from which these soldiers came. Giuseppe Garibaldi wrote for instance to the wounded Hungarian soldier Istvan Türr in June 1859: “The Magyar blood has been shed for Italy, the brotherhood that must knit together the two peoples in the future has grown [...]”⁵⁸⁷ Similarly, after the January Uprising in Poland in 1863, he wrote to Polish emigrants in Florence: “For you, that you have shed your blood on the battlefields of the Italian redemption, it is right that Italy is moved [...]”⁵⁸⁸ For Garibaldi, this idea of reciprocal military “debts” between nations is very strong. Even if he himself – excluding his earlier participation in South American campaigns – only enters a foreign battle again in 1870, small groups of Italian Garibaldians had in fact already gone to join the fight in other countries, as did Francesco Nullo who left for Poland in 1863.⁵⁸⁹

This idea of an international bond based on the experience of fighting together also progressively took hold in Catholicism. In 1867, Moufang spoke in Cologne about the “mighty bond, that all of a sudden” had pervaded “all of Christendom! And the blood that for this cause is flowing in such a noble manner establishes a blood-relationship between all Catholics [...]”⁵⁹⁰ At the same time, however, he underlines that “the blood that the courageous Dutchmen in the Papal Army have shed for the holy cause of the Church was German blood.”⁵⁹¹ How can this seemingly contrasting “blood” imagery be reconciled? It seems to me that there are two, contemporaneous concepts of “blood-relationship.” On the one hand, there is a blood-relationship that is considered to be inherent to the nation – even if Moufang’s ‘reference to the Dutch clings to the remnants of the debates over the concrete

fortfahren die Pflichten zu erfüllen, welche die Waffenbrüderschaft auferlegt.“ Friedrich Wilhelm Rüstow, *Erinnerungen aus dem italienischen Feldzuge von 1860*, vol. 2 (Leipzig: F.A. Brockhaus, 1861), pp. 308-309.

⁵⁸⁷ “Il sangue magiaro si è versato per l’Italia, la fratellanza che deve rannodare i due popoli nell’avvenire, è aumentata [...]”. Giuseppe Garibaldi, “Al Colonnello Türr, Nuvolento, 17 giugno 1859,” in *Edizione nazionale degli scritti di Giuseppe Garibaldi. Epistolario*, vol. 4 (Rome: Istituto per la storia del Risorgimento italiano, 1982), p. 77.

⁵⁸⁸ “Per voi che avete sparso il sangue sui campi di battaglia della redenzione italiana, è ben giusto che l’Italia si commuova [...]” Giuseppe Garibaldi, “All’emigrazione polacca - Firenze, Caprera, 5 febbraio 1863,” in *Edizione nazionale degli scritti di Giuseppe Garibaldi. Scritti e discorsi politici e militari*, 3 vols., vol. 1 (Bologna: Cappelli, 1934), pp. 184, 315.

⁵⁸⁹ With regard to the case of Nullo, see Kiwior-Filo, “Francesco Nullo”; with regard to Garibaldi and the Garibaldians on the French side in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, see Cecchinato, *Camicie rosse*, pp. 134-148; on Ricciotti Garibaldi and other Italians fighting with the Greeks against the Turks in 1897, see Pécout, “Philhellenism in Italy,” pp. 405-27.

⁵⁹⁰ „O, was ist das für ein mächtiges Band, das sich mit einem Male durch die ganze Christenheit zieht! und das Blut, das für eine solche Sache, in solch edeler Weise fließt, begründet eine Blutsverwandtschaft unter allen Katholiken, so fest und so stark, wie sie nicht schöner und stärker gedacht werden kann.“ Moufang, *Der Kampf um Rom*, p. 24.

⁵⁹¹ „[...] denn das Blut, das die tapfern Holländer in der päpstlichen Armee für die heilige Sache der Kirche vergossen haben, ist doch germanisches Blut.“ Ibid., p. 27. This shows that while national discourse also began to penetrate the Catholic milieus, the question as to who should be regarded a member of the nation, and especially if and how a nation state should be formed, was still a debated issue amongst the political “parties”.

borders of the German nation – that corresponds to the ideas of common kinship and blood, which Banti identified as being intrinsic to national discourse already since the early nineteenth century.⁵⁹² On the other hand, however, Moufang – when he spoke of international bonds – makes reference to the rituals of forming a “blood-brotherhood”, rituals of “fraternization” between two individuals that are *not* akin to each other. The “blood-brotherhood” of this type was an important topic at the time, especially for amateurs and professionals of those nascent fields dedicated to “Germanic” history – such as “Germanic” archaeology or parts of “Germanistics” – that especially revolved around the different sources of the “Song of the Nibelungs” (Nibelungenlied).⁵⁹³ “Blood-brotherhood” in the sense of the “Germanic” ritual was considered to be a “chosen relationship, wherein the participants partake in a ritual and form an indissoluble alliance, which can also be extended to the respective tribes”.⁵⁹⁴ What is important here is the fact that *nineteenth-century authors* tend to consider this blood-brotherhood to be an “artificial”⁵⁹⁵ (as in constructed) relationship, while they tend to consider the relationship between the members of a given nation to be “real”, or biological in nature.⁵⁹⁶

Both the “brotherhood of arms” built by a first collective fight and the “blood-brotherhood” formed between individuals – or “nations” – by the common “shedding of blood” entail future duties or responsibilities. These images are the foundation of the idea that a bond exists between nations that goes well beyond one single fight. This conception of “loyalty” is the reason why, in the context of “transnational soldiers”, “brotherhood of arms” and “blood-brotherhood” behave like important topoi of international mobilization. They do

⁵⁹² Banti, *La nazione del Risorgimento*.

⁵⁹³ See Ingo Wiwiorra, “Germanenmythos und Vorgeschichtsforschung im 19. Jahrhundert,” in Michael Geyer and Hartmut Lehmann, eds., *Religion und Nation. Nation und Religion. Beiträge zu einer unbewältigten Geschichte* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2004), pp. 367-385. For the time dependent interpretations of the Nibelungenlied in particular, see, from the broad literature, the introduction to a recent anthology of adaptations of the Nibelungenlied by Joachim Heinze, *Mythos Nibelungen* (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2013), pp. 7-69.

⁵⁹⁴ Michael Belgrader, “Blutsbrüderschaft,” in Lotte Baumann, ed., *Enzyklopädie des Märchens*, vol. 2 (“BE-CHRI”) (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1979), col. 523.

⁵⁹⁵ Most recent sociology and ethnology have underlined that we cannot make neat distinctions between “artificial” and “real” or “biologic” concepts across time and space; for modern concepts of kinship, however, it is important to analyse the ways in which the relation between biology and kinship was seen in history *by the contemporaries themselves*. See Bernhard Jussen, “Künstliche und natürliche Verwandtschaft? Biologismen in den kulturwissenschaftlichen Konzepten von Verwandtschaft,” in Yuri L. Bessmertny and Otto Gerhard Oexle, eds., *Das Individuum und die Seinen. Individualität in der okzidentalen und in der russischen Kultur in Mittelalter und früher Neuzeit* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 2001), pp. 39-58; Johannes F. K. Schmidt, “Das Verhältnis von soziologischer und biologischer Verwandtschaft. Konkurrenz oder Symbiose biologischer und soziologischer Konzepte?,” in Karl Siegbert Rehberg, ed., *Die Natur der Gesellschaft. Verhandlungen des 33. Kongresses der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Soziologie in Kassel 2006*, vol. 2 (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2006), pp. 894-908.

⁵⁹⁶ Alberto Mario Banti, “La nazione come comunità di discendenza,” in idem, *L'onore della nazione. Identità sessuali e violenza nel nazionalismo europeo dal XVIII secolo alla Grande Guerra* (Turin: Einaudi, 2005), pp. 112-98.

so because they contain the promise that the commitment of foreign soldiers on the part of one nation will, in the future, be "paid back" in kind by the receiving nation, should the former ever need help with its own national cause.

These topoi revealed themselves to be excellent mobilizing devices to attract foreign participation in a national conflict, but often proved to be mere lip-service when the foreigners called on those very nationals to reciprocate the service rendered. Rüstow guessed as much when he wrote about a speech that Garibaldi had given, describing it as a "deceptive sermon on the nationalities" (*Nationalitätenschwindelpauke*) based on the "solidarity between the freedom movements of every nation". According to Rüstow, Garibaldi spoke of the Hungarians and the English who had come to help Italy and about the duties and responsibilities to help the Hungarians in their battle that had come of that aid. Rüstow, however, also notes that the Italians only weakly responded with the proposed formula: "We will do this!"⁵⁹⁷

3.10 Conclusions

The political and cultural mobilization of the different Italian "parties" was based on their respective combination of different modes and contents of political argumentation and symbolic communication. While some of these elements could be used in an a-national manner, others were specifically formulated a precise link between foreign national discourse and the respective Italian case, and thus literally highlight inter-national bonds (i.e. bonds between nations). Romanticism fuelled the desire to push beyond the limits. A form of "escapism", adventure and travelling were two interconnected means with which this drive could be accomplished. Whether they really constituted the primary motivating factor for enlistment in Italian armed groups or not, many German soldiers left Germany with images of Italian landscapes and monuments in their mind's eye; the typically Romantic foreign and Italian image of Italian decadence may have made Italy especially interesting from a (bourgeois) Romantic perspective. If soldiers had the time to do so (which was generally more probable for officers than common soldiers, they visited the monuments that were to be found on the routes their armies were following. Often the choice of what to visit was informed by their political stance, which is most obvious in the case of Rome, where there are two overlapping and intersecting, but nevertheless partially distinct visitors' maps: that of ancient Rome, and that of religious Rome. Depending on what type of education they had

⁵⁹⁷ "Lo faremo!" Rüstow, *Erinnerungen aus dem italienischen Feldzuge von 1860*, 2, p. 99.

received, some of the German soldiers already had a clear idea of the itinerary on these maps well before they came to Italy; therefore the maps and their itineraries constituted yet one more reason to join one of the respective armed groups.

All sides developed elaborate personality cults, which were increasingly able to reach wider strata of society not only in Italy, but abroad as well. With regard to such figures as the Pope, Garibaldi or the wife of the last Bourbon king it is right to discuss the extent of their European reach. Of note are the ways in which the lives of these personages were presented and communicated: the emotional and the corporal aspects in particular take centre stage here in that through their use the aim was to stimulate a similarly emotional and corporal reaction in their followers (or, in the words of the “Stearns”: in this way, their use established the “emotional standard”, i.e. the specific emotions that were to be felt in reaction to specific news about these people⁵⁹⁸). As with the description of the (foreign) soldiers in the press or in novels, the topos of sacrifice was in this instance of paramount importance. The detailed narration of suffering – used by all sides – aimed to kindle a physical reaction that makes manifest the shared suffering. These personality cults are considered to be very “modern” forms of political communication; they foreshadowed the authoritarian and fascist “cult of the leader” that would develop in the twentieth century. It is important to note, however, that the personality cults of the nineteenth century at least partially functioned at the global level as well. Economic disinterest, taken to the extreme of corporal suffering caused by deprivation, was a fundamental part of the idea of “sacrifice”. That this was the case becomes evident the highly emotional reactions to accusations made by the opposing party that one's soldiers were governed by economic motivations: By insinuating that the soldiers of the political enemy were motivated by the desire to earn money, it was possible to attack the imagery of martyrdom and sacrifice at its core.

Alongside essentially a-national mobilizing factors there were elements at the trans-national level that established connections between that were functioning in a trans-national way, by establishing concrete links between the respective Italian party and the various European nations. In the German-Italian case, as in others, “minor” personality cults were built up around figures that stood symbolically for a specific connection between Germany (or another foreign country) and/or its regions and the respective Italian party. The heroization of the papal Minister of Arms, Hermann Kanzler from Baden, or that of the wife of the last Bourbon king, Marie Sophie, are but two examples.

⁵⁹⁸ Peter Stearns and Carol Z. Stearns, "Emotionology. Clarifying the history of emotion and emotional standards," *American Historical Review* 90, no. 4 (1985): pp. 813-36.

In these cases, regional and national identities are not placed in opposition with each other but rather are interconnected.⁵⁹⁹ Within the same text it is possible to find, for instance, that although it is noted that Kanzler came from Baden, he was also “the pride of Germany”; Joseph Alois Bach is seen to be a courageous Palatine, who however behaved in accordance with the “Prussian” military way; and Marie Sophie is considered a member of the Wittelsbach family, but is at the same time portrayed to be a quintessential “German” woman due to her “German loyalty” to her husband.

As this examination of the semantic field of international brotherhood and similar concepts has shown, solidarity was increasingly based on national grouping. The “brotherhood of arms of the peoples” and the concept of the common shedding of blood of different nations was used as an important metaphor to bind together the respective Italian cause with national thought in Germany. The promise to reciprocate informed both of these specific concepts of brotherhood; it connected nationalism and internationalism in a special way. Interestingly, this specifically national way to perceive transnational solidarity also began to take hold in Catholicism as well, and gradually replaced the traditional “cosmopolitanism” of the (Catholic) Church.

The idea of international brotherhood “travelled” however back and forth across between the political lines. This is a conceptual variant of the frequent phenomenon of copying from the adversary. In this case, Marco Meriggi’s observation as to what was the effect of the Holy Alliance’s use of the concept of brotherhood in 1815 does not seem to be accurate. According to Meriggi, this was a “process of neutralizing a concept and a word by its assimilation into the vocabulary of a political field different from that of origin”.⁶⁰⁰ Although the concept had been transplanted from one context (nationalism) to another (Catholicism), it was not just the outward symbol (the word “brotherhood”) that was copied, but also in part the vision of the world, i.e. the idea that humanity primarily consisted of different nations; in other words, Catholicism in some way assisted, rather than hindered, the process of nationalization. Even within Catholicism, some spoke of substituting the traditional diplomacy of the states with the “diplomacy of the peoples”, and in so doing partially drifted away from the theological elaboration of an a priori universal brotherhood in Christ.

The ways in which solidarity were conceptualized is, at least theoretically, only one possible way in which to imagine the solidarity among people and beyond national borders.

⁵⁹⁹ See for the ways in which the “local” and the “regional” was, so to say, nationalized, e. g., Alan Confino and Ajay Skaria, “The local life of nationhood,” *National Identities* 4, no. 1 (2002): pp. 5-24.

⁶⁰⁰ Meriggi, “Fraternité/Brüderlichkeit. Le ambivalenze della ricezione tedesca (1789-1815),” p. 109.

This aspect risks being forgotten, when authors use the concepts of “solidarity” or “brotherhood” without additional qualifications insofar as these words as they stand alone still sound good to our ears. However, during the period studied here a qualifier was nearly always attached to these concepts: “brotherhood” becomes “brotherhood *of arms*”, “brotherhood *of the peoples*” or even “brotherhood *of arms of the peoples*”, and “blood-brotherhood” becomes “blood-brotherhood *between nations*.” Here, solidarity was primarily considered a relationship between nationally defined collectivities, which led to the widespread diffusion of projects of a “representation” of foreign nations on the different Italian sides. These rather qualified ideas of solidarity had assigned a crucial place to national discourse as well as military violence and inherently contained specifically military obligations of reciprocity. As aforementioned, nationalism and internationalism alike have a history over the course of the centuries. Throughout the nineteenth century, a decidedly “trans-national” idea of “brotherhood” predominates; although solidarity crossed national borders at the individual level between people of different nationalities, it was primarily conceived of as existing between nations.

It was also evident that enlisted soldiers were not necessarily directly reached by the type of political and cultural mobilization discussed thus far. The following chapter will demonstrate how the recruitment structures, enlistment conditions and economic rewards could all be equally or alternatively important for the enlisting soldier. This is not to say that cultural and political mobilization was not a necessary element for the practical outcome (foreigners enlisting in the Italian armed groups). But rather that mobilization could come about through more indirect routes as well. The decisive role of associations in the recruitment efforts highlight how there was often a kind of “recruitment of recruitment”: If it is true that the members of the associations, i.e. the people most active in organizing support in Germany for the Italian “parties”, had often been directly influenced by cultural and political mobilization – all one has to do to see that this is true is refer back to the demonstrated recurrence of the central *topoi* discussed in this chapter in both the texts presented above and those written at the local level – this is not necessarily true for the single enlisting soldier.

The way in which the specific ways of conceiving “human” solidarity in this period influenced the ways in which this very “solidarity” was carried out will be examined in the following chapters no. 7 and 8. These *topoi* of “solidarity between nations” partially informed the actual forms of military organization chosen for integrating the foreign soldiers into the Italian armed groups, while at the same time they excluded other theoretically possible

military organizational forms. Even more so, the ideas of a “brotherhood of arms of the peoples” influenced the mutual perceptions of and experiences between foreign and Italian soldiers both during and after deployment.

4 Recruitment

4.1 Legal obstacles to foreign recruitment

As part of the measures to keep up their military capacities, most European states tried to prevent their subjects from joining foreign military service. These legal barriers are often overlooked by the historiography on foreign soldiering.⁶⁰¹ This erroneously suggests that entering foreign armies or recruiting foreign soldiers was an “easy promenade”. With the legal obstacles in place, actually the opposite was the case, even if the intensity of legal barriers gradually changed over the centuries.

Given the situation with mercenary recruitment during the seventeenth century and especially the issues that arose in connection to mercenary forces in the Thirty Years' War, European states began to enact laws to prohibit the recruitment of soldiers on their territory by foreign powers. They did so while continuing to recruit foreigners for their own standing armies. Sanctions were initially established for both the recruiters and the potential recruits. Criminal law governed the sanctions directed against recruiters. The kinds of sanctions that could be applied to the potential recruits could be corporal or confiscatory in nature, or could even result in imprisonment or the withdrawal of the individual's status as citizen. The norms were distributed across different areas of law, from the regulations on emigration or local citizenship to general and/or military criminal codes. They also differed in circumstantial validity (i.e. in times of peace or war), with regard to the addressees (recruiter, co-helpers, confidants, innkeepers, recruits) or in the degree of criminality of the attempt. To join a *hostile* foreign power was punished more severely, and most often resulted in the death penalty. The imperial Recesses of the sixteenth century already contained extensive regulations in an attempt to prevent recruitments into the ranks of hostile powers. They prohibited any recruitment of soldiers that would then be deployed against the Empire, its Estates or its subjects in general⁶⁰²; in order to enforce this ban, a procedure was instituted whereby the foreign recruiters had to ask for official permission prior to begin recruiting. This

⁶⁰¹ I discussed some of the following issues in my Ferdinand Nicolas Göhde, "All'interno e al di sopra dei 'partiti'. Tedeschi nelle forze armate italiane del Risorgimento (1834-1870)," in Andrea Ciampani, ed., *L'Unità d'Italia in Europa* (Rome: Istituto per la storia del Risorgimento italiano, 2013), pp. 309-37.

⁶⁰² “Mandata daß sich niemand wider das H. Reich oder dessen Haupt in Kriegsdienste begeben soll”, imperial recess, Nuremberg 1542, § 31, cit. from "Abschied des Reichs-Tags zu Nürnberg Anno 1542 auffgerichtet," in *Aller des Heiligen Römischen Reichs gehaltenen Reichs-Täge, Abschiede und Satzungen etc.* (Frankfurt am Main: In Verlegung Johann Martin Schönwetters, 1707), § 31, pp. 398-399.

permission would be granted only in the event that the recruiter deposited a guarantee that the recruited soldiers would not fight against the empire and its estates.⁶⁰³

The Imperial Estates also began to subject foreign recruitment to a similar process of prior permission or by banning them altogether. In Württemberg, for instance, a "Placat" from 1625, "concerning the ban of entering into foreign military service" was directed against the potential recruits as the addressees of the regulation. In spite of the broader title of the law, however, the Placat did not exclude the possibility to recruit in the case the sovereign's permission had been granted. Within this context, only if this permission had not been granted would the foreseen "penalties on body, honour and property" take place.⁶⁰⁴ The decree voted in the Council of the city of Hamburg for the first time in 1655, which was repeated in the years 1661, 1665, and 1666, was more extensive in terms of the elements of offence considered. It declared that "hereby all foreign recruitment in this good city and its territories is prohibited, repealed and abrogated" and that innkeepers should neither house foreign recruiters nor recruits, but instead report them to the Council.⁶⁰⁵

Henceforth, similar bans were a frequent subject of the codifications of the Empire and the Imperial Estates, even if they continued to differ in terms of addressees and the elements of offence. The sheer number of such patents, edicts and mandates in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is enormous, but the frequency of their repetition even in one and the same territory hints at the fact that foreign recruiters continued nevertheless to operate throughout the empire and that the governments were unable to keep the problem under control.

Still in the nineteenth century all European states continued to prevent the recruitment on their territory of their nationals into foreign armies. The regulations of this matter were to be found in the general criminal codes, in the military criminal law and war articles, but also

⁶⁰³ "Ohn Erlaubnuß und Caution kein Kriegsvolck zu werben", imperial recess, Worms 1564, § 26, in: "Abschied des Deputations-Tags zu Worms Anno 1564 auffgericht," in *Aller des Heiligen Römischen Reichs gehaltenen Reichs-Täge, Abschiede und Satzungen etc.* (Frankfurt am Main: In Verlegung Johann Martin Schönwetters, 1707), § 26, p. 717.

⁶⁰⁴ „Straffen an Leib, Ehr und Gut“ "Placat, betreffend das Verbot der Annahme fremder Kriegsdienste, vom 18. Juni 1625," in *Vollständige historisch und kritisch bearbeitete Sammlung der Württembergischen Gesetze*, ed. August Ludwig Reyscher, vol. 19/1 = Kriegsgesetze, 1. Teil, 1360-1800 (1849), p. 153.

⁶⁰⁵ „[..H]iermit alle fremde Werbung in dieser guten Stadt und dero Gebiete allerdings und bey ernster willkürlicher Strafe verboten, caßiret und aufgehoben [...]“. "Wiederum erneuertes Mandat gegen die fremden Werbungen, von 1655, 1661 und 1665, vom 19. Oct. 1666," in *Sammlung der von E. Hochedlen Rathe der Stadt Hamburg so wol zur Handhabung der Gesetze und Verfassungen als bey besonderen Eräugnissen in Bürger- und Kirchlichen, auch Cammer-Handlungs- und übrigen Policy-Angelegenheiten und Geschäften vom Anfange des siebenzehnten Jahr-Hunderts bis auf die itzige Zeit ausgegangenen allgemeinen Mandate, bestimmten Befehle und Bescheide, auch beliebten Aufträge und verkündigten Anordnungen. Der Erste Theil, welcher die Verfügungen im siebenzehnten Jahr-Hundert in sich fasset*, (Hamburg: gedruckt und verlegt bei J. C. Piscator, E. Hochedlen und Hochweisen Rath's Buchdrucker, 1763), pp. 233-234.

in emigration patents and laws on citizenship, in the rules on issuing passports and identity papers, and last but not least in those rules specified in the aforementioned laws governing desertion, which often applied not just to those who had actually been conscripted, but even to those that had not been conscripted but were still liable to serve. For the purposes of this study⁶⁰⁶, these regulations are best understood by differentiating between those directed against the recruiters and those targeting the recruits.

4.1.1 Measures against the recruiters

The rules against recruiters, as aforementioned, were articulated in a number of legal sources. For instance, the emigration patent of 10 August 1784 regarding the hereditary lands of the Habsburgs forbade all foreign recruitment. The foreign recruiter was to be regarded as a "false recruiter" ("Falschwerber") to be punished not only in the civil courts but also in military courts according to military law, even if the recruiter was a civilian. According to the law, which applied both in times of peace and in war, i.e. the "War Articles" ("Kriegsartikel")⁶⁰⁷ the punishment for this offence was "hanging next to a main road." Subjects that reported the "false recruiters" to the authorities, instead, could expect a reward of 100 ducats.⁶⁰⁸ A partial revision of the regulations came into force with a decree issued by the Habsburg Imperial War Council in 1821. These revisions only regarded those subjects that were not members of the military, while members of the Austrian Army were still subject to the older rules. As a result of this differentiation, members of the Austrian military that aided foreign powers to recruit locals should still be punished "according to martial law, even in times of peace", and hence should be hanged. For those subjects that were not in the Austrian military, however, the penalty in peacetime for attempted foreign recruitment was reduced to five to ten years of compulsory labour in building fortifications, while for completed acts of recruitment, the penalty was reduced to between ten and twenty years ("Schanzarbeit"). Even for civilians, the punishment was adjudicated according to military law and took the form of typical military

⁶⁰⁶ In fact, the issue is even more complex when the status of the army in which the recruits were enlisting is taken into account: Systematically more severe punishments were pronounced for joining a foreign enemy army. Within the context of our study, this could have been of (albeit limited) importance in the case of south German soldiers on the Italian side in 1866 (hence members of an indirect enemy of Prussia) during the so-called "third war of independence", which saw a Prussian-Italian alliance formed against Austria and its south German allies.

⁶⁰⁷ So even if they were called "War Articles", they were applied both in times of war and peace.

⁶⁰⁸ „[..F]alscher Werber“, "Patent on Emigration, 10th of August 1784," in *Handbuch aller unter der Regierung des Kaiser Joseph des II. für die K. K. Erbländer ergangener Verordnungen und Gesetze in einer Systematischen Verbindung enthält die Verordnungen und Gesetze vom Jahre 1784*, vol. 6 (Vienna: Verlegt bei Joh. Georg Moesle K. K. privil. Buchhändler, 1768), pp. 297-307.

punitive action. In times of war, however, even civilians were judged under the more severe parameters that applied to military subjects and would be hanged.⁶⁰⁹

4.1.1.1 From general bans to bans on the recruitment of domestic subjects and soldiers

While in the eighteenth century most of the bans on foreign recruitment were still comprehensive in the sense that there was no differentiation made between foreign and domestic subjects when dealing with recruiters and recruits, the respective laws of the nineteenth century were mostly limited to punishing the recruitment of domestic citizens for foreign armies. But the complicated system of laws and regulations created important legal loopholes.

In Prussia, one legal loophole was created when the general Criminal Code of 1851 was passed. Up until that point, the General State Laws (*Allgemeines Landrecht*) of 1794 punished foreign and domestic recruiters who recruited for a foreign, though not adversary, power, with two to four years of prison in a fortress (§ 143 ALR), independent of whether or not the recruiter had recruited Prussian *or* foreign subjects. The new Criminal Code of 1851, however, altered this punishment, reducing the penalty to between three months and three years (§ 111), but only with regard to the recruitment of *Prussian subjects* or for inciting or helping a *Prussian subject* to desert. The recruitment of non-Prussian subjects, therefore, was not forbidden under the new Code, given that the corresponding regulations of the *Landrecht* were explicitly abrogated by the new criminal law.⁶¹⁰

The legislation in the Kingdom of Württemberg created an even more complex situation: What was referred to as “His Majesty’s Law” of 1810 established penalties of between four to ten years of prison only in the event that Württemberg’s *civilian citizens* recruited for foreign armies within Württemberg itself. Instead, foreigners, military members and Württemberger subjects that recruited for foreign armies beyond Württemberg borders, and generally all recruiters in times of war⁶¹¹ fell under the jurisdiction of the military criminal code of 1818, which, however, in its art. 47 established a ban only on the recruitment

⁶⁰⁹ See the text of and the explanations on art. 20 of the War Articles in: Ignaz Franz Bergmayr, *Kriegsartikel für die kaiserlich-königliche Armee mit allen übrigen österreichischen Militär-Strafgesetzen vereinigt und erläutert*, 2 ed. (Vienna: Auf Kosten des Verfassers, 1825), pp. 174-183.

⁶¹⁰ The part of the *Landrecht* containing the paragraphs on foreign recruiters was explicitly and entirely abrogated by § 2 of the introduction to the new Criminal Code of 1851. “Gesetz über die Einführung des Strafgesetzbuches für die Preußischen Staaten [1851],” in Melchior Stenglein, ed., *Sammlung der deutschen Strafgesetze*, vol. 3 (Munich: Verlag von Christian Kaiser, 1858), part XI, art. 1, p. 7.

⁶¹¹ In times of war, military jurisdiction was generally extended to all foreign recruiters, see art. 179 of the military criminal laws of 1818. “Militär-Strafgesetze für die K. Truppen vom 20. Juli 1818,” in August Ludwig Reyscher, ed., *Vollständige, historisch und kritisch bearbeitete Sammlung der württembergischen Gesetze*, vol. 19, 2 (Tübingen: Verlag und Druck von L. Fr. Fues, 1850), art. 179, p. 1504.

of Württembergian soldiers for foreign armies, wherein such recruiters could be handed a sentence of between four to twelve years of detention in a fortress. Hence, between them, these two legal sources failed to regulate the *recruitment of Württembergian civilians on the part of foreign recruiters*, who therefore could count on impunity. The loophole was noted by the criminal law professor Robert Mohl from Tübingen, who tried to resolve the problem dogmatically by pleading *contra legem* in favour of the continued validity of the older interdiction on foreign recruitment.⁶¹² Regardless, throughout the nineteenth century the punishment of foreign recruitment in Württemberg continued to be based on legal sources that had been in force for more (eighteenth century according to Robert Mohl) or less (early nineteenth century) time. The general Criminal Code of 1839 only contained regulations on recruitment for and aid given to the *enemy* and the encouragement of desertion.⁶¹³

4.1.1.2 The criminality of trial – measures against the advertising of foreign recruitments

Even the sheer *attempt* to recruit for foreign/enemy armies constituted an offence. Therewith, the states took measures not only against foreign recruitment offices on their territory, but also against newspaper advertisements that announced the locations of such offices and the conditions of recruitment. To provide one example, in Bavaria acts "advertising recruitment" were forbidden, as was any other "invitation to a Bavarian citizen to enlist". Even general calls that do not target individual people and how they are issued sometimes by organized recruitment offices must be regarded as an [criminal] attempt⁶¹⁴, "provided of course [...] that from the call itself or the circumstances it becomes clear that it really intends to recruit also Bavarian citizens or to direct them to recruiters."⁶¹⁵

The Prussian military code of 1845 recognized the offence of aiding and abetting desertion (§ 111). According to the military criminal code, the punishment of this offence should follow the penalties foreseen for desertion itself.

⁶¹² Robert Mohl, *Das Staatsrecht des Königreichs Württemberg. Vol. II (Administrative Law)* (Tübingen: Heinrich Laupp, 1831), § 184, p. 360 and footnote 1 on p. 361.

⁶¹³ *Strafgesetzbuch für das Königreich Württemberg. Amtliche Handausgabe*, (Stuttgart: Joh. Friedr. Steinkopf, 1839), art. 145 (treason), especially points 3, 5 and 7, here p. 47.

⁶¹⁴ Melchior Stenglein, *Commentar über das Strafgesetzbuch für das Königreich Bayern und das Gesetz über die Einführung des Strafgesetzbuches und des Polizei-Strafgesetzbuches*, vol. 2 (Munich: Christian Kaiser, 1862), p. 38.

⁶¹⁵ „[...] Aufforderung an einen bayerischen Staatsangehörigen, sich anwerben zu lassen. Auch allgemeine, nicht an bestimmte Personen gerichtete Aufforderungen, wie solche organisierte Werbebureaux zuweilen ergehen lassen, müssen als Versuch betrachtet werden“, „vorausgesetzt natürlich [...], daß aus der Aufforderung selbst oder aus den Umständen erhellt, daß es beabsichtigt ist, auch bayerische Staatsangehörige anzuwerben oder fremden Werbern zuzuführen.“ Ludwig Weis, *Das Strafgesetzbuch für das Königreich Bayern sammt dem Gesetze vom 10. November 1861 zur Einführung des Strafgesetzbuches und des Polizeistrafgesetzbuches* (Nördlingen: Druck und Verlag der C. H. Beck'schen Buchhandlung, 1863), p. 320.

In the military criminal code, the punishment of this offence was equal to the penalties reserved for desertion itself. Therefore, in times of peace (§ 95), according to the number of attempts, the punishment could vary from six months to fifteen years of imprisonment in a fortress; in times of war (§ 9), the first attempt was punished with six to ten years of imprisonment in a fortress, but in cases of recurring violations the death penalty would be applied.

4.1.1.3 The role of recruitment permits

The general Austrian criminal law of 1852 explicitly banned *only* those foreign recruitments that operated “without special governmental consent”. In a similar fashion, some German states did not punish all foreign recruiters altogether, but left at least the possibility that they could obtain governmental permission.

In the Kingdom of Bavaria, the general ban on every type of foreign recruitment as regulated by the military criminal code of 1813 was replaced by a ban only on the recruitment *without permission of Bavarians* in the new Criminal Code of 1861.⁶¹⁶

Such permission for foreign recruitment was, however, not always easy to obtain. The retired Austrian General Mayerhofer for instance, who was commissioned by the papal government to negotiate with Bavaria to obtain this permission, had to leave Munich in 1860 without results after having attended several meetings with high-ranking officials of the Bavarian government.⁶¹⁷ In April of the same year, a certain Georg Sodeur from Lindau (a Bavarian city along the shores of Lake Constance) had to face a trial in Munich for having failed to obtain permission to recruit and, hence, for recruiting Bavarians for the army of the Two Sicilies. His lawyer resorted to a rather clever defensive strategy: He placed emphasis on the friendly relations between Munich and Naples – he most certainly had in mind Francis II’s Bavarian spouse – and also on the Bavarian position with regard to the Papal States, of which Naples could be seen as an important supporter. The lawyer’s use of arguments based on international relations and diplomacy was not without result: After the trial, the Bavarian king exerted his right of clemency and reduced the punishment from one year of imprisonment in a fortress to only four months of prison.⁶¹⁸

Officially, however, neither here nor elsewhere in Germany were official permissions for recruitment to the Papal Army granted. Even the Austrian government, in 1860 and again in 1868, denied granting official permission to recruit Austrian subjects for the Papal

⁶¹⁶ Ibid., art. 117, p. 320.

⁶¹⁷ *Fränkischer Kurier / Mittelfränkische Zeitung*, 19/04/1860: p. 2.

⁶¹⁸ *Allgemeine Zeitung (Augsburg)* 20/04/1860: p. 1834.

Army.⁶¹⁹ The official backing of papal recruitment structures in Austria – at least those that aimed to recruit Austrian subjects – was consciously avoided. Nevertheless, the respective political sympathies of the governments or monarchs carried some weight, as was seen in the case of Sodeur's pardon by the Bavarian king; these sympathies, however, were linked to diplomatic and "geostrategic" questions. European states tried to influence the legal practices regarding the recruitment of "foreign soldiers" in other states by means of their diplomacy⁶²⁰, and more than one permission was most likely not granted due to fears that such permission would result in foreign policy issues.

4.1.2 *The bans against recruits*

With regard to the rules governing domestic subjects that enlisted in foreign armies, the connection that exists in the contemporary laws between foreign enlistment and emigration must be noted. Through this link, the development of the rules on foreign enlistment was very much influenced by the developments in emigration laws and liberties. This connection between the two spheres was already established for instance in the 1784 emigration patent for the Habsburg hereditary lands: Here, domestic subjects that enlisted in a foreign army were, in times of peace, regarded as "real emigrants" and punished accordingly. Having been captured on Hapsburg territory, they had to face several years of public work, or, once this form of punishment had been abolished, prison; in every case any eventual personal property was confiscated. To carry out these punishments effectively, the relatives and residents of the "emigrant's" native hometown were obliged to report when a subject was returning to Austria so that the authorities "could prevent a repeated escape."⁶²¹ To enlist in a foreign army in times of *war*, however, was seen as an act of "treason" and punished accordingly.⁶²²

Prussian subjects that enlisted abroad similarly had to face the penalties for illegal emigration. The Canton System instituted in 1733 introduced prohibitions on the emigration of conscripts and more general prohibitions on an individual's unauthorized departure from the territory; with regard to the penalty, several months were in place for the possible return

⁶¹⁹ As only a "subcutaneous" success due to the lack of an official permission, the papal recruitment in Austria is described by Hans Haas, "II. Vereine, Verbände und Parteien als Zentren der politischen Öffentlichkeit in den Donau- und Alpenländern / B. Politische, kulturelle und wirtschaftliche Gruppierungen in Westösterreich (Oberösterreich, Salzburg, Tirol, Vorarlberg)," in Helmut Rumpler and Peter Urbanisch, eds., *Politische Öffentlichkeit und Zivilgesellschaft. Partial vol. 1* (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2006), p. 273.

⁶²⁰ See for instance the diplomatic activities between European states, the Swiss federal government and the cantons after the "Invasion of Savoy", according to Paul Schweizer, *Geschichte der Schweizerischen Neutralität* (Frauenfeld: J. Hubers Verlag, 1895), pp. 727-734.

⁶²¹ „[.D]er Obrigkeit anzuzeigen, um seine nochmalige Entweichung zu hindern.“ See "Patent on Emigration, 10 August 1784," §40, p. 302, §27, p. 295 and §25, p. 294-295.

⁶²² Ibid., pp. 279-307.

of the individual, after which the confiscation of assets and the exclusion from any further inheritance was foreseen.⁶²³

4.1.2.1 Noble privileges in terms of military duty, emigration and foreign (military) service

In the states of the German Confederation in the nineteenth century, important parts of the nobility enjoyed several specific privileges with regard to emigration and entering into foreign service. The dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire led to a reduction in the number of states and reigning powers, which was counterbalanced by the conservation of certain privileges especially for those members of the nobility that had been dispossessed of their sovereignty in the Act of Confederation ("Deutsche Bundesakte") of 1815. The number of privileges differed according to the status they held when the Empire was still in place. The group granted the most privileges was the heads of those former states that had ceased to exist in 1815, namely the "Standesherrn".⁶²⁴ These were the nobles⁶²⁵ that had enjoyed imperial immediacy ("Reichsunmittelbarkeit") and were directly represented in the Reichstag, i.e. had held the status of an imperial estate ("Reichsstandschaft"), but that had lost their sovereignty by being mediatised when the empire was dissolved (i.e. mediatization in the narrow sense and so between 1803 and 1815). Article 14 of the Act of German Confederation of 1815 ("Deutsche Bundesakte") established a list of privileges: despite their mediatization and loss of direct political power, they were to be regarded as "part of the high nobility in Germany" and hence to be regarded as equals to the remaining reigning families of the new German Confederation; they retained the "unrestricted freedom to take up residence in any state belonging to or living in peace with the Confederation"; they enjoyed "exemption from all military obligation for

⁶²³ See, for instance "Edict no. 9, 29 of January 1754," in *Novum Corpus Constitutionum Prussico-Brandenburgensium Praecipue Marchicarum, Oder Neue Sammlung Königl. Preußl. und Churfürstl. Brandenburgischer, sonderlich in der Chur- und Marck-Brandenburg, Wie auch andern Provintzien, publicirten und ergangenen Ordnungen, Edicten, Mandaten, Rescripten... Vom Anfang des Jahrs 1751 und folgenden Zeiten*, vol. 1, partial vol. 1754 (1754), pp. 619-22; "Publicandum no. 3, 18 February 1779," in *Novum Corpus Constitutionum Prussico-Brandenburgensium Praecipue Marchicarum, Oder Neue Sammlung Königl. Preußl. und Churfürstl. Brandenburgischer, sonderlich in der Chur- und Marck-Brandenburg, Wie auch andern Provintzien, publicirten und ergangenen Ordnungen, Edicten, Mandaten, Rescripten... Vom Anfang des Jahrs 1751 und folgenden Zeiten*, vol. 6, partial vol. 1779 (1779), pp. 1453-54.

⁶²⁴ The primary reference work is Heinz Gollwitzer, *Die Standesherrn. Die politische und gesellschaftliche Stellung der Mediatisierten 1815-1918. Ein Beitrag zur deutschen Sozialgeschichte* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1964).

⁶²⁵ Already in the literature of the time, the meaning of the word "Standesherrn" varies between the more specific – and according to the Act of German confederation, legally correct – designation of these figures as the "heads" of their respective families and the broader acceptance that includes their families in general. Later on, however, the distinction between the "heads" of the family and other family members is as important legally as it seems to be complicated at the concrete level.

themselves and their families”; and they still held some jurisdictional rights and the “supervision over church and school matters, and also over charitable foundations”.⁶²⁶

All single German states passed laws to accept and confirm the provisions in the Act of Confederation regarding this privileged group of the *Standesherren*. They and their families were granted the right to establish domicile (“Aufenthalt”) in any state of the confederation or in those countries at peace with the latter.⁶²⁷ According to the legislation of Bavaria and the Grand Duchies of Hesse and Baden, the *Standesherren* were even allowed to enter foreign civil or military *service*, as long as they were not already part of the civil or military service at home. All of the states also confirmed the exemption of this special group of nobles and their families from military duty.⁶²⁸

These privileges contained some very important exclusive rights for the “*Standesherren*” class in regard to German noble, foreign soldierly engagement. Not only the *Standesherren* themselves, but also “their families” were declared to be absolutely exonerated from every military duty that had been established – even if differently – in each of the German confederated states.⁶²⁹ They were also exempt from remaining limitations to emigration that were dictated by the respective laws of their new sovereign state, insofar as they were free to take up residence in any state of the Confederation or in any state living in peace with the latter. In the legal commentaries of the time, this right was also seen as to contain the right to take up (civil or military) *service* in these countries. In other words, the

⁶²⁶ English version of the Act of German Confederation taken from German History in Documents and Images (GHDI), parts of §14 on http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/docpage.cfm?docpage_id=138 (last accessed: 11/12/2012).

⁶²⁷ Prussia: “Instruktion wegen Ausführung des Edikts vom 21sten Juni 1815, die Verhältnisse der vormals unmittelbaren deutschen Reichsstände in der Preußischen Monarchie betreffend. 30 May 1820,” in *Gesetz-Sammlung für die Königlichen Preußischen Staaten Instruktion wegen Ausführung des Edikts vom 21sten Juni 1815* (Berlin: zu haben im Königl. Debits-Kontoir für die Allgemeine Gesetz-Sammlung, 1820), pp. 81-100, §12, p. 84. Bavaria: “Edict die staatsrechtlichen Verhältnisse der vormals Reichsständischen Fürsten, Grafen und Herren betreffend (Vierte Beylage zu der Verfassungs-Urkunde des Königreichs Bayern, Tit. V, § 2),” in *Gesetzblatt für das Königreich Baiern Edict die staatsrechtlichen Verhältnisse der vormals Reichsständischen Fürsten, Grafen und Herren betreffend* (Munich: s. n., 1820), §5, col. 191; Grand Duchy of Hesse: “Edict, die standesherrlichen Rechts-Verhältnisse im Großherzogthum Hessen betreffend. 29 March 1820,” in *Großherzoglich-Hessisches Regierungsblatt auf das Jahr 1820* (Darmstadt: im Verlage der Großherzoglichen Invaliden-Anstalt, 1820), §A7-A8, p. 127. Baden: “Edict, die standes- und grundherrlichen Rechtsverhältnisse im Großherzogthum Baden betreffend. 16 April 1819,” in *Großherzoglich Badisches Staats- und Regierungsblatt* (Karlsruhe: in der C. F. Macklotscehn Hof-Buchdruckerey, 1819), § 3, pp. 2-3.

⁶²⁸ “Edict die staatsrechtlichen Verhältnisse der vormals Reichsständischen Fürsten, Grafen und Herren betreffend (Vierte Beylage zu der Verfassungs-Urkunde des Königreichs Bayern, Tit. V, § 2),” §11, col. 195; Hesse, “Edict, die standesherrlichen Rechts-Verhältnisse im Großherzogthum Hessen betreffend. 29 March 1820,” §A8, p. 127. Baden, “Edict, die standes- und grundherrlichen Rechtsverhältnisse im Großherzogthum Baden betreffend. 16 April 1819,” §8, p. 4. Prussia: “Instruktion wegen Ausführung des Edikts vom 21sten Juni 1815, die Verhältnisse der vormals unmittelbaren deutschen Reichsstände in der Preußischen Monarchie betreffend. 30 May 1820,” §13, p. 84.

⁶²⁹ This addresses the complicated issue – in light of the typical split-off of different ramifications of noble families – regarding who was to count as a family-member of the more restricted “*Standesherren*”.

“Standesherren” were the social group that, from the point of view of legal restrictions, could most easily join foreign armies. As Heinz Gollwitzer has aptly noted, the military career was an important way to “accommodate” family members, such as the second-born or members of the secondary branches of the family, during this period in which the noble families began to lose their power through the mediatization process. In fact, many of the Standesherren took service in foreign armies, from the French Army to the British and Russian armies.⁶³⁰

Furthermore, the *ius patronatus* of the Standesherren and the facility with which they could institute “charitable organizations” may have been of decisive importance within the context of the noble initiatives to mobilize and recruit for the Italian “parties”.

Moreover, it is important to see that *some* of these privileges were granted by the Act of Confederation to another group of nobles as well: the so-called “Reichsadel” (imperial nobility) or “Reichsritterschaft” (imperial knighthood), i.e. the imperial nobles, which had imperial immediacy, but – in contrast with the Standesherren – did not have their own full vote in the Imperial Diet (Reichstag).⁶³¹ That, purportedly, they were the descendants of the “imperial knighthood”, which had a special military role in former times, constituted perhaps an ingredient in their own perception that they were a special military caste. However this may be, it is important to note – a fact often overlooked by historiography, which has always focused on the “Standesherren” – that the German Confederation Act of 1815 granted to this group of nobles not all, but some of the privileges of the former, namely – and explicitly⁶³² – the freedom of taking residence in every state of the German confederation or in those foreign states “at peace with it”; the moderated right to preserve their own laws of succession in regard to their possessions; and finally, *ius patronatus*. Even if the Act stated, that “[t]hese rights will, however, only be practiced in accordance with the regulation of [confederated] state laws”, according to the jurisprudential literature of the time, it was understood nonetheless that these rights were *not* to be subject to the will of the respective confederated

⁶³⁰ Gollwitzer, *Standesherren*, p. 300.

⁶³¹ The formation or no of an imperial estate seems to lay at the core of the differentiation between Standesherren and Reichsadel, see for instance the definitions in “Reichsadel,” in *Herders Konversations-Lexikon. Kurze aber deutliche Erklärung von allem Wissenswerthen aus dem Gebiete der Religion, Philosophie, Geschichte, Geographie, Sprache, Literatur, Kunst, Natur- und Gewerbekunde, Handel der Fremdwörter und ihrer Aussprache. Reich illustriert durch Textabbildungen, Tafeln und Karten*, vol. 4 (Lindenbrugg bis Ryut) (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1856), p. 692 and their naming as “Reichsritterschaft”, e.g., in: “Königliche allerhöchste Verordnungen die der königlichen Souverainität unterworfenen Ritterschaft und ihre Hintersassen betreffend. 31 January 1807,” in *Königlich-Baierisches Regierungsblatt* (Munich: gedruckt von Franz Hübschmann, 1808), p. 193.

⁶³² See §14, penultimate clause, as the special clause regarding this “imperial nobility”, in: “Deutsche Bundesakte vom 8. Juni 1815,” in *Dokumente zur deutschen Verfassungsgeschichte*, ed. Ernst Rudolf Huber, 3 ed., vol. 1 (Stuttgart Kohlhammer, 1978), pp. 84-89. The English translation is taken from German History in Documents and Images (GHDI), parts of §14 on http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/docpage.cfm?docpage_id=138 (last accessed: 11/12/2012).

legislator and, therefore, he could not, “deprive the formerly immediate imperial nobility of these rights arbitrarily.”⁶³³

But in fact, different from the case of the Standesheeren, the particular laws in the German states differed with regard to how this “Imperial Nobility” and even each state’s remaining nobility were treated. In regard to imperial nobility, Bavaria for instance declared that they could not enter foreign service without monarchical consent, and all restrictions established by the law on emigration applied even to them.⁶³⁴ The regulations in Baden, however, were totally different. There, an edict from 1824 declared: “They [the former nobility of imperial immediacy] have the unrestricted freedom to take domicile in every state that is part of the Confederation or that is at peace with the latter, or to enter its service, but both only with the caveat of the obligation to military service [...]. The change of domicile and entering into foreign service has to be notified to the sovereign.”⁶³⁵ In other words, given that in Baden as elsewhere, the imperial nobility was – unlike the Standesherren – liable to military service, Baden restricted this group of nobles only as far as regarded its military duties; in every other case, a simple notification to the monarch on their intention to establish their domicile or to enter a foreign service sufficed. In this instance, the monarch could not veto – as was the case in Bavaria – these movements of the nobility.

4.1.2.2 Freedom of emigration and foreign military service

The situation changed after the revolutions of 1848/49, due to legal developments on emigration especially for the non-noble population. Implicitly (in the legal literature of the time) or explicitly (in the codifications themselves) to join foreign armies was equated with emigration; in the same manner that the right to emigrate asserted itself during the nineteenth century, the freedom to enter foreign military service also expanded.

While some of the states’ legislation regarded the entrance of their subjects into the service of foreign states – and hence, in the opinion of the legal literature of the time, civil as

⁶³³ „Diese Rechte werden jedoch nur nach Vorschrift der Landesgesetze ausgeübt.“ „[...K]eineswegs darf dieser Satz aber so verstanden werden, als habe es auch in das Belieben jeder Landesgesetzgebung verstellt werden wollen, diese Rechte dem ehemals unmittelbaren Reichsadel willkürlich zu entziehen.“ Heinrich Zoepfl, *Grundsätze des allgemeinen und deutschen Staatsrechts. Mit besonderer Rücksicht auf die neuesten Zeitverhältnisse*, 4 ed., vol. 2 (Leipzig; Heidelberg: Winter’sche Verlagshandlung, 1856), p. 326-327.

⁶³⁴ “Königliche allerhöchste Verordnungen die der königlichen Souverainität unterworfenen Ritterschaft und ihre Hintersassen betreffend,” §7, p. 195.

⁶³⁵ „Sie haben unbeschränkte Freiheit, ihren Aufenthalt in jedem zum deutschen Bunde gehörigen oder mit demselben im Frieden lebenden Staate zu nehmen, oder in die Dienste desselben zu treten, beides jedoch mit Vorbehalt der Verbindlichkeit zum Militärdienst [...] Die Veränderung des Aufenthalts und der Eintritt in fremde Dienste wird dem Souverän angezeigt.“ “Edict. 22 April 1824,” in *Großherzoglich Badisches Staats- und Regierungs-Blatt* (Karlsruhe: in dem Comptoir des Staats- und Regierungsblatts, 1824), §3, p. 72.

well as military service in a foreign country⁶³⁶ – to constitute a completed act of emigration⁶³⁷, others' legislation literally counted foreign *military* service amongst the acts that were equated with an effectuated emigration. This is not to say that those individuals that entered into foreign civil or military service effectively left their home country forever. Rather it is intended to underline the fact that from a legal standpoint, by equating foreign service with emigration, the existing legal conditions for emigration, whether in terms of constrictions or in terms of legal consequences, applied to foreign civil and military service as well. Consequently, the debates on the “right on emigration”⁶³⁸ and the fact that this freedom was gradually anchored in the constitutions of the time had a decisive influence on the question of foreign military service. Quite early on, for instance, Württembergers who wished to enter military service in a foreign country could invoke the guarantees of their constitution of 1819: “Every citizen is free to emigrate from the kingdom without paying any emigration tax, as soon as he has informed the authorities of his plan, corrected his debts and other obligations, and after having made adequate insurances that within a year he will not do service against his king and fatherland [...]” (§32). Many of the earlier eighteenth-century laws prohibiting entry into a foreign military service had therefore lost their validity: “They [these earlier laws] threaten subjects that let themselves enlist without governmental permission [...] but of course this regulation is abrogated by the right on emigration and the right to enter foreign service.”⁶³⁹

The Frankfurt Constitution from 1849 established a general right on emigration as a fundamental right: “The freedom of emigration is not limited by the state; emigration taxes cannot be imposed.” (§136). The text in article 10 of the constitutional draft of the Prussian

⁶³⁶ As a subtype of “foreign service”, foreign military service was still interpreted according to the law on German citizenship from 1913, the “Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz”, which was valid until 2000, see for instance Kay Hailbronner, Günter Renner, and Hans-Georg Maaßen, *Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2010), §28, note 4.

⁶³⁷ See how both are already connected for instance in the Prussian “Gesetz über die Erwerbung und den Verlust der Eigenschaft als Preußischer Unterthan, sowie über den Eintritt in fremde Staatsdienste vom 31. Dezember 1842,” in *Gesetz-Sammlung für die Königlichen Preussischen Staaten* (Berlin: zu haben im vereinigten Gesetz-Sammlungs-Debits- und Zeitungs-Komtoir, 1843), pp. 15-18.

⁶³⁸ For the previous French debates in the years 1791 and 1792 over freedom of emigration and the issue of bans on emigration within the context of the fear that reactionary monarchists would gather outside France see Ladan Broumand, “Emigration and the Rights of Man. French Revolutionary Legislators Equivocate,” *Journal of Modern History* 72 (2000): pp. 67-108. For the debate on emigration in the Frankfurt Assembly see Michael Kuckhoff, “Die Auswanderungsdiskussion während der Revolution von 1848/49,” in Günter Moltmann and Harald Focke, eds., *Deutsche Amerikaauswanderung im 19. Jahrhundert. Sozialgeschichtliche Beiträge* (Stuttgart: Metzler 1976), pp. 102-45.

⁶³⁹ „Dieselben bedrohen auch den Unterthanen, der ohne Staats-Erlaubniß sich anwerben lassen will [...]; allein diese Bestimmung ist natürlich durch das Auswanderungsrecht und das Recht in fremde Dienste zu gehen, aufgehoben [...]“ Mohl, *Das Staatsrecht des Königreichs Württemberg. Vol. II (Administrative Law)*, § 184, p. 361.

Constituent Assembly (“Charte Waldeck”) was identical, as was the text of the constitution octroyée of 5 December 1848. In the most relevant constitution (“revised constitution”) of 1 January 1850 (insofar as it was valid until 1918), the right on emigration was only limited by Prussian military service: “The freedom of emigration can be limited by the state only in reference to the compulsory military service. Taxes on emigration will not be applied.”⁶⁴⁰

Similarly, “[n]early all German states incorporated the right on emigration in their constitutions [...]”⁶⁴¹ In consequence to the 1849 Frankfurt Constitution, many German states also renounced their previous tradition of exacting emigration taxes.⁶⁴² The tendency to no longer perceive the act of being recruited for a foreign army – if this was an act of free will and did not violate any duty of military conscription in the homeland – as a breach of law was common to the legal codes and legal literature of the time.⁶⁴³ The stance also significantly changed with regard to “sujets mixtes”, i.e. individuals with dual citizenship. The opinion gradually took hold in the legislative processes and the legal literature that this category of people could not be punished, because they had “in both states the right and the duty to contribute to defence, so that for them ‘treason’ cannot be assumed.”⁶⁴⁴

Interestingly, the Catholics also cited the new constitutional liberties to cast the recruitment for the Papal Army in a legal light. In 1868, the steering committee of the Viennese Archbrotherhood of Saint Michael sent an address to the Austrian Emperor Franz Joseph I, asking that “it may be clarified by the governmental authorities that the recruitment of Austrian subjects for the Papal Army is not subject to any obstacle.”⁶⁴⁵ Möisinger in the same year wrote of the legal obstacles against papal recruitment in Austria: “How can it be forbidden to the Austrian Catholics on the basis of their so highly praised constitution that

⁶⁴⁰ „Die Freiheit der Auswanderung kann von Staatswegen nur in Bezug auf die Wehrpflicht beschränkt werden. Abzugsgelder werden nicht erhoben.“

⁶⁴¹ Jan Ziekow, *Über Freizügigkeit und Aufenthalt. Paradigmatische Überlegungen zum grundrechtlichen Freiheitsschutz in historischer und verfassungsrechtlicher Perspektive* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1997), p. 194.

⁶⁴² Ibid., p. 201.

⁶⁴³ See, e. g., the reports of the parliamentary commission on the new Police Criminal Code from 1863, in: Ludwig Stempf, *Das Polizeistrafgesetzbuch für das Großherzogthum Baden mit den Motiven, Commissionsberichten und den landständischen Verhandlungen bearbeitet* (Mannheim: Verlag von J. Bensheimer, 1864), §40, p. 115.

⁶⁴⁴ „[.G]egen beide Staaten das Recht und die Pflicht der Landesvertheidigung hätten, ein Landesverrath bei ihnen daher nicht denkbar sei.“ Jodocus Donatus Hubertus Temme, *Glossen zum Strafgesetzbuche für die Preussischen Staaten* (Breslau: Verlag der Schletter’schen Buchhandlung 1853), p. 147.

⁶⁴⁵ „[.E]s möge durch die Regierungsbehörden ausgesprochen werden, daß die Anwerbung österreichischer Unterthanen für die päpstl. Armee keinem Anstande unterliegt.“ Heinrich Schulthess, ed., *Europäischer Geschichtskalender*, vol. 9 (Nördlingen: Druck und Verlag der C. H. Beck’schen Buchhandlung, 1869), part II, Habsburgermonarchie, 30 January 1868, p. 200; *Volks- und Schützen-Zeitung*, 07/02/1868: p. 71 (p. 3 of the resp. issue).

which has already for a long time been allowed to the Catholics of all other countries?”⁶⁴⁶ Both the petition and the invocation of the constitution by Möisinger did not help, and the petition to the Austrian monarch was refused by the Minister of national defence and public safety; but in his refusal the Minister made clear, “that according to the fundamental state’s laws any citizen is granted free self-determination, according to the legal conditions.”⁶⁴⁷ In other words: While (at least civilian) Austrians who were recruited for the Papal Army were not considered to be a problem by the Austrian government, official backing – as aforementioned – was cautiously avoided.

4.1.2.3 *The influence of military duties on penalties*

The limit to the general right on emigration was however in one instance carried over; this limitation was inserted into the later constitutions of other German states, and hence after 1848/49, was frequently the only limit placed on the right on emigration⁶⁴⁸: those (still) liable to military service could not exercise this right. The Prussian Criminal Code of 1851 remained within the boundaries established by the “revised” constitution of 1850, when it stated in §110: “He who without permission leaves the royal territories and tries therewith to avoid entering the [Prussian] standing army, including a man of the Landwehr on vacation who emigrates without consent, will be punished with a fine of between fifty to one thousand taler or prison from one month to one year.”⁶⁴⁹ The additional penalty of the confiscation of estates as established by the following paragraph, however, was never exercised due to the general ban of this form of punishment in the constitution (art. 11).⁶⁵⁰ From a legal perspective, the Prussian case did not greatly differ from that of other German states, because here as elsewhere the “most common requirement for the right of emigration [in the constitutions of the German states] was to have fulfilled one’s military duties.”⁶⁵¹

⁶⁴⁶ „Wie könnte den Katholiken Oesterreichs in der so viel gepriesenen freien Verfassung das untersagt werden, was den Katholiken aller anderen Länder schon lange zugestanden ist?“ Möisinger, *Wozu braucht der heilige Vater eine Armee?*, p. 28.

⁶⁴⁷ “[...]nach den Staatsgrundgesetzen jedem Staatsbürger unter den gesetzlichen Voraussetzungen das freie Selbstbestimmungsrecht gewahrt sei.” Schulthess, *Europäischer Geschichtskalender 1869*, part II, Habsburgermonarchie, 30 January 1868, p. 200

⁶⁴⁸ Ziekow, *Über Freizügigkeit und Aufenthalt*, p. 207.

⁶⁴⁹ “Wer ohne Erlaubniß die königlichen Lande verläßt und sich dadurch dem Eintritt in den Dienst des stehenden Heeres zu entziehen sucht, ingleichen ein beurlaubter Landwehrmann, welcher ohne Erlaubniß auswandert, wird mit einer Geldbuße von fünfzig bis zu eintausend Thalern, oder Gefängniß von einem Monat bis zu einem Jahr bestraft.“ „Prussian Criminal Code of 1851“, Strafgesetzbuch für die Preußischen Staaten vom 14. April 1851, in Melchior Stenglien, ed., *Sammlung der deutschen Strafgesetze*, vol. 3 (Munich: Verlag von Christian Kaiser, 1858), part XI, §110, p. 78.

⁶⁵⁰ Art. 11 in the Prussian constitution of 1850, in: Ludwig von Rönne, *Die Verfassungs-Urkunde für den Preußischen Staat vom 31. Januar 1851* (Berlin: Verlag von Carl Heymann, 1850), p. 30.

⁶⁵¹ Ziekow, *Über Freizügigkeit und Aufenthalt*.

This assessment of the legal situation regarding foreign military service and its nineteenth-century trend toward the mitigation of sanctions, however, is not complete. One must take into consideration the situation for which an increasingly large portion of citizens, aside from the soldiers currently serving, were at an increased risk of penalties for desertion as a result of the extension of compulsory military service in some countries. The reason for this is that not only the avoidance of active military service, but also, increasingly, the avoidance of the various military reserve duties or departure in times of granted leaves of absence from the military constituted the offense of desertion. In Prussia, the paragraphs on desertion (§§91-112 of the Military Criminal Code of 1842⁶⁵²) were applicable to several groups of people: actual conscripts, reservists and the various contingents of the *Landwehr*. For the soldiers on active duty in all of these contingents (standing army, *Landwehr*, and – theoretically – the *Landsturm*⁶⁵³), desertion was assumed already after one day in wartime or two days in times of peace of unjustified absence (§92 alternative 1). But reservists and soldiers on official vacation who joined a foreign army also incurred the risk of being punished for desertion: §94 explicitly stated “Desertion is assumed, until proof of the contrary, in case of vacationists with an undetermined leave and reservists, [...] if they emigrate without permission *or* enter foreign military service” (the italics in the cited §94 are mine).⁶⁵⁴ Leaving Prussia, but also already and explicitly enlisting in a foreign military service was considered to be an action that justified “such a presumption, that the accused can avoid punishment only by proving the contrary.”⁶⁵⁵ Even a man of the *Landwehr*, the Prussian type of militia, who was on leave most of the time with only very short intervals of service, would be punished for desertion were he to emigrate without permission or enter into the service of a foreign army.⁶⁵⁶ A handbook on the Prussian military laws published in 1829 explained: “The soldier in the military reserves must be regarded as a deserter if he emigrates

⁶⁵² Eduard Fleck, *Kommentar über das Strafgesetzbuch für das Preußische Heer [1845]* (Berlin: Verlag der Deckerschen Geheimen Ober-Hofbuchdruckerei, 1856), §§91-112, pp. 113-132.

⁶⁵³ “Wenn der Landsturm im Kriege von Sr. Majestät ausgerufen wird [...], so stehen die Landsturmmofficiere und Landsturmmänner, in Hinsicht aller von ihnen in Bezug auf den Dienst begangenen Vergehen und Verbrechen, unter den Militairgesetzen und den Militärgerichten [...]” Karl Gustav von Rudloff, “Anhang in Betreff des Landsturms,” in idem, *Handbuch des preußischen Militärrechts*, vol. 2 (Berlin: Rücker; Gädicke, 1826), p. 605.

⁶⁵⁴ “Gegen die auf unbestimmte Zeit von ihren Truppentheilen Beurlaubten und gegen Reservisten gilt, bis zum Beweise des Gegentheils, die Vermuthung für das Verbrechen der Desertion, [...] wenn sie ohne Erlaubniß auswandern, *oder* in fremde Kriegsdienste treten.” Fleck, *Kommentar über das Strafgesetzbuch für das Preußische Heer*, p. 114, the italics are mine.

⁶⁵⁵ “[..E]ine solche Präsumtion begründen, daß nach Feststellung dieser Thatsachen der Angeschuldigte nur durch den Beweis des Gegentheils die Verurtheilung wegen Desertion vermeiden kann.” Ibid., p. 117.

⁶⁵⁶ See the court decision, “Men of the *Landwehr* can be punished for desertion, even if they are not called to active service”: “Landwehrmänner können sich der Desertion schuldig machen, wenn die *Landwehr* auch nicht zusammengezogen ist,” *Archiv für das Civil- und Criminal-Recht der Königl. Preuß. Rheinprovinzen* 23 (1836): p. 34.

without having been previously discharged from the military by the military authorities. Instead the man of the *Landwehr* [must be considered a deserter] in the case he emigrates without prior consent of his provincial government and without proper notification to the district sergeant.”⁶⁵⁷ In later years this principle was upheld, even though the statutory basis as it applied to members of the *Landwehr* was transferred from the special paragraph (§94) to the general paragraph (§91) on desertion. Based on this change, some commentators posited that it was no longer possible to punish men of the *Landwehr* on vacation, whereas others – among which the arguably most influential commentator of the military criminal code, Eduard Fleck – argued that it was certainly still possible, but with a reversal of the burden of proof. In 1856 Fleck wrote that men of the *Landwehr* “can only be punished during ordinary peacetime for desertion in case of arbitrary absence from their place of origin, if by legally admissible evidence it is shown that by this absence they had the intention to withdraw entirely from their military duties.”⁶⁵⁸ The Prussian military reforms after 1860, with their inclusion of the three younger classes of the *Landwehr* into the standing army and the increase of time that the reservists spent in the infantry, resulted in the increase in the number of Prussians that ran the risk of being punished for desertion. Only older men (more theoretically) liable to service in the *Landsturm* were not subject to the risk of being punished for desertion for the simple fact that they were normally not called to serve, except by the monarchical requests of 1813 and 1914.

Desertion – from active service, from the reserves, from a leave in the standing army or from the (as of 1860, the *Torso*-)*Landwehr* - was considered military misconduct. What is particularly important here is that the jurisdiction over this concrete offence and only a few others lay with the military courts and not the civilian courts, even for those men on leave.⁶⁵⁹

⁶⁵⁷ “Der Soldat der Kriegsreserve ist danach als Deserteur zu betrachten und zu behandeln, wenn er, ohne vorher die Entlassung aus seinen Militärverhältnissen von seiner Militärbehörde erhalten zu haben, der beurlaubte Landwehrmann aber, wenn er ohne einen Auswanderungsconsens von Seiten der betreffenden Provinzialregierung, und ohne die vorschriftsmäßige Meldung an den Bezirksfeldwebel, auswandert.” Karl Gustav von Rudloff, *Handbuch des preußischen Militärrechts*, vol. 2 (Berlin: Rücker; Gädicke, 1826), §627, p. 21.

⁶⁵⁸ “[..N]ur dann während der gewöhnlichen Friedens-Verhältnisse wegen eigenmächtiger Entfernung aus ihrem Aufenthaltsorte mit der Strafe der Desertion belegt werden dürfen, wenn durch die gesetzlich zulässigen Beweismittel festgestellt wird, daß sie bei ihrer Entfernung die Absicht gehabt haben, sich ihren militairischen Dienstverhältnissen gänzlich zu entziehen.” Fleck, *Kommentar über das Strafgesetzbuch für das Preußische Heer*, p. 120.

⁶⁵⁹ Eduard Fleck, “Preußische Militär-Strafgerichtsordnung [1845],” in idem, ed., *Preußische Militär-Strafgerichtsordnung nebst den dieselbe ergänzenden, erläuternden und abändernden Gesetzen, Verordnungen, Erlassen und allgemeinen Verfügungen. Zum Handgebrauch* (Berlin: Verlag der Königlichen Geheimen Ober-Hofbuchdruckerei R. v. Decker, 1873), §6, p. 14.

This special jurisdiction of the military judicature was confirmed in 1867 for the North German Confederation in its entirety.⁶⁶⁰ A Prussian, and later, North-Germans in general, incurred the risk of being punished for desertion even before actually entering into service; it was enough to be selected, as a recruit or member of the *Landwehr*, from the group of men theoretically liable to service, which in German was “ausgehoben” (“lifted”)⁶⁶¹; only after an individual had fulfilled every possible military duty and was officially dismissed from military duty, was he no longer at risk of being punished for desertion.⁶⁶²

By controlling emigration, the Prussian state attempted to prevent the departure of those who were liable to military service. Consequently, the strict requirement to register and deregister when changing the place of residence in the monarchy was established, and hence it was possible to automatically assume desertion in the case of emigration without permission. Until 1867, this permission had to be obtained from the military authorities and later from the civil bureaucracy in the form of an emigration consent, which implicitly comprised not only the dismissal from military service but also the loss of citizenship.

In Württemberg as well, to provide another example, *military personnel* were subject to limits on emigration, despite the overarching general freedom to emigrate. The prohibition to emigrate included not only all Württembergers that had already been drafted, but also all those who were liable to military service and for whom it was still possible to be drafted: in other words, all men between 22 and 32 years of age⁶⁶³ that had not already fulfilled their military duty by actually serving this entire time, or in the form of the “one-year-volunteering”, or by providing a substitute.⁶⁶⁴ But this ban was – as elsewhere – difficult to reinforce. After all, the state threatened the “recalcitrant military population” that did not go to its physical examination or show up for service, with a prolongation of duty of one to two years; to enter foreign military service, it was explicitly stated, was to be regarded as an “aggravating circumstance” in the decision on the degree of the penalty for desertion (Art. 92 point 3 of the Conscription Law). Moreover, the Württembergian state tried to maintain its hold on the “military population” by explicitly enacting a special regulation with regard to citizenship: in the event an individual joined a foreign *military service* without permission, a

⁶⁶⁰ See, e.g., *Großherzoglich Mecklenburg-Strelitzscher Officieller Anzeiger für die Gesetzgebung und Staatsverwaltung* 9 (1868): pp. 4-74. See especially §26, which directly links to the Prussian laws.

⁶⁶¹ Fleck, “Preußische Militair-Strafgerichtsordnung [1845],” §5 and explicitly §6 alt. 2, pp. 13-15.

⁶⁶² *Ibid.*, §16 alt. 2, pp. 19-20.

⁶⁶³ “Gesetz über die Verpflichtung zum Kriegsdienste,” in *Regierungs-Blatt für das Königreich Württemberg vom Jahr 1843* (1843), art. 2, p. 322.

⁶⁶⁴ See the enumeration of cases in Robert Mohl, *Das Staatsrecht des Königreichs Württemberg*, vol. 1, Constitutional Law (Tübingen: Heinrich Laupp, 1831), §72, pp. 322-328.

subject's citizenship would not be removed, so that upon his return home he could still be subject to military service at home.

John Torpey sustained, that border controls, the restrictions on emigration, and the development of methods of identification for people as “restrictions of personal freedom of movement” were traditionally linked not only to issues of social policy, but also to the question of “who could be required to perform military service and how they could be constrained to do so.”⁶⁶⁵ But as discussed above, there were significant developments with regard to these issues. Before the nineteenth century, states tried to attack foreign recruitment from every possible angle, criminalizing the recruiters as well as the recruited, the recruitment of nationals and foreigners in their territory, and that which was foreign in general as well as more specifically the recruitment efforts of their adversaries. The nineteenth century saw instead a shift in the focus. The attention was turned not only toward nationals but more precisely toward those who were liable for conscription, even if this group could be – due to some very extensive conscription systems – quite big. Regardless, the debate on the “right to emigrate” “, and the respective codifications in the constitutions and other laws, led to a decisive relaxation of efforts to control the movements of at least those Germans who were not liable (or were no longer liable) to conscription. Thus the legal possibilities to join foreign armies increased.

Associating foreign military service with emigration, however, did not have just positive effects for those who were actually recruited. Alongside this depenalization of emigration, this association meant that the recruit ran the risk of facing legal consequences for their emigration: the loss of citizenship, which depending on the state became an automatic consequence for all those who enlisted in foreign militaries, and at times only for those who had not first asked permission.

It is important to remember, however, that many of the “foreign soldiers” in Italy had already broken laws before (and sometimes long before) making their Italian commitment: On the one hand, information in the soldiers' registers regarding previous foreign military engagements reveals that many had already travelled, in Europe and the world, for varied lengths of time.⁶⁶⁶ On the other hand, those who came to Italy from their various locations of exile were often more or less "outlaws" in their home countries, at least until they were

⁶⁶⁵ John Torpey, *The invention of the passport. Surveillance, citizenship and the state* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 19.

⁶⁶⁶ Many had been part of the French Foreign Legion or the British Army and had fought in Algeria, in the Crimea War or, later, in Mexico.

rehabilitated, and therefore, may have been less sensitive toward accruing further legal consequences.

To this must be added – in the case of pro-Unitarian recruitment – the ambiguous political status of some of the Garibaldian armed groups, the moment that in some instances an official link to the army of Piedmont/Italy did not exist. Consequently, in some European capitals there were debates on how to consider the *garibaldini* in legal terms.⁶⁶⁷ But some states resorted to bans on foreign recruitment in the legally ambiguous cases. In 1849, for instance, France and Piedmont both forbade the establishment in their port cities of camps for the assembling recruits for the Sicilian revolution.⁶⁶⁸

There were two motives as to why recruitment offices were often placed in border regions: the first was to more easily recruit from more than one country, and the second was to avoid legal issues connected to a nation's legislation on foreign recruitment and emigration. Recruitment offices were inevitably located in those states where foreign recruitment and emigration legislation was the least restrictive. Therefore, recruitment offices operated in Feldkirch in Austrian Vorarlberg⁶⁶⁹ near Württemberg, Baden, and Bavaria, and in Saint-Louis along the Rhine and Altkirch in France, which were both very close to Basel and Baden. These legal geographies were important even for the recruitment of the *garibaldini*: According to one source, a couple of Bavarian deserters in 1862 first fled to France before being shipped to Italy together with the recruited French soldiers.⁶⁷⁰

⁶⁶⁷ Such debates occurred in Austria for instance in 1860, of course primarily within the context of Garibaldi's "Italian" volunteers that were subjects of the Empire. In the same year, however, recruitment for the Two Sicilies was allowed. See Stefan Malfèr, ed., *Abt. 5: Die Ministerien Erzherzog Rainer und Mensdorf, vol. II: 1. Mai 1861 - 2. November 1861*, Die Protokolle des Österreichischen Ministerrates (Vienna: Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 1981), p. 471. The permission enabling the Neapolitan recruitment in Austria is discussed in Marc Monnier, *Garibaldi. Histoire de la conquête des Deux-Siciles. Notes prises sur place au jour le jour* (Paris: Michel Lévy Frères, 1861), pp. 93-95. For the debates on how to interpret the British activities to support Garibaldi from a legal point of view, see the protocols of the sessions of 11, 14, 17, 25 May and 18 June 1860 in the House of Commons, online via <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1860> (last accessed: 21/08/2012).

⁶⁶⁸ Hoffstetter, *Tagebuch*, p. 3.

⁶⁶⁹ Feldkirch was also a very important place for papal recruitment due to the fact that the Jesuit public school "Stella Matutina" was located there. Scholars of this school were, for instance, Franz Xaver von Korff or Klemens August Eickholt, both from Westphalia. These two did not join papal service directly from the school, but several years after they had left. Nevertheless, Eickholt writes about a group of eighteen ex-scholars of the school who met for a "Stammtisch" (meet up) in the roman restaurant "Al Falcone". Klemens August Eickholt, *Roms letzte Tage unter der Tiara. Erinnerungen eines römischen Kanoniers aus den Jahren 1868 bis 1870* (Freiburg: Herder, 1917), p. 58.

⁶⁷⁰ At least this was written in some German newspapers, see *Pfälzer Zeitung (Speyer)*, 22/08/1862: p. 2 or *Bayerische Zeitung (Munich)*, 25/08/1862: p. 755.

4.1.3 A biographical example – Wilhelm Plum and the baggy-style trousers

Documents from the Department of Internal Affairs of the Prussian governmental district of Aachen that are now kept in the State Archive of Nordrhein-Westfalen offered up a rather complex story. The main characters and elements are: A Catholic pastor, an unknown clergyman, an alleged vagabond and his mother, various levels of the Prussian government and, most importantly, an odd pair of trousers. In 1868, to begin citing a letter from the Foreign Ministry in Berlin, a certain Wilhelm Plum, born 18 January 1833 in Roetgen near Monschau in Prussian Rhineland, turns himself in at the Prussian Embassy in Rome, claiming that he still has the duty to be available for the military reserves in Prussia. He declares that he wished to leave the Papal Army within which he was serving at the moment. Going through the arguments in the longish enquiry ordered by Berlin and carried out by the Chief Administrator of the district, Plum is deemed “furbo” (or “crafty” and “wily”) as the Italians would say. The enquiry goes on to assert that Plum “had feigned illness so well, that he has been [...] released from the 1st Rhineland infantry regiment No. 25 in Hadersleben as being unfit for military service; this decision was confirmed by the departmental-substitution-commission in 1865 [...]”.⁶⁷¹ But according to Berlin, Wilhelm Plum was not the problem; he was only the symptom of a problem that was already mentioned in the letter that Berlin sent to the governmental district. Berlin wished to know how the decision to enter the Papal Army was matured and therefore requested that the royal government of Aachen “clarify the truthfulness of the statement which” Plum “[...] made about the influences that induced him to enter the Papal Army and to refer the result”.⁶⁷² According to the report from the local administration, the statement Plum, himself, made points to a certain Pastor Fischer in Roetgen. Without calling Fischer to make a statement, and after having heard only Plum’s version, the Chief Administrator of the district declared, “to date, I haven’t had any information on any activities of Pastor Fischer of Roetgen that goes against §111 of the Prussian Criminal Code and even now – notwithstanding the diverse enquiries undertaken –

⁶⁷¹ “[..V]erstand er so gut, Krankheit zu simulieren, daß man ihn [...] vom 1. Rheinischen Infanterie-Regiment No. 25 zu Hadersleben als zum Militair untauglich in die Heimath entließ; diese Entscheidung wurde von der Departements-Ersatz-Commission 1865 bestätigt [...]. Angebliche Verleitung des Wilhelm Plum zum Eintritt in die päpstliche Armee”. Letter, Montjoie, 7. April 1868, in: Landesarchiv Nordrhein-Westfalen (LA NRW), Abteilung Rheinland (Düsseldorf), Regierung Aachen, Militärwesen, signature B no. 1436, Militaria; Deserteurs.

⁶⁷² “Die Angaben, welcher [...] Plum] über den Entschluß gemacht hat, der ihn zum Eintritt in die päpstliche Truppe bewogen haben soll [...] über die Richtigkeit dieser Behauptungen Ermittlungen anzustellen und mir über deren Resultat Bericht zu erstatten.” Letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Berlin den 21. März 1868, in: LA NRW, Abteilung Rheinland (Düsseldorf), Regierung Aachen, Militärwesen, signature B no. 1436, Militaria; Deserteurs.

have not come up with any facts that could corroborate the statement Plum made against Pastor Fischer.”⁶⁷³ But the administrator’s interrogation of Plum’s mother is intriguing:

“On behalf of Plum’s joining of the Papal Army, his mother [...] has made the following statement: Her son Wilhelm had gone [...] to Pastor Fischer and asked him for a certificate to join the Papal Zouaves again; but Pastor Fischer had refused that wish directly. But because she wished to have her son – who caused her only sorrow and trouble – removed a while again from here, she had sent her daughter Regina to Pastor Fischer with the same request; the latter was denied as well. After this, her son had vanished; on 10 December he returned to her, dressed in peculiar fancy military trousers; she asked him where he got these trousers, and he answered that he had received them in Aachen from a clergyman who had also provided him with a letter of recommendation for Pastor Fischer, so that he was now in possession of the necessary certificate to join the Papal Army; but, she added, she never saw this certificate.”⁶⁷⁴

But the Chief Administrator continued to remain firmly convinced: Wilhelm Plum and not Fischer was the problem. According to the “local” version of the story, it was rather “Plum’s own tendency to be a vagabond that inspired him to allow himself to be engaged by the recruitment office in Brussels for the Papal Army. Hence, I have until now abstained from calling upon Pastor Fischer to make his own statement regarding the accusations brought against him by Plum.”⁶⁷⁵

⁶⁷³ “[..D]aß ich bis dahin von einer gegen den § 111 des Straf-Ges.-Buchs verstoßenden Thätigkeit des Pastors Fischer zu Roetgen keine Kenntniß erhalten und auch jetzt ungeachtet der verschiedentlich angestellten Erkundigungen keine Thatsachen habe ermitteln können, welche geeignet wären, die gegen den Pfarrer Fischer gerichtete Aussage des Wilhelm Plum zu unterstützen [...]”. Angebliche Verleitung des Wilhelm Plum zum Eintritt in die päpstliche Armee, Letter, Montjoie, 7. April 1868, in: LA NRW, Abteilung Rheinland (Düsseldorf), Regierung Aachen, Militärwesen, signature B no. 1436, Militaria; Deserteurs.

⁶⁷⁴ “Was nun den Eintritt des Plum in die päpstliche Armee betrifft, so hat seine Mutter [...] die Erklärung abgegeben: Ihr Sohn sei [...] zum Pfarrer Fischer gegangen und habe diesen um ein Certificat gebeten, damit er wieder bei den päpstlichen Zouaven eintreten könne; Pfarrer Fischer habe dies aber rundweg abgeschlagen; weil sie indeß gern gesehen hätte, daß ihr Sohn, welcher ihr nur Kummer und Verdruß machte, auf längere Zeit noch einmal von sich hier fort bewegen möchte, habe sie selbst darauf ihre Tochter Regina noch einmal mit derselben Bitte zum Pfarrer Fischer geschickt; auch diese sei abschlägig beschieden worden. Darauf sei ihr Wilhelm wieder von hier verschwunden; endlich am 10ten Dezember pr. Abends sei er zu ihr zurückgekommen und zwar bekleidet mit einer eigenthümlich phantastischen Militairhose; sie habe ihn gefragt, wo er an diese Hose gerathen sei, worauf er erwiedert habe, daß er diese in Aachen von einem geistlichen Herrn bekommen habe, welcher ihm auch ein Empfehlungsschreiben an den Pfarrer Fischer mitgegeben habe, so daß er jetzt von diesem das nöthige Certificat für den Eintritt in die päpstliche Armee in Händen habe; gesehen hatte die Frau dieses Zeugniß indeß nicht.” Angebliche Verleitung des Wilhelm Plum zum Eintritt in die päpstliche Armee, Letter, Montjoie, 7 April 1868, in: LA NRW, Abteilung Rheinland (Düsseldorf), Regierung Aachen, Militärwesen, signature B no. 1436, Militaria; Deserteurs.

⁶⁷⁵ “dass sein eigener Trieb zum Vagabondieren ihm den Entschluß eingegeben haben wird, sich von dem Werber-Comite in Brüssel für die päpstliche Armee engagieren zu lassen. Ich habe daher auch bis jetzt Abstand genommen, dem Pfarrer Fischer selbst über die Anschuldigungen des Plum zu hören [...]”. Angebliche Verleitung des Wilhelm Plum zum Eintritt in die päpstliche Armee, Letter, Montjoie, 7 April 1868, in: LA

But who is Wilhelm Plum? Why is he a problem for the local administration? And why does he wear trousers that seem strange to his mother? From where did he get these trousers? And who is the unknown clergyman from Aachen that Plum mentions to his mother?

Johann Wilhelm Plum, in accordance with the biographical sketches included in the letter from the local authorities in Monschau-Roetgen, not only feigned illness to be discharged from his reserve duties in the Prussian army, but he also tried to join the Papal Army twice, and also at least once to get away from it. Moreover, when he was 16 years old, Plum was handed over to the public work house in Braunweiler; in 1851 he was punished for being a vagabond and fined to another stay in the workhouse. None of this “bettered him in any way and he continued to have an unsteady life”.⁶⁷⁶ In 1853, Plum tried to join the Prussian military but was destined to remain in the reserves. Later, he was picked up in France and brought by the French authorities to Baden, where he faced police custody in Pforzheim and was later handed over to the 1st battalion of the infantry regiment of Coblenz. From the military service in Coblenz, he deserted repeatedly, “and served in the French and as well in the papal service in 1860, where he was then captured by Piedmont I think”, [here the Administrator shows his knowledge of international politics] “at Castelfidardo. Having returned home, he was handed over to the military authorities and had to face a prison term of three years and eight months.”⁶⁷⁷ It is after this, in 1865, as aforementioned, that Plum feigned illness and in doing so preserved himself from having to serve his reserve duties in the Prussian military. “Even if totally healthy, Plum has shown no inclination for work; he once again resumed his old industry of providing himself with clothes and money by issuing begging letters and walking around”⁶⁷⁸ like a vagabond. In September 1865, Pastor Fischer gave such a begging letter to the mayor, but Plum fled directly, and “because he now knows that Pastor Fischer was the informer, he wishes henceforth to take revenge on the latter.”⁶⁷⁹ If this recount was true, it becomes clear why Plum was the problem for the Administrator and not Fischer. In other words, the local Administrator was more interested in fighting the local

NRW, Abteilung Rheinland (Düsseldorf), Regierung Aachen, Militärwesen, signature B no. 1436, Militaria; Deserteurs.

⁶⁷⁶ “Dies besserte ihn aber keineswegs; er fuhr fort ein unstätes Leben zu führen.”

⁶⁷⁷ “[...] hat in französischen und auch im Jahr 1860 in päpstlichen Diensten gestanden, wo er damals angeblich in piemontesische Gefangenschaft /: wie ich glaube, bei Castelfidardo :/ gerieth; Heimgekehrt, ist er nunmehr verhaftet und an die Militairbehörde zurückgeliefert worden und mußte darauf wegen Desertion und Diebstahl nun Festungs-Strafe von drei Jahren acht Monaten überstehen.”

⁶⁷⁸ “Obschon anscheinend ganz gesund, zeigte g. Plum doch gar keine Lust zur Arbeit; er begann wieder seine alte Industrie, durch Bettelbriefe sich Kleider und Geld zu verschaffen und im Lande umherzulaufen [...]”

⁶⁷⁹ “[...]Daß er jetzt weiss, daß der Pfarrer Fischer damals sein Denunciant gewesen ist und deshalb an demselben sich gern rächen möchte.”

problem of beggars and vagabonds than he was in knowing who was responsible for papal recruitment; at the very least he was not willing to blame one of the local pastors.

The question of the strange trousers is easy to resolve, because almost certainly they are the baggy-style trousers of the French or Papal Zouaves. The question as to where Plum got them is more difficult to answer. According to his mother's statement, he got them in Aachen. It is very likely that Plum ran into an organization managed by locals to support the Pope, the structure of which is partially revealed by later notes found in the same file. Eulenburg, the Minister of Internal Affairs wrote directly to Aachen some months later: "Of those personalities, that handle the recruitment for the Papal Army, the Catholic Pastor Schneider at St. Peter's Church [most probably Saint Peter in the centre of Aachen] and the owner of a foundry in Wallstreet, Oster(n) [Schmitz and Oster Foundry, Wallstraße 55, Aachen] were identified."⁶⁸⁰ Eulenburg asks the local authorities to open enquiries with regard to the mentioned figures. But the local police could find no trace of any pastor who went by the name of Schneider nor did they find "any proof" that Oster, breached in any way §111 of the Criminal Code.

But the statement made by the factory-owner Oster leaves room for doubt. In fact, he states, "in the last weeks ca. 130 to 150 people – most of them from this district and around – have been at my place, and uttered that they wanted to join the Papal Army and that they wanted to know from me what they should do. I answered that I couldn't help them. [...] To those persons I declared [...] that in Belgium there were committees, to which they should turn. [...] The fact that the mayor [of Aachen] Contzen as well as the count of Nellessen sent those people to me is due to the fact that I am Cashier of the committee for the alms for the pope and that I am in written contact with Rome."⁶⁸¹ On the same paper, below, we find a revealing passage: "Following special instructions from the Head of the Police, Hirsch, Mr. Oster was informed about the illegality and punishableness of the indicated acts and – upon reading out loud paragraphs 110, 111 and 114 of the Criminal Code – he was seriously

⁶⁸⁰ "Als diejenigen Persönlichkeiten, welche die Werbungen für die päpstliche Armee hauptsächlich betreiben sollen: sind der katholische Pfarrer Schneider an der dortigen Peterspfarrkirche und der Besitzer der Eisengießerei, Oster(n) in der Wallstraße da-selbst habhaft gemacht worden." Letter from the Minister of Internal Affairs to the government of Aachen, 28 october 1868, in: LA NRW, Abteilung Rheinland (Düsseldorf), Regierung Aachen, Militärwesen, signature B no. 1436, Militaria; Deserteurs.

⁶⁸¹ "Es sind allerdings im Laufe der letzten Wochen ca. 130 bis 140 solcher Personen – größtentheils aus hiesiger Mark und Umgegend – bei mir gewesen, welche angaben, daß sie in die päpstliche Armee eintreten wollten und von mir Auskunft darüber verlangten, wie sie sich zu verhalten hätten. Diesen Personen habe ich erklärt, daß ich ihnen nicht weiter behülflich sein könne. [...] Den Umstand, daß sowohl durch den Herrn Oberbürgermeister Contzen als auch durch den Grafen von Nellessen die betreffenden Leute zu mir geschickt wurden, erklärt sich dadurch, daß ich Cassirer des Comités der für den Pabst bestimmten Gaben bin und mit Rom in schriftlichem Verkehr stehe." Verhandelt Aachen den 19ten Dezember 1867, in: LA NRW, Abteilung Rheinland (Düsseldorf), Regierung Aachen, Militärwesen, signature B no. 1436, Militaria; Deserteurs.

cautioned that he should abstain from all activities related to the recruitment, transport, support of people from here for the Papal Army.”⁶⁸² It is from a different source, that it becomes clear that Oster underplayed the aim of the committee in his statement. In the proceedings of the general assembly of the Catholic associations from 1868, it is recorded that in October 1867, the mayor of Aachen, Johann Contzen, formed an “association to provide Papal Zouaves” (“Verein zur Gestellung päpstlicher Zuaven”).⁶⁸³

4.2 Army recruitment in nineteenth-century Italy and foreign mobilization

Contrary to a widely held belief associated with the idea that general conscription existed, the armies of the nineteenth century continued to be supplied with recruits through a mix of different forms of recruitment. General conscription in Italy was only instituted in 1861, but some of the Italian armies prior to unification had instituted some form of conscription, even if this did not apply to all subjects.

4.2.1 Piedmont

The army of the Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia consisted of a combination of professional, formally “voluntary” and conscripted soldiers. Conscription, albeit with many legal exemptions such as for Sardinia and the possibility to either provide a substitute or to pay an exoneration tax, was re-introduced again in 1816. There were two distinct types of soldiers in the army that varied in proportion throughout the nineteenth century: These were the permanent and “provincial” soldiers. Permanent soldiers served for eight years and were, until 1839, recruited according to the premises of a professional army, i.e. with formally voluntary enlistments. The “provincial” soldiers however were a product of military conscription. Their name derived from the Piedmontese provincial militias of the eighteenth century, even if in the nineteenth century all soldiers – permanent and provincial – served together in mixed regiments. Until 1831, provincial soldiers in times of peace had to regularly serve for four of every sixteen months over a period of twelve years in total. In times of war, all provincial soldiers had the duty to join in active service. Therefore, in times of peace, the Piedmontese

⁶⁸² “In Folge speciellen Auftrages des Herrn Polizei-Präsidenten Hirsch wurde Herrn Oster die Ungesetzlichkeit und Strafbarkeit der angedeuteten Handlungen vorgehalten und ihm unter Hinsicht auf die §§ 110, 111 und 114 des Straf-G. Buches, weche §§ ihm vorgelesen worden, ernstliche Verwarnung dahin ertheilt, daß er sich für die Folge aller auf Anwerbung, Beförderung, Unterstützung hh von Leuten für die päpstliche Armee hinielenden Handlungen zu enthalten habe [...]” Verhandelt Aachen den 19ten Dezember 1867, in: LA NRW, Abteilung Rheinland (Düsseldorf), Regierung Aachen, Militärwesen, signature B no. 1436, Militaria; Deserteurs.

⁶⁸³ N. N., *Die General-versammlungen der katholischen Vereine Deutschlands. Rundschau und Kritik über die Wirksamkeit der letzten fünf General-versammlungen. Der neunzehnten General-versammlung zu Bamberg gewidmet* (Münster: Adolph Russell, 1868), p. 21.

army comprised roughly 16,000 provincial and 8,000 permanent soldiers between 1815 and the 1830s.⁶⁸⁴ In 1831 and 1832, a series of new laws significantly altered the configuration of the Piedmontese Army. The duty of provincial soldiers now consisted of two consecutive years, after which they were placed on leave; in the first eight years they could be called back to active duty, and in the following six years they remained in the wartime reserves. Where before the ranks of the permanent soldiers were filled only through voluntary enlistments and the conscripts' substitutes, the possibility was introduced, and later converted into law in 1839, to enlist conscripts into the ranks of permanent soldiers.⁶⁸⁵

The new regulation inverted the previous proportions of the two groups of soldiers, and now the permanent soldiers were to count 16,000 men and constitute the bedrock of the army against only 8,000 provincials.⁶⁸⁶ The last Piedmontese Army reform of 1854, with its new law on the recruitment of the army⁶⁸⁷, however, formally inverted the percentages of the two groups once again, even if in practice they tended to converge in terms of length of service. The army now consisted of few permanent soldiers signed on to serve eight years, many conscripts with five years of active duty and six years in the reserve, and the greatest portion of conscripts that were given only forty days of instruction before passing directly into the reserve.⁶⁸⁸ The new Italian Army of the 1860s adopted this last Piedmontese Army structure preserving the possibility for its conscripts to provide a substitute or to pay a military exoneration tax.⁶⁸⁹

Within the context of the “second war of independence” of 1859, volunteers were incorporated according to the Piedmontese regulations. The volunteers were integrated on the one hand into the regular Piedmontese regiments, and on the other they joined specifically formed volunteer corps, such as the Garibaldian *Cacciatori delle Alpi*. The Piedmontese law on the conscription of 1854 regulated the volunteers in the first instance. In fact the volunteers were integrated into the regular army as “permanent soldiers”, and therefore initially signed on for a period of engagement of eight years. As Anna Maria Isastia has shown, the length of engagement was a contentious issue, because already “the first enrolled volunteers immediately manifested scarce enthusiasm for a norm that penalized them well beyond their

⁶⁸⁴ Pieri, *Storia militare del Risorgimento*, pp. 88-89.

⁶⁸⁵ "Nuovo ordinamento della truppa di fanteria," *Gazzetta piemontese* 19, no. 31 gennaio 1832 (1832), p. 72.

⁶⁸⁶ Pieri, *Storia militare del Risorgimento*, p. 170.

⁶⁸⁷ "Legge sul reclutamento dell'esercito del Regno di Sardegna. 20 March 1854, no. 1676," in *Raccolta degli atti del Governo di Sua Maestà il re di Sardegna*, vol. 22 (dal 1° gennaio a tutto giugno 1854) (Turin Stamperia reale, 1854), pp. 81-140.

⁶⁸⁸ Pieri, *Storia militare del Risorgimento*, pp. 574-575.

⁶⁸⁹ Gianni Oliva, *Soldati e ufficiali. L'esercito italiano dal Risorgimento a oggi* (Milan: Mondadori, 2011), pp. 34-38.

intentions.”⁶⁹⁰ Already in January 1859, exceptions were made, but by the end of the month, the period of engagement for all volunteers was again fixed at eight years. Despite new attempts to introduce exceptions, the “major part” of those enlisted between the end of January and mid-February was “constrained to serve the eight years”.⁶⁹¹ In February, the volunteers enlisted in the regular army with different periods of engagement, before the period was fixed for all at one year in March. This measure was not retroactive and therefore applied only to those soldiers who enlisted from that moment forth, and not to those that had enlisted under the longer terms of service.

However, at least for non-Piedmontese subjects – i.e. individuals who were not from Piedmont or from the newly acquired Lombardy – who had signed up under the longer terms (before March) a decree was issued at the end of July that permitted them to leave the army if they so chose, independently from the duration they had originally signed up for.⁶⁹²

For the separate corps of volunteers, the Piedmontese government decided to anchor its practices in the laws governing the national guards, and in fact the volunteer corps were organized at the local level. For the volunteer corps, a period of engagement of one year was foreseen. With regard to Garibaldi’s *Cacciatori delle Alpi* – formed with the volunteers assembled in the depot of Cuneo – the official proposal was that they be considered “volunteers of the local national guard of Genoa”⁶⁹³, even if this city was a 150 km away.

4.2.2 Papal Army

While the Piedmontese Army was comprised of both locally conscripted soldiers and formal volunteers (as permanent soldiers or as “volunteers” of the specific volunteer corps for instance in 1859), the Papal Army was entirely comprised of formal volunteers. In the Papal States conscription was abolished after 1815, so that the army was entirely dependent on formally voluntary enlistments.⁶⁹⁴ Since 1832⁶⁹⁵, the Papal Army had two “foreign regiments” that consisted mainly of Swiss soldiers but also southern Germans and others from other regions.⁶⁹⁶ Even if these regiments were officially disbanded in the spring of 1849 by the

⁶⁹⁰ Anna Maria Isastia, *Il volontariato militare nel Risorgimento. La partecipazione alla guerra del 1859* (Rome: Stato Maggiore dell'Esercito, Ufficio Storico, 1990), p. 128.

⁶⁹¹ Ibid., p. 130.

⁶⁹² Ibid., pp. 150-151.

⁶⁹³ Ibid., pp. 166-167.

⁶⁹⁴ There were some projects to build an “army of the second line” with recruits from the provinces, but for various reasons they were never realized. See Vigeveno, *La fine dell'esercito pontificio*, pp. 44-49, 63-64 and 129.

⁶⁹⁵ Dalla Torre, “Materiali,” p. 60.

⁶⁹⁶ This is revealed by a cursory look at the soldiers’ registers ASR, Ministry of Arms, soldiers’ registers vols. 1601-1625.

Roman Republic⁶⁹⁷, some of their soldiers enlisted in the Republican Army, in the same way that other Papal Soldiers sided with the revolutionaries. Immediately after the fall of the Roman Republic, in July 1849, the restored papal government formed a new army. A law that was passed in 1852 sanctioned the presence of foreigners in the Papal Army. This law was valid right up until the dissolution of the Papal States in 1870.⁶⁹⁸ Two line regiments in the infantry consisting entirely of foreigners were instituted in 1855⁶⁹⁹; others were created in 1859.

In 1860, the Papal Army seems to have been in particularly critical condition, and at best poorly prepared for war. Acknowledging these conditions, and in anticipation of the imminent wars as the political atmosphere steadily worsened in Italy, the Papal Army was reorganized between April and September 1860 with the aim of creating a force capable of going to war. For just this purpose, the French General Christophe Louis Léon Juchault de La Moricière was hired. He was an experienced officer, who had fought for instance in the French campaign in Algeria. The papal administration under La Moricière recruited heavily in other European states and even beyond to build up this new army, increasing the percentage of foreigners from 24% (in 1859) to 42% (in August 1860).⁷⁰⁰

Within this context, more or less linguistically homogenous battalions of foreigners were created: a Belgian-French battalion of skirmishers, a German-Swiss battalion of carabineers, and an Irish battalion named after St. Patrick. The new Papal Army, augmented mostly by this foreign recruitment reached its total strength of roughly 20,000 men when it went to war in 1860. In the aftermath of Garibaldi's Expedition of the Thousand, on 11 September 1860, the Piedmont troops of General Cialdini entered the Papal States. On 18 September 1860, in the battle of Castelfidardo near Ancona in the Marche, the papal soldiers under the command of the French General Lamoricière and the Austrian De Pimodan were defeated. The result of this battle was the cession of Umbria and the Marche to the new Italian state, the former having voted already at the beginning of the year in favour of unification. This defeat was later elaborated into the myth of the "martyrs of Castelfidardo" and was spread first in France, and then rapidly to other countries as well.⁷⁰¹

⁶⁹⁷ Dalla Torre, "Materiali," p. 66.

⁶⁹⁸ *Legge emanata dalla Segreteria di Stato li 7 gennaio 1852 per costituire dei corpi militari speciali d'individui di nazione estera al servizio della S. Sede* (Rome: Tipografia della Rev. Cam. Apostolica, 1852).

⁶⁹⁹ Vigeveno, *La fine dell'esercito pontificio*, p. 7.

⁷⁰⁰ See table 2.1 on p. 36.

⁷⁰¹ Segur, *Les martyrs de Castelfidardo*, Dutch translation of 1861, Italian translation of 1862. See also the monument for the fallen soldiers placed in the Basilica of St. John Lateran, in Piero Raggi, *La nona crociata. I volontari di Pio IX in difesa di Roma (1860-1870)*, 2 ed. (Ravenna: Libreria Tonini, 2002), p. 146, which, however, was only inaugurated in 1904 according to Eduard Wymann, "Die letzten schweizerischen und

The imminent application of the September Convention in 1864⁷⁰² prompted yet another reorganization of the Papal Army. The Convention, which had been stipulated between Italy and France, agreed upon the withdrawal of the French troops of guarantee from Rome; the move of the Italian capital from Turin to Florence, rather than to Rome; and the respect of the remaining papal territories on the part of the Italian state. Sceptical that particularly this last point would be respected, the Papal Army underwent a transformation that was intended to enable it to face nearly alone⁷⁰³ probable attacks from Italian forces. The third article of the Convention speaks of “Catholic volunteers”, stating that the “[...] Italian government will make no protest against the organization of the Papal army, even composed of foreign Catholic volunteers, sufficient to maintain the authority of the Pope and tranquillity both at home and on the frontier of the Papal States [...]”⁷⁰⁴

Despite the reorganization of the Papal Army in 1861, the initial idea of 1860 to group the foreign soldiers into more or less nationally or at least linguistically homogenous battalions continued to inform the reality of the main foreign regiments between 1861 and 1870: The 1860 French-Belgian battalion (“tirailleurs franco-belges”) was transformed in 1861 into the corps of the Papal Zouaves, resulting in a strong French presence and only a limited German, Swiss or Irish presence throughout this period. During this period, what had been ideated as the “German” battalion, the “carabinieri”, continued to be comprised of mainly Swiss and German soldiers.

4.2.2.1 ‘Conditions’ of engagement, enlistment periods etc.

According to the law of 1852 governing the foreign regiments in the Papal Army⁷⁰⁵, it was a necessary requisite to be of the Catholic faith. This, however, was not the case before: In the soldiers’ registers of the papal foreign corps of the 1830s, there is a pre-printed field labelled “religion”, and in fact there were some Protestant soldiers listed in the ranks.⁷⁰⁶ In the pre-stamped registers, for instance, of the “carabinieri esteri” from 1861, there is no longer any

deutschen Offiziere der päpstlichen Armee,” *Zeitschrift für schweizerische Kirchengeschichte; Revue d’histoire ecclésiastique Suisse* 14 (1920): p. 141.

⁷⁰² Duggan, *The force of destiny*, pp. 247-248.

⁷⁰³ A corps of French origin was integrated into the Papal Army, the “Legion of Antibes”, which remained in Rome after the retreat of the French army.

⁷⁰⁴ English text in Patrick Keyes O’Clery, *The making of Italy* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., 1892), p. 342; the French original goes as follows: “[...] s’interdit tout réclamation contre l’organisation d’une armée papale composée même de volontaires catholiques étrangers, suffisante pour maintenir l’autorité du Saint-Père et la tranquillité tant à l’intérieur que sur la frontière de ses états [...]” Cit. from Norbert Miko, *Das Ende des Kirchenstaates*, vol. 2 (Vienna: Herold, 1962), doc. no. 59, p. 41.

⁷⁰⁵ *Legge emanata dalla Segreteria di Stato li 7 gennaio 1852 per costituire dei corpi militari speciali d’individui di nazione estera al servizio della S. Sede*, art. 18, §1, p. 13.

⁷⁰⁶ See, for instance, Ulrico Alder from Appenzell, ASR, Matricole primo reggimento estero, 1602, no. 86.

field to denote the religious confession of the enlisting soldier.⁷⁰⁷ Nevertheless, it seems that there were still cases in which Protestant aspirants tried to enter the army by providing falsified documents.⁷⁰⁸

Initially the duration of engagement was set at 4 years with the possibility to reengage for the same period.⁷⁰⁹ This was changed after 1860, and it became possible to enlist between six months and two years (in the Zouaves) and one to four years (as in the corps of the Foreign Carabineers until 1869), with the possibility to then extend service by similar lengths of time thereafter.⁷¹⁰ Every new recruit received an engagement gratification, and every soldier was regularly paid.⁷¹¹ The law also foresaw that nobody would be deployed to fight against their nation of origin.⁷¹²

4.2.2.2 Recruitment offices

The papal government made use of recruitment depots especially in France and Austria: Pontarlier, Marseille, Nantua, Saint-Louis and Altkirch in France, and Feldkirch in Austria. Given the escalation of the situation in Italy, temporary recruitment offices were erected throughout Austria in 1860 to cover nearly all corners of the Empire. In France, an additional office opened in Paris, and others opened in Italy, in Ancona and Civitavecchia.⁷¹³ The lack of official recruitment offices in the other German states than Austria was a result of the legal restrictions on foreign recruitment and the fact that permission had been sought by the papal administration but not granted. Hence German recruits had to travel on their own initiative to the recruitment offices that were found along the German borders. The depot in Feldkirch in Vorarlberg was particularly important for German recruits because of its geographically ideal position near various states such as Württemberg, Baden and Bavaria⁷¹⁴ as was the office in Saint-Louis along the Rhine: Nearly all Germans present in the corps of the Zouaves, for

⁷⁰⁷ ASR, Matricole, vols 1630-1634 (Foreign Carabineers) or 1635-1646 (Zouaves), passim.

⁷⁰⁸ Mancini Barbieri, "Nuove ricerche," p. 167.

⁷⁰⁹ *Legge emanata dalla Segreteria di Stato li 7 gennaio 1852*, art. 22, p. 15.

⁷¹⁰ Mancini Barbieri, "Nuove ricerche," p. 167.

⁷¹¹ *Legge emanata dalla Segreteria di Stato li 7 gennaio 1852*, art. 22, p.15 and tariffs pp. 59-60.

⁷¹² *Ibid.*, art. 118, p. 39.

⁷¹³ Vigeveno, *La fine dell'esercito pontificio*, p. 11; Guénel, *Dernière guerre du pape*, p. 29.

⁷¹⁴ M. v. A., "Militärische Bilder aus dem Kirchenstaat," *Die Grenzboten. Zeitschrift für Politik und Literatur* 19, no. 3 (1860): p. 372.

instance, had joined the Papal Army by signing on at this last, with its strategic geographical position along the border with Baden.⁷¹⁵

Work in the recruitment offices was often carried out by soldiers and officers that were not papal subjects. Maintaining such a network of offices, to ensure they functioned, the payment of transportation costs or of the premiums of engagement necessitated a lot of money. The offices were to try to accommodate the recruits in local barracks, and, when that was not possible, they were to stipulate contracts with local hostels, and local bread distributors. These contracts had to be countersigned by the Ministry in Rome in the event the fund established for the recruitment office was exceeded (Art. 36). Consequently, the archival records of the papal Ministry of Arms on the correspondence sent to Rome by the recruitment offices primarily contained invoices and inquests for payments for every type of spending (invoices for hostels, train tickets, etc.).⁷¹⁶ Only after 1860, when there were larger groups of soldiers to transport to Italy, the system was changed, and the papal administration began to directly pay for accommodation and provisions during the journey, while the daily cash payment was reduced.⁷¹⁷

4.2.2.3 Catholic recruitment associations

Alongside this official recruitment organization, various Catholic committees worked in different European countries. They contributed by sending men to Rome, as well as munitions, money, cloth for uniforms, and even tobacco for the papal soldiers. For example, one pamphlet from 1867 had a page that gave information on how to support the cause: whether by communicating the wish to join to the parish priest or by donating to the priest or one “of the committees dealing with the collections for the Papal Zouaves” a specified sum of money “for which the whole year of a Papal Zoauve can be sustained”.⁷¹⁸

In October 1867, the mayor of Aachen inaugurated an “association to supply Papal Zouaves” (“Verein zur Gestellung päpstlicher Zuaven”).⁷¹⁹ In practice, roughly 13% of the German Zouaves (see p. 246) were from Aachen or the nearby town of Eupen. There were

⁷¹⁵ See the entries on the depot of enlistment in the soldiers’ registers, ASR, Ministero delle Armi, vols. 1635-1646; the prominence of St. Louis holds true for the Germans in the papal Foreign Carabineers as well, see the vols. 1630-1634.

⁷¹⁶ See the boxes 1277-1279 (“Reclutamento in Austria” - Recruitment in Austria) and 1280 (“Reclutamento a Marsiglia” – Recruitment in Marseille) in: ASR, Fondo Ministero delle Armi.

⁷¹⁷ Mancini Barbieri, “Nuove ricerche,” p. 168.

⁷¹⁸ „[..S]ende es an ein Comité, das die Sammlung für päpstliche Zuaven besorgt.“ “[..S]o kann dafür auf ein ganzes Jahr ein Zuave erhalten werden.“ Mössinger, *Wozu braucht der heilige Vater eine Armee?*, p. 35.

⁷¹⁹ N., *Die General-versammlungen der katholischen Vereine Deutschlands. Rundschau und Kritik über die Wirksamkeit der letzten fünf General-versammlungen. Der neunzehnten General-versammlung zu Bamberg gewidmet* (Münster: Adolph Russell, 1868), p. 21.

sixteen "Academic Committees for the Support of the Papal Army" located in the universities of such cities as Münster and Paderborn. They spread information on the military situation of the Papal States, collected money, and encouraged voluntary enlistment.⁷²⁰ In the universities, in such cities as Münster and Paderborn, sixteen 'Academic Committees for the Support of the Papal Army' spread information about the military situation of the Papal States, collected money and encouraged voluntary enlistment.

A printed form from the "Association of Catholic Noblemen from Westphalia"⁷²¹, dated 4 December 1867, was used to ask nobles to subscribe for the sustainment of Papal Zouaves: "The unjust robbery attacks of bands of people hostile to religion against the Papal States have shown clearly the necessity of an army that is loyal to the H[oly] Father. [...] To the Catholic nobility of Westphalia it was unfortunately not granted to be present under the flag of the Holy Father in the last battles. More so, the signatories are convinced of the wish of the Catholic fellows of rank to help the H. Father in the necessary augmentation of his army. The signatories dare therefore to ask their Catholic Westphalian fellows of rank to sign for the recruitment of Papal Zouaves for two years [...] and ask them as well, as far as they can, to incite others to this subscription."⁷²² The cost to sustain one Papal Zouave for two years amounted to 134 talers, but the pamphlet specified that it was also possible to provide a portion or to build a group to finance the recruitment.⁷²³


⁷²⁰ N. N., *Verhandlungen der neunzehnten General-Versammlung der katholischen Vereine der deutschen Länder in Bamberg am 31. August, 1., 2. und 3. September 1868. Amtlicher Bericht* (Bamberg: Otto Reindl, 1868), p. 192.

⁷²¹ On the association, see Horst Conrad, "Stand und Konfession. Der Verein der katholischen Edelleute. Teil I: Die Jahre 1857–1918," *Westfälische Zeitschrift* 158 (2008): pp. 125–86.

⁷²² "Die ungerechten Raubanfalle von Banden religionsfeindlicher Menschen gegen den Kirchenstaat haben die Nothwendigkeit einer dem h. Vater treu ergebenen Armee in neuester Zeit klar und deutlich bewiesen. [...] Dem katholischen Adel Westfalens war es leider nicht vergönnt, in den letzten Kämpfen unter den Fahnen des h. Vaters vertreten zu sein. Um so mehr sind die Unterzeichner von dem aufrichtigen Wunsche der katholischen Standesgenossen überzeugt, durch Geldbeiträge dem h. Vater zur nothwendigen Vermehrung seiner Armee zu Hülfe zu eilen. Die Unterzeichner erlauben sich daher, ihre katholischen Standesgenossen Westfalens zu einer Zeichnung für die Anwerbung von Zuaven auf zwei Jahre [...] einzuladen und bitten zugleich, für eine solche Zeichnung nach Kräften auch Andere anregen zu wollen." Landschaftsverband Westfalen-Lippe, Archivamt (LWL WL), Archiv der katholischen Edelleute.

⁷²³ Vereinigte Westfälische Adelsarchive (VWA), *Nachlaß Franz Xaver von Korff gen. Schmising-Kerssenbrock*, Bri. N. XVI-3.

Image 4.1 – Subscription pamphlet of the Westphalian nobility for the provision of Papal Zouaves, 1867



Source: VWA, Personal Estates of Franz Xaver von Korff-Schmising-Kerssenbrock (1838-1910), Bri. N. XVI-3.

4.2.3 The Kingdom of the Two Sicilies

Throughout the nineteenth century, the army of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies consisted nearly entirely of formally voluntary soldiers that enlisted for long periods of service. Until the 1820s there had been no formal general conscription and each township would independently choose its own small contingent of citizens to send to the army. In 1823, however, conscription was reintroduced and was subsequently reformed by the laws of 1834 and 1837. From this time forward, all men between the age of 18 and 25 were liable to military service for five years of active service and another five years in the reserves. However, only a limited number of conscripts effectively entered the army. Not only all the islands, including Sicily, were exempted from conscription but many occupational groups

were as well, as among which public servants and the clergy. The number of conscripts requested in comparison to the quotas of professional soldiers was so small that conscription may have functioned primarily as the means with which military service as a profession was promoted at the local level.

In accordance with this predominant professional character of the Bourbon Army were the capitulations with Swiss cantons to provide the kingdom with four regiments throughout the century. In the opinion of both historiographers and contemporaries, these soldiers constituted the best part of the army. The following exclamation within the context of a parade of the Swiss in Naples is attributed to King Ferdinand II (1830-1859): “These are soldiers! But ours, what are they? They are salad!”⁷²⁴ In 1859, however, due to decisions taken in Switzerland, the crisis surrounding the tradition of hiring out Swiss soldiers came to a head.⁷²⁵ After the “revolt of the Swiss” on 15 May 1859 in Naples⁷²⁶, the Swiss formations were dissolved that August, and the soldiers were left the option either to return home or to stay in southern Italy. The formally “Swiss” regiments were replaced at the end of 1859 by new “foreign regiments”. The ranks were filled by those Swiss soldiers that had chosen to stay and by newly arrived recruits, mostly from Austria and southern German states. Recruitment began in January 1860, after an apposite protocol was issued by the Austrian government at the end of December 1859. The main recruitment office was located in Vienna, but in spring Neapolitan officers were to be found throughout the Austrian empire looking for recruits. The protocol from December guaranteed the official backing of the Austrian administration, but nevertheless the provincial authorities were asked to avoid publicizing this fact; similarly, despite the fact that recruitment offices had been opened on Austrian soil, newspaper announcements or the publication of informational material by the Neapolitan government had been explicitly forbidden.⁷²⁷ In terms of eligible recruits, it was stated that only Austrian subjects without (any further) military duty could be enlisted, together with recruits of other nationalities. The head of the Neapolitan recruitment effort, the Swiss Colonel Hess von Schmidegg, was ordered not to enlist “northern Germans, namely Prussians, nor [...] Hungarians, because one holds them not to be reliable, too easily irritable” for political reasons.⁷²⁸ In August 1860, the new “foreign regiments” in Bourbon service consisted of some 4,200 soldiers, two thirds of which were Austrians, and the rest were Swiss

⁷²⁴ “Chiste so’ surdate! E nuoste, che so’? So’ lattuche!” Romano Bracalini, *L'Italia prima dell'Unità (1815-1860)* (Milan: Rizzoli, 2001), p. 133. I was however unable to find the phrase in contemporary sources.

⁷²⁵ Maag, *Schweizertruppen in neapolitanischen Diensten*.

⁷²⁶ For the “rivolta degli svizzeri”, see e.g., De Cesare, *Fine di un regno II*, pp. 20-23.

⁷²⁷ Blaas, “L'Austria e le truppe straniere,” pp. 68-91.

⁷²⁸ Cit. from a Viennese police report in *ibid.*, fn. 53, p. 84.

and southern Germans. These regiments were deployed against the Garibaldian “Southern Army” at the end of May in Sicily⁷²⁹, again 1 October during the “battle at the Volturno”⁷³⁰, and finally in the siege of Gaeta which would last until the end of the year.⁷³¹

In the same period, the groundwork was laid for the less regular attempts to regain the lost territory of the kingdom by fostering and sustaining local pro-Bourbon insurrections by sending particularly experienced officers to southern Italy. One of these projects was proposed to the king by the Prussian Theodor Klitsche de la Grange. Born in 1799, Klitsche de la Grange was already part of the Prussian Army between 1813 and 1815; he converted to Catholicism, became a captain in the papal general staff, and left the Papal Army in 1851. Since the 1850s he was in Bourbon service, where he organized a “volunteer battalion’s brigade” (“Brigata Battaglioni Volontari”⁷³²). The counter-revolutionary purpose of this troop was defined in the “Instructions for the volunteers’ column” at the end of September: “Re-establish the government of His Majesty and hence remove the authorities erected by the revolutionary government, replacing them with either those pre-existing to 20 July or others that could guarantee their devotion and determination for the royal government.”⁷³³ For this purpose, Klitsche recruited local volunteers throughout the campaign. The result was a rather heterogeneous troop of between 1,500 and 2,000 people⁷³⁴: ex-policemen from Sicily and the continent, ex-Bourbon regular soldiers, mixed with peasants from the Abruzzi, recruited during Klitsche’s campaign.⁷³⁵ Luigi Alonzi, nicknamed Chiavone, also fought with Klitsche. Alonzi would continue to lead peasant’s groups against the new Italian Army throughout the 1860s. During this guerrilla war against the new Garibaldian and Piedmont authorities, Klitsche’s son Adolfo served as his military adjutant.⁷³⁶ After the remnants of Klitsche’s “volunteer brigade” left the Bourbon territory on 6 November 1860⁷³⁷, Klitsche while in

⁷²⁹ Pieri, *Storia militare del Risorgimento*, pp. 664-674.

⁷³⁰ Ibid., pp. 703-711.

⁷³¹ Ibid., pp. 721-726.

⁷³² The denomination was confirmed in a letter written by Klitsche de Lagrange to the adjutant of Francis II. in Gaëta, 27 September 1860, Archivio di Stato di Napoli (ASN), Archivio borbone (AB), file 1262, no. 219.

⁷³³ “Ricostituire il Governo di Sua Maestà (D. G.) ed a tale uopo rimuovere le Autorità costituite dal Governo rivoluzionario, sostituendovi o le preesistenti al 20. Giugno o altre che darebbero garanzia di devozione e di decisione pel R.e Governo.” Istruzioni per la colonna de’volontari, superiormente approvate, in: ASN, Archivio Borbone, file 1262, 209, 211 and 221.

⁷³⁴ The numbers are mentioned in two letters written by Klitsche to King Francesco II dated 12 and 21 October 1861, ASN, Archivio Borbone, file 1262, nos. 237 and 243.

⁷³⁵ See for instance Klitsche’s comment in his letter to Francesco II: “Restando io solo in Itri alla custodia del Magazzino di abbigliamento, ed alla cura dello arrollamento dei Volontari, i quali solo in questo giorno se ne sono presentati 2.” ASN, Archivio Borbone, file 1262, 233.

⁷³⁶ See for instance Adolfo’s plan on the formation of a bataillon of grenadiers, *ibid.*, no. 215.

⁷³⁷ ASN, AB, file 1262, no. 269.

Rome proposed to use papal soldiers and officers for another attempt to regain the Bourbon territory in December of that year.⁷³⁸

Like Klitsche, other officers that gravitated around the exiled Bourbon king were developing similar plans from the spring of 1861 onwards to provide volunteers for the Bourbon cause, especially those from abroad.⁷³⁹ These plans were put into practice between 1861 and 1864 in a joint effort by the diplomats of the Bourbon court in the European capitals, officers that had followed the monarchs into their Roman exile and legitimist circles in Europe, that were already working to support the papal cause. Together they formed a “veritable international secret organization”⁷⁴⁰ to re-establish Bourbon authority. Emissaries were sent out to the European cities, among which was Klitsche de La Grange. Officers and soldiers were shipped via Marseille and Malta down to southern Italy or Rome. The result was a “guerrilla war with the official seal of the dynasty”.⁷⁴¹ Among the “brigands” were in fact some foreigners, such as the Spanish Josè Borjés or the Prussian Ludwig Richard Zimmermann.

4.2.4 Mazzini's and Garibaldi's armed groups

The commitment of many foreigners fighting with Mazzini or Garibaldi was linked to the networks established by European democrats between the 1830s and 1850s in the various locations preferred by exiles such as Zurich, London, Paris or Brussels. Mazzini's failed attempt at an invasion of Savoy in 1834 was a first outcome of the idea to bring together the various communities in exile in Switzerland and France for a common cause.

Another case in point is the democrat Johann Philipp Becker, a German exile that since 1838 resided in Switzerland and who at various points between 1848 and the 1860s tried to assemble legions for the Sicilian State, the Roman Republic or Garibaldi.⁷⁴²

Participant of the Hambach Festival in 1832, Becker was imprisoned for his speeches for a total of 11 months. In 1838 he was exiled to Switzerland, first to Bern and then to Biel in the canton Bern. Biel was one of the main meeting points of exiles from all over Europe in the 1830s and 1840s (as was Switzerland in general): Mazzini was in Biel from 1833 to 1837 and

⁷³⁸ ASN, AB, file 1143, no. 48.

⁷³⁹ Sarlin, *Légitimisme en armes*, p. 137.

⁷⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 134.

⁷⁴¹ Di Fiore, *I vinti del Risorgimento*, p. 104.

⁷⁴² Marco Paolino, "Johann Philipp Becker ed il Risorgimento italiano," *Rassegna storica del Risorgimento* 85, no. 2 (1998): pp. 216-37; Hans-Werner Hahn, ed. *Johann Philipp Becker. Radikaldemokrat - Revolutionsgeneral - Pionier der Arbeiterbewegung* (Stuttgart: Thorbecke, 1999); Rolf Dlubek, *Johann Philipp Becker. Vom radikalen Demokraten zum Mitsreiter von Marx und Engels in der 1. Internationale* (s. l.: s. n., 1964).

may have met Becker there.⁷⁴³ Becker obtained Bernese cantonal and Swiss citizenship in 1847.⁷⁴⁴ In the same year, he participated as an officer on the side of the liberal cantons in the Swiss Sonderbund war. On 26 March 1848, in Biel, he organized a meeting of German associations in Switzerland, exploring the ways in which to support the revolution in Germany. For this purpose the associations founded a “Central committee for the building of a German Legion from Switzerland”. Becker prepared a twenty-points instruction on the organization of this army.⁷⁴⁵

There were several missions sent to support the revolution in Germany and to fight for the republic of Friedrich Hecker. But, when these attempts failed, Becker along with Gustav Struve returned to Biel in September 1848. In January 1849, Becker was expelled from the canton of Bern for the publication of his journal “Die Revolution” and went to Neuenburg/Neuchâtel, where he continued to pursue this publication with the title “Die – Evolution”. It was between the 1848 revolutions and the organization of the revolutionary army of Baden (“Volkswehr”) in 1849, that Becker first tried to organize German support for the Italian cause: In November 1848 the second phase of the revolution triumphed in Rome against the counterrevolution. Becker showed great enthusiasm for this and praised Mazzini in his paper “The – Evolution”.⁷⁴⁶ His later plan to assemble a “German-Swiss Legion” for Italy was fuelled by a number of interconnected elements. First, in Switzerland, where future “capitulations” with foreign powers had been banned, while existing agreements – for instance with the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies or the Pope – remained intact, a petition campaign was born to protest the participation of Swiss citizens on behalf of the “conservative” powers.⁷⁴⁷ Second, already in January 1849, Mazzini wrote of his idea to create such legions to the future Roman “triumvir” Aurelio Saffi: “you should introduce practices in which I could help you to assemble foreign legions of Corsicans, Swiss, Germans, Poles, and Spaniards.”⁷⁴⁸ Johann Philipp Becker in Biel and August Willich, a member of the organized groups of German craftsmen of Lyon, had begun to plan a German-Swiss Legion for the revolutionary government in Sicily. This company was intended, in a subsequent

⁷⁴³ Although, Mazzini was exiled to the UK at the end of 1838.

⁷⁴⁴ Wilfried Haeblerli, “Der erste Klassenkampf in Basel (Winter 1868-69) und die Tätigkeit der Internationalen Arbeiterassoziation (1866-1876),” *Basler Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Altertumskunde* 64 (1964): p. 103.

⁷⁴⁵ See the reprint of these instructions in Karl Schmiedel and Ingrid Becker Neumann, eds., *Johann Philipp Becker. General der Revolution* (Berlin: Militärverl. der Dt. Demokratischen Republik, 1986), pp. 18-19.

⁷⁴⁶ See the citations from the paper in Dlubek, *Johann Philipp Becker. Vom radikalen Demokraten*, pp. 125-131.

⁷⁴⁷ Maag, *Schweizertruppen in neapolitanischen Diensten*, p. 248.

⁷⁴⁸ “Dovreste far pratiche ch’io potrei agevolarvi per raccogliere legioni straniere di Corsi, Svizzeri, Tedeschi, Polacchi, Spagnoli.” Giuseppe Mazzini, “Letter from Giuseppe Mazzini to Aurelio Saffi a Forlì [1849],” in *Scritti editi ed inediti*, vol. 38 (epistolario vol. 20) (Imola Cooperativa tipografico-editrice Paolo Galeati, 1923), p. 264.

moment, to be the kernel of a revolutionary army for Germany. In other words, the German-Swiss legion was considered to be an alternative to the organization of a German legion for the revolution in Germany, which had encountered serious organizational problems, first, because of the persecution by the French and Swiss authorities, and second, because of the course of the events in Germany. The organization of a German-Swiss Legion on Italian grounds, thus, represented not only a chance to support the Italian cause but also to finally organize a legion for the struggle in Germany. At the beginning of 1849, Becker and Mazzini discussed their plans in Biel.⁷⁴⁹ Mazzini stipulated a contract to regulate the formation of a “Germano-Helvetic Republican Legion”. For the single soldier, the conditions resembled the capitulations that had been stipulated between the Swiss cantons and the Bourbon monarchy and the Pope respectively. The regiment was to fight under Swiss and German flags and to prepare the union of Sicily with the Roman Republic, whose army it ought to join afterwards. Once the contract was stipulated, Becker began to recruit soldiers. He hoped to attract several thousand people. The main terrain for the recruitment was the communities of German exiles in Switzerland and France, whose numbers grew because of the success of the counterrevolutionary forces in Germany. In Switzerland and in Alsace Becker found recruits, and the project was also backed by German exiles in France: A column of German craftsmen under August Willich wished to join Becker’s regiment. Several Swiss republicans from neighbouring cantons joined in an attempt to counterbalance what, in their eyes, were shameful capitulations between Switzerland and the legitimist sides in Italy. Initially the recruitment was conducted clandestinely, but later on a press campaign was launched. In response to this development, the Swiss Federal Council on 28 March 1849 forbade the planned republican legion declaring it to be unconstitutional and to violate Swiss neutrality. Nevertheless, Becker, who was urged to move from Neuchâtel to Geneva, continued to recruit for the cause. In France, the exiles willing to join his legion were faced with serious administrative problems, namely the government was not willing to issue them passports. Regardless, Becker with some friends went to Marseille with the intent to put to sea. Here, several people – among which Polish émigrés, German craftsmen, Swiss democrats, and Hungarians that had deserted from the Austrian army – had gathered with the intention of joining the revolution in Italy. Because of the lack of financial resources, the beginning of Becker’s expedition was repeatedly postponed. Becker even poured his own money into the cause. After the final defeat of the polish revolutionary General Mieroslawski in Catania,

⁷⁴⁹ Dlubek, *Johann Philipp Becker. Vom radikalen Demokraten*, pp. 125-131.

Becker stipulated a new contract, this time with the Ambassador of the Roman Republic in Switzerland. At the end of April he sent some officers to Rome to clarify the contract. Only single isolated participations were the concrete outcome of all of Becker's efforts. One such individual was Gustav von Hoffstetter, who went to serve the Roman Republic. But Hoffstetter was able to join Garibaldi's troops in Rome also because he possessed a personal recommendation by Mazzini; in the end, Hoffstetter became Chief of Garibaldi's General Staff toward the end of the defence of the republic.

Between 1860 and 1862 Becker tried to build up a "German Legion" for Garibaldi from Genoa. At the end of January 1861, Becker prepared a text with the title "To the Germans" ("Ai tedeschi") with which he proposed to form German committees in Europe that would collect money as well as enlist soldiers in order to have a "German legion" ready in the case war broke out once more in Italy, whether this was to take Veneto or Rome.⁷⁵⁰ In terms of soldiers, Becker indirectly pushed for the enlistment of experienced soldiers; he specified that when the soldiers' registers were to be drawn up, the committees should include "the indication of the duration of service" passed in other armies, "the rank or function occupied" as well as the branch of service "to which they had belonged."⁷⁵¹ The Legion was however never came to pass: For the actual Garibaldian campaign in southern Italy it was too late, while in 1861 such a "German legion" would have been, as Mazzini wrote to Becker in June 1861, too precocious: "Your idea of a German legion is a noble and good idea: it is premature. We are searching in this moment for the necessary funds to be able to act. Only when the way has been paved, will you be able to bring your idea to fruition. Try in the meantime to form the cadres. Be well, your brother Joseph Mazzini".⁷⁵²

Together with Becker, other people also became important intermediaries in establishing contacts between Germany and Italy. For instance Emma Herwegh and her husband Georg did so while they were living in exile in Paris and Switzerland. Emma proposed that Friedrich Wilhelm Rüstow go to Italy and established contact with Garibaldi. It

⁷⁵⁰ "Legione tedesca". Johann Philipp Becker: "Ai Tedeschi", International Institute of Social History, Johann Philipp Becker Papers, add. 2; cited from the fotostatic copy of the original at the Archiv der Sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Bonn (ASDFE), pp. 2-3 and 5.

⁷⁵¹ "Trattandosi di individui che abbiano già militato, vi si aggiunga l'indicazione della durata del servizio presentato, il grado o carica occupata, a quel anno abbiamo appartenuto." Johann Philipp Becker: "Ai Tedeschi", International Institute of Social History, Johann Philipp Becker Papers, add. 2; cited from the fotostatic copy of the original at the ASDFE, point 2, p. 7.

⁷⁵² "Votre idée d'une Légion Allemande est une noble et bonne idée: elle est prématurée. Nous cherchons en ce moment les fonds nécessaires pour agir. Ce n'est quand l'initiation ayant lieux que vous pourrez réaliser votre idée. Tachez en attendant d'en former les cadres. Adieu: croyez-moi. Votre frère Joseph Mazzini." Giuseppe Mazzini, letter to Johann Philipp Becker, 16 June 1861, in International Institute of Social History, Johann Philipp Becker Papers, DII 356; cited from the fotostatic copy of the original at the ASDFE, pp. 4-5.

was her husband Georg that explicitly dedicated his translation of the “Garibaldi anthem” to Rüstow.⁷⁵³

4.3 The officer corps and the traditions of nobility

When speaking of the history of soldiers it is often important to differentiate between officers and common soldiers: In this study, differing patterns may be identified with regard to the mobilization, recruitment, pay and provisions, and institutional collocation in the various armed groups of the two categories. The history of foreign *officers* in Italian service is characterized by specific facets that are connected to the military function of the officer.

Since the early modern age, the officer corps has had strong connections to the nobility. The right of command in the military had much older roots⁷⁵⁴ than absolutism, where the power of the officers was derived from the monarch. Despite the absolutist logic, the right of command of the officer can be seen to also derive from the role that the nobility played in times of war and in the military in the period prior to the advent of standing armies and absolutism. The primary feature lay in the overlap and interlocking of civil and military elites. Furthermore, the very legitimation of the position of power of the nobility arose from its role in times of war, the moment that ever since “the central Middle Ages, its *raison d’être* – the justification of its privileged position in state and society – had been that it was the fighting class. [...] In some languages the very words for ‘nobility’ (or parts of it) derived from this function: for example *chevalerie* (French) and *cavalieri* (Italy). The European elite was in origin the men on horseback, the mounted knights who had dominated the battle-fields of the Middle Ages.”⁷⁵⁵ According to Morris Janowitz, the “professional armies” of Western Europe developed out of an “institutional differentiation” from the feudal or aristocratic model, where “civilian and military elites were socially and functionally integrated.”⁷⁵⁶ From the military reforms of the Enlightenment onwards, the star of the nobility in the officer corps began to wane over the long-term. In many countries, this process of “*embourgeoisement*” was already well underway in the nineteenth century: The percentages of officers from noble origin not

⁷⁵³ Georg Herwegh, *Neue Gedichte. Herausgegeben nach seinem Tode* (Milwaukee: Karl Dörflinger, 1877), pp. 43-44.

⁷⁵⁴ Karl Demeter has identified a different set of traditions in the specific case of Prussia: the communal and guild-traditions of the *Landsknechte* (which according to him survived in the specific Prussian co-optation into the officer-corps), absolutism and finally nationalism, which in the end was also absorbed by the officer corps. Karl Demeter, *The German officer-corps in society and state 1650-1945* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965), p. 159.

⁷⁵⁵ Christopher Storrs and H. M. Scott, “The military revolution and the European nobility,” *War in History* 3, no. 1 (1996): p. 2.

⁷⁵⁶ Morris Janowitz, “Armed forces in Western Europe. Uniformity and diversity,” *European Journal of Sociology* 6, no. 2 (1965): pp. 225-226.

only varied widely throughout Europe during this century, but also oscillated significantly in each country. Historian Karl Demeter noted the high percentages of “noble” officers in the Prussian and consequently German armies, suggesting that this was an indication of a specific “conservative” tendency; he saw in both armies a “Sonderweg” in military terms, which he posed in opposition to the more “liberal” development for instance in southern German armies that seemed to be characterized by comparatively higher percentages of bourgeois officers. But recent works on Baden and Bavaria have shown for instance that rather than a progressive, linear development, different phases can be made out during the nineteenth century. With regard to Baden, Karl-Heinz Lutz’s work shows the following pattern: 1) the proportional reduction of noble officers between the French Revolution and the Congress of Vienna in 1815; 2) the subsequent rise in these numbers until 1841; 3) followed by another decrease in the two decades after the Revolution of 1848/49; and 4) finally again a rise after the military convention was stipulated with Prussia in 1870.⁷⁵⁷ In Bavaria, Gundula Gahlen identified quite similar patterns: 1) An increase in the number of bourgeois officers during the Napoleonic period⁷⁵⁸; 2) a decrease in the percentage of bourgeois officers up to 1847; and 3) again an increase in the percentage of bourgeois officers between 1849 and 1855. The second phase especially reveals that even in Bavaria and Baden monarchs continued to prefer, in peacetime and when sufficient numbers were “available”⁷⁵⁹, noble officers to bourgeois candidates and hence goes counter to Demeter’s argument that this was only a Prussian phenomenon.

No such numbers exist on the percentage of “bourgeois” and “noble” officers in the Italian armed groups. This is another confirmation of the fact that in terms of the comparative military history of the pre-Unitarian Italian states much still remains to be done.⁷⁶⁰ No

⁷⁵⁷ Lutz, *Offizierskorps*, pp. 98-101.

⁷⁵⁸ Gahlen notes that the increase of bourgeois officers in the Napoleonic period is to be found (against Demeter: “even”) in Prussia as well, where bourgeois officers comprised 10% of the total in 1806 and rose to nearly 50% in 1819. Gahlen, *Offizierskorps*, p. 171.

⁷⁵⁹ As Gahlen underlines, the number of nobles per se was quite different between the German states as well, wherein Prussia had many and Bavaria had fewer noble families. *Ibid.*, p. 174.

⁷⁶⁰ There is clearly a kind of double “victory” tendency in Italian military historiography: Whereas the newly assembled Italian Army of 1860/61 and the previous history of Piedmont (which without doubt influenced the former very much) are represented by a consistent body of works, this is less so for the military history of the pre-Unitarian states in the Ancien régime and even less so for the history of the armies of the Italian states in the period between 1815 and 1860-1870, which is virtually non-existent. Only some cursory remarks are to be found in the historiography on the pre-Unitarian states in general, such as, e.g., Meriggi, *Gli stati italiani prima dell'unità*, and in the specific literature on the single histories of the pre-Unitarian states such as, e.g., Angelantonio Spagnoletti, *Storia del Regno delle Due Sicilie* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1997); Elena Fasano Guarini, Giuseppe Petralia, and Paolo Pezzino, eds., *Storia della Toscana. 2. Dal Settecento a oggi* (Rome; Bari: Laterza, 2004). The preponderance of Piedmontese military history in comparison with the military history of the other pre-Unitarian states is to a certain degree of course matched by the preponderance of the Prussian case in

statistics are even available on the generally better researched case of the Piedmontese Army. The numbers measuring the social origin of the scholars of the Military Accademy of Turin may be used as indicators; here, the noble component decreased from 90% in 1816, to 66% in the 1820s, to 55% in the 1840s and down to just 33% in the 1850s.⁷⁶¹ How this actually translated in the officer corps per se remains to be seen. For the new Italian Army, a percentage of only 6.5 to 7% of officers with a noble background has been identified for the year 1863.⁷⁶² If this astonishingly low percentage of noble officers is verified, we must assume – knowing that only some former Garibaldian officers were incorporated into the new army⁷⁶³ – that the percentages of noble officers in the other pre-Unitarian Italian armies must have been particularly low as well.

Only qualitative data is available on the Bourbon Army. This hints at a traditionally low percentage of noblemen in the officer corps: “The major part of the military cadres [...] especially in the final years of the Kingdom was of bourgeois or petty bourgeois provenance.”⁷⁶⁴ “These findings are confirmed by the historiography on the southern Italian nobility: Giovanni Montroni, in his study on the Neapolitan nobility of the nineteenth century, writes for instance, that the “military career, in southern Italy, did not present itself as an option for the young nobles.”⁷⁶⁵ In the Bourbon case, therefore, there is no reason to “speak of a military caste originating from the aristocracy and linked to it, even in a country in which the aristocracy enjoyed enormous privileges, but did not enter into a military career without reluctance.”⁷⁶⁶

German military history; nevertheless it seems to me that the other pre-Unitarian German armies are covered to a much greater degree than in the Italian case.

⁷⁶¹ Anthony L. Cardoza, “An officer and a gentleman. The Piedmontese nobility and the military in liberal Italy,” in *Esercito e città dall'unità agli anni trenta. Atti del convegno di studi, Perugia 11 - 14 maggio 1988*, vol. 1 (Rome: Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato, 1989), p. 185; Anthony L. Cardoza, *Aristocrats in bourgeois Italy. The Piedmontese nobility, 1861-1930* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 36; Alberto Mario Banti and Marco Mondini, “Da Novara a Custoza. Culture militari e discorso nazionale tra Risorgimento e Unità,” in Walter Barberis, *Guerra e pace*, Storia d'Italia. Annali 18 (Turin: Einaudi, 2002), p. 432.

⁷⁶² Cardoza, “An officer and a gentleman,” p. 187.

⁷⁶³ Of the initial “Thousand”, some 200 were integrated into the regular army of Italy according to Cecchinato, *Camicie rosse*, p. 167.

⁷⁶⁴ Argiolas, *Storia dell'esercito borbonico*, pp. 5 and 141.

⁷⁶⁵ Giovanni Montroni, *Gli uomini del re. La nobiltà napoletana dell'Ottocento* (Catanzaro: Meridiana libri, 1996), p. 168.

⁷⁶⁶ Argiolas, *Storia dell'esercito borbonico*, p. 76.

4.3.1 Patronage and Clientele

4.3.1.1 The specificity of the Italian foreigners' corps: the strong royal prerogative

For the *foreign officers* in the Italian armed groups, it is important to make a distinction between possible appointments in the various regiments of the army – some were assigned to a more or less “foreign” orbit, leading troops of mostly foreign origin, whereas others were appointed to the head of primarily Italian corps. In the Bourbon and Papal Armies, this difference was also important for the formal rules of appointment: The officers of those corps that were called “indigenous”, i.e. consisting mainly of subjects of the Italian states, were appointed according to the general rules for officers in the respective states.

The regulations governing the appointment of officers to the *foreigners'* corps clearly differed from those in the other corps of the Bourbon and Papal Armies. These specific rules always regard two specific instances: When a foreigners' corps was first created, the sovereign had complete discretion in his choice of officers. Only once the corps was up and functioning were the nominations for officer posts, when these last became vacant, subject to a more regulated manner of selection.

In the example of the Bourbon Army, the regulations governing the formation of the three new “foreigner regiments” of 1859 – the 1st and 2nd battalion of light carabineers and the 13th battalion of “cacciatori” (skirmishers) – dictated that the initial nomination of the officers was totally reserved to the king: “The commander and the officers of every rank are nominated by His Majesty, and they are chosen from the individuals that His Majesty believes capable for these positions.”⁷⁶⁷ No further concretizations of the prerequisites for this first nomination can be found in the regulations. But even once the corps was instituted, the king continued to hold more rights in terms of nomination over the foreign corps than was the case with the indigenous regiments. Even if the rules of the foreigners' corps stated that after “the first formation, the promotion to the vacant posts of officers [...], until there is a new regulation, will be made according to the seniority of the various grades”⁷⁶⁸, the extraordinary influence the sovereign had over the choice of officers was confirmed by the following passages. If the post of commander of a foreigners' battalion became subsequently vacant, the substitute “will be nominated upon the sovereign's choice out of [...the previous ranks] those

⁷⁶⁷ “Il Comandante e gli Uffiziali di qualunque grado saranno nominati da Sua Maestà, e scelti fra gl'individui, che si giudicheranno dalla Maestà Sua idonei per tali impieghi.” *Regolamento per l'organizzazione del 1° e 2° battaglione carabinieri leggieri e del 13° battaglione cacciatori approvato da Sua Maestà il dì 10 novembre 1859 in Portici*, (Naples: Stamperia Reale, 1859), art. 19, p. 9.

⁷⁶⁸ “Dopo la prima formazione lo ascenso ai posti vacanti di Uffiziali si farà [...] fino a nuova disposizione secondo l'antichità de' diversi gradi [...]” Ibid., art. 20, p. 9.

believed to be most capable and most appropriate.”⁷⁶⁹ For the lower ranks of company captains and first and second sergeants, however, nominations by the sovereign had to be made “two thirds according to the rank of seniority, and the other third according to merit and capacity of the immediately inferior officers [...] on the basis of a presentation from the commander of the Corps and the proposal of the Inspector.”⁷⁷⁰ Similarly, the “posts of sub-lieutenants [alfieri] will be sovereignly filled two-thirds by cadets and one-third with non-commissioned officers.”⁷⁷¹ The appointment to the first grade of officers, the “alfiere”, was however in every case dependent on the outcome of an examination at a pre-established *foreigners’* cadet school.⁷⁷² This school, which due to the end of the Bourbon State in 1860 was never instituted, was theoretically meant to provide all “the necessary officers, having all that aspire to this rank to come from this school.”⁷⁷³ Even the one-third of alfieri that were to be selected from the non-commissioned officers had to take the final exam of this cadet school. The cadet school was to prepare the candidates with the necessary knowledge for the examination, due to the fact that – despite the very heavy sovereign prerogatives in nominating the officers – for the “nomination to officer only theoretical and practical knowledge will be decisive.”⁷⁷⁴ Non-commissioned officers and caporals “who distinguish themselves with good conduct and talent, can – in the proportion of one- to two-thirds – take part at the courses of study of the cadets. They will be subjected to the same exams that they [the cadets] have to undergo.”⁷⁷⁵

4.3.1.2 *Foreign officers of the Papal foreigners’ corps*

The regulations governing the foreigners’ corps in the Papal Army were not much different from those in the Bourbon Army in regard to entrance to the officer corps and promotions.

⁷⁶⁹ “Al posto di Comandante di Battaglione sarà a scelta sovrana nominato [...] che sarà reputato il più capace, o il più idoneo.” Ibid., art. 20, p. 9.

⁷⁷⁰ “[.D]ue terzi per rango di anzianità, e l’altro terzo secondo il merito e la capacità individuale degli Uffiziali di grado immediatamente inferiore [...] sulla presentazione del Comandante del Corpo, e la proposizione dello Ispettore.” Ibid., art. 20, p. 9.

⁷⁷¹ “I posti di Alfieri saranno sovranamente coverti due terzi coi Cadetti, ed un terzo co’ Sottuffiziali.” Ibid., art. 20, p. 9.

⁷⁷² Ibid., art. 18, p. 8.

⁷⁷³ “[.F]ornirà i necessari Uffiziali, dovendo tutti quelli che aspirano a questo grado essere provenienti da quella scuola.” Ibid., art. 9, p. 7.

⁷⁷⁴ “[.L]a nomina ad Ufficiale saranno unicamente decisive le conoscenze teoriche e pratiche.” Ibid., art. 14, p. 8.

⁷⁷⁵ “che si distinguono per buona condotta e per talenti, potranno prendere parte nella proporzione di un terzo a due terzi al corso degli studi de’ Cadetti. Essi saranno sottoposti a’ medesimi esami, che debbono costoro subire.” Ibid., art. 18, p. 7. Staatsarchiv Basel-Stadt (STABS), Archive of the 13th battalion of *Cacciatori* and the foreigners’ brigade in royal Neapolitan service [1828-1873], sign. 2a.

The law from 1852 remained the legal pillar of the foreigners' corps.⁷⁷⁶ According to the 1852 law, the Pope reserved the right to nominate – as had the Bourbon King with the institution of the foreigners' corps in 1859 – all generals and officers in the future constitution of every new foreigners' corps; this comprised even the military chaplains and the medical officers (art. 8). No further prerequisites were indicated in the law. The first nominations of non-commissioned officers and caporals were, instead, the prerogative of the commanding colonel of the respective corps (art. 12).

Once the corps were formed, different regulations of this same law were applied with regard to the various ranks in the officer corps. Interestingly, it seems – at least on the basis of the law – that for the foreigners' corps no formal examinations were foreseen, with the exception of the rank of caporal wherein a series of prerequisites was named: He must have been in active service for at least 6 months, and he had to know how to “read and write” as well as “the function of this grade defined by the various regulations” of the army. This was closest to examination standards that these requisites came, and could perhaps have led to formal examination. For the other grades, merit was the prerequisite of promotions. In fact, decisions had to be based on another instrument that was already well known in other armies and the civil administration in early modern times: the lists of conduct. According to art. 108 an annual list “of the most meritorious of the corps” had to be issued, based on the information provided by “the captains of the companies, the adjutant majors, and the superior officers of the corps”. This list had to be approved by the commander of the division as well. As with other cases, these lists could include a variety of information: while in part they were simple soldiers' lists, many went much further in the evaluation of the officers and soldiers, constituting veritable “lists of their skills, achievements, character and conduct”.⁷⁷⁷ In Prussia, for instance, the formerly secret “lists of conduct” from 1848 onwards were substituted by the reports on soldier “qualifications” (“Personal- und Qualifikationsberichte”), which, despite the fact that their name seems to regard the soldier's knowledge and expertise, were also to contain “a full description of the officer in terms of his personality, character traits, military utility and other peculiarities”.⁷⁷⁸ Military leaders were increasingly asked to use this device

⁷⁷⁶ *Legge emanata dalla Segreteria di Stato li 7 gennaio 1852.*

⁷⁷⁷ Friedrich Wilhelm Rüstow, “Conduite,” in idem, *Militärisches Hand-Wörterbuch nach dem Standpunkte der neuesten Literatur und mit Unterstützung von Fachmännern*, vol. 1 (A-M) (Zurich: Druck und Verlag von Friedrich Schultheß, 1858), p. 156.

⁷⁷⁸ Bernhard von Poten, “Personal- und Qualifikations-Berichte,” in idem, *Handwörterbuch der gesamten Militärwissenschaften*, vol. 7 („Militärliteratur bis Polnischer Aufstand“) (Bielefeld; Leipzig: Verlag von Velhagen und Klasing, 1879), p. 373.

to evaluate the “whole” person, including a soldier’s morals, personality, character, and hence his psychological “qualities” as well.

However detailed or not they may have been, the “lists of merit” in the foreigners’ corps of the Papal Army ought to have functioned as one tool by which an individual could rise to officer or be promoted. How much of a determining factor these lists had to be is however, insufficiently codified by the law of 1852. There are only general statements, such as art. 105 – apparently valid for all promotions – which states that “promotions that are dictated by seniority are conditional upon good conduct in every respect and on the ability to well maintain the new rank.”⁷⁷⁹ With regard to the nomination of caporals and non-commissioned officers, it was stated that merit should be the foundation upon which promotions were based, without however replacing the annual lists of merit. That there was tension between seniority, merit and previously acquired military experience is clear in the specific way in which in the rules of the foreigners’ corps of the Papal Army establish how the lists of officer seniority of officers should be created. This included the recognition of rank and experiences formerly acquired in other armies. The list of officer seniority was to be formed by four groups with different status: The first and highest was to include those officers that had already been in papal service, with their respective seniority and rank; the second group was to contain the officers “that previously served foreign powers”, and internal seniority of this group was to conform to the seniority and rank they had in the foreign service; the third group is the most curious, since it compiled a list of officers from “non-permanent troops”.⁷⁸⁰ Lastly, the fourth group included those officers that had not previously served in any armed force. With regard to the non-commissioned officers, the lists of seniority ought to have been formed in the same manner (art. 114).

4.3.1.3 Courts and sinecures: Foreign officers and clientele

As seen above, according to the *formal* regulations the sovereign had notable decisional prerogatives in appointing officers, especially *foreign* officers. These rights were counterbalanced with more formal criteria with regard to the “indigenous” regiments. But sovereign rights continued to be greater with regard to the foreigners’ corps. First, the monarch could use his third or “terzo di grazia” especially for appointing foreign officers to

⁷⁷⁹ “Gli avanzamenti a cui dà diritto l’anzianità avranno sempre in concorso la buona condotta sotto tutti i rapporti, e la capacità per ben sostenere il nuovo grado.” *Legge emanata dalla Segreteria di Stato li 7 gennaio 1852 per costituire dei corpi militari speciali d’individui di nazione estera al servizio della S. Sede*, art. 106.

⁷⁸⁰ It would necessitate further archival inquiry to clarify exactly what was meant by this feature; perhaps this left the possibility open for former foreign officers of the Roman Republic and/or soldiers of the reserves and militias of the European countries.

indigenous regiments. Second, he had nearly unrestricted formal power with regard to the first appointment of officers when a foreigners' corps was instituted. Third, he retained a much greater degree of only partially restricted power in his appointments subsequent to the institution of the foreigners' corps. This meant that the importance of patronage and clientele was most likely much higher for foreigners than it was for the regular indigenous corps. It was important to be privy to the informal discussions of the commanders and to have access to the court so that they might cultivate and win the favour of the sovereign and the relevant functionaries. In terms of the modes of entry into the officer-corps, the small sample of German officers in the Papal Zouaves shows that at least in these cases no direct appointment to the officer positions occurred: All seven had been – for more or less time – simple soldiers or non-commissioned officers in the Papal Army prior to attaining their officers' diploma. With the exception of Mousty, all German Zouave officers before being promoted had been part of the Papal Army for quite a long period – at least so long that it is difficult to speak of them as “military amateurs”; sometimes, as in the case of Bach, they were “amateurs” when they joined the army, but became “professionals” over the course of their service.

Nearly all sovereigns in Europe at the time remained at the top of the military hierarchy throughout the nineteenth century.⁷⁸¹ They saw themselves – and in fact very often were – the supreme commander of the armies; to differing degrees they remained important in the procedures to appoint officers; they considered the “cadet corps” to be their own personal institution, and therefore wished to be regularly informed about their “pupils”. As a result, they made frequent visits to these and other military institutions. The court was also the place where decisions were made on the conferment of medals of the equestrian orders – these had particularly burgeoned in the nineteenth century, as a kind of compensation for the loss of

⁷⁸¹ See for France, e. g., William Serman, “La noblesse dans l’armée française au XIXe siècle,” in *Les noblesses européennes au XIX siècle* (Milan; Rome: Università di Milano; Ecole française de Rome, 1988), pp. 551-58; on the nobility in the armies of the nineteenth century from a comparative perspective, see Dominic Lieven, “The noble as warrior,” in idem, *The aristocracy in Europe 1815-1914* (London: Macmillan 1992), pp. 181-202. For the noble-officer nexus in the nineteenth-century Austrian officer corps, see István Deák, “Nobles and near nobles in the officer corps,” in idem, *Beyond nationalism. A social and political history of the Habsburg officer corps 1848-1918* (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 156-64. There is to underline the specificity of the British case, where commissions were given to the officer on the basis of the “purchase system”, hence they were sold. See for this, e. g., the entries on officers in Harald E. Raugh jr., *The Victorians at war. An encyclopedia of British military history* (Santa Barbara; Denver; Oxford: ABC-CLIO, 2004), passim. For the social origin of the officers in the British purchase system, very often from the aristocracy or landed gentry (and hence they did not adhere to the “myth” of the “civil” bourgeois British soldier), see P. E. Razzell, “Social origins of officers in the Indian and British home army 1758-1962,” *The British Journal of Sociology* 14, no. 3 (1963): pp. 248-60. On the Danish case until the middle of the nineteenth century, see instead Gunner Lind, “Military and absolutism. The army officers of Denmark-Norway as a social group and political factor 1660-1848,” *Scandinavian Journal of History* 12 (1987): pp. 221-43.

formal noble privileges. Ennoblements were also decided at court, and they were increasingly conferred to “brave” officers.⁷⁸²

The case of the Papal Court at Rome is emblematic.⁷⁸³ To demonstrate this, it is enough to compare the lists of the lay people that were granted one of the three possible titles of “chamberlain” with the lists of the soldiers and especially the lists of officers in the foreign regiments of the Pope. The three titles were: “Cameriere segreto di spada e cappa partecipanti” (“Real privy chamberlain of the sword and cape”), “Cameriere segreto di spada e cappa” (“Privy chamberlain of the sword and cape”) and finally the “Cameriere d’onore di spada e cappa” (“Chamberlain of honour of the sword and cape”). Those holding the title were called on to fulfil ceremonial functions in particular: They were the ushers at the Papal Mass, “indicating the reserved places to the guests of honour and the diplomatic corps”; they were marshals of order “during the audiences” with the Pope; and they “accompanied heads of states and governments or ambassadors for their inaugural or parting visit from their Roman residences to the papal apartments.”⁷⁸⁴ When the lists of German chamberlains in the nineteenth century drawn up by Hartmut Benz⁷⁸⁵ are compared to the army lists of the papal foreign military corps, it is possible to see the many overlaps in the family names on the two lists. Some chamberlains had been papal officers, for instance Franz Xaver Graf von Korff gen. Schmising-Kerssenbrock, a non-commissioned officer in the corps of the Papal Zouaves from December 1868 who became second lieutenant (hence officer) in the corps of the “carabinieri esteri” on 20 March 1869.⁷⁸⁶ He became “chamberlain” in 1881, i.e. twelve years after his father had become “cameriere segreto” in 1869.⁷⁸⁷

⁷⁸² And here, foreign officers were included, see for instance the ennoblement of the Swiss Felix Schumacher by the Bourbon king, Montroni, *Gli uomini del re*, p. 15.

⁷⁸³ On the partially specific situation of the Roman court as both monarchical and governmental body see Christoph Weber, “La corte di Roma nell'Ottocento,” in Cesare Mozzarelli and Giuseppe Olmi, eds., *La corte nella cultura e nella storiografia. Immagini e posizioni tra Otto- e Novecento* (Rome Bulzoni 1983), pp. 167-204. About the orientation of a part of the Catholic nobility – both foreign and “Roman”- towards Rome see instead Christoph Weber, “Papsttum und Adel im 19. Jahrhundert,” in *Les noblesses européennes au XIX siècle* (Milan; Rome: Università di Milano; Ecole française de Rome, 1988), pp. 607-57, on German catholic nobles with a link to Rome see especially the pp. 614-616 and 626-632.

⁷⁸⁴ Hartmut Benz, “Kammerherren mit ‘Schwert und Mantel’. Zur Präsenz deutscher Katholiken am päpstlichen Hof im 19. Jahrhundert. 1,” *Archiv für Familiengeschichtsforschung* 10, no. 1 (2006): p. 6.

⁷⁸⁵ Ibid.; Hartmut Benz, “Kammerherren mit ‘Schwert und Mantel’. Zur Präsenz deutscher Katholiken am päpstlichen Hof im 19. Jahrhundert. 2,” *Archiv für Familiengeschichtsforschung* 10, no. 2 (2006): pp. 82-102.

⁷⁸⁶ See the entry in the list of the officers of the papal foreign carabinieri, no. 95 on Franz Xaver, ASR, Ministero delle armi, matricole, Vol. 1381.

⁷⁸⁷ Benz, “Kammerherren 1,” p. 18.

Wilderich von Galen⁷⁸⁸ was a Papal Zouave from August 1868 to May 1869⁷⁸⁹, while his brother Ferdinand⁷⁹⁰ had served as a papal chamberlain since 1853. In 1877, their brother Hubert⁷⁹¹ became a papal chamberlain as well.⁷⁹²

Furthermore, many who stood at the forefront in the organization to support the Pope were papal chamberlains. Of the nobles in the “Association of Catholic Noblemen” in Westphalia⁷⁹³, many that had started a “subscription for the appointment of Papal Zouaves” in December 1867 were already, or later became, papal chamberlains, as had their relatives. Signees of the “subscription” for the Papal Army were, for instance, the papal chamberlains Burghard Freiherr von Schorlemer-Alst, Clemens Graf Droste-Erbdroste, and Karl Freiherr von Droste zu Hülshoff. Some relatives of other signees of 1867 were provided with the title of chamberlain as well, namely those from the families von Ketteler, von Twickel, Metternich zur Gracht and other members of the Schorlemer-Alst family. One family member, Felix von Loë, was even ennobled (and received the hereditary title of a “comes romanus”) by the Pope in 1877. Furthermore, even bourgeois supporters of the Papal Army were nominated chamberlains or ennobled: On the list of those holding the title of “chamberlain” is Heinrich Oster, the bourgeois owner of an iron foundry in Aachen; as aforementioned, Oster came into conflict with the Prussian Criminal Code because he had helped possible recruits to find their way to the papal recruitment offices (see p. 165 above). The possible new recruits had been sent to Oster by the mayor of Aachen and Karl Nellessen, a proprietor of a cloth factory there; Nellessen was ennobled by the Pope in 1855, and from 1857 onwards Prussia – despite his collaboration in what was still the illegal recruitment of citizens for foreign armies in Prussia – allowed him to officially to wear his title.⁷⁹⁴

Access to the Pope, however, was a decisive feature of the noble officers in particular: It confirms that parts of German nobility continued to strongly orientate themselves toward Vienna and the Papal Court, and not to the “kleindeutsche” courts. It seems that this “freedom” of orientation toward foreign “courts” formed for many nobles a decisive ingredient of their struggle to remain important despite the formal reduction of their noble prerogatives in the German states.⁷⁹⁵ In the case of Catholic nobility, the entanglement

⁷⁸⁸ Wilderich Alfred Anton Maria Hubertus Leonhardus, Graf zu Galen 1835-1922.

⁷⁸⁹ ASR, Fondo Ministero delle Armi, Soldiers’ registers of the Papal Zouaves, no. 7873.

⁷⁹⁰ Ferdinand Heribert Ludwig, Graf zu Galen, 1831-1906.

⁷⁹¹ Hubert Anton Max Friedrich, 1849-1931.

⁷⁹² Benz, “Kammerherren 1,” p. 16.

⁷⁹³ See for this association Conrad, “Stand und Konfession I,” pp. 125-86.

⁷⁹⁴ Benz, “Kammerherren 2,” p. 85.

⁷⁹⁵ On the “Obenbleiben” (“remaining at the top”) – a term used by Werner Sombart – as an aim of the practices of the nobility see, e. g., Charlotte Tacke, “Es kommt also darauf an, den Kurzschluß von der Begriffssprache

between the Papal Court and papal military careers is most striking. In a circular manner, this close connection helped to consolidate their role in German Catholicism as well: Service to the Pope increased their standing among Catholics in Germany and lent strength to the German “Kulturkampf”.

This sort of “gift exchange”, where the conferment of titles and ennoblements led to a heightened recruiting activity, or, vice versa, the provision of soldiers was “repaid” with titles and ennoblements, was by no means an invention of the nineteenth century. Instead, in some ways it recalls the practices of the early modern period, such as the conferral of ennoblements on recruiters by the Prussian Kings Friedrich Wilhelm I and Friedrich II.⁷⁹⁶

The “legitimist” side of the Italian Risorgimento was not alone in using gift-exchange to attract soldiers. Similar measures were adopted as well on the opposite side, when it was in dire need of soldiers. In a law on the military draft that was imposed upon the municipalities of Sicily in 1848 by the Sicilian government, a symbolic reward was envisaged for those that provided recruits: “Whoever brings to the recruitment councils twenty recruits, beyond those that every municipality is obliged to provide [...] will have a bronze medal of merit from the fatherland and will be appointed as honorary counsellor of the municipality to which he belongs.”⁷⁹⁷ The provisory, liberal government of Rome in December 1848, after the participation of Roman soldiers in the first campaign in the so-called “first war of independence” – which caused the loss of many soldiers – took this one step further. The liberal government had allotted a reward of 10 scudi to be paid to whoever provided 10 soldiers. Furthermore, in the event 20 recruits were brought forward, it announced that this individual would be given a rank: “He who presents 20 individuals for enrolment [...] can have the rank of corporal, if he has the respective ability.” Individuals who brought 40 soldiers into service would be appointed sergeant, and finally, anyone who brought one hundred recruits “can have the rank of second lieutenant”⁷⁹⁸, i.e. an officers’ diploma.

auf die politische Geschichte zu vermeiden.’ ‘Adel’ und ‘Adeligkeit’ in der modernen Gesellschaft,” *Neue Politische Literatur* 55 (2007): pp. 91-123; Heinz Reif, *Adel im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, 2 ed. (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2012), especially pp. 128-131.

⁷⁹⁶ Carmen Winkel, *Im Netz des Königs. Netzwerke und Patronage in der preußischen Armee 1713-1786* (Paderborn et al.: Schöningh 2013), p.107.

⁷⁹⁷ “Legge no. 280 del 30 settembre 1848,” in *Collezione delle leggi e decreti del General Parlamento in Sicilia nel 1848. Anno 1° della Rigenerazione* (Palermo: Stamperia Pagano, 1848), art. 9, p. 308.

⁷⁹⁸ “Chi colle premesse norme e condizioni presenterà all’arrolamento [sic] dieci individui riceverà un premio scudi dieci, da fruirne all’atto dell’ammissione degli individui stessi. Chi presenterà all’arrolamento venti individui ammissibili come sopra, qualora ne abbia la capacità, potrà avere il grado di caporale; e quegli che ne presentasse quaranta colle stesse norme potrà fruire del grado di sergente. Chi poi ne recasse cento avrà il grado di sotto-tenente, premesso sempre il concorso delle accennate condizioni.” “Ordinanza del Ministero delle Armi sull’arrolamento per compire i quadri dell’esercito,” in *Raccolta delle leggi e disposizioni del governo*

Significantly, the Garibaldian officer Rüstow interprets this early-modern connection between the recruitment of soldiers and the conferral of an officers' rank in recompense as a typical mechanism for "volunteer forces": "In a volunteer army the importance of an individual depends always more or less on the number of people that this person has assembled. [...] The commanders of the divisions and brigades, but also the second commanders in the Italian southern army [Garibaldi's "Esercito meridionale"] quite avoided admitting how weak their divisions were, and if they had to say it outright, they know enough to speak about their depots, that still were left and where they were carrying out recruitment, so that the truth was hidden for a long time."⁷⁹⁹ This confirms two points: First, that issues of "military strength" and military "effectiveness" were important for the leaders of the pro-Unitarian armed forces as well and that they did not abstain from resorting to clientelist procedures in order to fill the rank and file. Second, it reveals that the political convictions of officers could go hand in hand with their quest for "personal glory" and the desire to hold important military posts.

But the gift exchange functioned in another way as well. In the army of the secessionist Sicilian revolution of 1848, according to Piero Pieri, roughly 9% of the total force was comprised of officers by the end of 1848.⁸⁰⁰ The Sicilian forces were made up of very different elements: a "regular" army force, bands formed by the lower strata of society (including released prisoners), and the primarily bourgeois national guards of the cities. But even the "regular" army was of very mixed origin. Even if in-depth studies of its composition have not yet been carried out, it seems that there was a basic difference between this situation and that of the Roman Republic in 1848/49: In this last, the Pope withdrew to Gaeta, taking with him only a handful of officers and generals, leaving the rest of the regular troops in the hands of the revolutionary government. The situation in Sicily was fairly different. Not only was the recruitment of Sicilians for the Bourbon Army quite weak – this because the island was exempted from the military draft⁸⁰¹ – but it is also important to note that the "legitimist"

provvisorio pontificio che incominciò col 25 novembre 1848 ed ebbe termine il 9 febbraio 1849 epoca in cui fu proclamata la Repubblica Romana (Rome: Tipografia governativa, 1849), p. 75.

⁷⁹⁹ „In einem Freiwilligenheer hängt die Wichtigkeit einer Person immer mehr oder minder von der Zahl der Leute ab, welche diese Person zusammengebracht hat. [...] Die Commandanten der Divisionen und Brigaden, ja auch die Untercommandanten in der italienischen Südmarmee hüteten sich daher wohl, zu sagen, wie schwach ihre Abtheilungen waren, und wo sie es deutlich sagen mußten, da wußten sie wenigstens so viel von den Depots zu sprechen, welche sie noch zurückgelassen hatten und in denen für sie geworben ward, daß die Wahrheit lange verdeckt blieb.“ Friedrich Wilhelm Rüstow, *Erinnerungen aus dem italienischen Feldzuge von 1860*, 2 vols., vol. 1 (Leipzig: F.A. Brockhaus, 1861), p. 100.

⁸⁰⁰ Pieri, *Storia militare del Risorgimento*, p. 526.

⁸⁰¹ In general the number of drafted soldiers in comparison with *formal* volunteers was limited in the Bourbon army; nevertheless the governmental structures for the military draft functioned as important institutions for the recruitment of volunteer soldiers; given the exemption from the military draft on the island, and that therefore

Bourbon Army continued to exist, even if nearly all Bourbon troops were withdrawn to the continent quite early on. In order to mount a “regular” army, the Sicilian revolutionary government had to resort to a series of measures: already in February 1848 the revolutionary “comitato generale” (general committee) in Palermo issued a plan for the “Sicilian army”, wherein there was to be a rather normal percentage of 3.8% officers in respect to the total force of 7,544 men.⁸⁰² A “domestic” recruitment of Sicilians for this new army was launched, and in September the Sicilian parliament voted a new law on the recruitment, with a period of service between four and six years.⁸⁰³ But in the end the number of officers, which as we saw earlier amounted to 9%, was far higher than had originally been planned. In reference to February 1849, Pasquale Calvi notes: “If the Sicilian army was still [...] much to be desired in terms of soldiers, it was not poor in terms of officers.”⁸⁰⁴ The revolutionary governments distributed commissions to “valorous” revolutionaries, providing them not only regular pay, but especially the right to a pension; in other words, many commissions seem to have been granted as a sinecure for a number of people. The Sicilian government appointed individuals to the officers’ posts that had contributed in different ways to the revolution, and this not necessarily in terms of military commitment. Some were decidedly contrary to this practice of handing out appointments based on revolutionary merit. The leader of the Sicilian contingent in the “first war of independence” and later head of the Sicilian General Staff, Giuseppe La Masa, wrote that he, as early as the beginning of 1848, did not agree with this multiplication of the officer ranks. He underlined that the formation “of an army can be effectively done only by officers with knowledge in theory and practice of military education. I proposed not to provide the revolutionaries with another reward than a distinct uniform with a simple name or, for the more glorious ones, the distinctive title ‘first soldiers of the nation’ or ‘soldiers of 12 January’, and leave them at the head of the bands until the regular army was built.”⁸⁰⁵ But

these institutions did not exist in Sicily, it seems reasonable to assume that a great deal of the Bourbon soldiers in Sicily were not of Sicilian origin, but came from the mainland.

⁸⁰² "Piano organico per la composizione dell'Esercito Siciliano, Palermo, 7 February 1848," in *Collezione ufficiale degli atti del Comitato Generale di Sicilia nell'anno 1848* (Palermo 1848), pp. 78-85.

⁸⁰³ "Legge per la reclutazione dell'Esercito Nazionale. Legge no. 276 del 29 settembre 1848," in *Collezione delle leggi e decreti del General Parlamento in Sicilia nel 1848. Anno 1° della Rigenerazione* (Palermo: Stamperia Pagano, 1848), pp. 300-06.

⁸⁰⁴ “Se il siciliano esercito era ancora [...] un desiderio, in quanto ai soldati, non era mica povero, in quanto agli ufficiali.” Pasquale Calvi, *Memorie storiche e critiche della rivoluzione siciliana del 1848*, vol. 3 (London: s. n., 1851), p. 82.

⁸⁰⁵ „[.C.]onformazione d’un esercito, non potendo questa effettuarla che uffiziali scienti nella teoria e nella pratica d’ogni istruzione militare. Io progettava di non darsi ai rivoluzionarii altra ricompensa se non quella d’un distinto uniforme col nome semplice ed il più glorioso – i primi soldati della nazione, ovvero i soldati del 12 gennaio – e lasciarli provvisoriamente al comando delle squadre sintantochè non formavasi l’armata regolare.” Giuseppe La Masa, *Documenti della rivoluzione siciliana del 1847-49 in rapporto all'Italia*, vol. 1 (Turin: Tipografia Ferrero e Franco, 1850), p. 157.

in the end, the Sicilian Army was not free of this form of patronage. Pasquale Calvi, in 1851, specifically accused the new Minister of War, Giuseppe La Farina, of clientelism.⁸⁰⁶ Yet, in February 1849, the problem of the easy granting of officers' diplomas still persisted, so much so that the parliament discussed a law, wherein officers would receive their whole pay only once their respective corps reached the previously fixed numbers, and in the meantime they would only receive two-thirds of their pay; new officers could not be appointed and promotions made until every officer that had been nominated was in active service, even by assign superior officers to respectively lower posts; and that new "cadres" could be created only when the existing ones had been filled with officers, and then only by decision of the parliament itself. These measures, wrote Calvi in 1851, were to help to "impede the continuation of those incessant and scandalous nominations and promotions that the Minister [of War] allowed every day."⁸⁰⁷

4.4 Military expertise, professionalization of armies and national military "character"

Without doubt the introduction of standing armies triggered a process of professionalization of the armies that was destined to continue over the following centuries. To make the armies permanent was the first step in bringing about an institutional differentiation of the "social organization of violence"⁸⁰⁸ from general civil society. "The professional", wrote Morris Jannowitz, "as a result of prolonged training, acquires a skill which enables him to render specialized service."⁸⁰⁹ The concentration on a special vocational activity was the pre-requisite for the specialization of knowledge in these developing professions. Standing armies with their "standing soldiers", hence, individuals that for many months or years remained within the army, were the most obvious sign of a division of labour between civil society and the military environment. To "speak of professionalism clearly means that the conduct of warfare is given over to men who have committed themselves to a career of service, men who are recognized for their 'expertise' in the means of warfare. It implies the decline of the gentleman amateur."⁸¹⁰ Professionalization, i.e. the formation of specialized knowledge with regard to specific functions, transformed the officer corps. Whereas there had always been

⁸⁰⁶ Calvi, *Memorie storiche*, 3, p. 84.

⁸⁰⁷ "Con quest'articolo impedevasi la continuazione di quelle incessanti, e scandalose nomine, e promozioni, che ogni giorno il ministro si permetteva" Ibid., p. 83-84.

⁸⁰⁸ Michael Geyer, "The past as future. The German officer corps as profession," in Geoffrey Cocks and Konrad H. Jarausch, eds., *German professions. 1800-1915* (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 183-212.

⁸⁰⁹ Morris Janowitz, *The professional soldier. A social and political portrait* (New York; London: The Free Press, 1971), p. 5.

⁸¹⁰ Ibid., p. 6.

commanders in the military, the nineteenth century saw the “establishment of the role of officer as an institution and profession”.⁸¹¹

In a simplified manner, the prerequisites of becoming an officer in the nineteenth century basically adhered to two principles: “intelligence” and knowledge on the one hand, and “character” on the other. The problem, historically speaking, was that parts of the nobility and traditional monarchs were to a certain degree able to legitimize claims for a continued noble prerogative in the nineteenth century by equalling the noble estate to “character”. Whereas intelligence and especially knowledge were assessed by (military) schools and examinations, kings and nobility continued to make use of mechanisms to control the social origin of candidates: The king by reserving at least portions of the officer posts to cadets, (noble) royal guards, and other people of his choice; and the nobility, especially in Prussia, by controlling the selection of candidates in the officer corps itself, or – in other armies – by being responsible for evaluating the “character”, “morals” and “conduct” of officer candidates.

4.4.1 The Prussian case

But the role of examinations was increasing in importance nearly everywhere. In Prussia, for instance, the officer career depended on two exams at least: According to the Prussian rules of 1808, every young man that had reached the age of seventeen could try to be appointed as an “ensign with sword-knot” (“Portepeefähnrich”), hence an officer-aspirant. The prerequisites were the following: he had to provide a certificate of “good conduct” and pass an apposite exam (“Portepee-Fähnrichs-Prüfung”). The candidate was to take the exam before a commission of the respective military corps of interest. After 1844, the candidate had to prove that his education level was such that he was eligible to enter the last year of “Gymnasium” (or secondary school). Hence, already at the level of the exam taken by ensigns (officer-aspirant) an individual had to be acquainted with some knowledge of German literature, Latin and French, the history of Rome and Athens, as well as that of Germany and Prussia, for instance. Were the candidate to pass, he would then be issued a diploma of “maturity as an ensign with sword-knot” (“Reifezeugnis zum Portepee-Fähnrich”) – henceforth ensign - which however was not the same as being appointed to the position of ensign. Only when a post became vacant, could the candidate be appointed upon discretion of the commanders of the corps. Once confirmed, new ensigns would be sent to the “divisional school”, where they

⁸¹¹ Martin Elbe, “Der Offizier. Ethos, Habitus, Berufsverständnis,” in Sven Bernhard Gareis and Paul Klein, eds., *Handbuch Militär und Sozialwissenschaften*, 2 ed. (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2006), p. 460.

were taught “in the ‘military sciences’, that is: weaponry, artillery, fortifications, elementary tactics, field service, petty war [“kleiner Krieg”], military essay-writing, situational drawing [...]”. At the end of this education in the divisional schools, which lasted nine months, the ensigns had to take a pre-exam that would determine whether they were regarded competent to face the “real” officer’s exam. At the same time, the candidates had to serve from between five to six months as simple soldiers or non-commissioned officers. Upon completion of this period, the officers of the company, the commander of the company and of the regiment had to decide whether the candidate was “worthy” to continue in the career and become an “officer”, on the basis of an evaluation of such criteria as “conduct”, knowledge and performance in service. As established by the law, this exam had to be taken “in Berlin”. For those young men attending universities, the time they were required to spend in the military before being appointed as ensign was reduced to three months. They could also bypass the divisional schools and be admitted directly to the officer’s exam. In any case, however, they had to pass the respective exams.

The level of education necessary to take the two exams (the ensign’s exam at the beginning of the career and the officer’s exam) differed between them. This becomes apparent for instance in the level of abilities in the requisites regarding the German language: while the *fenriks* only had to have “tolerable writing in terms of calligraphy and orthography”, the officer already had to have “the ability and precision to write an essay on military issues”. Moreover, such knowledge as “French, so much, that he [the future officer] can translate from French into German” was only requested of candidates that would take the officer’s exam.⁸¹²

Prussia also created an institution for those already appointed officers that wished to improve their knowledge. The “General War Academy” (“Allgemeine Kriegsschule”) – which was formed from a school that had already been instituted by Frederic II (“Berlin School of Inspection” - “Berliner Inspektionsschule”) – was created with the aim of educating a portion of the officers in “military sciences”; Carl von Clausewitz was appointed as director of the school in 1818. This military academy also served as an important place to prepare future officers of the general staff, hence those that would eventually be sent to the top of the military hierarchy.

Although character evaluations carried out by the already appointed officers and commanders of the corps continued to play a part, it was clear that general school education

⁸¹² See “Reglement über die Besetzung der Stellen der Portepée-Fähnriche und über die Wahl zum Offizier bei der Infanterie, Kavallerie und Artillerie vom 6. August 1808,” in *Novum Corpus Constitutionum Prussico-Brandenburgensium*, vol. 12, part 1808 (1822), pp. 404-08.

and specific military knowledge was becoming more important. The general level of education required, hence at least that of the penultimate class of the “Gymnasium”, may have remained low, but low only in comparison to today’s standards: In France, for instance, only 1% of all 19-year-old men went to take “le bac” in 1820, and in 1909 only 2.4% of the population of the same age.⁸¹³ In Prussia, in 1864 only 3.6% of all school-aged children up to 14 years of age went to secondary schooling.⁸¹⁴ What is even more important for this study of foreign soldiering is the fact that some basic knowledge of French was a prerequisite. This was a first step toward the international military world, because French was still the *lingua franca* within this context.⁸¹⁵ Apart from the establishment of a base level of general education required to take the respective exams, a core of “military knowledge” was also developed in this period. In fact, it has been argued that the development of the officer career in Prussia in the nineteenth century tended to concentrate on more specifically “military knowledge”; and the greater the distance from the enlightened ideas of the 1808 reform, the more this development moved in this direction. This “military knowledge” comprised not only specific skills such as map drawing, fortification or knowledge in weaponry, but in general strategy and tactics as well. Together with the aforementioned topics, military history was also taught. Apart from the transmission of a very rudimentary level of “general history” (wherein political arguments were cautiously avoided), military history took centre stage, and “wars and battles” were analysed using an applicatory approach as a means to find clues on how to ensure “future success”: “History became the prolegomena for tactics and strategy.”⁸¹⁶

4.4.2 *The Kingdom of the Two Sicilies*

The lowest rank of the officer corps in southern Italy was the “alfiere” (from Spanish *alférez*, and from Arabic *al-faris*, for knight). According to the 1828 rules governing promotions, one-third of the vacancies in the rank of the “Alfieri” were to be filled by cadets, royal guards (military bodyguards), and those nominated by the king. These formed the so-called “terzo di grazia”, or the “third of grace” that lay at the complete discretion of the monarch. The other

⁸¹³ Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, *Sozialgeschichte Frankreichs seit 1789* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1989), p. 142.

⁸¹⁴ Thomas Nipperdey, *Deutsche Geschichte 1866-1918. Erster Band. Arbeitswelt und Bürgergeist*, vol. 1 (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1990), p. 555.

⁸¹⁵ See the role of French in all European cadet institutions of the time as opposed to English; French was still the *lingua franca* of the European nobility and the language of diplomacy, and it had been so since the eighteenth century (having replaced Latin), and hence the role of French constitutes one of the “legacies” of the world of nobles that was transmitted into the future officer corps. See, on the role of the French language in international and aristocratic contexts, e. g., Jürgen Osterhammel, *Die Verwandlung der Welt. Eine Geschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2009), pp. 665 and 1100.

⁸¹⁶ Manfred Messerschmidt, “Die preußische Armee,” in Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, ed., *Deutsche Militärgeschichte in sechs Bänden 1648-1939*, vol. 2, section IV, part 2 (Herrsching: Manfred Pavlak Verlagsgesellschaft, 1983), p. 77.

two thirds were to be extracted from the group of sergeants in service (hence the non-commissioned officers in British terminology, or “Sottufficiali” in Italian, and “Unteroffiziere” in German) on the condition they took an apposite exam. Since 1835, it seems that two exams were necessary, the first to denote the passage from sergeant to adjutant (“aiutante”) - the equivalent to the “ensign with sword-knot” in Prussia – and the second to denote the passage between adjutant and alfiere.⁸¹⁷

According to one manual, however, the examination strictly concentrated on knowledge necessary for service in the respective grade. The candidates were responsible for knowing the rules of the very detailed (see the analysis of this regulation in chapter 7) general service regulation⁸¹⁸: in the first exam they had to know, in particular, the rules regarding the service obligations of the adjutant, in the second they were expected to know those of the officer while on campaign. The candidates were also expected to know increasing portions of the regulations on training (only some chapters were required in the first exam, and more were required for the second) and were expected to complete a progressively difficult examination “on the ground”; furthermore, candidates taking the second exam were responsible for knowledge of “plane geometry”, the “solution of arithmetic problems”, of writing a report on what was going on in a given place, and finally on how to analyse and describe an area.⁸¹⁹

Further promotions in the officer corps were normally given out on the basis of seniority (hence the amount of time an individual had passed in the rank immediately below). But there were two important exceptions: First, as in many other armies, the passage from captain to major, the “major’s corner” (“Majorsecke”) was dictated by an exam. And like in Prussia, this exam was not only based on the knowledge of the candidate, but also on “the moral, political and military conduct” of the future majors.⁸²⁰ Second, the king reserved the

⁸¹⁷ Boeri, Crociani, and Fiorentino, *L'esercito borbonico I*, p. 125; but here no reference for this change is given; in the official collection of laws of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, I could not find any regulations on promotions that went further back than that from 1828; the “double” exam is however indirectly confirmed by the (“royally approved”) list of subjects of examination that was slightly different for the first level (sergeant to aiutante) than for the second (from aiutante to alfiere) in *Manuale pe' Soldati e Sotto-Uffiziali del Real Esercito atto a guidarli ne' diversi esami cui vanno sottomessi giusta I programmi fissati per le varie armi*, (Naples: Nella tipografia dei fratelli reale, 1837), pp. 11-12.

⁸¹⁸ *Ordinanza di Sua Maestà pel governo, il servizio e la disciplina delle Reali Truppe nelle piazze*, (Naples: Reale Tipografia della Guerra, 1831).

⁸¹⁹ *Manuale pe' Soldati e Sotto-Uffiziali del Real Esercito atto a guidarli ne' diversi esami cui vanno sottomessi giusta I programmi fissati per le varie armi*, pp. 11-12.

⁸²⁰ Guido Landi, *Istituzioni di diritto pubblico del Regno delle Due Sicilie 1815-1861* (Milan: Dott. A. Giuffrè editore, 1977), p. 544.

right to nominate the generals; hence “seniority does not give any right to be promoted into the class of generals.”⁸²¹

4.4.3 Prussia and southern Italy compared

When the two cases of Prussia and the Two Sicilies are looked at together, two “professionalizing” developments may be seen: First, the importance of examinations was increasing. In some cases these exams were held before commissions that included external members – i.e. external to the military corps to which the examinee belonged. Generally speaking, the higher the vacant rank, the more external members there are in the committees.

These external members were brought in from different corps, or from the centrally instituted military schools and academies; at times they even came from outside the military sphere. For instance, in the Two Sicilies in 1815, a professor of mathematics of the University of Naples was included on the commission that was formed to examine future officers of the General Staff.⁸²² Second, at least for a portion of the soldiers, the importance of military educational institutions was on the rise. This began to compete with the traditional education of soldiers and officers, which occurred in situ in the regiments and corps themselves. Sometimes intermediate solutions were evident, such as the divisional schools in Prussia, where the examination was held at a school of a division that was different from the candidate’s and before a “provincial examination committee.”⁸²³

But there were decisive differences as well. The Prussian ensigns seem to have been more formally educated than their southern Italian colleagues. At least this is what surfaces when the regulations on the entrance exam for the Prussian ensigns (that is, for a post that still falls below the group of officers) of 1844 is compared with the list of topics for the exam to become an *alfiere* (hence, the lowest rank in the officer corps) in the Two Sicilies (in the two-thirds portion of the contingent subject to the tests). In the latter, neither French nor Latin, neither geography nor history were requisites of the exams. Only in the cadet corps, the “*Nunziatella*”, i.e. the Royal Military College (*Real Collegio Militare*) in Naples was this kind of knowledge included in the educational programme. Here, in 1833, even the German

⁸²¹ "Decreto no. 1813 del 13 aprile 1828. Decreto col quale approvasi un regolamento per gli ascensi militari," in *Collezione delle leggi e de' decreti reali del Regno delle Due Sicilie. Anno 1828*, vol. 1 (Naples: Stamperia Reale, 1828), p. 82.

⁸²² Landi, *Istituzioni di diritto pubblico del Regno delle Due Sicilie*, footnote 210 on p. 541.

⁸²³ Messerschmidt, "Die preußische Armee," p. 81.

language was included in the curriculum.⁸²⁴ But the pupils from the Nunziatella would constitute only one third of all of the alfieri.

On this basis it seems fair to conclude that in terms of formal education, many Prussian soldiers were more advanced in comparison with their counterparts in southern Italy. They were also educationally advanced in comparison to the officer candidates in other German states, such as Bavaria. This was the case despite the fact that in Prussia – as elsewhere – portions of the nobility had mobilized against giving the officers too much “bourgeois”, “Gymnasium”-esque education, since this would improve the chances that the “bourgeoisie” would rise in the ranks in comparison to parts of the nobility, which by contrast were very poorly educated.⁸²⁵ Apart from the general stereotypes on the “national” military character, the issue of education was an argument within the Italian context of hiring Prussian and “German” officers.

For the German officers, the Italian service was a good way to bridge gaps in their career ladder. The future papal Minister of Arms Hermann Kanzler had entered the Baden cadet corps after secondary schooling, but his Baden military career was interrupted in 1843 due to reasons related to his Catholic beliefs. In the Papal Army he could continue with his military career and eventually reached the highest post. Similarly, the papal officer Franz Xaver von Korff was – together with his two brothers – dismissed from the Prussian army, where he had served for four years, because he had refused a duel. The continuation of military careers in foreign armies was facilitated by many factors. There were similarities in the entry and promotion procedures in the German and Italian officer corps as established in the formal regulations on military ranking, and therefore enabled the relatively easy transition from one army to another. The knowledge of French was a sort of ticket into an international military world, i.e. the world of European military notables. This was because French was the lingua franca not only at the courts but for military exercises as well (the abundance of French words of command used in many European armies is proof enough); it was also the language that German officers learned at school and at their military educational institutions. The

⁸²⁴ Boeri, Crociani, and Fiorentino, *L'esercito borbonico I*, footnote 16 on p. 120; see the resp. "Decreto no. 1602 del 23 luglio 1833. Decreto che aggiunge una cattedra di lingua tedesca nel real collegio militare," in *Collezione delle leggi e de' decreti reali del Regno delle Due Sicilie*, vol. 2 (Naples: Stamperia Reale, 1833), pp. 14-15. This was in line with the explicit project of “copying” from the other armies in Europe. See the list of reform projects and especially the high number of Bourbon military personal that were sent abroad in Argiolas, *Storia dell'esercito borbonico*, pp. 83-87.

⁸²⁵ As Gundula Gahlen has rightly argued, the level of formal education of the Prussian officer examinees was considerably higher than for instance that of the Bavarian candidates; this despite the right argument of Demeter that there were parts of the nobility that had been mobilizing against too much of a “bourgeois” (hence typically “Gymnasium”-style) education. See Gahlen, *Offizierskorps*, footnote no. 182, p. 381.

continuation of careers was especially eased by specific regulations governing the transition. For instance, in the rules on seniority in the papal foreigners' corps, foreigners retained their "foreign" military rank upon joining and were inserted into their own seniority systems.

4.4.4 Stereotypes on national "military character"

The differences in formal education, however, added to a kind of "Prussian" and/or "German" "military myth". Since the eighteenth century the image of a purportedly "Prussian" or "German" prerogative for order took root. This myth was fuelled by the "success" of the armies of Frederic II⁸²⁶ and the "old Prussian drill"⁸²⁷ as well as by the stereotypical ideas that circulated with regard to different national characters. A purportedly "German" sense for subordination and discipline was a rather common belief in southern Italy for instance. Already in 1760, the Duke S. Arpino Alonso Sanchez de la Luna refuted the "French" and the "German" military model. According to him, the "Alemanni" were "of a relaxed, suffering, subordinated mind, which makes them tolerate any rigorous discipline in such a way that they form a law out of the commands of their superiors, and a hint of these suffices, that they obey immediately. Therefore they can be directed and guided by a few officers."⁸²⁸ The military reforms devised by John Acton in the 1780s, who was invited to Naples by Maria Carolina of Austria, were seen from this perspective in 1785 and considered to be too "German". They were "right" for the supposedly typical "German" inclination toward obedience, but would not work for southern Italians.⁸²⁹ These *military* stereotypes lay at the heart of national stereotypes more in general. Furthermore, as is quite often the case, they did not change much over time. Many military authors and leaders of the 1860s and 1870s in Italy resorted to consolidated German-Italian auto- and hetero-stereotypes that were strikingly similar to those used by Arpino many decades ago. For a series of military leaders and politicians in this period, Christoph Berger Waldenegg has shown that many placed emphasize on what they saw as being the "calmness" of the Prussian-German population and its soldiers, as well as characteristics such as "order, obedience, discipline, sense of duty, assiduity and precision".⁸³⁰

⁸²⁶ The military writing of Frederic II still figures prominently among German authors and is included in the military bibliography of Mariano D'Ayala (professor at the Collegio Militare of Naples); Mariano D'Ayala, *Bibliografia militare-italiana antica e moderna* (Naples: Stamperia reale, 1854), for the Italian translations of Frederic II see p. 24.

⁸²⁷ Steven D. Jackman, "Shoulder to shoulder. Close control and 'old Prussian drill' in German offensive infantry tactics 1871-1914," *Journal of Military History* 68 (2004): pp. 73-104.

⁸²⁸ Cited from Anna Maria Rao, "Esercito e società a Napoli nelle riforme del secondo Settecento," *Studi Storici* 28, no. 3 (1987): p. 626.

⁸²⁹ Ibid., p. 669.

⁸³⁰ Georg Christoph Berger Waldenegg, "Die deutsche 'Nationale Mentalität' aus Sicht italienischer Militärs 1866-1876. Beschreibung, Rezeption, Schlußfolgerungen," *Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen* 50, no. 2 (1991):

How different, instead, according to the same contemporary authors, the “nature” of the members of the “Latin race”. According to the report of the former Garibaldian, and now Italian officer Enrico Cosenz on his travels to Prussia and Austria in 1868, the French were “more enthusiastic”, while the Prussians were “more disciplined”; similarly, the Prussian was rather “cold”, and the French “vivacious”.⁸³¹ Comparably, the Italian General and Minister of War (in 1867) Genova Giovanni Thaon di Revel, wrote of the “spiritedness” and “vivacity” of the Italian character.⁸³² Precisely due to this “belief” in the difference between “national characters”, there was significant hesitation as to whether elements of the Prussian military order could or should be “imported” to Italy. At the same time, there was also some “discomfort, a notable aversion when the German ‘national mentality’ came up”.⁸³³ Nevertheless, for instance, Garibaldi asserted at the beginning of the expedition of the Thousand, that the “Italian nation still lacks discipline”⁸³⁴, while in a report on the “crusaders” of the Pope in 1867 in the Catholic periodical “Civiltà Cattolica”, the Bavarian Bach was described as being “cool” as well as having “shot in the Prussian way.”⁸³⁵

These military facets of national stereotypes very much informed the motivations of the Italian sides that were hiring. The revolutionary Sicilian government tried to attract officers and soldiers with some military experience from abroad, not only to fill the gaps in the Sicilian Army, but to provide the newly recruited soldiers with an example: “A good backbone of veterans hired abroad among the most bellicose and free nations of Europe, and introduced into the young army, would have given solidity and alignment to the columns; it would have provided excellent heads of columns at need; and it would have created a valuable model of discipline and subordination.”⁸³⁶ Similarly, Filippo de Boni, who was sent by the Roman Republic to Switzerland, perceived the Swiss to be “practically unique in terms of instruction and rapid disciplining”⁸³⁷

p. 88. See his German dissertation as well, Georg Christoph Berger Waldenegg, *Die Neuordnung des italienischen Heeres zwischen 1866 und 1876. Preußen als Modell* (Heidelberg: Winter, 1992).

⁸³¹ Berger Waldenegg, “Die deutsche ‘Nationale Mentalität,’” p. 91.

⁸³² Ibid., pp. 90 and 94.

⁸³³ Ibid., p. 97.

⁸³⁴ Cit. from Piero Del Negro, “Garibaldi tra esercito regio e nazione armata. Il problema del reclutamento,” in *Garibaldi condottiero. Storia, teoria, prassi*, ed. Filippo Mazzonis (Milan: F. Angeli, 1985), p. 272.

⁸³⁵ “[.C]oraggio freddo [...]” (p. 160); “Egli poi tirava coricato a terra, il che i camerati suoi dicevano tirare alla prussiana [...]” (p. 162); “[...] l’eroica determinazione [...]” (p. 165). “I Crociati di San Pietro. Scene storiche del 1867”.

⁸³⁶ “Un buon nerbo di veterani, ingaggiati all’estero, tra le più bellicose e libere nazioni di Europa, tramestati nelle file della giovine armata, dato avrebbe solidità, ed a piombo alle compagnie; fornito avrebbe al bisogno dell’eccellenti test di colonne; profferito avrebbero un prezioso modello di disciplina e di subordinazione.” Calvi, *Memorie storiche*, 3, p. 77.

⁸³⁷ Cited from Ignace, “French volunteers in Italy,” p. 449.

Foreign soldiers were sought out on all sides, and this for a variety of reasons. Stereotypes of national military character dictated many of the choices on the hiring side. At the same time, armies wanted especially experienced soldiers, even if they had acquired that experience in “regular” armies. Especially on the pro-Unitarian side, foreign officers were sought out because it was believed they would help to circumvent problems that might arise due to the more “irregular” character of the pro-Unitarian armed groups. Foreigners were wanted to help train and “discipline” not just the Italians in general, but those that had less military experience in particular. These processes were bound to what was sometimes quite a desperate necessity on the part of some Germans to find foreign military employment, and their Italian careers were partially based on a conscious “brain-drain” to Italy.

4.4.5 “Wanted” across the political divides: Experienced soldiers and officers

This quest for (foreign) military expertise was already present in the democratic political environments of the 1830s, despite the more radically differing ideas on military organization in general.⁸³⁸ This desire for military experts was noted (with some irony) by the German-Danish poet Harro-Paul Haring, who participated in Mazzini’s unsuccessful “Invasion of Savoy” in 1834:

“The patriots in the interior of Italy seemed to want a glorious name leading their movement; especially the militaries. Dazzled by the prejudice of the epaulette, if one may say so, they absolutely wanted to see a man marching at the head of their tricolour banner whose name was already renowned by some feats of arms. [T]hey wanted a name that was not only famous in the military annals, but also chivalrous and romantic.”⁸³⁹

In 1848, the brothers Nicola and Paolo Fabrizi recruited roughly 1,000 French soldiers for the Sicilian government, among which approximately 700 were from the “mobile troops of the French National Guard”, despite the fact that they had “participated actively in the suppression of the workers’ insurrections in June 1848.” According to Anne-Claire Ignace, this “does not seem to have been an obstacle for the Sicilian commissars, who were eager to recruit troops that were already organized and ready for combat. As soon as he heard that several of this guard’s battalions were to be disbanded, Paolo Fabrizi decided to recruit massively many ex-members of this corps, who were already fully equipped.”⁸⁴⁰

⁸³⁸ Banti and Mondini, “Da Novara a Custoza. Culture militari e discorso nazionale tra Risorgimento e unità”.

⁸³⁹ « Les patriotes, dans l’intérieur de l’Italie, semblaient désirer à la tête de leur mouvement un nom glorieux ; les militaires surtout, éblouis du préjugé de l’épaulette, si l’on peut s’exprimer ainsi, voulaient absolument voir marcher à la tête de leur bannière tricolore un homme dont le nom fût déjà illustré par des faits d’armes. » Haring, *Mémoires sur la Jeune Italie*, 1, p. 26.

⁸⁴⁰ Ignace, “French volunteers in Italy,” pp. 455-456.

As the registers of the foreign corps of the Papal Army reveal⁸⁴¹, many soldiers had previously served in their national armies, or with the French Foreign Legion in Algeria or Mexico, before entering papal service. On the legitimist side, not only did many officers that had engaged in the planning of the pro-Bourbon guerrilla resistance have previous military education and military experience in the field but so did those who actually fought together with the “brigands”. One such example is the German-Austrian Ludwig Richard Zimmermann who had been a cadet and officer in the Austrian Army for six years before joining the anti-Bourbon “volunteers”.⁸⁴²

The same could be said with regard to the opposite political side. In the case of the French soldiers in Sicily in 1848, many had previously experienced combat, according to Ignace, especially in Algeria.⁸⁴³

Algeria, in particular, was a complicated nexus of mobility where the political, economic and military aspects of Mediterranean and global geographies intertwined all together. The port cities, as international nodes of transport, played a crucial role in bringing these layers together. A good example is Marseille in France, which was an important harbour for all sides: the pro-Unitary forces, the pro-Bourbon activities of the 1860s⁸⁴⁴, but also for French colonialism. Due to its positive legislation on exile, France became one of the main destinations for European refugees after the revolutions of the 1830s. Many in exile passed through Marseille on their way to other destinations in the Mediterranean Sea, especially the islands. Marseille, however, was also intimately linked with the French conquest of Algeria from 1830 onwards. Not only did many merchants pass through this node, but also the French military forces on their way to the Algerian campaigns. The French Foreign Legion, which was to be prominently engaged in Algeria, was created within this context. It was created in 1831 to “get rid” of the refugees that had arrived in 1830, “by sending them abroad as members of the French army.”⁸⁴⁵ Algeria would come to be in “the next 130 years [... the] spiritual home” of the Legion.⁸⁴⁶ Together with the French Zouaves, which had been initially recruited from the Berber tribes; the Chasseurs d’Afrique, a French cavalry corps; and French line regiments, the Foreign Legion was engaged in the Algerian enterprise, which led to the victory against Abd al-Qadir in 1847. It was not by chance that the revolutionary government

⁸⁴¹ ASR, Fondo Ministero delle Armi, Soldiers’ registers – Foreign Corps, vols. 1832-1870.

⁸⁴² Ludwig Richard Zimmermann, “Erinnerungen eines ehemaligen Briganten-Chefs,” *Der Kamerad* 4 (1864), p. 14.

⁸⁴³ Ignace, “French volunteers in Italy,” pp. 445-60, 455.

⁸⁴⁴ Sarlin, *Légitimisme en armes*, pp. 146-150.

⁸⁴⁵ Koller, “Recruitment Policies and Recruitment Experiences,” p. 88.

⁸⁴⁶ Porch, *French Foreign Legion*, p. 11.

of Sicily, as well as the Papal States, gave precedence to recruitment among the French colonial troops, which after 1847 had become to a certain extent dispensable to France. Johann Philipp Becker in the spring of 1849 tried to form an expedition for the Roman Republic from Marseille. According to Ignace, Paolo Fabrizio “organized a recruitment committee” for the Sicilian revolutionary government of 1848 even directly in Algeria [...].⁸⁴⁷

4.5 Pay and Provisions

Most of the armed groups in this study offered not only regular wages but various other elements that added to the income of their soldiers and officers.

4.5.1 Pay in the Papal Army

A contract was stipulated between every new recruit and the Papal Army. Until 1860, the duration of the contract was for four years with the possibility to renew and therefore to re-engage. After 1860, different enlistment periods were allowed. Foreigners could, for instance, choose to enlist in the corps of the Papal Zouaves for as little as six months.⁸⁴⁸ In the case of the “carabinieri esteri”, a new regulation passed in 1869 established that enlistments could be for one, two or four years with the possibility to renew enlistment.⁸⁴⁹ The recruit signed this contract in the recruitment office abroad (e.g., in Feldkirch or Saint-Louis). Between 1852 and 1866, the common soldier, the non-commissioned officer or corporal, but not the regular officer⁸⁵⁰, upon signing already received their enlistment premium. This was set at 30 Roman scudi, which was equivalent (in 1861) to roughly 160 Italian Lire with a purchasing power of approximately 390 kilogrammes of bread or about 183 kilogrammes of bovine meat.⁸⁵¹ 20 of these 30 scudi had to be paid immediately to the recruit in the recruitment office after he signed the contract. The remaining 10 scudi was the soldier’s individual fund for basic clothing and shoes. But he also received an extra payment for clothing of 0.017 scudi a day, amounting to a maximum individual fund of not more than 14 scudi. The fact that the soldier was obliged to pay out of this fund for this basic equipment and any necessary repairs

⁸⁴⁷ Ignace, “French volunteers in Italy,” p. 455.

⁸⁴⁸ Guénel, *Dernière guerre du pape*, p. 44.

⁸⁴⁹ Mancini Barbieri, “Nuove ricerche,” p. 167.

⁸⁵⁰ *Legge emanata dalla Segreteria di Stato li 7 gennaio 1852 per costituire dei corpi militari speciali d'individui di nazione estera al servizio della S. Sede*, art. 14, p. 13.

⁸⁵¹ This is my own calculation, based on “Tavola 21.3. Prezzi medi al consumo di alcuni prodotti del comparto alimentare - Anni 1861-2010,” in Istituto Nazionale di Statistica, ed., *L'Italia in 150 anni. Sommario di statistiche storiche 1861-2010* (Rome: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica, 2011), p. 884; the exchange rate of 5.3 Lire for 1 papal Scudo is calculated on the basis of the amount of silver or gold of the respective mints.

incentivised him to take care of his belongings so that he would have this money left over when his term of service expired. In any case, at the end of every trimester, the eventual sum of money exceeding 14 scudi was paid out to the soldier (Art. 82). Upon regular termination of service, the soldier could take with him this amount of basic clothing and shoes (Art. 83), if they were still usable, in addition to the amount of outer wear (winter coat or tunic, pair of trousers and a cleaning set) that were granted to every soldier, whose termination was in conformity, independently of the balance of his individual mass (Art. 142); a basic set of civilian clothing (*vestiario borghese*) was allocated even to soldiers that were expelled from service. In the event of his death, the soldier's basic clothing was passed to his legitimate heirs (Art. 84). Therefore, by being careful with clothing, a soldier could hope to improve his or his heirs' situation, as well as taking with him a bigger amount of clothing.

From the time the recruit reached his respective regiment in Italy he received wages according to his rank (see table 4.1 on p. 207 below). The purely quantitative indication of a soldier's pay in the tables, however, masks some important facts. Making a simple monetary comparison between pay as expressed in lire is only indicative, given that the cost of life differed considerably from Italian region to region. In 1862, for instance, in the north of Italy the price for one kg of bread varied between 0.33 cents in Turin to 0.42 cents in Milan⁸⁵², whereas the Italian National Institute of Statistics (Istituto nazionale della statistica, ISTAT) in its "150 years" series notes that the average for Italy was 0.39 lire per kg.⁸⁵³

In addition to money, every soldier from sergeant major downward was, in times of peace, provided with a daily ration of 24 Roman ounces (*oncie romane*), i.e. roughly 650g of standard bread⁸⁵⁴; an additional portion of food was added in times of war⁸⁵⁵, and from the narrations of papal soldiers we know that coffee was distributed to them in the morning.

The tables below reflect wages in peacetime: The second column shows the respective pay in monetary units (lire) and the third the equivalent of that pay in kg of bread. The fourth

⁸⁵² Mario Romani, *Storia economica d'Italia nel secolo XIX 1815-1882* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1982), statistical appendix, chart. no. 8, pp. 388-389; this covers however only northern Italy.

⁸⁵³ "Tavola 21.3. Prezzi medi al consumo di alcuni prodotti," p. 884.

⁸⁵⁴ The quality of bread was so repeatedly mentioned and specified in the terms of the contract with the suppliers, that it is possible to deduce that there was a consistent problem with it; in 1851 bread had to be "composto di tutta farina di grano di buona qualità, escluso il grano duro, ed il grano incerato. Il grano da impiegarsi nella panificazione dovrà essere non tarlato, non avrà alcun cattivo odore, o sapore, sarà concio, non avrà semenze estranee, e particolarmente sarà senza terra, gioglio, vecchia, e grano carbonato, vi sarà estratta la sola semola, ed il tritello grosso, viceversa non vi potrà essere estratta alcuna parte di fiore, e non vi si potrà aggiungere alcuna porzione di semoletta, e grossumi di qualunque specie estranei al grano che si panizza. Il pane infine dovrà essere perfettamente cotto. Si dichiara che resta espressamente vietata la macinazione del grano a così detto frutto per impedire la triturazione della crusca." Capitolo per la fornitura del pane alla truppa di linea al servizio della S. Sede in Roma e nello Stato Pontificio, printed brochure, ASR, Fondo Ministero delle Armi, file 1144.

⁸⁵⁵ Vigeveno, *La fine dell'esercito pontificio*, p. 802.

column gives the sum of daily wages and daily provisions of bread converted into monetary units (lire) and the fifth the equivalent of this sum in kg of bread. Taking into account that bread was provided by the military administration only for the subordinate levels, in the fourth and fifth column their pay in monetary units and in kg of bread is 6 baiocchi (0.319 lira) higher, or some 700g of bread more (this is in fact the quantity of bread that could be purchased with 6 baiocchi according to the price statistics available).

Table 4.1 - Daily pay for foreign soldiers in the papal army in 1852⁸⁵⁶

<i>Rank</i>	<i>Daily pay without comestibles in Lire</i>	<i>Daily pay without comestibles in kg of bread</i>	<i>Daily pay including comestibles in Lire</i>	<i>Daily pay including comestibles in kg of bread</i>
Colonel (<i>colonnello</i>)	15.072	37.067	15.072	37.067
Major (<i>maggiore</i>)	10.640	26.168	10.640	26.168
Sergeant (<i>sergente</i>)	0.578	1.420	0.904	2.224
Corporal (<i>caporale</i>)	0.319	0.785	0.638	1.570
Common soldier (<i>comune</i>)	0.160	0.393	0.479	1.178

⁸⁵⁶ This is my own elaboration based on the *Legge emanata dalla Segreteria di Stato li 7 gennaio 1852*, pp. 59-60.

Table 4.2 - Daily pay for soldiers in the “indigenous infantry” of the Papal Army in 1845⁸⁵⁷

<i>Rank</i>	<i>Daily pay without comestibles in Lire</i>	<i>Daily pay without comestibles in kg of bread</i>	<i>Daily pay including comestibles in Lire</i>	<i>Daily pay including comestibles in kg of bread</i>
Colonel (<i>colonnello</i>)	14.000	34.432	14.000	34.432
Lieutenant Colonel (<i>tenente colonnello</i>)	11.375	27.976	11.375	27.976
Major (<i>maggiore</i>)	9.188	22.596	9.188	22.596
Sergeant (<i>sergente</i>)	0.692	1.701	0.851	2.093
Corporal (<i>caporale</i>)	0.426	1.047	0.585	1.439
Common soldier, grenadier, voltigeur (<i>comune, granatiere, volteggiatore</i>)	0.266	0.654	0.426	1.047

In order to get an idea of how attractive these kinds of wages were, the following table provides several examples of workers’ and journeymen’s wages in Italian and German cities at the time so that it is possible to make a comparison with the pay of the lower ranks of soldiers, and for civil servants in Prussia and so that the comparison may be made with the pay given to officers.

⁸⁵⁷ This is my own calculation based on the pay lists in Roman scudi presented in Giuliano Friz, *Burocrati e soldati dello Stato pontificio (1800-1870)* (Rome: Edindustria editoriale, 1974), pp. 228, 171, 241; taking into account the official exchange rates of 1861 with 1 scudo romano = 5.32 Lire given in the "Decreto no. 123 del 17 luglio 1861. Decreto circa il corso legale della lira italiana...", in *Raccolta ufficiale delle leggi e dei decreti del regno d'Italia*, vol. 1 (Turin: Stamperia Reale, 1861), pp. 355-60. The quantity of bread equivalent to a soldier’s respective pay is calculated on the basis of the price in 1861 in Italy according to "Tavola 21.3. Prezzi medi al consumo di alcuni prodotti," p. 884, demonstrating that the price of bread varied considerably in Italy as elsewhere across time and space.

Table 4.3 – Several daily wages in Italy and Germany in the mid-nineteenth century

Place	Occupation	Year(s)	Daily pay in Lire
Varano (Como)	Cotton weaver	1847	0.67 – 1.20 ⁸⁵⁸
Milan	Mason (Master)	1847	1.0 – 1.75 ⁸⁵⁹
Germany	average pay for a journeyman/worker	1845-1849	1.05 ⁸⁶⁰
Essen/Germany/Krupp	Iron foundry worker	1850	1.54 ⁸⁶¹
Prussia	Messenger in the public administration	1849	2.43 ⁸⁶²
Prussia	Ministerial chancellery secretary	1849	6.09 ⁸⁶³
Prussia	Senior civil servant	1849	15.03 ⁸⁶⁴

It is important to note, however, that enlistment premiums and regular pay were only one part of a soldier's income. In addition to these, there were many conditions in which they were paid a supplement: such as when they were garrisoned in the city of Rome, at the seaside, or when they were in a war campaign.

4.5.2 Pay in the Roman Republic 1849

During the defence of the Roman Republic, soldiers of the two components of the Republican Army, the “regular” and the “volunteer” forces, (some of the latter under the command of Garibaldi, had the right to regular pay by the republican government.⁸⁶⁵ Due to the lack of coinage the pay was at times made in paper money, especially toward the end of the Republic. The daily wages (without supplements) to be paid out to the ranks, from sergeant major downwards to the simple soldier, were more or less a continuation of the previous practices carried out under the Papal Army. The “National Guards” and Garibaldi's legionnaires were

⁸⁵⁸ Romani, *Storia economica d'Italia*, p. 470.

⁸⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 471.

⁸⁶⁰ Jürgen Kocka, *Das lange 19. Jahrhundert. Arbeit, Nation und bürgerliche Gesellschaft*, 10 ed., Gebhardt. Handbuch der deutschen Geschichte (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2001), p. 71; the currency conversion is mine (1 Mark = 0.81 Lire), and is based on Wolfgang Trapp, *Kleines Handbuch der Münzkunde und des Geldwesens in Deutschland* (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1999), p. 120.

⁸⁶¹ Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte. Von der deutschen Doppelrevolution bis zum Beginn des Ersten Weltkrieges 1849-1914*, Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2006), p. 144.

⁸⁶² Trapp, *Kleines Handbuch der Münzkunde*, p. 235.

⁸⁶³ Ibid., p. 234.

⁸⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 234.

⁸⁶⁵ On administering pay, as with many other administrative aspects of the Garibaldian Legion during their time in the city of Rome, see the detailed work of the German-Italian historian and archivist who worked in the State Archive of Rome until 1927, Hermann [Ermanno] Loevinson. Loevinson obtained Italian citizenship in 1908; in 1938 he was dismissed from the State Archive of Bologna due to the Italian racial laws; in 1943 he was deported from Rome by the Germans. His work on Garibaldi and the Roman Republic was published under the title: Ermanno Loevinson, *Giuseppe Garibaldi e la sua legione nello Stato romano, 1848-49*, 3 vols. (Rome; Milan: Soc. Edit. Dante Alighieri di Albrighi, Segati e C., 1902-1904). The analytical section is in the second volume: Ermanno Loevinson, *Giuseppe Garibaldi e la sua legione nello Stato romano, 1848-49. Parte seconda. Coll'elenco degli ufficiali della prima legione italiana*, vol. 2 (Rome; Milan: Soc. Edit. Dante Alighieri di Albrighi, Segati e C., 1904), the chapter regarding the administration is on pp. 67-75.

basically paid the same way the papal soldiers had been: A caporal was paid 11 baiocchi (0.585 lire) per day in all three corps (the papal infantry of 1845, Garibaldi's "legione italiana" 1848/1849, and the "guardia nazionale" of 1849), a sergeant received 16 baiocchi (0.851 lire), while the common soldier in the National Guard with his 9 baiocchi (0.479 lire) received one baiocco more than the 8 baiocchi (0.426 lire) per day that was paid in the Papal Army of 1845 and in the Garibaldian Legion. The Garibaldian legionnaires were still receiving extra pay in December 1848 for being on the march ("indennità di via" or "indennità di viaggio"), which also corresponded to the practices that had been upheld in the Papal Army. After 29 April, all soldiers that were engaged in the defence of the Republic, whether in the volunteer brigades or in the regular army received the customary extra pay for being in a war campaign of daily 5 baiocchi (0.266 lira). After 26 May until the end of the Republic at the beginning of July, the daily pay of sergeant majors down to the common soldier was again increased by 3 baiocchi (0.160 lira).

Table 4.4 - Daily pay for soldiers in the "National Guard" of the Roman Republic in 1849

<i>Rank</i>	<i>Daily pay without comestibles in Lire</i>	<i>Daily pay without comestibles in kg of bread</i>	<i>Daily pay including comestibles in Lire</i>	<i>Daily pay including comestibles in kg of bread</i>
Colonel (<i>colonnello</i>)	13.125	32.280	13.125	32.280
Lieutenant colonel (<i>tenente colonnello</i>)	10.500	25.824	10.500	25.824
Major (<i>maggiore</i>)	7.875	19.368	7.875	19.368
Sergeant (<i>sergente</i>)	0.692	1.701	0.851	2.093
Corporal (<i>caporale</i>)	0.426	1.047	0.585	1.439
Common soldier (<i>comune</i>)	0.319	0.785	0.479	1.178

Table 4.5 - Daily pay for soldiers in the Garibaldian “Italian Legion” in 1848/49

<i>Rank</i>	<i>Daily pay without comestibles in Lire</i>	<i>Daily pay without comestibles in kg of bread</i>	<i>Daily pay including comestibles in Lire</i>	<i>Daily pay including comestibles in kg of bread</i>
Major (<i>maggiore</i>)	7.501	18.449	7.501	18.449
Lieutenant (<i>tenente</i>)	2.899	7.131	2.899	7.131
Sergeant (<i>sergente</i>)	0.692	1.701	0.8512	2.093
Corporal (<i>caporale</i>)	0.426	1.047	0.585	1.439
Common soldier (<i>comune</i>)	0.266	0.654	0.426	1.047

When it became clear that the fall of the Republic was imminent, toward the end of June 1849, the idea was cultivated to continue the fight outside the eternal city’s walls, “bringing the insurrection to the provinces” that had not been occupied by the French troops. Garibaldi held a speech in St. Peter’s Square on 2 July 1849, regarding this plan; it was “his best and by far most famous”⁸⁶⁶, of which one version goes as follows:

“Soldiers who with me have shared until now the toils and dangers of patriotic battles, who obtained rich rewards of glory and honour: all you who now choose exile with me, this is what awaits you: heat and thirst by day, cold and hunger by night. For you there is no pay but toil and danger, no roof, no rest, but absolute poverty, exhausting vigils, extreme marches, and fighting at every step. Who loves Italy follow me!”⁸⁶⁷

There is some controversy regarding the exact words used by Garibaldi, however, because, as Giuseppe Guerzoni has written in a critical footnote, “it was most probably never written down by anyone. At any rate, every biographer has fabricated the contents of this speech as he has liked [...]. The only phrase on which all concur, and which is vivid in the Garibaldian tradition, is: ‘I offer hunger, thirst, forced marches, battles and death’.”⁸⁶⁸ Be this as it may, the passage that there would be no pay for the soldiers who chose to follow Garibaldi does not seem to conform to the ensuing reality, i.e. that the soldiers were paid – albeit not much and not regularly, but nevertheless on the basis of a capitulation that

⁸⁶⁶ Riall, *Invention of a hero*, p. 84.

⁸⁶⁷ The English translation of the version given in the official edition of Garibaldi’s writings has been taken from *ibid.*, p. 84.

⁸⁶⁸ « [...]Perché assai probabilmente non fu da alcuno raccolto. Però ogni biografo se l’è confezionato a suo gusto, senz’altro a torto, a dir vero, che di non averlo confessato. [...] La sola frase nella quale tutti convengono, e che è viva nella tradizione garibaldina, è: ‘Vi offro fame, sete, marcie, battaglie e morte’” Giuseppe Guerzoni, *Garibaldi*, vol. 1 (Florence: G. Barbèra, 1889), p. 331, footnote no. 1.

established a fixed sum of daily pay. Gustav von Hoffstetter, who followed Garibaldi until the beginning of August, wrote down his doubts, “given the not particularly advantageous conditions of capitulation for the soldiers and how these were in fact effectuated, not many would decide to join a march after two months of fighting [...]” Later on, Hoffstetter described the funds the Garibaldian troops had with them: “Our war chest contained just enough paper money to pay the troops for about four weeks.”⁸⁶⁹ In fact, historian and Roman archivist Hermann Loevinson reports that according to the archival material, on 1 July, a total of 12,000 Roman scudi (63,840 lire) – even if only, it seems, in paper money – were paid to the quartermaster of the legion for the soldiers’ wages and the confection of clothes. Of this sum only 300 scudi were left after the departure of the Garibaldian soldiers on the evening of 2 July, and therefore were repaid by the quartermaster to the military revenue office of the army.⁸⁷⁰ The paper money the Garibaldians had with them upon leaving Rome, according to Hoffstetter, surely came from this source. However, according to an Italian legionnaire, pay was not regular, at least not at the end of the campaign in early August.⁸⁷¹

4.5.3 Pay in the Garibaldian campaigns between 1859 and 1867

With regard to the Garibaldian campaign in 1859, in May the decree of formation of the *Cacciatori delle Alpi*, established an enlistment period of one year. A decree established that the wages of both soldiers and officers would be based on the pay of the infantry in the Piedmontese Army.⁸⁷² According to the tariffs of 1851, for instance, a common soldier in the infantry of Piedmont was paid 0.40 Lira a day, a corporal 0.55 and a sergeant 1.00 Lira.⁸⁷³

⁸⁶⁹ „[.D]aß bei nur einigermaßen für die Soldaten vortheilhaften Kapitulationsbedingungen, wie sie denn auch in der That gegeben wurden, nicht viele sich entschließen würden, nach zwei Monate langem Kampfe einen Marsch anzutreten [...]“ Unsere Kriegskasse enthielt so viel Papiergeld, um die Truppen während etwa 4 Wochen zu besolden [...].“ Hoffstetter, *Tagebuch*, pp. 307 and 324.

⁸⁷⁰ Loevinson, *Giuseppe Garibaldi e la sua legione nello Stato romano*, 2, p. 74.

⁸⁷¹ E. Ruggeri, *Della ritirata di Giuseppe Garibaldi da Roma. Narrazione* (Genoa: Tip. Moretti, 1850), p. 87.

⁸⁷² “R. Decreto circa la formazione in Cuneo delle Compagnie di Cacciatori delle Alpi, 17 marzo 1859,” in Anna Maria Isastia, *Il volontariato militare nel Risorgimento. La partecipazione alla guerra del 1859* (Rome: Stato Maggiore dell'Esercito, Ufficio storico, 1859), art. 6, p. 163.

⁸⁷³ “Legge no. 1238 del 7 luglio 1851,” in *Raccolta degli atti del governo di Sua Maestà il re di Sardegna*, vol. 19 (Turin: Stamperia reale, 1851), pp. 964-965.

Table 4.6 - Daily pay for soldiers in the infantry of the Piedmontese Army in 1860

Rank	Daily pay in lire
Major (<i>maggiore</i>)	10.96 ⁸⁷⁴
Second lieutenant (<i>sottotenente</i>)	4.38 ⁸⁷⁵
Sergeant (<i>sergente</i>)	1.00 ⁸⁷⁶
Corporal (<i>caporale</i>)	0.55 ⁸⁷⁷
Second Class soldier (<i>soldato di 2a classe</i>)	0.40 ⁸⁷⁸

The issue of payment is a bit more complicated in the case of the Garibaldian southern campaign of one year later. A major problem lay in the fact that in the available sources the sums of payment are recorded in different currencies and types of coins. Furthermore, the pay is sometimes noted with the name of a coin that had a different value in Sicily than on the mainland: the “tari”, which was one-tenth of a ducat in Sicily, but one-fifth on the mainland.

At least until 1 June 1860 the usual wage paid to the soldier seems to have been of 2 Sicilian tari, which was equivalent to roughly 0.76 – 0.85 lire including food, or about 1 Sicilian tari, or the equivalent to roughly 0.38 – 0.425 lire excluding food. According to some authors, the first “Thousand” all received the same pay of 45 grana with food and 25 grana without food. But the conversion must be discussed: Some convert the 45 grana to 0.85 lire⁸⁷⁹; on the basis of the official rates of exchange, however, since the introduction of the decimal system, 45 grana actually had the value of about 1.91 lire, and 25 grana were equal to about 1.06 lire. This conversion seems to be more in line with those authors that have stressed that “to a good degree, the officers contented themselves to receive, despite the food received in kind, only two francs a day”⁸⁸⁰ – according to the Latin monetary union, then, officers received 2 lire a day, the franc being equal to the lira.⁸⁸¹ Similar numbers were given, for instance, by Rüstow, who speaks of the difference in pay between officers and common soldiers, and notes the former received “2 francs” a day plus the rations in kind, which were worth roughly 70 lira cents, reaching therefore a total of 2.70 lire daily.⁸⁸² Following the first

⁸⁷⁴ *Guida pratica per la compilazione e verificaione dei fogli delle competenze dell'Esercito italiano...* (Florence: G. Cassone e Comp. Tipografi di S. M., 1868), p. 271.

⁸⁷⁵ *Ivi.*

⁸⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 272.

⁸⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 272.

⁸⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 272.

⁸⁷⁹ So, for instance: Giacomo Oddo, *I Mille di Marsala. Scene rivoluzionarie* (Milan: presso Giuseppe Scorza di Nicola editore, 1863), p. 275. The two tari are converted into one lira by Jessie White Mario, *Vita di Giuseppe Garibaldi*, 2 ed., vol. 1 (Milan: Fratelli Treves editori, 1882), p. 217.

⁸⁸⁰ “È giova recare alla pubblica conoscenza come gli ufficiali si sono di buon grado contentati di ricevere, oltre a’ viveri in natura, soli due franchi al giorno in conto del proprio soldo [...]” Francesco Mistrali, “Le guerre d’Italia da Villafranca ad Aspromonte,” (Milan: Francesco Pagnoni tipografo-editore, 1863), p. 287.

⁸⁸¹ Trapp, *Kleines Handbuch der Münzkunde*, p. 119.

⁸⁸² Rüstow, *Erinnerungen aus dem italienischen Feldzuge von 1860*, 1, p. 106.

expedition from Genoa, similar pay was noted for others as well: for instance one Bourbon source writes on the expedition from Livorno on 6 May 1860 that “every volunteer was paid a 60 scudi enlistment premium and 4 paoli of pay”, 4 paoli being the equivalent to approximately 2.12 lire.⁸⁸³

From these sources, hence, it is clear that the pay was most probably not the same for officers and common soldiers. Moreover, some leading officers, such as Rüstow himself, had negotiated individual pay and pensions.

Furthermore, the sums that were actually paid out are only one side of the story. The other was that quite early on the official right to pay was equated with that in the Piedmontese Army. Already by 11 June (so one month after the landing in Marsala), a decree in the name of “Italy and Vittorio Emanuele” was issued in Palermo by Garibaldi as “Commander-in-Chief of the National Forces in Sicily”, granting the officers – from 1 June onwards – the same pay as that of the Piedmontese Army, but established that they were to be paid only half of the sum during the campaign, and the second half only at war’s end.⁸⁸⁴ At the same time, the non-commissioned officers saw a pay increase; the officers, instead, “for the expenses for entering the campaign”, were also to receive “one month of pay” extra.⁸⁸⁵ Seven days later, another decree stated that the extra pay for being “in campaign” as well as the quantity of food supplied “correspondent to the different ranks” would be that which was established in the Piedmontese military legislation.⁸⁸⁶ At the end of June, another decree brought all payments, food rations and extra payments –for the common soldiers and officers alike – “entirely” into alignment with the norms of the Piedmontese Army. On 22 November 1860, yet another decree stated that the officers could henceforth request the half of the Piedmontese pay that had not been handed out to them in June.⁸⁸⁷ And finally on 12 November 1860 an order of the day established that whoever did not want to continue the military career in the

⁸⁸³ “Ogni volontario ha 60 scudi d’ingaggio e 4 paoli al giorno di soldo [...]” Francesco Guardione, *Il dominio dei borboni in Sicilia dal 1830 al 1861*, vol. 2 (Turin: Società tipografico-editrice nazionale, 1907), p. 269.

⁸⁸⁴ “Decreto no. 69 del 11 giugno 1860. Emolumenti mensili da doversi agli ufficiali e sotto ufficiali dell’armata nazionale (11/06/1860),” in *Collezione delle leggi, decreti e disposizioni governative compilate dall’avvocato Nicolò Porcelli*, 2 ed. (Palermo: Carini, 1860), art. 1, p. 40.

⁸⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁸⁶ “Decreto no. 101 del 17 giugno 1860. Soprasoldi e razioni delle Truppe Nazionali,” in *Collezione delle leggi, decreti e disposizioni governative compilate dall’avvocato Nicolò Porcelli*, 2 ed. (Palermo: Carini, 1860), p. 52.

⁸⁸⁷ “Decreto no. 938 del 22 novembre 1860. S’ordina il sodisfo della intiera entrata in campagna per tutti gli uffiziali dell’esercito,” in *Collezione delle leggi, decreti e disposizioni governative compilate dall’avvocato Nicolò Porcelli*, 2 ed. (Palermo: Carini, 1860), pp. 661-62.

Piedmontese Army could leave with a final gratification of three months (for the soldiers and non-commissioned officers) or six months of pay (for the officers).⁸⁸⁸

Hence, according to the legal sources, wage payments for the southern army in 1860 initially differed from that of the Piedmontese Army, but seemed to converge toward the latter as the end of the campaign approached. Especially in the first month of the campaign in Sicily, many were paid – at least for the time being – according to a simple, dual distinction between soldiers and officers. In the following months, however, at least legally, the rules of payment gradually aligned to those of the Piedmontese Army, even if in June officers could only “pocket” half of their pay; nevertheless, they continued to retain their right to full Piedmontese payment. The point is that many contemporary sources tend to tell only “half” of the story, underlining the conditions of the first month in particular, and insinuating that soldiers and officers had contented themselves with “meagre” pay.

How many, however, really were “content” with their pay, and how many chose to renounce part or all of their promised money? To answer these questions, is much more difficult than reporting the legal situation described above. In terms of actual payments during the campaign, we know that they were made quite irregularly.

Rüstow reports that – at least in his division, i.e. the 15th (Stefan Türr), “for a time it was actually not even possible to pay the officers, so that some of them, who had not brought with them from Genoa some savings, would have suffered real shortages without comradely help.”⁸⁸⁹ The situation was even worse for the common soldiers. They were paid very unregularly, and payments depended very much on the course of the campaign.

The initial “Thousand”, for instance, seem to have been paid in Genoa before taking to sea and then were paid their first wage in Sicily already on 11 May.⁸⁹⁰ It seems the pay was deducted from the first requisitions of money in Sicily: While the first expedition had departed from Quarto with a cash reserve of 94,000 lire⁸⁹¹, already on 11 May, the city treasury of Marsala, totalling 890.45 ducati (equivalent to 3,784.41 lire) was handed over to the Garibaldian Francesco Crispi.⁸⁹² Some historians of the “Anti-Risorgimento” believe this

⁸⁸⁸ “Comando generale dell’armata meridionale, ordine del giorno, 12 november 1860,” in *Atti governativi per le provincie napoletane. Raccolta dell’avv. Giuseppe d’Ettore*, vol. 1 (Naples: Stamperia del Fibreno, 1861), pp. 322-23.

⁸⁸⁹ “[.D]aß es eine ganze Zeit lang nicht einmal möglich war, den Offizieren überhaupt ihren Sold zu bezahlen, sodaß einige, die nicht noch einen Sparpfenning von Genua mitgebracht hatten, ohne kameradschaftliche Aushülfe wirklichen Mangel gelitten haben würden.” Rüstow, *Erinnerungen aus dem italienischen Feldzuge von 1860*, 1, p. 107.

⁸⁹⁰ White Mario, *Vita di Garibaldi*, 1, p. 217.

⁸⁹¹ According to Candeloro, *Storia dell’Italia moderna IV*, p. 445.

⁸⁹² In these days, Crispi was still officer in the Garibaldian general staff, but was nominated some days later “Secretary of State in Sicily”, hence head of Garibaldi’s, i.e. the “dictator’s” government in Sicily.

document, signed by Crispi in the name of the “provisional government” and some municipal authorities of Marsala – like the subsequent requisitions of money that were made on the island – to be a strategy to cloak in a semblance of official conduct what, from a legitimist standpoint, was and is considered the continuous robbery of municipal and public treasuries in Sicily and Calabria on the part of the Garibaldians. Gigi di Fiore’s observation – that the document from Marsala “seemed to be a normal transfer to an already constituted authority. But it was official money of the legitimate Bourbon state” – is a clear example of this position.⁸⁹³

Even later, the activities of the Garibaldian Army in southern Italy continued to be fuelled not only by the money collected by associations throughout Europe, but also in great part by money requisitioned (or “lent”) from the treasuries of Sicilian and Calabrian cities or from Bourbon governmental funds, such as the mint of Palermo. Francesco Crispi, nominated Secretary of State on 17 May, dedicated much of his work to the aim, described by his relative Tommaso Palamenghi-Crispi, to “dispossess the legal government of public funds, making them flow into the purse of the Revolution.”⁸⁹⁴ As George Trevelyan has noted, of the money collected from Agostino Bertani, the cashier of the central committee created to aid Garibaldi, five-sixths were in fact transferred to him by Garibaldi from Sicily. This last took the money for the most part from the Mint in Palermo (*zecca di Palermo*): “In this way Sicily was made to pay for the liberation of Naples as the price of its own liberation [...]”.⁸⁹⁵

In the subsequent campaign of 1862, however, such cash flows to the Garibaldians did not exist; consequently, soldiers and officers, who this time were to have identical pay, were not paid at all it seems.⁸⁹⁶ In 1867, payments were equally difficult to manage, while before, in 1866, due to the official link to the Piedmontese Army, the situation was similar to what it was in 1859.

In sum, in terms of payment there are decisive differences between the various Garibaldian campaigns. In campaigns that were directly linked to regular armies – in 1849, 1859 and 1867 – at least from the legal official point of view, wages were oriented along the lines of the tariffs established for the infantry of the regular armies. The southern army of 1860 constitutes, in terms of payment and in other regards as well, a kind of midpoint

⁸⁹³ Di Fiore, *Controistoria*, p. 116.

⁸⁹⁴ „[.P]rivare il governo costituito del danaro pubblico, facendo affluir questo alla cassa della Rivoluzione.” Francesco Crispi, *I Mille. Da documenti dall'archivio Crispi* (Milan: Fratelli Treves, 1911), p. 130.

⁸⁹⁵ George Macaulay Trevelyan, *Garibaldi and the making of Italy* (New York; Bombay; Calcutta: Longmans, Green and Co., 1911), appendix C, p. 321.

⁸⁹⁶ In concurrence, Ruggiero Maurigi, *Aspromonte. Ricordi storico-militari*, 4 ed. (Naples: Perrotti, 1862), p. 427; Celestino Bianchi, *I martiri d'Aspromonte. Cenni storici*, Panteon dei martiri della libertà italiana (Milan: C. Barbini, 1863), p. 79.

between regularity and irregularity. But even in the campaigns of 1862 and 1867 regular pay was at least initially foreseen. In 1862, of note is the particularly interesting decision to pay the same rate to officers and common soldiers. The actual payments, however, depended very much on the financial circumstances. However, it was not uncommon during campaigns of the time that wages were not paid regularly and that food was often in short supply; this in fact is something that happened to many armed groups, independently of their political orientation.⁸⁹⁷

4.5.4 Foreign and indigenous soldiers treated differently

Apart from individual negotiated pay, in the Garibaldian armed groups Italian and foreign soldiers ought to have been paid in the same way. This was different for instance in the Bourbon Army and the Papal Army (up to 1866): The respective laws for the institution of the foreigners' corps had set tariffs that were often higher than those for the indigenous regiments. In the Papal Army, according to the law of 1852, for instance the pay including food was higher for all ranks in the foreigners' corps than in the indigenous regiments.

Table 4.7 – Daily pay for soldiers of the indigenous and foreigners' corps in the Papal Army

<i>Rank</i>	<i>Indigenous – with comestibles in Lire</i>	<i>Foreign – with comestibles in Lire</i>
Colonel (<i>colonnello</i>)	14.000	15.072
Major (<i>maggiore</i>)	9.188	10.640
Sergeant (<i>sergente</i>)	0.851	0.904
Corporal (<i>caporale</i>)	0.585	0.638
Common soldier (<i>comune</i>)	0.426	0.479

Still, in 1864, a simple soldier in the corps of the Carabinieri esteri was paid one bajocco (roughly 5 lire cents) more than his indigenous, papal counterpart.⁸⁹⁸ These differences in pay were well known to the non-foreign soldiers of the armies. Protests against this “injustice” led finally, in the papal case, to a pay alignment. On 21 June 1866, as part of the celebrations of the 20th anniversary of his coronation, Pius IX declared in an order of the

⁸⁹⁷ See, e. g., the reports of the Bourbon soldier M. Maier, *Der Kampf zwischen der deutschen Fremden-Legion und den Garibaldianern im Königreich beider Sicilien vom 6. April bis 28. October 1860* (Karlsruhe: Druck von Friedrich Gutsch, 1861), pp. 4-5, 23.

⁸⁹⁸ See the tables in Friz, *Burocrati e soldati*, for the indigenous troopers see chart XVII, p. 241; for the Carabinieri esteri see instead chart XIV, p. 238.

day: “A vivid desire, often shown by the indigenous troops”, writes the papal Minister of Arms, Hermann Kanzler in 1867, “was to be treated in terms of pay and accessories equally as the foreign troops and His Holiness, ceding to the impulses of his heart, notwithstanding the restrictions of the state finances, has, the 21 June 1866 [...] deigned to satisfy them fully.”⁸⁹⁹ The better regulations on pensions and “jubilees” (“giubilazioni”) of the foreign regiments, however, remained in vigour, as an apposite decree of the Minister of Arms some months later made clear.⁹⁰⁰

In the Bourbon Army, the former Swiss regiments were traditionally treated better than the indigenous troops⁹⁰¹, and the same may be said of the newly established “foreigners’ regiments”. Here, the differences in pay were even more accentuated than they were in the Papal Army.

Table 4.8 - Comparison between the pay of indigenous and foreign soldiers and officers in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies⁹⁰²

<i>Rank</i>	<i>Daily pay in Lire indigenous soldiers/officers</i>	<i>Daily pay in Lire foreign soldiers/officers</i>
Colonel (<i>colonnello</i>)	13.24	29.47
Lieutenant colonel (<i>tenente colonnello</i>)	9.60	19.97
Major (<i>maggiore</i>)	8.20	14.77
Corporal (<i>caporale</i>)	0.64	1.13
Jäger; carabineer; common soldier (<i>cacciatore/carabiniere/comune</i>)	0.43	0.60

4.5.5 Incentives to stay

The simple regular pay was however only a part of the payments soldiers received. As aforementioned, there were many situations in which soldiers were paid extra (“soprassoldo”), in times of peace or during war campaigns. In the Papal and Bourbon

⁸⁹⁹ “Un vivo desiderio più volte mostrato dalle truppe indigene”, wrote the papal Minister of Arms in 1867, “era di venir trattato nel soldo e negli accessori alle pari delle truppe estere e Vostra Santità, cedendo agl’impulsi del proprio cuore, nonostante straordinarie ristrezze dell’erario, si degnava il 21 giugno 1866 [...] di appagarlo pienamente [...]” Hermann Kanzler, “Doc. no. 686. Rapporto alla Santità di Nostro Signore Papa Pio IX. felicemente regnante del generale Kanzler prominstro delle armi sulla invasione dello stato Pontificio nell’autunno 1867,” in Norbert Miko, ed., *Das Ende des Kirchenstaates*, vol. 1 (Vienna: Herold, 1962), p. 364. This part is not in the stamped version Kanzler, *Rapporto alla Santità di Nostro Signore Papa Pio IX. felicemente regnante del generale Kanzler*.

⁹⁰⁰ “Decreto no. 36 del 14 agosto 1866. Rilascio per la giubilazione degl’individui di nazione estera,” *Giornale Militare Ufficiale* (1866): pp. 182-83.

⁹⁰¹ Argiolas, *Storia dell’esercito borbonico*, p. 80.

⁹⁰² This is my calculation on the basis of the charts in Boeri, Crociani, and Fiorentino, *L’esercito borbonico I*, pp. 147, 151 and 153.

Armies, there were many kinds of supplements: those for being in specific places (Rome, the seaside, etc.), for being on the march or travelling, or during Malaria outbreaks, for specific duties (in Rome for service during carnival for instance, or in Rome and Naples for ceremonial functions such as guards of honour), or sums paid on specific occasions (dynastic and papal anniversaries). At least the supplements typical for war campaigns were also paid to the Garibaldians in 1849, 1859, 1860 and 1866.

Furthermore, in the regular armies some of these supplements were added or related to sophisticated systems of pensions. What is important to note here is that many of these retributive solutions were used as a means to encourage or incentivize the soldiers to stay in the respective army as long as possible.

When a soldier served in the foreigners' corps of the Papal Army for a long period, he would be paid an extra daily sum linked to his rank and the number of years served: this ranged between 0.25 baiocchi for a common soldier after 12 years of service and 3 baiocchi for a non-commissioned officer after 24 years of service. Another incentive to stay had to do with the complicated pension system established in the Papal Army. Pensions for foreign soldiers, slightly better than for the indigenous troops⁹⁰³, ranged from the "discharge" (congedo) to the "jubilee" (giubilazione) to, finally, "pensions" (pensioni). In the Papal Army, this last term was only used to indicate payments to heirs of a defunct soldier.

A certain amount of money was deducted from the daily regular wage payment, which went to create a fund for "jubilations and pensions". For high-ranking soldiers, who were paid monthly, 6% was taken from their pay. For the soldiers who were paid on a daily basis, 5 baiocchi a month was deducted from their individual fund for basic clothing. After having completed a minimum of 8 years of service, the whole sum that had been set aside for the payments to the jublations' and pensions' fund was given to the lower-ranking soldiers that chose to regularly leave the Papal Army at the end of their contracted time. This amount was the "discharge" premium (if everything was in order, a minimum sum of 4.80 scudi, with a purchasing power of 62kg of bread, would be allotted). The next level in the pensions system was the "jubilee". This was a life-long pension given to the soldier: for foreigners (except officers) this accrued after 20 years of service (and for indigenous soldiers this was 30 years); only in the event the soldier had been permanently wounded was it possible to receive the "jubilee" pension before 20 years of service had been completed (with up to a third of the

⁹⁰³ See, for a comparison, the "Editto no. 26 del 16 aprile 1844. Disposizioni riguardanti le giubilazioni alle truppe di linea indigene," in *Raccolta delle leggi e disposizioni di pubblica amministrazione nello stato pontificio emanate nell'anno 1844* (Rome: Nella stamperia della R. C. A., 1845), pp. 71-78.

respective regular pay). After the normally necessary 20 years of uninterrupted service, the “jubilee” pension reached half the normal pay, after 25 two-thirds was paid, and after 30 years the entire wage was paid. Similarly, in case of a partial or total discharge of the foreign regiments by the papal government, the same proportions of pay constituted the pensions of “reform” for the officer (with one-fifth under 10 years of service up to the entire pay after 30 years of service) or for the lower ranks (only after 10 years of service, with one-fourth of pay plus a single payment of 2 months of pay for the journey home); in the event of governmental discharge before 10 years of service had been completed, the lower ranks were to get 12 months of pay in one payment without any further pension. It was hence very important in monetary terms how a soldier was actually discharged: The best option was always to be dismissed “by reform”, because this meant the mentioned sum of money had to be given; according to the soldiers’ registers of the Papal Army, a very high number of soldiers left the army due to “reform”.

The “jubilee” or similar “reform” pensions, however, were only payable when the soldier, irrespective of his rank, lived in the Papal States or in his home country and when he received no other payments for services to other governments except his own. In other words: these pensions were not dependent on the age of the soldier, but were paid only when he had received no other income from another army – this was also true for the Bourbon Army.⁹⁰⁴

Pension payments were made through the offices of the state treasury (“cassa camerale”) in Rome or other places of the Papal States. The soldier was obliged to organize the withdrawal and eventual transfer of the money to the place he lived (Art. 149). Finally, what in the laws was called “pension”, was only the payment to widows and other heirs of a soldier who had died while in service. The pension was modelled after the “jubilee”, but was in fact restricted by the regulations on marriage: they were only payable in those instances in which there had been an official papal consent to marry; soldiers entering the army had to be unmarried or widowed⁹⁰⁵, and the aforementioned permission to marry was difficult to procure.

These regulations were in place to incentivize the soldier to remain in the Papal Army for the whole duration of his enlistment contract. But they were also in place to push him to re-engage, seeing as the pay supplements and pensions were dependent on quite long periods

⁹⁰⁴ *Regolamento per l'organizzazione del 1° e 2° battaglione carabinieri leggieri e del 13° battaglione cacciatori approvato da Sua Maestà il dì 10 novembre 1859 in Portici*, art. 30, p. 13. From the copy of the regolamento in Staatsarchiv Basel-Stadt, PA 149 (Personal Estates of Johann Lukas von Mechel), 2°, doc. no. 1.

⁹⁰⁵ *Legge emanata dalla Segreteria di Stato li 7 gennaio 1852 per costituire dei corpi militari speciali d'individui di nazione estera al servizio della S. Sede*, art. 18, § 4, p. 14.

of service in the respective armies. Moreover, it is important to note that these regulations were also in place for the corps of the Papal Zouaves, despite the fact that they were offered the possibility of contracting for six-month periods at a time.

4.6 Changes of sides and mutual head-hunting

As the soldiers' registers reveal, many of the German soldiers in the Papal Army had already served in German Armies, in the Foreign Legion of the French Army, and/or in Algeria and Mexico before entering papal service.

When the need for more soldiers arose, the idea of taking them from other armies was nearly automatic. Mobilization and recruitment in the Bourbon and Papal Armies were intimately connected, and consequently it was not uncommon for soldiers to switch between the two. By recruiting soldiers that had already acquired experience elsewhere, states could not only enhance their military "strength", but could also save time and money on training. To guide pro-Bourbon volunteers in 1861, the last King of the Two Sicilies, Francesco II, availed himself of an old papal colonel, the Prussian convert Theodor Klitsche de Lagrange. Klitsche seems to have been chosen precisely for his military experience, as is shown by his meticulous military biography written down in the King's papers that are preserved in the Archivio Borbone in the State Archive of Naples: "Captain of the General Staff in papal service since 2 March 1831, major 10 August 1831, colonel lieutenant 14 March 1841, jubilee in 1851 [...]. Soldier for 48 years, officer for 46, and superior officer for 30 years, he was present in more than twenty armed conflicts, for one of which, at Rheims 1814, he was decorated, hence in a period in which such distinctions were still *real*."⁹⁰⁶

4.6.1 Port cities

Port cities were important nodes where the recruitment activities of the various armed groups overlapped. Many foreign soldiers, in fact, had to pass through ports such as Marseille, Genoa, Trieste, and Livorno. With regard to the Swiss that had been dismissed from Bourbon service in 1859, Albert Maag writes that already "the debarkation of the transport ships at Genoa had given the possibility to the people to pass into Garibaldian service; in Marseille, recruitment (this time for Rome and Algiers) was pursued with particular ardour and most

⁹⁰⁶ "Capitano di Stato Maggiore al servizio Pontificio 2 Marzo 1831, Maggiore 10 Agosto 1831, Tenente Colonnello 14 marzo 1841, giubilato al 1851 [...]. Soldato da 48 anni, Ufficiale da 46, e ufficiale Superiore da 30 anni, s'è trovato in più di venti fatti d'armi, in uno dei quali, Rheims 1814, venne decorato, e veramente in epoca, in cui tali distinzioni furono tuttora *vere* distinzioni." ASN, AB, file 1144, no. 31. My italics.

likely facilitated by the French civil and military authorities; this recruitment began even before the debarkation.”⁹⁰⁷

Such "radical" changes of sides, from the regular legitimist armies into the pro-Unitarian and less formal Garibaldian ranks and/or vice versa do not seem to have been particularly uncommon. The legitimist writer Giuseppe Buttà writes for instance that many of the soldiers of the newly created Bourbon foreign regiments had “previously fought under Garibaldi in the Varese area”⁹⁰⁸; therefore, according to this certainly biased author, these soldiers had been part of the Garibaldian *Cacciatori delle Alpi* in 1859. But given the facility with which soldiers could change sides, it seems more easily understandable that some perhaps in the end no longer knew which cause they were actually fighting for. The historian and eye-witness Raffaele de Cesare (he was 15 years old in 1860) writes about the incoming foreign recruits for the Bourbon Army: “These Bavarians and Austrians, brought by Lloyd’s steamers, debarked at Molfetta, and I remember them well. They were young, full of health, and came to serve a cause that they did not understand, and they murmured in a low voice: *long levee Caripalde*.”⁹⁰⁹

The Bavarian soldier Rottmund is perhaps an extreme example in terms of the number of times he changed armies. According to a book he published about his military life in 1863, Rottmund had served – in the following order – in the British, Papal, Garibaldian, Neapolitan and French Armies.⁹¹⁰

4.6.2 Garibaldi’s “foreign company”

Many changes of sides as well as desertions happened during times of war. In fact, during war deployment it was far more difficult for the military to police the boundaries of the respective armies than when the soldiers were garrisoned. Desertion to go join the “adversary” was convenient for the fact that by doing so, a soldier could guarantee the continued income,

⁹⁰⁷ Maag, *Schweizertruppen in neapolitanischen Diensten*, pp. 469-470.

⁹⁰⁸ “[..Q]uali molti avevano combattuto sotto Garibaldi nel Varese [...]” Giuseppe Buttà, *Viaggio da Boccadifalco a Gaeta. Memorie della rivoluzione dal 1860 al 1861* (Naples: Comm. G. de Angelis & figlio tipogr., 1883), p. 29.

⁹⁰⁹ “Quei bavaresi ed austriaci, condotti dai vapori del Lloyd, sbarcavano a Molfetta e io li ricordo bene. Erano dei giovani, pieni di salute, i quali venivano a servire una causa che non capivano e mormoravano a bassa voce: *fife Caripalde*.” De Cesare, *Fine di un regno II*, p. 25.

⁹¹⁰ J. Rottmund, *Erlebnisse und Interessante Begebenheiten eines Deutschen in englischen, römischen, garibaldischen, neapolitanischen und französischen Kriegsdiensten. Genau nach den geführten Tagebüchern bearbeitet u. hsg. von J. R. [J. Rottmund]* (Augsburg: Selbstverlag, 1863); J. Rottmund, *Erinnerungen aus meinem Leben. Geschichtliche Zusammenstellung denkwürdiger Begebenheiten eines Deutschen in Kriegsdiensten der Königin Victoria v. England, des Papstes Pius IX., des Generals Garibaldi, des Königs Franz II. von Neapel u. des Kaisers Napoleon III. von Frankreich. Reise- und Kriegs-Memoiren* (Augsburg: Selbstverlag, 1864).

while the “free” deserter who just left the army in general ran the risk of remaining without pay. By joining a new army, the deserter could also find protection against the punishments of desertion; also, by enlisting with the adversary after having been captured, a soldier could avoid the harsh realities of captivity that were still typical of the nineteenth century in the period prior to the Hague Conventions. Despite the usual official contracts between states to mutually extradite the respective deserters, all armies continued to integrate deserters into their ranks, even if official rules often excluded the eventual recruitment of possible deserters.⁹¹¹

A case in point is the “foreign Garibaldian Company”, which was part of the southern army in 1860. This company was comprised of Bourbon soldiers that deserted to the Garibaldian side, a “hundred or more foreigners from different nationalities, but for the larger part Swiss and Germans [...], a company consisting totally of Bourbon soldiers, clothed, armed and equipped with Bourbon uniforms and gear, which marches and fights against the Bourbon King.”⁹¹² In this case, as in others, whole groups of soldiers would defect over to another army. Garibaldi’s famous Hungarian Legion was another such instance. The Legion was initially formed by Austrian soldiers, “Hungarian hussars” that deserted to join the *garibaldini* in 1859 in Lombardy.⁹¹³

Similarly, the German-bourbon soldier Maier reported about frequent desertions of officers and soldiers from the bourbon to the Garibaldian army in 1860: “And what did the officers, who had sworn to the King never to take service against him, when they got into imprisonment? They had to hurry for nothing more than taking all immediately service in the Garibaldian army.”⁹¹⁴

Indeed, many former officers of the bourbon army changed sides before the end of the kingdom, and doing so they procured themselves the best opportunities for a splendid further military career in Piedmont/Italy.

⁹¹¹ See for instance the papal *Legge emanata dalla Segreteria di Stato li 7 gennaio 1852 per costituire dei corpi militari speciali d'individui di nazione estera al servizio della S. Sede*, art. 20, § 2, p. 14.

⁹¹² “[..U]n centinaio e più di stranieri di diversa nazionalità, ma nella maggior parte svizzeri e tedeschi [...], una compagnia composta tutta di borbonici, vestita, armata ed equipaggiata con uniformi e con dotazioni borboniche, che marcia e combatte contro il Borbone.” Vigeveno, *Compagnia estera garibaldina*, p. 3.

⁹¹³ Maier, *Der Kampf zwischen der deutschen Fremden-Legion und den Garibaldianern im Königreich beider Sicilien vom 6. April bis 28. October 1860*, p. 27. See, for the history of this group of foreign soldiers in Italy Vigeveno, *Legione ungherese*.

⁹¹⁴ “Und was thaten die Offiziere, die dem König eidlich gelobten, nie gegen Ihn Dienste zu nehmen, als sie in Kriegsgefangenschaft kamen? Sie hatten nichts Eiligeres zu thun, als sämtlich sofort in der Garibaldi’schen Armee – Dienste zu nehmen.” Maier, *Der Kampf zwischen der deutschen Fremden-Legion und den Garibaldianern im Königreich beider Sicilien vom 6. April bis 28. October 1860*, p. 5.

4.6.3 Pay and reciprocal “headhunting” between the armies

The liberal/democratic forces tried to incite soldiers and officers of the legitimist armies to defect and come over to their side during the war. They employed various measures to do so, from propaganda to promises of money and a helping hand in organizing the actual moment of desertion and passage over to their army. Rottmund experienced this form of liberal “agitation” by his adversaries while he was serving in the Papal Army in autumn 1859. He wrote that the “non-papal party” succeeded in leading fifteen of his papal comrades to desert “with horses and arms”, by providing “money, identity papers and civil clothing”.⁹¹⁵ These measures were again used by the Garibaldians in 1860 in order to increase their own number of soldiers. Rüstow recounts that a great number of especially Neapolitan officers defected when in Paola – 31 August to 2 September 1860. He specified that he treated them very well: “Even if I was aware that my till was nearly empty, knowing Garibaldi’s intentions, I offered to pay the royal officers their remunerations for some days if they were short of money.” It goes without saying that he also invited them to join the southern army.⁹¹⁶ Therefore, in 1860, it was easy for Rottmund to switch between the Papal Army and the Garibaldian troops. As he writes, he and his group of deserters were personally presented to Garibaldi, who “found in us enterprising young men and hence we were allowed to enter his troops as corporals.”⁹¹⁷

On 25 June of that year, Garibaldi issued an official decree that proffered quite impressive sums to Neapolitan deserters: “All soldiers that have deserted from the Neapolitan Army and that come to soldier under our flags will – at the end of the war – receive a premium of 50 ducats, which in the event of their death will be handed out to their heirs.”⁹¹⁸

⁹¹⁵ “[..M]it Pferd und Wagen” ; „mit Geld, Papieren und Civilkleidern versehen“. Rottmund, *Erlebnisse und Interessante Begebenheiten eines Deutschen in englischen, römischen, garibaldischen, neapolitanischen und französischen Kriegsdiensten. Genau nach den geführten Tagebüchern bearbeitet u. hsg. von J. R. [J. Rottmund]*, p. 56.

⁹¹⁶ „Ferner, obwohl mir bekannt war, daß meine Kasse fast auf nichts zusammengeschrumpft war, erbot ich mich doch, da ich die Intentionen Garibaldi’s wohl kannte, den königlichen Offizieren für einige Tage ihren Gehalt zahlen zu wollen, falls es ihnen an Geld fehle.“ Rüstow, *Erinnerungen aus dem italienischen Feldzuge von 1860*, 1, pp. 165-166.

⁹¹⁷ „Wir wurden dem greisen General persönlich vorgestellt; er fand in uns junge thatenlustige Männer und und uns sämtlichen war der Eintritt als Corporale in seine Truppen gestattet.“ Rottmund, *Erlebnisse und Interessante Begebenheiten eines Deutschen in englischen, römischen, garibaldischen, neapolitanischen und französischen Kriegsdiensten. Genau nach den geführten Tagebüchern bearbeitet u. hsg. von J. R. [J. Rottmund]*, p. 77.

⁹¹⁸ „Tutti i soldati, i quali disertando dall’esercito napoletano sono venuti e verranno a militare sotto le nostre bandiere, otterranno alla fine della guerra un premio di ducati cinquanta, e nel caso di loro morte sarà corrisposto ai loro eredi.” “Decreto no. 132 del 25 giugno 1860. Si dà un premio di ducati 50 alla fine della guerra a tutti i disertori napoletani che verranno a militare sotto le nostre bandiere (25/06/1860),” in *Collezione delle leggi, decreti e disposizioni governative compilate dall’avvocato Nicolò Porcelli*, 2 ed. (Palermo: Carini, 1860), pp. 69, p. 69. 50 Neapolitan ducats was equivalent to approximately 212 lire, whereas the regular enlistment premium in the Papal Army was about 160 lire.


The foreign Bourbon soldiers were addressed by the Garibaldian side with appositely stamped pamphlets in various languages. Already in mid-June, according to a contemporary source, “to stimulate desertions among the royal foreign troops, announcements were circulated that had been printed in German and French, offering 40 ducats to those that deserted with their rifle, and 30 [ducats] without a rifle; and to those that did not wish to serve Garibaldi, a compensation and free passage up to Marseille would be given”. But, according to this source, “not many passed” over to the Garibaldian side.⁹¹⁹

German soldiers in the Bourbon Army were in fact addressed from the pro-Italian side with a German pamphlet, prompting the German soldiers to desert and reminding them of a “brotherly” duty to stop fighting for the Bourbon cause: “Germans and Italians are brothers. Do you want to be an exception [...]?”⁹²⁰

⁹¹⁹ “A promuovere la diserzione tra le reali truppe estere si fanno circolare proclami stampati in tedesco, ed in francese, offrendo ducati 40 a chi si diserta col fucile, e 30 senza fucile; ed a chi non volesse servire Garibaldi, si accorda una indennità, ed il passaggio franco fino a Marsiglia: ben pochi passano fra gl’insorti” *Cronaca degli avvenimenti di Sicilia. Da aprile 1860 a marzo 1861 estratta da documenti*, (s. l.: s. l., 1863), p. 150.

⁹²⁰ Pamphlet addressed to the “German soldiers in the service of King Francis II of Naples”, presumably from August 1860, in the STABS, Personal Estates of Johann Lucas von Mechel, PA 149 5, fasc. “Akten August 1860”.

Image 4.2 - Pamphlet addressed to the “German soldiers in the service of King Francis II of Naples”, presumably from August 1860



Source: STABS, Personal Estates of Johann Lucas von Mechel, PA 149 5, fasc. “Akten August 1860”.

Foreigners were sometimes brought into the Italian armed groups with either the “clear political project” of inciting their fellow nationals on the politically opposed side to “capitulate”, or to “win their compatriots” over to their own cause.⁹²¹

Caution must be taken when looking at these changes of sides, which can be interpreted as signs of the absence⁹²² of, the presence of, or the emergent presence of national and/or political motivations. The motivation to change sides could stem from political beliefs (Hungarian or Italian nationalist aspirations) just as easily as from less political considerations (better pay, better provisions). A deeper analysis must be carried out in order to identify which of the two is dominant, acknowledging that “mercenaries” did not necessarily become political “volunteers” simply by changing sides and vice versa. To do otherwise risks reproducing the polemic classification of the nineteenth century.

Finally, headhunting was not confined to the recruitment of soldiers from the opposite camp, but could also occur within an army. Rüstow writes, for instance, that the commanders of the various divisions “had their own recruiting agents”, which without compunction “tried to hire from the organized corps of the same army by promising higher pay, nicer uniforms, advancements, in short, promised everything possible, which [however] was by no means in their power to deliver.”⁹²³

4.7 Conclusions

The presence of foreign, and among them German, soldiers in the ranks of the various Italian armed groups was a result of the interlocking between a cultural and political mobilization with a concrete recruitment infrastructure across Europe. With regard to general mobilization, the pro-national side was not alone in making use of partially “modern” forms of communication and argumentation; the legitimists and pro-papal forces did as well. With regard to recruitment, however, the traditions of mercenary recruitment developed in the previous centuries still partially informed the ways in which the foreigners’ corps were created and manned.

A traditional element of foreign mercenary recruitment were the legal obstacles that the European states erected in an attempt to prevent or at least to hinder the recruitment of

⁹²¹ Ignace, “French volunteers in Italy,” p. 449.

⁹²² Andrzej Nieuwazny, “Patriotes ou mercenaires? Les légions polonaises au service de la France (1797-1807),” *Revue historique des armées*, no. 260 (2010): pp. 26-36.

⁹²³ „Die Divisionscommandanten hatten ihre Werber, und diese letzern machten sich kein Gewissen daraus, aus den organisirten Corps derselben Armee heraus anzuwerben, indem sie höhern Sold, schöne Uniformen, Beförderungen, kurz alles Mögliche versprachen, was zu halten keineswegs in ihrer Macht lag.” Rüstow, *Erinnerungen aus dem italienischen Feldzuge von 1860*, 1, p. 124-125.

their nationals for foreign armies on their soil. This legal situation was far from static, however, and especially from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, there were significant developments with regard to foreign recruitment. Already the German Act of Confederation of 1815 granted important privileges to formerly “reigning” nobles, in terms of foreign military engagement and emigration, namely the freedom from military duties and the right to take residence abroad, which included – according to the legal literature of the time and in the cases of Baden or Bavaria to specific laws – the right to enter foreign military service as well. The right of emigration was granted to another group of nobles as well, the so-called “imperial knights”; in terms of foreign military service, many German states privileged them (and sometimes their own mediatised nobility) over non-nobles. The nobility, and among it, some specific groups of nobles, was the group that from the legal point of view could most easily join foreign armies already at the beginning of the century. And they did so quite frequently. But by using these privileges, preserving and cultivating their connections to other courts – from Austria to France to the Papal States – was also a way for them to (re-)assert their “nobility”, a way to “remain at the top”. The case of the papal court was used to exemplify how this mechanism functioned, highlighting also the ways in which many Catholic noble families were in fact intertwined with it, from the Papal Army to papal titles and ennoblements. These interconnections also created a concrete foundation upon which the recruitment activities for the Papal Army were established in Germany.

In terms of legal obstacles, the situation began to change with regard to the non-noble strata of society, especially after the revolution of 1848/49. The essentially all-encompassing bans on foreign recruitment of former centuries gradually gave way to laws against the recruitment of national subjects for foreign armies, or even more specifically only against the recruitment of those national subjects that were (still) liable to military service in the respective German state. This was a comprehensive relaxation of the legal situation, though the inclusiveness, based on the requisites of reserve and militia duties, of the words “those liable to military service” must not be overlooked. Nevertheless, by equating enlistment in a foreign military service to emigration, the constitutional debates led to the de-penalization of enlistment in foreign service for the recruit, while the prohibitions on the recruiters remained in place, even if there was a tendency to reduce the gravity of the punishment. By equating emigration and foreign military service, however, the consequences for emigration under the law now threatened to apply to all those subjects that chose to enlist abroad.

The recruitment structures in Europe for the Italian armed groups can only be understood within the context of the previous traditions of mercenary recruitment. The

placement of recruitment offices along the borders was a direct consequence of the continued bans on foreign recruitment described above. The interplay between official recruitment structures in Italy and abroad with associations for mobilization and/or recruitment, or even those associations that promoted subscription campaigns to “buy” (as in fund) soldiers for Italy, shows that infrastructures were important in ensuring the recruitment of foreign soldiers was effective. This lies in direct opposition with the idea that foreigners autonomously and spontaneously joined the Italian armed groups, which continues to inform some of the works on international volunteers. In reality, enlistment, regardless to which side, was not often an isolated, individual affair. It was essential for the various Italian sides to “recruit” intermediaries, recruiters in a wider sense that directed potential recruits to the official recruitment offices. Therefore, in the recruitment phase, it is possible if not likely that recruiters were more informed by the forms and content of political communication described in the second chapter than the recruits themselves. This is not to say that they did not subsequently become so once they had become active soldiers in Italy.

In nearly all cases, the Italian armed groups offered regular pay, even if this was rather modest for the common soldier. Pay and other financial rewards were always contemplated for the “Garibaldians” in all their Italian activities, even if to differing degrees and especially with differences in terms of actual payment, which at times were partly or even fully deferred to later times and/or via paper money that was far from being worth the nominal value. This fact is highly interesting for two reasons: First, it contradicts a reality often portrayed by pro-Risorgimental authors (even to today), that these soldiers received no pay or that this was not an important issue.⁹²⁴ Second, by extracting data on the wages given to the pro-Risorgimental soldiers and demonstrating that the sums paid were basically comparable to the wages paid in the regular armies, the opposite of what is often described in the “anti-Risorgimento” literature (again, even today) is revealed. The description of the Garibaldian troops as a “band of thieves” that pocketed enormous sums of money, therefore, is misleading at least in regard to the level of pay these soldiers and many of the officers received.

The armed groups across the political spectrum offered (despite the effective problems in realizing this offer) not only regular pay, but also food rations, pensions, and various extra sums – in the case of the Bourbon and Papal Armies, but then for the Garibaldian southern army as well. The payment structures in the Bourbon and Papal Armies aimed to incentivized soldiers to stay as long as possible in service; this seems to be in contradiction with the

⁹²⁴ In fact, it was, because it seems that unpaid wages and money were the reason why many deserted from the Garibaldian troops.

supposedly voluntary character of for instance the Papal Zouaves, who could choose upon enlisting to sign on for six months only.

Regardless of the political orientation of the armed group, economic incentives – as in previous centuries – were used to increase enlistments. The enlistment premiums offered by the Papal and Bourbon Armies were quite impressive. But even the Garibaldian southern army in 1860 offered such premiums to the deserters from the Bourbon Army as well. In fact, a company of former Bourbon soldiers was integrated into the southern army as a Garibaldian “foreign company”, which contained some 70 soldiers from German states. This case shows as well that the recruitment of (foreign and Italian) soldiers was fuelled by different sources: the recruitment in the recruitment offices of France or Austria and/or mediated by political associations abroad; the recruitment at the nodes of international transport such as the port cities; the recruitment in the “theatres” of war themselves. This calls attention to the fact that there was a mix of different types of recruitment; although there were new methods, long used mechanisms of previous continued to hold an important place in the recruitment procedures.

While the act of enlisting in an armed group or army is not sufficient proof of economic motive, neither is the enlistment over time in more than one army. Of course, although it is possible that a revolutionary with military experience could have been primarily or even solely motivated by political ideals, one cannot discount the fact that economic and career motivations seem nevertheless to have been a driving force for many “transnational soldiers” in the Risorgimento and Anti-Risorgimento. This shows that often it can be misleading to just assume that a foreign soldier fighting for a particular Italian side does so only or primarily for a political motive or that a soldier who switched sides at some point during the conflict did so only or primarily for a political reason. Aside from only political considerations, there is often evidence that other classes of motives have come into play, either instead of this first or in concomitance with it. Furthermore, arguments based on pay and/or military careers were often used by the Italian armed groups themselves to attract foreign and Italian participation.

As in previous centuries, practices were at work that guaranteed a rank to anyone that brought recruits with them; this kind of incentive was evident in the case of the Sicilian state in 1848 or the provisory Roman government in January 1849. According to Rüstow, this principle seemed to have also been applied in the Garibaldian campaign of 1860.

On all political sides, soldiers that had previously fought in other armies were quite willingly enlisted, and sometimes they were specifically sought out for their (supposed or real) military abilities and/or their supposed “national military character”. Stereotypes of the

military character or nature of certain nationalities were not an invention of the nineteenth century; they had blossomed already at the end of the previous century. In both periods, however, these military stereotypes lay at the heart of the auto- and the hetero-stereotypes of the nations. While the “decadence” of Italy was said to be primarily visible in the unmanly, unmilitary character of the Italians, the Prussian and/or “German” soldier epitomized the traits of calmness, order and discipline. The “Prussian military myth” was also fuelled by differences in terms of education. At the general level, Prussian officers were expected to have Gymnasium-level schooling, and in terms of formal military education they were also better prepared than their southern German or southern Italian colleagues. The mutual images of the respective military character and/or abilities of a nation were an important ingredient in the projects of military exchange, of which supplying German soldiers for Italy, and especially hiring German officers, was just one example. The enlistment of foreign officers was facilitated by the organizational similarities between the European armies. Because of this, the Papal Army, for instance, would recognize the previous rank that a recruit had accrued in another army; in this way military careers could be continued.

By integrating foreign soldiers and especially foreign officers, however, the seemingly specific military abilities were not the only thing that the Italian armed groups imported, but – as we will see in the next chapter – a tendency to make continuous transnational inner-military comparisons was born as well.

5 Outcome

What was the outcome of this political and cultural mobilization and its combination with concrete recruitment structures? The following chapter will present numbers regarding the German⁹²⁵ participation in the armed groups of the different Italian sides, and in some cases statistical elaborations on various aspects of this group as well.

This chapter relies heavily on one type of source in particular: the soldiers' registers. The quality of this raw material varies greatly between Italian armed groups. In the case of the Papal Army, soldiers' registers were meticulously and regularly kept: names, places of birth and last residence, date of birth and the date of enlistment are nearly always listed, are normally readable, and are quite precise even with regard to spelling – at least so much so that it was possible to verify the places mentioned and which German state and, for the larger states of Prussia and Bavaria, which region they were in.

The entries on the names of parents, former military engagements in other countries, advancements in the military career as well as military decorations (often including foreign decorations as well) were also very consistently kept. Given the vast quantity of soldiers' registers of the Papal Army, it was necessary from a practical perspective to concentrate my research. Ultimately I chose to focus on the foreigners' corps using the logic that most foreigners, insofar as they were foreigners, would have been automatically placed in the "foreigners' corps" and not in the "indigenous corps". In order to assess the validity of this parameter, I looked at multiple registers of the indigenous corps and all of the foreign transfers to the indigenous corps. More specifically when looking at the registers of the indigenous corps I was only able to verify isolated cases of German soldiers.⁹²⁶ When I extracted all of the German soldiers in the foreigners' corps that were eventually transferred to indigenous corps the numbers were very limited.⁹²⁷

The situation with regard to record keeping is significantly different on the pro-national side. Here, the actions carried out within the regular armies must be differentiated from those that are carried out without this formal container. For 1859, for instance,

⁹²⁵ One should keep in mind the definition of "Germans" as is used in this study to mean those soldiers whose place of birth and/or last residence was in one of the states of the German Confederation excluding Austria, see the discussion of the chosen definition on p. 55.

⁹²⁶ I namely looked through the complete registers of the Papal Artillery.

⁹²⁷ Between 1860 and 1870, of the 1,065 German Foreign Carabineers on which a reason for leaving the corps is given, only 27 were transferred to the artillery and 8 to the sanitary corps ("infermieri") of the "indigenous corps". There were no German transfers to other "indigenous corps".

volunteers were integrated in both the regular army and the specific volunteer corps, which nevertheless were considered an official part of the Piedmontese Army; Anna-Maria Isastia has provided lists of those enlisted and a statistical analysis based on the (quite regularly and often immediately) recorded daily reports of the enlistment commission of Turin.⁹²⁸ In other cases, there are no registers, or there is only partial coverage because there are registers only for sections of the armies and armed groups. With regard to Garibaldi's Italian Legion, which fought in the defence of Rome in 1849, it is of note that Garibaldi was reluctant to keep soldiers' registers, as, more generally speaking, he did not want any interference from the Roman Ministry of War in the (administrative) affairs of his legion; a soldiers' register was indeed created at the end of March, but shortly thereafter was no longer maintained.⁹²⁹ Nevertheless, on the basis of the extensive archival research carried out by Roman archivist Hermann Loevinson, some information on the origin of at least a portion of these legionnaires has been provided.⁹³⁰

In other cases statistical data, although available, is highly problematic. This is the case with the various official lists of the "Thousand" that were produced between 1862 and 1878. The list of 1878, with its indication of professions, is normally the point of departure for many historical works. However, the list is patchy in that it only contains the information on the professions of some of the soldiers – specifically 744 of 1,089. Even more problematic, however, is the fact that the professions were registered only in 1877 and 1878, and therefore "when twenty years had already passed" since the actual expedition; hence the professions of the participants were those at the time of registry and not the professions of the "Mille" back in 1860.⁹³¹ The list of 1878 was produced with the specific intent of granting pensions; the calculations of such sums depended on the respective professional status of the former members of the Thousand at the time in which the list was created. Furthermore, in this list of

⁹²⁸ See the lists in the annex of Isastia, *Il volontariato militare nel Risorgimento*. For those enlisted in the regular branches of the army, see pp. 312-528; and for those integrated into the Garibaldian *Cacciatori delle Alpi* see pp. 531-630. With regard to soldiers with foreign origin, this data is extracted and treated in Isastia, "Volontari provenienti dall'estero". Of note is that Isastia's lists concern only those individuals enlisted in Turin; the total number of volunteers enlisted in Italy in 1859 is estimated at 50,000 in northern and central Italy by Isastia, *Il volontariato militare nel Risorgimento*, p. 261. She gives the same number again in Isastia, "La guerra dei volontari," p. 175.

⁹²⁹ For the administration of Garibaldi's Italian Legion in 1849 and on the attempts by the Roman government to rationalize this record keeping in the face of the opposition posed by Garibaldi and the *garibaldini* themselves, see Loevinson, *Giuseppe Garibaldi e la sua legione nello Stato romano*, 2, pp. 67-75, on the abandonment of record keeping in the soldiers' registers, see especially pp. 67-68.

⁹³⁰ Ibid., on p. 22, Loevinson gives the information on the regions of origin for 121 of the 180 officers as well as for 357 soldiers (elaborated on the basis of information given on legionnaires that needed help from corpsmen or hospitalization). Among these, we find 7 officers and 10 soldiers of foreign origin, but no Germans (there were only 6 French, 2 Swiss, 3 Hungarian, 3 Polish, 1 Tunisian and 2 South Americans).

⁹³¹ Very instructive in this regard is Miani-Calabrese, "Lineamenti strutturali," pp. 559-84, the citation is on p. 576.

the “Mille”, the number of individuals whose profession was registered as “soldier” is elevated (151 out of 744 for which professions are given⁹³²). This is consistent with the fact that a fair number of former Garibaldians joined the new Italian Army after 1860.

Eva Cecchinato’s study reveals that for the professional status of the Garibaldians in 1860 it is necessary to look at the individual files that were produced in this context, some of which also contain data on the lives of the “Thousand” prior to 1860.⁹³³ By integrating this information together with that of other sources, Cecchinato is able to demonstrate that previous periods of membership in the “regular” branches of states’ armies were not as uncommon as our idea of the political “volunteer” would have us believe.

No continuous and immediate keeping of soldiers’ registers occurred in the case of the southern army of 1860, for instance. The confirmed presence of several Germans can, nevertheless, be discerned thanks to the database “Alla ricerca dei *garibaldini scomparsi*”, the as of yet unfinished joint project between the State archives in Turin and Genoa; the project endeavours to bring together the available information in the four archival complexes: the “Mille di Marsala”, “Archivio militare di Sicilia”, and “Esercito Italiano meridionale” in Turin, with the “Prefettura di Genova, Matrici di Passaporto” in Genoa. The ultimate aim of the project is to create a cross referencing system whereby all of the information present in the four archival complexes on any given individual is brought together in one single database that is accessible online via the official website of the State Archive of Turin.⁹³⁴ However, the most laborious part of this archival work has yet to be completed: i.e. the information on single soldiers that is not in the various registers, but in the letters and material of the army’s administration (in the corpus “Esercito meridionale”), has not yet been transformed and inserted into the database. Moreover, the sources used for this database are characterized by their own strong problems.⁹³⁵ Many of the registers preserved in the aforementioned complexes are partial, and important information, such as places of birth or last residence, has often not been recorded. Even more problematic is the fact that these registers were often not

⁹³² Ibid., p. 577. As noted above, Miani bases his elaboration on the “Elenco alfabetico di tutti i componenti la spedizione dei Mille di Marsala...,” *Gazzetta Ufficiale del Regno d’Italia. Supplemento*, no. 266 (1878): pp. 1-24; the source confirms the numbers Miani provides.

⁹³³ Cecchinato, *Camicie rosse*, p. 28.

⁹³⁴ <http://archiviodistatorino.beniculturali.it/Site/index.php/it/progetti/schedatura/garibaldini> (last accessed: 05/01/2013).

⁹³⁵ On the project and the problems connected to its data, see the respective publications of archivist Paola Briante, “Alla ricerca dei garibaldini scomparsi,” *Historia Magistra* 111, no. 5 (2011): pp. 144-46; see as well Paola Briante, “Alla ricerca dei garibaldini scomparsi,” *Il Mondo degli Archivi on line. Quadrimestrale di informazione e dibattito*, no. 2 (2011), online via [http://mda2006-11.ilmondodegliarchivi.org/detail/articleid/1178/parentchannel/152/title/Alla ricerca dei garibaldini scomparsi.html](http://mda2006-11.ilmondodegliarchivi.org/detail/articleid/1178/parentchannel/152/title/Alla%20ricerca%20dei%20garibaldini%20scomparsi.html) (last accessed: 05/01/2013).

kept during the southern campaign of 1860, but were created later – sometimes much later – for the sole purpose of granting medals or pensions.

Bearing in mind the current state of this project, it is not astonishing that there were many foreign “sounding” surnames in the database, but often no information on their origin or their residence prior to their Italian engagement. Only with regard to the 193 soldiers of the so-called “foreign company”⁹³⁶ – hence the foreign soldiers that deserted from the Bourbon Army to enlist with Garibaldi – was there enough information to enable a positive identification of the Germans and to carry out a statistical analysis. Having extracted the names and information on those soldiers and officers of the southern army in 1860 that could be positively identified as “Germans” according to the definition specified above, I created my apposite lists (see below in the appendix I).

We similarly know, with regard to the Papal and Bourbon Armies, of single German officers that were not (or no longer) part of distinct foreigners’ corps. This was the case for instance of Hermann Kanzler, who initially joined the 1st foreign regiment (“1° Reggimento Estero”) of the Papal Army in September 1845, but after 1848 held various positions in the command of different and “indigenous” corps or in the military administration, to eventually be promoted to pro-Minister of Arms in 1865.⁹³⁷ Gustav von Hoffstetter was another German that gravitated further from a strictly “foreign” orbit as part of the “Lombard sharpshooters” (*bersaglieri lombardi*) in the army of the Roman Republic in 1849. He went on to become a member of Garibaldi’s General Staff at the end of the Republic.⁹³⁸ Yet another example is Theodor Klitsche de Lagrange, who was part of the Papal General Staff of the 1850s and later a colonel of the pro-Bourbon forces that operated in southern Italy between 1860 and 1863.⁹³⁹

⁹³⁶ See Vigeveno, *Compagnia estera garibaldina*.

⁹³⁷ Piero Crociani, “Kanzler, Hermann,” in Alberto M. Ghisalberti and Mario Caravale, eds., *Dizionario biografico degli italiani*, vol. 64 (“Iacobiti-Labriola”) (Rome: Istituto della Enciclopedia italiana, 2004), online via [http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/hermann-kanzler_\(Dizionario-Biografico\)](http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/hermann-kanzler_(Dizionario-Biografico)) (last accessed: 21/01/2013).

⁹³⁸ Andrea Weibel, “Hoffstetter, Gustav von,” in Marco Jorio, ed., *Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz*, vol. 6 (Basle: Schwabe, 2007) online via <http://www.hls-dhs-dss.ch/textes/d/D28076.php> (last accessed: 17/08/2013).

⁹³⁹ Johann Friedrich von Schulte, “Klitsche, Theodor Friedrich,” in *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie* (1882), pp. 199-200.

5.1 Germans in the pro-Unitarian armed groups

Table 5.1 – Foreign and German Mazzinian and Sicilian soldiers

<i>Army; armed group</i>	<i>Total number of soldiers</i>	<i>Foreign soldiers</i>	<i>Composition</i>	<i>German soldiers</i>
Invasion of Savoy – Mazzini 1834	783 (Plan 2 February 1834) of which 573 (for which nationalities are given) ⁹⁴⁰ ca. 300 (which reached Piedmontese territory)	303 ⁹⁴¹ = 53%	160 Poles 35 Germans 58 Swiss 50 French ⁹⁴²	35 ⁹⁴³ = 12% of the foreign soldiers; 5% of the total ca. 20 ⁹⁴⁴ = 7% of the total
State of Sicily 1848		ca. 1,200 French ⁹⁴⁵		

⁹⁴⁰ Ramorino, *Précis*, pp. 29-30.

⁹⁴¹ Ivi.

⁹⁴² Ivi.

⁹⁴³ Ivi.

⁹⁴⁴ Between 20 and 25 according to Paul Harro Harring, *Mémoires sur la Jeune Italie et sur les derniers événements de Savoie, par un témoin oculaire*, vol. 2 (Paris: Libraire de M. Dérivieux, 1834), pp. 11 and 42.

⁹⁴⁵ Ignace, "French volunteers in Italy," pp. 445 and 455.

Table 5.2 – Foreign and German soldiers of the Roman Republic 1849

Army; armed group	Total number of soldiers	Foreign soldiers	Composition	German soldiers
Roman Republic 1849				
Regular army	ca. 12,000 ⁹⁴⁶	[Papal Army in 1848: ca. 21%]		2 (Haug, Hoffstetter)
of which				
Swiss Battery		ca. 100 ⁹⁵²	mostly Swiss	
Volunteers, Civic Guards	ca. 7,000 ⁹⁴⁷	ca. 350 ⁹⁵³ = ca. 5%		
of which				
Italian Legion (Garibaldi/Sacchi)	482 (20/12/1848) ⁹⁴⁸			
	–			
	1,475 (03/06/49) ⁹⁴⁹			
	of which the origin is known for 478	17 = 4%	6 French 3 Hungarians 3 Poles 2 Swiss 2 South Americans 1 Tunisian ⁹⁵⁷	0 (among this sample of the Garibaldian legion) ⁹⁵⁸
Polish Legion		ca. 200 ⁹⁵⁴		
Foreign Legion		ca. 120 ⁹⁵⁵	mostly Polish mostly French	
Fallen soldiers	ca. 1,000 ⁹⁵⁰	ca. 25 ⁹⁵⁶ = ca. 3%		
Total	ca. 19,000 ⁹⁵¹			

⁹⁴⁶ Candeloro, *Storia dell'Italia moderna III*, p. 444.

⁹⁴⁷ Ivi.

⁹⁴⁸ Loevinson, *Giuseppe Garibaldi e la sua legione nello Stato romano*, 2, pp. 32-33.

⁹⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 48.

⁹⁵⁰ Severini, *La Repubblica romana*, p. 151.

⁹⁵¹ Candeloro, *Storia dell'Italia moderna III*, p. 444.

⁹⁵² Tosti, "La campagna del 1849," p. 83.

⁹⁵³ Candeloro, *Storia dell'Italia moderna III*, p. 444.

⁹⁵⁴ Tosti, "La campagna del 1849," p. 83.

⁹⁵⁵ Ivi.

⁹⁵⁶ Severini, *La Repubblica romana*, p. 151.

⁹⁵⁷ Loevinson, *Giuseppe Garibaldi e la sua legione nello Stato romano*, 2, p. 22.

⁹⁵⁸ Loevinson was able to identify 121 of the 180 officers of the Garibaldian legion; among them, no German could be found; nor were there any Germans among the (small) number of soldiers equally identified by Loevinson. Gustav von Hoffstetter became chief of staff during the retreat from Rome to San Marino, but he had been member of the bersaglieri of Luciano Manara, hence he does not figure in the list of Garibaldian officers elaborated by ibid., pp. 22 and 220-274.

Table 5.3 – Foreign and German Garibaldians in 1859

<i>Army; armed group</i>	<i>Total number of soldiers</i>	<i>Foreign soldiers</i>	<i>Composition</i>	<i>German soldiers</i>
Volunteers enlisted in Turin until 25 march 1859 Integrated into the regular army	ca. 20,000 ⁹⁵⁹ of which 10,119 ⁹⁶⁰	239 ⁹⁶³ = 1% 1.2% ⁹⁶⁴ 89 ⁹⁶⁵	40 French 30 Swiss 4 Spanish 3 Egyptians 2 British 2 Irish 2 San Marinese 1 Dutch 1 Danish 1 Senegalese ⁹⁶⁷	3 Germans ⁹⁶⁹
<i>Cacciatori delle Alpi</i> – Garibaldi	ca. 4,200 ⁹⁶¹	83 ⁹⁶⁶ = 2%	17 Austrians 28 Swiss 18 French 5 Egyptians 3 Algerians 4 British 1 Greek 1 Turk 1 Belgian 2 unknown ⁹⁶⁸	2 Germans ⁹⁷⁰
“Hungarian Army in Italy”	ca. 3,200 ⁹⁶²		mostly Hungarians	

⁹⁵⁹ Le Varenne, *Les chasseurs des Alpes*, p. 306.

⁹⁶⁰ Ilari, *Storia del servizio militare*, p. 360.

⁹⁶¹ Ivi. This number (4,200) counts only the enlistments in Turin and is erroneously often understood to be the total of the *Cacciatori delle Alpi*. In fact the corps seemed to have reached between 9,500 and 12,000 men, according to the figures of Trevelyan and Garibaldi as reported by Riall, *Invention of a Hero*, p. 172.

⁹⁶² Vigeveno, *Legione ungherese*, p. 55.

⁹⁶³ Le Varenne, *Les chasseurs des Alpes*, p. 306.

⁹⁶⁴ Ilari, *Storia del servizio militare*, p. 360.

⁹⁶⁵ Isastia, "Volontari provenienti dall'estero," passim.

⁹⁶⁶ Ibid., passim.

⁹⁶⁷ Ibid., pp. 179-183.

⁹⁶⁸ Ibid., pp. 184-189.

⁹⁶⁹ Francesco Paolo Heres from Bavaria enlisted 10 may 1859; Luigi Vieser from Baden enlisted 8 April; Leone Weillschott from Baden enlisted 28 April. Ibid., p. 183.

⁹⁷⁰ Augusto Mattes (August Matthes) from Württemberg; Giacomo Nocter from Prussian Rhineland. Ibid., p. 185.

Table 5.4 – Foreign and German Garibaldians in 1860

<i>Army; armed group</i>	<i>Total number of soldiers</i>	<i>Foreign soldiers</i>	<i>Composition</i>	<i>German soldiers</i>
Northern volunteers of Garibaldi's Southern Army of 1860	ca. 21,000	Min. 1,220 ⁹⁷⁶ = 6%		
- First "Thousand"	1,089 ⁹⁷¹	Max. 33 ⁹⁷⁷ = 3%		0 among the first "Thousand"
- Volunteers that arrived later of which Hungarian Legion	Ca. 20,000 ⁹⁷² 215-448 ⁹⁷³	215-448 ⁹⁷⁸	mostly Hungarians	8 German officers
British Legion	ca. 800 ⁹⁷⁴	ca. 800	mostly British	
<i>Cacciatori Esteri</i> (ex-Bourbon soldiers)	ca. 200 ⁹⁷⁵	ca. 200		64 Germans ⁹⁷⁹

Table 5.5 – Foreign German Garibaldians in 1862

<i>Army; armed group</i>	<i>Total number of soldiers</i>	<i>Foreign soldiers</i>	<i>Composition</i>	<i>German soldiers</i>
<i>garibaldini</i> 1862	ca. 5,000 ⁹⁸⁰		ca. 20 Hungarians ⁹⁸²	
Hungarian Legion (Regular Army of Piedmont)	ca. 900	ca. 900 ⁹⁸¹	mostly Hungarians	

⁹⁷¹ Miani-Calabrese, "Lineamenti strutturali," p. 563.

⁹⁷² Riall, *Invention of a Hero*, p. 216.

⁹⁷³ Vigeveno, *Legione ungherese*, pp. 79 and 104.

⁹⁷⁴ Pellegrino Sutcliffe, "British Red Shirts," p. 202.

⁹⁷⁵ The database "Alla ricerca dei garibaldini scomparsi" gives 193 soldiers for the *Cacciatori Esteri*.

⁹⁷⁶ Riall, *Invention of a hero*, passim.

⁹⁷⁷ Of this number, however, 14 are noted as coming from "Italian Tirol" and 1 from "Savoy"; the others are: 4 Hungarians, 3 Austrians, 3 from Nice in France, 2 from Switzerland and respectively 1 from Corsica, Corfu, France, England, Africa and America. Miani-Calabrese, "Lineamenti strutturali," p. 562.

⁹⁷⁸ Vigeveno, *Legione ungherese*, pp. 79 and 104.

⁹⁷⁹ Elaboration on the basis of the information extracted from the database "Alla ricerca dei garibaldini scomparsi".

⁹⁸⁰ Cecchinato, *Camicie rosse*, p. 73.

⁹⁸¹ Vigeveno, *Legione ungherese*, pp. 105 and 132.

⁹⁸² Guida, "Frigyesi," p. 868.

Table 5.6 – Foreign and German Garibaldians in 1866

<i>Army; armed group</i>	<i>Total number of soldiers</i>	<i>Foreign soldiers</i>	<i>Composition</i>	<i>German soldiers</i>
<i>garibaldini 1866</i>	ca. 40,000 ⁹⁸³			3 (Haug, Matthes, Nocter)

Table 5.7 – Foreign and German Garibaldians in 1867

<i>Army; armed group</i>	<i>Total number of soldiers</i>	<i>Foreign soldiers</i>	<i>Composition</i>	<i>German soldiers</i>
<i>garibaldini 1867</i>	ca. 12,000 ⁹⁸⁴			

When all of the information on German soldiers is combined with that of the officers on the same Italian side, one cannot fail to notice that the presence of German nationals on the pro-national side is very limited. In the invasion of Savoy in 1834 and then in the Garibaldian southern army in 1860, the German groups are relatively appreciable, whereas the other cases are characterized by single German presences.

In the case of the southern army of 1860, it is of note that the greater part of the German soldiers had deserted from the Bourbon army. These Germans were then integrated into one company of the Garibaldian Army. Even three of the eight Garibaldian officers that were identified as Germans were part of this company.


In sum we see that – even if there had been projects to provide Garibaldi with “German Legions” – German participation on this Italian side of the conflict never reached the levels of the Hungarians, Polish, British and French, each with their respective, sometimes quite numerically substantial legions which at various points joined the ranks of the *garibaldini*.

Only with regard to the larger group of German soldiers in the “foreign company” of 1860 does it make sense to carry out statistical research. In terms of states of birth, 34 of the 63 soldiers in this group were born in southern Germany. This conforms to the expectation, when the recruitment of the Bourbon foreign regiments especially in Austria is taken into consideration. Nevertheless, there are also 20 Prussians, of which 6 were from Brandenburg.

⁹⁸³ Cecchinato, *Camicie rosse*, p. 109.

⁹⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 118.

Chart 5.1 - Germans in Garibaldi's foreign company of 1860: States of birth



(Elaboration on the basis of information extracted from the database "Alla ricerca dei garibaldini scomparsi")


5.2 Germans in the Papal Army

Many more Germans were found in the records of the Papal and Bourbon Armies than on the pro-Unitarian side.

Generally speaking, the numbers of foreigners were particularly elevated in the Papal Army. According to Attilio Vigevano, more than half of the army consisted of foreign soldiers in 1870, while other sources declared this to be 40%. Vigevano went on to state that the greater part was comprised of French soldiers, followed by Swiss, Dutch and Belgians⁹⁸⁵; unfortunately for our study, he considered the Germans and Austrians together, which nevertheless form a considerable percentage of the total army.

⁹⁸⁵ Vigevano, *La fine dell'esercito pontificio*, p. 123.

Chart 5.2 - Nationalities of the 7,200 foreign soldiers in the Papal Army in 1870



(Elaboration on the basis of the information extracted from the numbers provided by Attilio Vigeveno⁹⁸⁶)

Upon examination of the soldiers' registers, it was possible to obtain even more precise numbers. Between 1860 and 1870, Germans are mostly to be found in two of the foreigners' corps of the Papal Army: the Papal Zouaves and the foreign Carabineers.

Table 5.8 - German soldiers in the foreign corps of the Papal Army

<i>Corps</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Total number of soldiers</i>	<i>German soldiers</i>	<i>Percentage of Germans</i>
Papal Zouaves	1861-1870	ca. 9,000 ⁹⁸⁷ (10,920 entries in the registers)	254 ⁹⁸⁸	2.8% 2.3%
Papal Carabinieri esteri	1861-1870	ca. 4,100 (4,910 entries in the registers)	1,531	37% 31%

5.2.1 "German" Papal Zouaves

All ten volumes of registers of the soldiers with their 10,901 entries,⁹⁸⁹ as well as both volumes of registers of the officers⁹⁹⁰ have been consulted. The information provided therein includes: name, last residence, place of birth, date of birth, date of entry in the corps,

⁹⁸⁶ Ivi.

⁹⁸⁷ ASR, Fondo Ministero delle Armi, Matricole vols. 1635-1645. The registers of the common soldiers of the regiment between 1861 and 1870 reach a total of 10,920 entries, but excluding all re-engagements and annulations this number – according to Jean Guénel – drops to 9,000. Guénel, *Dernière guerre du pape*, p. 40.


⁹⁸⁸ ASR, Fondo Ministero delle Armi, Matricole vols. 1382 and 1383.

⁹⁸⁹ Due to the various re-engagements this number does not correspond to the number of active individuals in the corps. ASR, Fondo Ministero delle Armi, Matricole vols. 1635-1645.

⁹⁹⁰ ASR, Fondo Ministero delle Armi, Matricole vols. 1382 and 1383.


profession, promotions, and decorations. The information on the names of places and the states to which they belonged at the time of birth or time of engagement has been verified.

Chart 5.3 – Nationalities of the Papal Zouaves 1861—1870



(Elaboration on the basis of the numbers provided by Jan Willem Rozema⁹⁹¹)

Chart 5.4 - Nationalities of the Papal Zouaves 21 September 1870



(Elaboration on the basis of the numbers provided by Lorenzo Innocenti⁹⁹²)

Of the approximately 9,000-9,500 soldiers actually enlisted in the corps of the Papal Zouaves, only 254, were born, or held their last residence in one of the states of the German Confederation, excluding Austria. Therefore, the Germans at 3%, were a minor group in this


⁹⁹¹ According to the quite plausible numbers given in Rozema, *'Op, Neerlands jeugd!'*, p. 14.

⁹⁹² According to the numbers provided by Lorenzo Innocenti, *Per il papa re. Il Risorgimento italiano visto attraverso la storia del reggimento degli zuavi pontifici, 1860 - 1870* (Perugia: Esperia, 2004), p. 27.

corps, which instead was dominated by Dutch (37%), French (24%) and Belgian (18%) soldiers, as indicated in the chart above.

The German contingent of the Zouaves was predominantly comprised of Prussians (158 were born in Prussia, and 137 had their last residence there before enlisting in the Papal Army), and more specifically of Prussians from the Rhine Province (102 were born in this province, and 89 had their last residence there). Though, the group was, to a minor degree, comprised of Germans from Westphalia (24 were born there, and 23 had had their last residence there) and of a spattering of other provinces (32 were born in these, and 16 had had their last residence there). The number of Prussians far outnumbered the Germans from other territories in the German Confederation, such as Luxembourg (23 soldiers were born there, and 19 had their last residence in the Grand Duchy).


Chart 5.5 - Germans in the Papal Zouaves: States of birth



(Elaboration on the basis of the information extracted from the respective soldiers' registers⁹⁹³)

⁹⁹³ This is my own elaboration based on the information extracted from the soldiers' registers, ASR, Fondo Ministero delle Armi, Matricole, vols. 1635-1645 (soldiers) and 1382-1383 (officers) of the Papal Zouaves.

Chart 5.6 - Germans in the Papal Zouaves: States of last residence



(Elaboration on the basis of the information extracted from the respective soldiers' registers)

Table 5.9 - Frequency of certain places of birth and last residence of the Germans in the Papal Zouaves

<i>Place</i>	<i>Birth</i>	<i>Last Residence</i>
Aachen	15	20
Eupen	9	11
Cologne	9	9
Munich	4	9
Wuppertal-Elberfeld	5	3
Rome	0	7
Marseille	0	3
Paris	0	3
Brussels	0	3
Vienna	0	2

(Elaboration on the basis of the information extracted from the respective soldiers' registers)


The highest number of Germans enlisting in the corps of the Zouaves was born or had its last residence in Aachen, followed by the then Prussian Eupen (see Table 5.9 above). The most likely reason for these numbers resides in the fact that in Aachen an association dedicated precisely to providing recruits to the Papal Zouaves had been erected;⁹⁹⁴ moreover, both Aachen and Eupen were near to the Belgian and French border, and the next closest papal recruitment office in Brussels was only 150 km away.

Another point of note arises from the comparison between the place of birth and the last residence registered of the recruit: When looking at the number of individuals (38) whose last residence was recorded outside of the German Confederation, excluding Austria, it is

⁹⁹⁴ See p. 165.

possible to observe an indication of interstate mobility of these individuals prior to their enlistment in the Papal Army. Of these individuals, 20 resided in France or Belgium, some of which had previously served in the French Foreign Legion, and therefore their presence in the Papal Zouaves was linked to their previous relationship to the French Army; similarly, those that resided in the Papal States (7) were already part of the former foreigners' regiments well before 1860.

Chart 5.7 - Germans in the Papal Zouaves: Age upon entry



(Elaboration on the basis of the information extracted from the respective soldiers' registers)


At the time of enlistment, the average age of the German Zouave was 25, the median age was 24. The most frequent ages to enlist were 25 (26 enlistments) and 18 (also 26 enlistments). When considered against the backdrop of the rather diffuse notion that Papal Zouaves were *extremely* young, these findings are quite telling. Although this idea that Papal Zouaves were exceptionally young has been perpetuated in contemporary texts⁹⁹⁵ and can still be found in today's academic literature⁹⁹⁶, this perception does not hold true for the Germans, or it holds true only in part:: In fact, of the 249 enlisted Germans for which it was possible to calculate their age at the time of enlistment, 39 were 18 or younger; if it is not an erroneous entry in the soldiers' register of the date of birth, one individual enlisted at 15 years of age (Carlo Kreh from Württemberg, whose profession is noted as "merchant" – *negoziante*). But the average

⁹⁹⁵ See the emphasis placed on the youth in the Zouaves, for instance, in Bresciani's *Olderich* discussed on p. 104.

⁹⁹⁶ Harrison, "Zouave Stories," p. 283.

age to enlist, at 25, reveals that relatively few adolescents enlisted, and for the most part, the soldiers in the ranks of the Papal Zouaves were, though young, most certainly adults.

Chart 5.8 - Professions of the German Zouaves



(Elaboration on the basis of the information extracted from the respective soldiers' registers)

Given the detail of the soldiers' registers it is possible to understand more in depth the social composition of the contingent. The chart 5.8 is a visual representation of the entries on the profession of the German Zouaves, which were available only for 153 of the German recruits. With regard to these professions, most soldiers are recorded as having been a worker (*operajo*) (33). The next largest professional group that is listed is that of student (*studente*) (21), followed by ex-military (*ex-militare*) (19), landholder (*possidente*) (14), and tailor (*sarto*) (12). One soldier's profession was listed as wayfarer (*viaggiatore*). Alongside the nobles (which figured mostly under the entry "landholder" (*possidente*), there are many German soldiers from the petty bourgeois or even lower social , classes; these amount to approximately 65% of the total. Of note also is the relatively high number of workers or labourers (33); among these were several that had listed their last residence in (Wuppertal-)Elberfeld, the early industrialized city in Prussian Rhineland known for its textile industry.

Another piece of interesting information that the data in the soldiers' registers reveals is the time spent in the respective papal corps. This was calculated on the basis of the following information in the soldiers' registers: while the date of enlistment has been recorded in nearly all cases, it is also rather common to find that the date in which an individual left the corps was registered. With regard to the individuals for which both dates are given (133), the average time spent in the corps is 605 days (with a median of 597 days).

If all of those individuals that did not have a recorded end date are assumed to have served until the Papal Army was dismantled, and hence until 20 September 1870, the average time spent in the corps increases to 705 (with a median of 545). The real average time of days spent in the corps, therefore, must lie somewhere between these two figures; regardless, these results are impressive. Despite the fact that Zouave recruits had the option to enlist for as little as 6 months, many soldiers re-enlisted multiple times, or directly contracted for longer periods. Whether they were real political war volunteers or not, they spent an average of nearly two years in the corps; this essentially means that if they were not already professional soldiers upon entry into the army, they certainly became so during their stay. "Duration of commitment" is not one of Pécout's criteria in his definition of the political war volunteer⁹⁹⁷, even if at least at first the idea of the political volunteer seems to suggest that the recruit would enlist only for a specific campaign. This, however, was not the case for most of the German members of the Zouaves. Their political beliefs may nevertheless have been more substantial than those who had joined other groups: in fact, the average length of time that the Germans spent in the Papal Carabineers was somewhat lower (between 465 and 615 days total), despite the fact that they were required by law to enlist for longer periods. Similarly, although there were desertions among the Zouaves (10 out of 133, or 7.5%), desertions were far more frequent in the Papal Carabineers (319 of 1077, or 30%).

There were only 35 German enlistments in the Zouaves between 1861 and 1866. The rest occurred in the three years between 1867 and 1870. This parallels the general recruitment trend of the total Zouave force, which counted between 300-600 men up until 1864 (before the September Convention), 1,500-1,800 between 1864 and 1867, and grew to nearly 3,200 before September 1870.⁹⁹⁸ This trend is also reflected in the increases in the number of enlistments of soldiers of other nationalities.⁹⁹⁹ There are most certainly concomitant factors that have contributed to this development: firstly, the September Convention of 1864 authorized the increase in the corps strength and numbers. At the same time, it seems that the spread of a "myth" surrounding the battle of Mentana in 1867 and its wide circulation in

⁹⁹⁷ "[The] phenomenon of the international volunteer fighter can in its simplest form be defined as the spontaneous movement of men who had no initial attachment to any regular or established army, who left their own country without having the need to earn money as their sole motivation (which does not mean that they would not earn some) in order to serve in a military and political struggle in a country other than their own [...]" Pécout, "The international armed volunteers," p. 420.

⁹⁹⁸ Guénel, *Dernière guerre du pape*, p. 40.

⁹⁹⁹ In the case of the Dutch Zouaves, similarly 78% of all Dutch enlistments between 1860 and 1870 occurred between 1867 and 1870, according to Rozema, *'Op, Neerlands jeugd!'*, p. 44.


Catholic media¹⁰⁰⁰ led to an increase in the offer of soldiers as well, which in turn enabled the papal government to further increase the number of Zouaves.

5.2.2 “German” Foreign Carabineers

Mainly Swiss and German soldiers comprised the “Foreign Carabineers” regiment (“reggimento carabinieri esteri”), which was founded in May 1860 and reached a strength of 1,262 men in 20 August 1870. Between 1860 and 1870 approximately 4,100¹⁰⁰¹ soldiers had enlisted in the corps. While the German presence was limited in the case of the Zouaves, their number was quite substantial in the Carabineers: 1,516 members of this corps had been born in one of the states of the German Confederation excluding Austria and 672 had listed their last residence there, Considering the overlaps the total number of Germans amounted to 1,531.

In terms of places of birth, most of the German soldiers came from southern Germany: the three southern countries of Baden, Württemberg and Bavaria alone account for 1,029 soldiers. Prussia provided a total of 268 soldiers, of which 31 came from the Prussian Rhine Province, 20 from Westphalia, 10 from Brandenburg, 8 from the Prussian Province of Saxony, 7 from Silesia, and 2 from Pomerania.

Chart 5.9 - Germans in the Foreign Carabineers: Countries of birth




(Elaboration on the basis of the information extracted from the respective soldiers' registers)

¹⁰⁰⁰ See for this p. 101.

¹⁰⁰¹ We find more than 4,910 entries in the soldiers' registers of the “carabinieri esteri”. If we allow for a similar percentage of re-enlistments, double and cancelled entries as in the case of the Zouaves, this should correspond to the number given in the text above.

In terms of places of last residence, the number of individuals that resided in France (472), Switzerland (260), Algeria (50) and the Papal States (21) prior to their enlistment seems astonishingly high.


Chart 5.10 - Germans in the Foreign Carabineers: States of last residence



(Elaboration on the basis of the information extracted from the respective soldiers' registers)


If these numbers are then broken down into the respective localities, it becomes clear that the last place of residence of these soldiers was often in border (Strasbourg, Basle, and Mulhouse) or port cities (Marseille). Basle, Mulhouse and Schaffhausen were very close to the recruitment offices of Saint-Louis at the Rhine, and from Marseille ships would transport people to different places as well as to other armies in Europe and the world. By stating that the recruits were already residents in a foreign country prior to their enlistment, the papal administration could partially avoid legal, but mostly diplomatic issues.

Chart 5.11 - Germans in the Foreign Carabineers: Last place of residence in France



(Elaboration on the basis of the information extracted from the respective soldiers' registers)


Chart 5.12 - Germans in the Foreign Carabineers: Last place of residence in Switzerland



(Elaboration on the basis of the information extracted from the respective soldiers' registers)

Compared to the social origin of the German Papal Zouaves, the social origin of the German Carabineers – both of which are based on the respective entries given on the recorded profession of each soldier upon recruitment – was slightly lower than that of the Zouaves; this is the case when the number of individuals that had non-artisanal professional status (i.e., day workers – *giornaliere*) and the number of individuals working in the category of least remunerated artisans (e.g. shoemakers or tailors) are taken into consideration.

Chart 5.13 – German Carabineers: Most frequent professions



(Elaboration on the basis of the information extracted from the respective soldiers' registers)


But the data on professions must be handled with special care. Although it can be used to gain an idea of the social background of the soldiers, it should not be taken at face value with regard to whether or not these individuals had enlisted after having served previous military engagements. Many more individuals than those recorded in the soldiers' registers as "militare" or "ex-militare" (19 in the case of the Germans of the Zouaves and 28 in the Papal Carabineers) had already served in other armies prior to enlisting in the Papal Army. Hence, these individuals were already accustomed to military life, having served not only in the armies of their home countries, but very often those in other foreign countries as well; in fact, many had served in the French Foreign Legion, in Algeria (this is explicitly noted in the registers for 113 German Carabineers, for instance) or in Mexico (this is explicitly noted for 39 German Carabineers). Nevertheless, civil professions are listed in the soldiers' registers for many of these "professional" soldiers.

This becomes all the more evident by examining the subset of German Carabineers whose last residence is listed as Algeria. (50). Although explicit information on service in the French Legion in Algeria is specified only with regard to 29 Germans, it is possible to assume that this is also the case for the other 'former residents' of Algeria as well. Of these 29 German, who were most certainly former French soldiers, 11 have a civil profession recorded in the registers (3 of these were, for instance day workers). Civil professions have also been recorded for the Bourbon soldiers that joined Garibaldi and would form the Garibaldian "foreigners' company" in 1860 (specifically, 25 civil professions were listed). Therefore, caution must be taken when drawing conclusions based on the entries regarding the

professions of these soldiers. While they can without doubt be used to get an idea about the social origin of the soldiers – and it seems that these records already functioned in precisely this way in the soldiers' registers – it would be erroneous to interpret the frequency of the entries of civil professions as (sufficient) proof that the individuals that enlisted in the army were enlisting for the first time. Instead, it must be noted that even those individuals for whom a civilian profession is recorded in the registers had frequently served (even for quite long periods of time) in other armies before enlisting on the one or other Italian side.

In terms of age at the time of enlistment, the Germans in the corps of the Carabineers do not differ much from the German Zouaves: Even for the Carabineers, the average age at the date of enlistment was 25 (and the median was 24).

Chart 5.14 - Germans in the Foreign Carabineers: Age upon entry




(Elaboration on the basis of the information extracted from the respective soldiers' registers)

As shown above, despite the fact that the obligatory minimum period of enlistment was longer for the Carabineers, the actual duration an individual spent in the corps was lower than for the Zouaves. The average German Carabineer remained with his corps anywhere between 465 (for which we have precise entries) and 615 days (if it is assumed that those without entry served until the corps was dismantled in September 1870). The reasons to leave also partially differed between the two corps. Desertion was far more frequent in the Carabineers than in the Zouaves, and therefore, the number of individuals who fulfilled their contractual enlistment period was lower. One possible factor may indeed be that the legal period of enlistment was longer in the case of the Carabineers. Nevertheless, on the basis of


the actual time served in the corps, it seems that the endurance of the Zouaves was “better”; it is possible that this was in part due to a stronger (political) motivation.

Chart 5.15 - Papal Carabineers: Reasons for leaving



(Elaboration on the basis of the information extracted from the respective soldiers' registers)

Chart 5.16 - Papal Zouaves: Reasons for leaving



(Elaboration on the basis of the information extracted from the respective soldiers' registers)

Table 5.10 - Frequency of some reasons for leaving the two corps

<i>Reason for leaving the corps</i>	<i>German Zouaves</i>	<i>German Carabineers</i>
Desertion	8%	30%
Enlistment period completed	45%	13%
Death	3%	11%
By administrative decision	28%	12%

(Elaboration on the basis of the information extracted from the respective soldiers' registers)

5.3 Germans in the Bourbon Army

As aforementioned, Germans were to be found as well in the foreigners' corps of the Bourbon Army. Some single Germans had previously served in the Swiss battalions in Bourbon service until 1859. Following the "revolt of the Swiss" in May 1859, however, many soldiers from these corps took their leave; those that left were transported to Switzerland, where for instance at Geneva among the 1,317 former Bourbon soldiers there were 52 non-Swiss. Of these 52, 24 were from Württemberg and 12 were from Baden. There were also soldiers from Bavaria, Saxony, Prussia and Liechtenstein, together with some Austrians and one Frenchman.¹⁰⁰²

After the official dismissal of the Swiss battalions in 1859, the decision was made to assemble new battalions – now labelled "foreigners'" battalions – which were to be formed of two distinct components: the first was to integrate those foreign soldiers that choose to remain with the Bourbon Army despite the legal threats emanated from the Swiss confederation; and the second, was the creation of a partially new recruitment structure – primarily in Austria – to recruit additional soldiers.¹⁰⁰³ The result was the formation of three Bourbon foreigners' battalions: two battalions of "light carabineers" and one of "jaegers" (*cacciatori*). Recruitment efforts began to truly function only at the beginning of 1860, and these were continued even after the first battles between Garibaldians and the Bourbon Army during the summer of that same year. On 1 August 1860, according to Albert Maag, the three Bourbon foreigners' corps numbered 4,200 soldiers.¹⁰⁰⁴ It is possible to get an idea of the composition of these battalions¹⁰⁰⁵ by looking at the records pertaining to the 2,077 soldiers that were taken as

¹⁰⁰² Maag, *Schweizertruppen in neapolitanischen Diensten*, p. 447.


¹⁰⁰³ See Blaas, "L'Austria e le truppe straniere".

¹⁰⁰⁴ Maag, *Schweizertruppen in neapolitanischen Diensten*, p. 430.

¹⁰⁰⁵ When I was in Naples for archival research in 2009, the military portion of the State archives (Sede di Pizzofalcone) was unfortunately closed for structural reasons. Therefore I was unable to consult the soldiers' registers and only had access to the material in the "Archivio Borbone", which is housed in the main building of the archive. This last archive, however, is more informative and pertinent with regard to the subsequent, more irregular fight to regain power in the south of Italy.

prisoners of war on 6 January 1861 at the pontifical border: 1,280 were Austrians, 503 Swiss, 112 Bavarians, 84 Württembergers, 12 Badenens, 18 Saxons, 4 Hessians, 2 Mecklenburgers; and there was one soldier each from Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach, Hanover, Liechtenstein, Bremen, and the duchy of Nassau; single soldiers were also listed as coming from Belgium, Piedmont, and Sicily; and even 31 Neapolitans were serving in the foreigners' corps.

Chart 5.17 - Bourbon foreigners' corps: origin of the soldiers captured in the Papal States, 06.01.1861



(Elaboration on the basis of the numbers provided by Albert Maag¹⁰⁰⁶)


Of the 2,077 soldiers captured, 260 were Germans according to our definition. Soldiers from southern Germany were predominant, with 209 soldiers from Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden and Liechtenstein. There were also 41 soldiers from Prussia and Saxony.

If we assume that the composition of the subset of those captured in the Papal States reflects that of the entire corps, there would be approximately 504 German soldiers in total, of which 217 would be Bavarians, 161 Württembergers, 45 Prussians and 35 Saxons. Considering the official enlistment period was four years¹⁰⁰⁷, the numbers provided in these last two paragraphs should more or less mirror the total number of enlistees from these countries.

¹⁰⁰⁶ Maag, *Schweizertruppen in neapolitanischen Diensten*, p. 612.

¹⁰⁰⁷ *Regolamento per la reclutazione del 13° battaglione cacciatori e de' due battaglioni carabinieri leggieri sovranamente approvato il dì 10 novembre 1859 in Portici*, (Naples: Stamperia Reale, 1859), art. 5, pp. 3-4.

Chart 5.18 - Bourbon foreigners' corps: origin of the German soldiers captured in the Papal States, 06.01.1861



(Elaboration on the basis of the numbers provided by Albert Maag)

5.4 German officers across the political divides

Only some of the Germans in the various Italian armed groups held the position of officer.

Generally speaking, officers, from generals to second lieutenants, comprised roughly 3-5% of the total manpower of the European armies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.¹⁰⁰⁸ This similarity in the percentage of officers throughout Europe is not surprising, when considering that the formal organization of armies into corps, from regiment to company, seems to have been widespread throughout Europe during this period: The military encyclopaedia of Julius Castner from 1882 notes for instance that in “Germany and Russia, the battalion consists of 4 companies and 1000 men; in Austria and France of 4 companies and 900 men; in Italy 4 companies and 950 men”. Hence there is quite little variation; only Spain and Great Britain differed a bit more from this scheme, with “6 companies and 800 men” in Spain and “10 companies and 1000 men, two of which function as depot companies” in “England”.¹⁰⁰⁹ The officer-soldier ratio in the British home and Indian armies, however,

¹⁰⁰⁸ For the number of officers and their percentage of the total army of some European armies, see the Appendix I, tables A1.14-A1.22, pp. 479-485.

¹⁰⁰⁹ Julius Castner, “Bataillon,” in idem, *Militär-Lexikon. Heerwesen und Marine aller Länder mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des Deutschen Reiches, Waffen und Festungswesen, Taktik und Verwaltung* (Leipzig: Verlag des Bibliographischen Instituts, 1882), p. 20.

still reflected that of the other European armies.¹⁰¹⁰ In the case of smaller armies, the officer corps was quite small, as it was in Baden, which had between 368 (1849) and 478 (1871) individuals.¹⁰¹¹

The officer corps of the Papal Army contained between 550 (1844) and 485 (1870) officers, amounting to a percentage of the total army between 4.4-3.7%. The percentages of officers in the army of the Two Sicilies are a bit lower, and in 1857 the officer corps comprised 1,334 individuals of 69,160 soldiers (1.9%).

Table 5.11 - Number of officers and their percentage in the Papal Army

<i>Army</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Total number of soldiers</i>	<i>Number of officers</i>	<i>Percentage of officers of the total</i>
Papal	1844	12,531	550 ¹⁰¹²	4.4%
Papal	1850	17,778	570 ¹⁰¹³	3.2%
Papal	20.09.1870	12,976	485 ¹⁰¹⁴	3.7%

¹⁰¹⁰ "Heerwesen Großbritanniens," v. Löbell's *Jahresberichte über die Veränderungen und Fortschritte im Militärwesen* 32 (1905): p. 93.

¹⁰¹¹ Calculated on the numbers given in the COW for the total strength of the army and the numbers of officers in Baden, according to Lutz, *Offizierskorps*. p. 99.

¹⁰¹² Friz, *Burocrati e soldati*, p. 163.

¹⁰¹³ Ibid., p. 167.

¹⁰¹⁴ Vigeveno, *La fine dell'esercito pontificio*, p. 485.

Table 5.12 - Number of officers and their percentage in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies

Army	Year	Total number of soldiers	Number of officers	Percentage of officers of the total
Kingdom of Two Sicilies	1857	69,160 ¹⁰¹⁵	1,334 ¹⁰¹⁶	1.9%
Sicilian infantry	1857	56,088	1,002 ¹⁰¹⁷	1.8%
Sicilian cavalry	1857	6,840	180 ¹⁰¹⁸	2.6%
Sicilian artillery	1857	6,232	152 ¹⁰¹⁹	2.4%
Only troops on Sicily	1860	26,667	897 ¹⁰²⁰	3.4%

On the opposite political side, the variation in the quantity of officers compared to the total count in the army is greater. The complaints at the time that the promotion of individuals to the position of officer occurred too frequently in the case of the State of Sicily in 1848 are mirrored by the percentage of officers provided by Piero Pieri, according to which officers represented approximately 9% of the Sicilian Army. In the case of the Garibaldian Legion in 1848/49, the proportion of officers to common soldiers was similar to that of the regular armies. In 1860, however, the percentage of officers in Garibaldi's southern army was particularly high, and according to one author, the officer corps comprised 7,343 individuals of a total of 52,000 soldiers (or ca. 14%). Here, the proportions in the Garibaldian Army was comparable to the European part-time reserve corps or militias, which normally had a higher

¹⁰¹⁵ This is so only in the three main branches of the army (infantry, cavalry, artillery).

¹⁰¹⁶ This is so only in the three main branches of the army (infantry, cavalry, artillery). H. O. Killmeyer, *Militär-Geographie von Europa mit den asiatisch-russischen und asiatisch-afrikanisch-türkischen Ländern* (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler'sche Buchhandlung, 1857), p. 243.

¹⁰¹⁷ Ivi.

¹⁰¹⁸ Ivi.

¹⁰¹⁹ Ivi.

¹⁰²⁰ Giovanni Delli Franci, *Cronica della campagna d'autunno del 1860 fatta sulle rive del Volturno e del Garigliano dall'esercito napoletano*, vol. 3 (Naples: per tipi di Angelo Trani, 1870), pp. 328-329.

number of officers than the regular infantry regiments, most likely for reasons of military education and training.¹⁰²¹

Table 5.13 - Number of officers and their percentage in the Sicilian Army 1848

<i>Army</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Total number of soldiers</i>	<i>Number of officer</i>	<i>Percentage of officers of the total</i>
Esercito siciliano	end of 1848			ca. 9% ¹⁰²²

Table 5.14 - Number of officers and their percentage in the Roman Republic 1848-49

<i>Army</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Total number of soldiers</i>	<i>Number of officer</i>	<i>Percentage of officers of the total</i>
Garibaldi Legion ¹⁰²³	21.12.1848	482	21 ¹⁰²⁴	4.4%
Garibaldi Legion ¹⁰²⁵	03.01.1849	535	24 ¹⁰²⁶	4.5%
Garibaldi Legion	End of April 1849	ca. 1,200-1,300	? 54-59 ¹⁰²⁷	? 4.5%

Table 5.15 – Number of officers and their percentage Southern Army 1860

<i>Army</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Total number of soldiers</i>	<i>Number of officers</i>	<i>Percentage of officers of the total</i>
Esercito Meridionale	1860	52,839	7,343 ¹⁰²⁸	13.9%

¹⁰²¹ See the percentages for some of these reserve corps (between 7.7% and 8.5% of officers) in the appendix I, table A1.22, p. 485.

¹⁰²² Pieri notes as well that according to the plans the ratio should have been smaller: i.e., 3 officers to 10 soldiers, Pieri, *Storia militare del Risorgimento*, p. 526.

¹⁰²³ Included the corps of the lancers (*lancieri*).

¹⁰²⁴ Loevinson, *Giuseppe Garibaldi e la sua legione nello Stato romano*, 2, pp. 32-33.

¹⁰²⁵ This included the corps of the lancers (*lancieri*).

¹⁰²⁶ Loevinson, *Giuseppe Garibaldi e la sua legione nello Stato romano*, 2, pp. 35-36.

¹⁰²⁷ Loevinson does not provide numbers on the officers for this period; therefore, we can only estimate a number based on the last available data. For the other numbers, see Ermanno Loevinson, *Giuseppe Garibaldi e la sua legione nello Stato romano, 1848-49. Parte prima, con uno schizzo geografico.*, vol. 1 (Rome; Milan: Soc. Edit. Dante Alighieri di Albrighi, Segati e C., 1902-1904), p. 160 and Loevinson, *Giuseppe Garibaldi e la sua legione nello Stato romano*, 2, pp. 48-49.

¹⁰²⁸ Torre, "Relazione," p. 300.

Table 5.16 - Number of officers and their percentage Cacciatori del Tevere of Luigi Masi

<i>Army</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Total number of soldiers</i>	<i>Number of officer</i>	<i>Percentage of officers of the total</i>
<i>Cacciatori del Tevere</i>	1860-1862	1,613	43 ¹⁰²⁹	2.7%

If we narrow the focus to the foreign officers, the number of people is greatly restricted: For instance, despite the fact that there were between 9,000 and 9,500 enlistments in the Papal Zouaves between 1860 and 1870, only approximately 150 individuals could name themselves Zouave officers in the same period; the officer corps of the Carabineers of that same period counted no more than approximately 85 individuals.

Table 5.17 - Officer numbers and percentages of officers in the foreign corps of the Papal Army

<i>Corps</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Total of soldiers</i>	<i>Number of officers</i>	<i>Percentage of officers out of the total</i>
Papal – Carabinieri esteri	1864	636	42 ¹⁰³⁰	6.6%
Papal – Papal Zouaves	1865	563	32 ¹⁰³¹	5.7%
Papal Carabinieri esteri	1860-1870	ca. 4,100 (4,910 entries in the registers) ¹⁰³²	ca. 85 (102 entries in the registers) ¹⁰³³	2% 2%
Papal Zouaves	1861-1870	ca. 9,000 (10,920 ¹⁰³⁴ entries in the registers)	ca. 150 (183 ¹⁰³⁵ entries in the officer registers)	1.7% 1.7%

¹⁰²⁹ Ivi.

¹⁰³⁰ Friz, *Burocrati e soldati*, p. 238.

¹⁰³¹ Ibid., p. 239.

¹⁰³² ASR, Fondo Ministero delle Armi, Matricole vols. 1630-1634 (soldiers).

¹⁰³³ ASR, Fondo Ministero delle Armi, Matricole vol. 1381 (officers).

¹⁰³⁴ The registers of the common soldiers of the regiment between 1861 and 1870 reach 10,920 entries, but without re-engagements and annulations this number drops to approximately 9,000-9,500 enlistments. 9,000 is the suggestion made by Guénel, *Dernière guerre du pape*, p. 40, but this number seems a bit too low.

¹⁰³⁵ This is so, if one accepts a similar number of re-engagements and cancellations as proposed ivi, p. 40.

Based on an analysis of the soldiers' registers, it is possible to extract the precise numbers of the German officers in the foreigners' corps of the Papal Army: 7 served as officers in the Zouaves between 1860 and 1870; 21 did so in the Carabineers.¹⁰³⁶ Of these officers, 10 were Bavarians, 9 Prussians, 2 Luxembourgers and 2 Badeners. Interestingly, one-third of the officers in the Carabineers were Prussian, hence they were – compared with the 18% of soldiers from Prussia in total – slightly overrepresented; as with the common soldiers, the last residence of several German officers was listed as being in foreign countries, from the Papal States (3) to Algeria and France (2 in total). If we allow for the fact that there were other isolated “Germans” among the generals (e.g. Hermann Kanzler, who became papal Minister of Arms) as well as several in other corps, the actual number of German officers in the Papal Army between 1860 and 1870 cannot be much higher than perhaps 40 individuals.

Of the papal German officers, some had already served the Papal Army for a long time. In fact, a “recent” mobilization can be assumed only for some of them; in the Zouaves, for instance, one can assume so for Joseph Alois Bach, Albert Kligge (who joined the previous corps of the French-Belgian sharpshooters – *Tirailleurs Franco-Belges* – in October 1860), Xaver von Korff-Schmising-Kerssenbrock (who joined in December 1867) and the two Luxembourgers Félix Poncin de Casaquy and Victor Mousty¹⁰³⁷ (who joined in 1860). The two brothers Ferdinand and Maximilian Hefner from Bavaria, however, joined the Papal Army in the 1850s (Ferdinand in 1854, and Maximilian in 1855¹⁰³⁸); the same goes for Hermann Kanzler, who was appointed as a cadet to the 1st foreign regiment of the Papal Army in 1845.¹⁰³⁹ The Hefners and Kanzler made their entire “career” in different corps of the Papal Army.

But even the officers that joined the Papal Army from 1860 onwards often came from previous military engagements and remained with the Papal Army for a more or less extended period. Poncin served in the Belgian Army between 1853 and 1860 and enlisted in the Papal Army in 1860, only to leave comparatively early in 1862. Korff had served in the Prussian Army between 1860 and 1864. He then joined the Papal Army in 1867 and remained there until September 1870. Lastly Bach, who had never previously served, likewise arrived in 1867 and remained until September 1870.

¹⁰³⁶ See the appendix I, tables A1.26 and A1.28, pp. 489 and 492.

¹⁰³⁷ That they figure in this thesis as “Germans” is the result of the definition of “Germans” adopted: Those who were born or had their last residence in the States of the German Confederation, excluding Austria. Mousty and Poncin de Casaquy were both born before 1839 in the French-speaking part of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, which in 1839 (during the “third partition of Luxemburg”) became part of Belgium.

¹⁰³⁸ They are a “bourgeois” example of the widely diffused practice of entering a military corps in which there was already a relative. Another example from the Papal Army are the Stolberg cousins.

¹⁰³⁹ ASR, Ministero delle Armi, soldiers' register vol. 1371 (1° Reggimento Estero, Ufficiali), no. 36.

Nevertheless – and this confirms my thesis that there was often a plurality of motives that simultaneously came into play even in one single case – at least with regard to Bach, Kanzler and Korff, it is possible to verify from their biographies that they came from very devoted catholic families.¹⁰⁴⁰ They were, or very much became, military professionals and pursued wholly military careers between Germany and Italy, but had nevertheless grown up in highly religious families. Perhaps there is no better illustration for this overlap between military life and (Catholic) religious belief than a list of “soldier saints” that Korff had with him in 1868, and which I found in his personal papers for the year 1868: Herein are also named the usual patrons of the respective branches of the armies, from Saint Maurice for the infantry to Saint Joseph for the engineer corps.

Image 5.1. “Calendar of holy soldiers”

Kalender heiliger Soldaten.
(Von Seiner Heiligkeit Papst Pius IX. mit mehrfachen Ablassen begnadigt.)

Heiliger Florian, bitt für uns, auf dass wir würdig werden der Verheissungen Christi.

Patron der Infanterie ist der heil. Mauritius,
Patron der Cavallerie ist der heil. Georg,
Patronin der Artillerie ist die heil. Barbara,
Patron des Genies etc. ist der heil. Joseph.

Januar. 1. 30 Märtyrer. 2. Marcellinus. 3. Gordius. 5. Eduard, König. 7. Canut, König. 12. 40 Märtyrer. 13. Godfridus u. 40 Märtyrer. 18. Moseus und Ammonius. 20. Sebastianus. 28. Carolus, Kais. 29. Papias und Maurus. Februar. 2. Cornelius. 4. Philoromus. 7. Adavacus,	Theodor und Richard, Kön. 10. 10 Märtyrer. 12. Damianus. 24. Edilbertus, König. 27. Besa. März. 3. Marinus, Hemiterius, Chelidonius, Cleonicus, Eutropius und Basiliscus. 4. Casimir, Prinz 8. Johannes de Deo. 10. 40 Märtyrer. 15. Longinus. 18. Eduard, Kön. 20. Sebastianus. 23. Victorianus. 27. Alexander,	Amphilocheus u. Cronidas. 28. Gunthram, König. 29. Armogastis. 30. Quirinus. April. 11. 8 Märtyrer. 13. Hermenegildis, Prinz. 16. Gerold, Herzog. 18. Corebus. 23. Georgius. 24. Sabas. 28. Vitalis. 29. Aemilianus. Mai. 1. Sigismundus, König. 3. Alexander.	4. Florianus. 8. Victor und Acathius. 13. Gangolphus. 18. Solochanus u. seine Gefährt. Erich, König. 21. Nicostratus u. Antiochus u. Andere. 24. Meletius und 252 Soldaten. 25. Gerlach. 27. Julius. 28. Wilhelm, Herzog. 30. Ferdinand, König. 31. Hermias. Juni. 1. Ischyron u. 5 Sold., Felinus	u. Gratinianus u. Crescentianus u. Wistan, Fürst. 7. Gottschalk, Fürst. 12. Basilides, Cyrinus, Nabor und Nazarius. 15. Hesychius. 17. Montanus. 18. Leontius und Hypatius. 22. Ein Soldat, der den h. Albanus zum Martertode führte. Galenus, Valenus, Achatius, Theodorus u. 10,000 Märt. 24. Sieben Brüder:	Orentius, Heros, Pharnacius, Firmianus, Firmus, Cyriacus und Longinus. 25. Gallicanus. 27. Ladislaus, König. 30. Basilides, der die h. Potamiona zum Martertode führte. Juli. 1. Rumoldus, Prinz. 2. 3 Soldaten, bekehrt bei dem Martertode des h. Paulus.
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Source: Vereinigte Westfälische Adelsarchive Münster, Nachlaß Franz Xaver von Korff gen. Schmising-Kerssenbrock (1838-1910), Bri. N. XVI.

It is also of note that in the Papal Army, the German officers were not predominantly of noble origin. Of the 7 Zouave officers only one was of noble background (Korff); and of the 21 German Carabineer officers, only 6 came from noble families.

¹⁰⁴⁰ See their biographies in the appendix II.

Among the Garibaldians of 1860, on the other hand, – considering the more complex archival situation, and the different corps – 8 officers in total were from Germany, 4 of which were born in Prussia, 2 in Bavaria, and one officer each from Baden and Luxembourg.¹⁰⁴¹

Looking more closely at the biographies of these German officers it becomes clear that many on this side of the conflict had had previous military engagements as well. Of the eight German Garibaldian officers, at least seven had previously served in regular armies before they joined the southern Italian campaign.

Ferdinand Fix from Luxembourg¹⁰⁴² had served in the German navy between 1849 and 1852¹⁰⁴³, and after his Garibaldian experience he entered the engineering corps of the Italian army. Then, in the spring of 1862 he joined, as captain, an infantry regiment of the (northern) Union. Fix went on to rise in the military ranks in the US right up to the War Department in Washington.¹⁰⁴⁴

Ernst Hoffman[n] served as an officer in the Prussian engineering corps, then participated in the first Schleswig-Holstein War (1848-1851), after which he joined the British service and fought in Crimea and in Africa. After having served in the Garibaldian campaign, he joined the engineering corps of the Italian Army, but, like Fix, left to serve the Union in the US as well, where he eventually became chief engineer of the 11th army corps.¹⁰⁴⁵

Karl Spraul first served in the Bavarian infantry before he joined the British German Legion for Crimea. After 1860, he, too, joined an army of the Union.¹⁰⁴⁶

Friedrich Wilhelm Rüstow, instead, had served in the Prussian engineering corps from 1838 to 1850 and then became an instructor in Swiss service from 1850 onwards. After 1860, he again actively served in the Swiss Army, where he became a colonel in the General Staff in 1870.¹⁰⁴⁷

¹⁰⁴¹ See the respective entries in appendix I, table A1.29, p. 495.

¹⁰⁴² "Fix, Louis F.," in *Biographie nationale publiée par l'Académie royale des sciences, des lettres et des beaux-arts de Belgique*, vol. 35, supplement vol. VII (« Adrenatius-Hubert ») (Brussels: Établissements Émile Bruylant 1869), pp. 268-69.

¹⁰⁴³ Fix is mentioned with this rank by Max Bär, *Die deutsche Flotte von 1848-1852. Nach den Akten der Staatsarchive zu Berlin und Hannover* (Leipzig: Verlag von S. Hirzel, 1898), p. 235.

¹⁰⁴⁴ Charles A. Poland, *Army register of Ohio volunteers in the service of the United States [...] for July 1862* (Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State Journal Printing Co., 1862), p. 53.

¹⁰⁴⁵ Wilhelm Kaufmann, "Hoffmann, Ernst F., Major," in idem, *Die Deutschen im amerikanischen Bürgerkriegs- Sezessionskrieg 1861-1865* (Munich; Berlin: Druck und Verlag von R. Oldenbourg, 1911), pp. 513-14.

¹⁰⁴⁶ Wilhelm Kaufmann, "Spraul, Karl M., Inspektor der Infanterie im 11. Korps," *ibid.*, p. 554

¹⁰⁴⁷ Carlo Moos, "Streiflichter auf Wilhelm Rüstows Beziehungen zu Italien," *Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken* 65 (1985): pp. 342-402.

Enrico¹⁰⁴⁸ Bild and Luigi Adolfo Wolff both served in the Bourbon Army. Wolff's previous military engagements are recorded as the "Roman Army", "Africa", and "Italy 1848-49". Lastly, Francesco Ulrich had served in the Prussian Army before enlisting with the Garibaldians.

The previous as well as subsequent military engagements of these German officers are a clear indication that we are dealing very much with professional soldiers that actively pursued military careers, albeit in various armies; some of these officers tended to remain on one political side, while others would oscillate.

5.5 Conclusions

The identification of German soldiers and officers across the Italian political sides most certainly suffers from the varied quality of information in the various sources available. Therefore, the study of the "transnational soldiers" of the Risorgimento, especially of those that participated in the Mazzinian and Garibaldian campaigns, faces issues that are well known to the scholars of the Italian *garibaldini*.

While this archival situation must be kept in mind, it seems nevertheless clear from the available material that the number of foreign soldiers was the highest in the armies of the Anti-Risorgimento. Both in absolute and relative terms, most of the foreign soldiers served in the Papal Army. This is not particularly astonishing, considering that the army depended entirely on formally voluntary enlistments and that at various and specific points the explicit decision was taken to recruit abroad. The numbers show that the combination of political and cultural mobilization, the presence of national associations created to support the Papal Army or even to provide it with soldiers, resulted in a doubled or tripled papal presence in the European states (papal recruitment structures, Catholic clergy and Catholic diplomacy), made itself quantitatively felt. The concrete recruitment activities and structures had a clear effect on the outcome: this is evident in the case of the elevated number of German papal soldiers from Aachen and nearby Eupen, where the presence and activities of an association to recruit Papal Zouaves was amplified by the nearby recruitment office; it is also clear in the case of the Bourbon foreign recruitment, where the presence of recruitment offices in Austria as well as the official decision not to enlist northern Germans led to the enlistment of a high percentage of southern Germans. Despite the projects to support Garibaldi, the actual

¹⁰⁴⁸ In this period first names were nearly always noted in the soldiers' registers in their Italian version, I only gave German first names in those cases where, with the aid of other sources, it was possible to confirm that the person denoted in Italian was the same as the corresponding German in other sources.

structures to recruit Germans were either created too late (Becker was, so to say, always too late) or were not effectively put into practice; the German case was hence different from that of the Hungarian, French or British, which had all provided apposite Legions for Garibaldi. Therefore, the largest group of German Garibaldians was formed in a very particular way: i.e., by deserters from the Bourbon Army. In this way, the behaviour of the Germans was not only similar to that of the soldiers that brought about the initial formation of the Hungarian Legion in 1859 the Germans were similar to the initial formation of the Hungarian Legion in 1859, but also to that of the many southern Italians that enlisted as the Garibaldians approached and passed through Sicily, Calabria, Basilicata and finally Campania.

It is worth noting that the foreign participation in the various Garibaldian campaigns in general quite often conformed to the percentages of foreigners in the regular European armies of this period. Therefore, contemporary historians must take care not to confuse their “transnational perspective” of the *garibaldini* with the idea of a supposedly exceptional “transnational character” of these campaigns.

More specifically, the previous paragraphs also demonstrate that although the papal recruitment was the most successful in quantitative terms, with regard to both the foreign and the German soldiers, German recruitment never reached the levels that, for instance, the French soldiers did in the same army. Organizational, political, diplomatic and last but not least legal reasons were determining factors in this outcome: The fact that there were no official papal recruitment offices in German territory, but instead were present in France, Belgium and Austria, most certainly influenced the number of German individuals that could be attracted to the papal cause. This reality also influenced the regional origin of those Germans that did join the Papal Army via the recruitment offices abroad.

In terms of their distribution in the Papal Army, only a minor portion of the Papal Zouaves, but a considerably larger number of the Papal Foreign Carabineers consisted of soldiers from the German states, excluding Austria. The relatively small German contingent of the Zouaves was characterized by the rather strong Prussian, more precisely Rhenish and Westphalian, origin of the soldiers, which brings to mind the early *Prussian* Kulturkampf. As shown in chapter 4.2.2.3, the Rhenish and Westphalian Catholic nobility lay at the forefront of the recruitment efforts for the Papal Army, and some of their exponents were themselves to be found in the Papal Zouave corps; other Rhenish and Westphalian enlistments were more indirectly linked to these activities. The Germans that joined the Carabineers came instead mostly from southern Germany. The social origin of the soldiers in these two corps also partially differed: While there were some (noble) landowners in the ranks of the Papal

Zouaves (even if there were not many in the officer corps), approximately 65% of the German Zouaves were artisans and labourers. The German Carabineers, on the other hand were from a slightly lower social status, but conversely there were more nobles amongst the Carabineer officers.

Compared with the Carabineers, the Zouaves tended to remain in service slightly longer than their German comrades in the other corps. Although they served on average for nearly two years – the similar median of days of service shows that this is not an average of extremes, the German Carabineers, despite the fact that they had to enlist for longer periods than the Zouaves, served for fewer days on average than their Zouave counterparts. Most likely also due to their longer contractual period, desertions were far higher in this corps than they were in the Zouaves. Nevertheless, it seems that the commitment of the Zouaves was more “enduring”, which likely hints at a partially higher political motivation, especially when specific economic incentives or deterrents can be excluded by virtue of the fact that the payment schemes of the two corps were very similar.

The enlistment on the part of the German Zouaves and the German Carabineers (but also that of the Garibaldian German soldiers and officers) was often not the first. Previous military engagements, among which service abroad, from the French Foreign Legion in Algeria or Mexico to previous engagements in the Papal Army were frequently recorded in the registers. In terms of age, both groups were very similar; each were only partially comprised of adolescent boys, but, nevertheless, predominantly counted young adults.

A comparison of the two papal regiments is of course especially interesting when considered within the context of another element: different military corps of the same army often had a different level of prestige, and frequently had a different social composition as well. Traditionally, not all regiments of the European armies were of the same symbolic “rank”; they differed in prestige in the eyes of the monarch, the officers themselves and the population. Nobles for instance traditionally tried to join the more prestigious guard regiments.¹⁰⁴⁹

Differences of prestige and “rank” among the corps of the Papal Army also existed. The Papal Zouaves had systematically been “mythologized” and “celebrated” by Catholic publications from its very inception; the Zouaves were described as the Pope’s “volunteers”,

¹⁰⁴⁹ See, e. g., Winkel, *Im Netz des Königs*, especially on the “rank of the corps” pp. 62-66; Lutz, *Offizierskorps*, pp. 112-116; for the case of the Bourbon Army and the exclusively noble royal guards, see instead Giovanni Montroni, “I gentiluomini della chiave d'oro,” *Meridiana*, no. 19 (1994): pp. 59-82.

and not only as a multinational corps, but also the finest corps of the Papal Army.¹⁰⁵⁰ Without doubt, this myth, which was fabricated at an early stage, contributed to the successful Europe-wide recruitment campaigns. From the moment it was created, the corps of the Papal Zouaves was conferred upon it a “singularity” in terms of the supposed motivation and social origin of the soldiers and officers, which was intimately connected to multimedia-based and also multinational elaborations of the military events of 1860 and 1867. The myth of the “Zouaves” still surfaces in a somewhat “Freudian” error for instance in Bach’s biography, which was written by Jakob Knauber. Knauber writes that Bach, upon his arrival in Rome, was directly appointed to the Zouaves. This, however, was not the case insofar as Bach was first appointed to the Carabineers. Much like Bach, Korff also switched between the two corps.

The analysis of the German soldiers and officers suggests that the myth of the Papal Zouaves, while important for the mobilization, only partially informed the military reality. Some Zouaves had joined the Papal Army well before the events of 1860 and 1867; many had also served in different corps and/or different European armies and not the Zouaves alone; and many had stayed with their corps for quite a long period and often pursued a military career in the Papal Army. In other words, a distinction must be made between the “image” of the respective corps that was more or less consciously produced by the contemporaries at the time, the effects that this image had on the general and military publics and the actual differences that, however – at least based on information extracted on the sample of German soldiers – seem to have been smaller than the image created at the time would have us believe.

The history of the officers provides a similarly “sobering” effect as well. Again it is important to emphasize that when speaking of officers we are dealing with only a small portion of any given army’s total count; the same can be said of the even more restricted group of German officers.

However small their number, there is generally far more and more detailed information on, as well as private sources for officers (including those from Germany) than there is for many of the rank and file. Hence, it is possible to analyse more in depth their biographies, personal networks and affiliations. It is not surprising in fact that officers take centre stage in many studies, especially with regard to foreign soldiering. While this can be

¹⁰⁵⁰ From the sources see, e. g., “I Crociati di San Pietro. Scene storiche del 1867”; N. N., “Die holländischen Zuaven im päpstlichen Heere”. Many historical works are dedicated to the corps of the Zouaves, but often are not sufficiently critical in regard to the “myth”: Even if the point should not be to show a strict dichotomy between “reality” and “myth”, but rather how reality is interwoven and shaped by (powerful) myths, in my view it is equally erroneous to equate the two from the beginning, as it seems the case for instance in Guénel, *Dernière guerre du pape*, Coulombe, *Pope's legion* or even Harrison, “Zouave stories”.

somewhat justified on the basis of their military role, it is important not to forget about a “history from below” of the rank and file of the “transnational soldiers”. Officers and common soldiers – due to their specific tasks and institutional placements, but also to other differences regarding for instance how they spent their time, the knowledge of foreign languages, and last but not least, income – could have had somewhat different experiences during their stay in Italy.

6 Volunteers and mercenaries: Individual motivation and the classification of warriors

Delving into the underlying motivation of soldierly engagement in Italy is an epistemologically difficult endeavour. First, it is important to underline that “motivation” was one of the main topics of the contemporary controversy between the political sides; it was a “war of concepts” that revolved around two words: “volunteer” and “mercenary”. Second, the question of motives is especially difficult from a scientific perspective, insofar as there are serious problems of proof, not to mention the possible existence of different and contemporaneous motives. Third, by the fact that in recent historiography volunteers are considered indirect proof of the diffusion of national discourse – or, in the more recent historiography, as proof of the political conviction of the anti-Risorgimento soldiers – the two aforementioned problems become intertwined: If the concepts of the “volunteer” and/or “mercenary” are applied in the study of (foreign) soldiers in the Italian armed groups of the nineteenth century, we use words that are ubiquitous in the sources. The risk, however, is that the words used in the sources become confounded with the words of the analysis thus creating confusion. In this way it becomes difficult to maintain critical distance, which is facilitated by the use of more analytical concepts.

The distinction between economically motivated “mercenaries” and politically and ideologically motivated “volunteers” was a central feature of the clash between the pro-Unitarian forces on the one hand and the legitimists and Catholics on the other, i.e. the “conceptual political” conflict. The way in which each side characterized the two forms of soldiers as well as the words that were used to make a distinction between “ours” and “theirs”, and specifically “our volunteers” and “their mercenaries”, was rather similar.

6.1 Volunteers and mercenaries – a “war of concepts”

Each side characterized its “own” soldiers as economically uninterested “volunteers”, and described the soldiers of the “other” as being economically driven “mercenaries”. One of the demonstrations of proof that a given side's soldiers were volunteers, and therefore only politically motivated, was that these (supposedly) renounced their pay. In 1868, the Catholic Mössinger wrote with regard to the Papal Zouaves that these last “often served paying their own way”.¹⁰⁵¹ A comment made by the papal soldier Eickholt about his mother somewhat

¹⁰⁵¹ „Sie dienen sehr häufig auf eigene Kosten [...]“. Mössinger, *Wozu braucht der heilige Vater eine Armee?*, p. 19.

contradicted this statement. Apparently Eickhart's mother did not want him to accept payment for his service to the Pope. But, when she realized that this was not possible (because a regular wage was, as aforementioned, stipulated in the contract) she decided to make personal monthly donations to the Pope for the same amount her son earned.¹⁰⁵² On the opposite side, for instance Rüstow spoke of his lack of interest in economic rewards: "I soon made an agreement with myself to ask for the lowest conditions possible, because I found that it was not appropriate to receive money while serving a cause for which I nurtured the highest interest." But despite these words, we know that he was not paid like other officers, but that he had negotiated specific conditions, including a "modest" allowance to be paid to his family, both during his activity in Italy or in the event of his death, in addition to coverage of only the "most necessary" for himself.¹⁰⁵³ Disinterest in economic rewards was an important ingredient of the topos of "sacrifice" so much so, that this created the environment whereby soldiers, in demonstration of their support to the cause, were conditioned to display little or no concern with regard to economic considerations. Harro-Paul Haring, a participant in the invasion of Savoy in 1834, described the typical privations of "sacrifice". He spoke of his comrades as being "the model of abnegation and altruism" and consequently refused, in a footnote, to be called a "soldier" seeing that the term was etymologically connoted with money. Nevertheless, a bit further on in his text, he specified what sums he had advanced from his own pocket during the campaign (157 Swiss francs, "without counting my nourishment"), obviously still hoping to be reimbursed in spite of the fact that the "invasion" had been unsuccessful.¹⁰⁵⁴ This topos of "economic disinterest" did indeed play an important role in the debates between political adversaries, but it was also prominent in the debates between exponents of the same "party". Within this same context of the Savoy campaign, the question of "economic disinterest" was one of the most prominent criticisms advanced against the hired General Gerolamo Ramorino insofar as he had stipulated, in previous campaigns, a

¹⁰⁵² Eickholt, Roms letzte Tage unter der Tiara. Erinnerungen eines römischen Kanoniers aus den Jahren 1868 bis 1870, p. 43.

¹⁰⁵³ „Ich war, da ich es für unangemessen hielt, eine Sache, für welche ich das größte Interesse empfand, um des Erwerbs willen zu dienen, sehr bald mit mir einig, daß diese Bedingungen so niedrig als möglich gestellt würden. Ich verlangte daher nur für die Zeit meiner Abwesenheit von Hause eine kleine Pension für meine Familie, die eben hinreichen konnte, den Hausstand in den bescheidensten Verhältnissen aufrecht zu erhalten, ferner die Zusicherung einer andern kleinen Summe für den Fall, daß ich in Italien den Tod fände, einer Summe, die genügen würde, die ersten Bedürfnisse meiner Familie zu decken [...]. Für mich selbst aber verlangte ich nichts als eine Stellung, in der ich wahrhaft nützlich werden könnte, und das Nothwendigste, um den Dienst dieser Stellung wirklich thun zu können, ohne irgendeine Summe zu fixieren.“ Rüstow, *Erinnerungen aus dem italienischen Feldzuge von 1860*, 1, p. 3.

¹⁰⁵⁴ « [..U]n modèle d'abnégation et de dévoûment [...] » ; « sans compter ma nourriture ». Haring, *Mémoires sur la Jeune Italie*, 1, p. 51

supposedly “enormous” wage for himself. According to the apparently personally economically disinterested Haring, Ramorino had received an enlistment premium of 40,000 Swiss francs for his role in the “Invasion of Savoy”.¹⁰⁵⁵

Each side of the conflict would couple the heroization of their own foreign soldiers with the denigration of the opposite ranks, especially the foreigners, often reserving for them the pejorative label of “mercenary”. Assumptions regarding the economic intentions of soldiers on the opposite political side were not only an effect of but also part of the process of the moralization and nationalization of the concept of the soldier, which especially took place during the nineteenth century. The Italian Nationalists liked to refer to the papal soldiers as “the Pope’s foreign mercenaries” (*mercenari stranieri del papa*) to polemically mark a difference between the volunteer who fought for ideals and the foreign soldier who would fight for anybody who would pay him.¹⁰⁵⁶ According to Garibaldi, the papal soldiers were “mercenaries, waste from all European cesspits”.¹⁰⁵⁷ Friedrich Wilhelm Rüstow considered them to be “depraved people” fighting only for money or as undisciplined “drunkards”.¹⁰⁵⁸ In 1860, an article in the German liberal journal “Grenzboten” expressed quite a negative opinion on the social origin of the foreign Bourbon soldiers: “For the corps of foreigners, the Austrian and Bavarian rabble is contributing with a strong contingent, and still now the steamships of the Triestian Lloyd bring twice monthly bunches of these warriors to the depots of Brindisi and Molfetta.”¹⁰⁵⁹ On the other side, Catholics believed the Garibaldians to be motivated solely by pay or the hope for war spoils, and were referred to as the “Garibaldian thieving horde”.¹⁰⁶⁰ The papal brigadier Eickholt described the soldiers of Victor Emanuel II of 1870 as “mercenaries”, of which one “could not expect honourable comportment.” The foreigners fighting on his side, however, were characterized in terms of voluntarism. According to Eickholt, papal soldiers were totally different from the Italian soldiers: “Noble, enthusiastic youth were gathering under the yellow-white flags, driven by the most idealistic

¹⁰⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 58.

¹⁰⁵⁶ Already in 1860 the Pope thought it necessary to respond to the accusations that his foreign soldiers were “mercenaries” in the allocution *Novos et ante*. See “*Novos et ante. Allocutio habita in concistorio secreto die XXVIII septembris MDCCCLX*”; English translation in “The Italian revolution. The papal allocution”. See for this the p. 96 above.

¹⁰⁵⁷ Giuseppe Garibaldi, *Edizione nazionale degli scritti di Giuseppe Garibaldi. Vol. II. Le Memorie di Garibaldi nella redazione definitiva del 1872*, vol. 2 (Bologna: Capelli, 1932), p. 524. They are also considered to be mercenaries by Hoffstetter, *Tagebuch*, p. 270.

¹⁰⁵⁸ Rüstow, *Der italienische Krieg 1860*, pp. 6-7.

¹⁰⁵⁹ „Zu dem Fremdenkorps lieferte österreichisches und bayerisches Gesindel ein starkes Contingent, und noch jetzt führen die Dampfer des Triester Lloyd monatlich zweimal Kriegsvolk dieser Art in die Depots von Brindisi und Molfetta.“ “Die neapolitanische Armee,” *Die Grenzboten. Zeitschrift für Politik und Literatur* 19 (1860): p. 29.

¹⁰⁶⁰ “[..G]aribaldinischen Raubgesindels [...]”. Möisinger, *Wozu braucht der heilige Vater eine Armee?*, p. 9.

of motives.”¹⁰⁶¹ This classification into volunteers and mercenaries, in the last instance, depended here as elsewhere on the “evaluation of the legitimacy of [the soldier’s ...] action and his motives [...]”¹⁰⁶²

The terms “mercenary” and “volunteer” were first and foremost expressions of political propaganda in the nineteenth century. These “asymmetric counter concepts”¹⁰⁶³ were this century’s parallel to binary conceptualizations that would be used in later periods: “The freedom fighters of the one side were the terrorists of the other.”¹⁰⁶⁴ Perhaps it is not true “that there was no longer any place for the mercenary in the nineteenth century”, as Andreas Herberg-Rothe has written.¹⁰⁶⁵ What was lacking however, was the positive perception of the mercenary; this negative consideration was already present in the contemporaries of the eighteenth century, as Peter Burschel has argued¹⁰⁶⁶, and even more so in the nineteenth century. In this period, plenty of room was given to the discursive denigration of foreigners in the ranks of the adversary, by describing them as mercenaries, and to the idealization of those in one’s own ranks as idealistic volunteers. The figure of the volunteer was used as a symbol to represent the soldier that was politically convinced of the objectives of the campaigns he was fighting in; the volunteer was not just a soldier, but he was first and foremost an individual specifically and exclusively motivated by political convictions. As such, the term “volunteer” was not confined – in terms of terminology or concretely speaking – to the democratic or liberal political arenas. What we have before us is a discourse on voluntarism: On neither side was the recognition or approval of the economic motives of their soldiers “sayable”, but both could and readily did – almost to a coercive degree – characterize their own soldiers as idealistically motivated “volunteers”.

6.2 What the agents themselves identified as their motives

In their own personal accounts, the Germans who fought for Mazzini and Garibaldi, as well those who served the Pope and the last Bourbon King tended to highlight their idealist motives. This was the case of the German democrats who joined *Giovine Europa* and took part in Mazzini’s attempted invasion of Savoy in 1834, which seemed to fulfil Mazzini’s hope

¹⁰⁶¹ Eickholt, *Roms letzte Tage unter der Tiara*, p. vi.

¹⁰⁶² Sikora, “Söldner. Historische Annäherung an einen Kriegertypus,” p. 212.

¹⁰⁶³ Reinhart Koselleck, “The historical-political semantics of asymmetric counterconcepts,” in idem, *Futures past. On the semantics of historical time* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985), pp. 159-97.

¹⁰⁶⁴ Haupt, *Gewalt und Politik*, p. 14.

¹⁰⁶⁵ Herberg-Rothe, *Der Krieg*, p. 67.

¹⁰⁶⁶ Peter Burschel, “Krieg, Staat, Disziplin. Die Entstehung eines neuen Söldnertypus im 17. Jahrhundert,” *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht* 11 (1997): pp. 640-52.

for the *fraternité des peuples*¹⁰⁶⁷ in a democratic as well as a national sense. Harro Paul Harring, the revolutionary from Schleswig-Holstein, emphasized his democratic and humanistic motives for this attempted revolution in his *Mémoires sur la Jeune Italie et sur les derniers événements de Savoie*, which he wrote when in exile in Dijon in 1834: “The cause of Italy and Savoy was and is still that of humanity, and the enterprise that sadly proved unsuccessful aimed to bring liberty and independence to the peoples bent under the yoke of despotism”.¹⁰⁶⁸ For Wilhelm Rüstow, participating in the Expedition of the Thousand was a way to express his general commitment to democracy and the liberty of nations, which he wished could be realized for all of them.¹⁰⁶⁹ On the other side of the conflict, devotion to Catholicism and the conviction that the Pope needed to maintain his temporal powers were prominent themes among the reasons given by Germans for fighting in the Papal Army. The German papal soldier Eickholt wrote: “As in the case of the crusades, where the call ‘God wills it’ resounded all throughout the world ... so at the end of the 1860s throughout the whole Catholic world rang out the call ‘Up, to Rome’. We’ve come to defend the Holy Father, to stand up for his unalienable rights by the sword.”¹⁰⁷⁰

6.3 The place of the volunteer in current Risorgimento historiography

The prominence of the figure of the volunteer did not end with the polemics between the political sides during the nineteenth century. In fact, it is reserved a special place in both the older and more recent historiography on the Risorgimento.

The supposedly elevated numbers of Italian volunteers are used as a kind of proof that there was an equally highly mobilizing force of national discourse. But if one is to use the term “volunteer” to mean a politically motivated soldier, it is necessary that an analysis of the motives of the soldiers be carried out. What is interesting is that to date this type of analysis has for the most part been excluded from the research sets.

¹⁰⁶⁷ Giuseppe Mazzini, *Foi et avenir* (Paris: Au Bureau du Nouveau Monde, 1850); Giuseppe Mazzini, "Fratellanza dei popoli," in *Scritti editi e inediti di Giuseppe Mazzini. Edizione diretta dall'autore* (Milan: G. Daelli, 1861), pp. 286-91.

¹⁰⁶⁸ “La cause de l’Italie et de la Savoie était, et est encore celle de l’humanité, elle est un effort malheureusement avorté vers la liberté et l’indépendance des peuples pliés sous le joug du despotisme.” Harring, *Mémoires sur la Jeune Italie*, 1, p. 4.

¹⁰⁶⁹ Rüstow, *Erinnerungen aus dem italienischen Feldzuge von 1860*, 1, p. 4-5.

¹⁰⁷⁰ „Wie bei den Kreuzzügen der Ruf ‚Gott will es!‘ die Welt durchhallte und die Blüte der christlichen Ritterschaft nach Jerusalem führte, so erscholl gegen Ende der 1860er Jahre durch die ganze katholische Welt der Ruf: ‚Auf nach Rom‘. Es gilt, den Heiligen Vater zu schützen, für seine unveräußerlichen Rechte mit dem Schwerte einzustehen.“ Eickholt, *Roms letzte Tage unter der Tiara*, p. 10.

This may be said of Banti and his work. Catherine Brice considers him to be a historian whose focus lies in the history of “political mobilization”, and I concur.¹⁰⁷¹ Political mobilization is indeed a central topic in some of the debates found in the “new Risorgimento historiography”. Banti and Ginsborg's assertion that the Risorgimento was a “mass movement” clearly goes against those Italian and international nationalism studies that maintain that nationalism did not or only much later on reached strata larger segment of society.¹⁰⁷² One of the underlying sources of this debate, it seems to me, is that both Banti and those that dispute his assertions tend to use synonymously two or three historical objects that for analytical purposes, however, would be better – at least initially – to keep separate. In fact, they all seem to have very easily equated “national discourse” to “nationalism” to “national movement”.¹⁰⁷³ In doing so, Banti and Ginsborg can claim that there was a “mass movement” by deducing its presence from the massive diffusion of “national discourse” as shown by Banti in his monographs. In this way, however, they are able to circumnavigate and avoid carrying out a historical analysis of the actual organization of this “national movement”. Hence, Banti and Ginsborg tend to equate “national discourse” with “national movement”. At the same time, their critics tend to do the same between “nationalism” and “national discourse”: By using the (“traditional”) argument that nationalism did not affect the non-bourgeois classes in the early and mid-nineteenth century, they assume that “national discourse” did not do so either.

There are sound epistemological, theoretical as well as empirical reasons against using synonymously the historical objects “national discourse”, “nationalism”, and “national movement” from the outset; this is because to do so would simply be to address one object with multiple new labels. As I argued in the first chapter, the use of the concept of discourse in regard to the national sphere only makes sense when some of the defining features of this concept are preserved.

With regard to the term “volunteers”, it is important to see that within the historiographical context of Risorgimento studies volunteers are considered as a supposedly direct, unproblematic confirmation of the extent of “national discourse” on the one hand, and of the presence of other forms of cultural and political motivation on the other. Furthermore, many authors perceive volunteering to constitute a particularly “Italian” tradition. Eva

¹⁰⁷¹ Brice, “Alberto M. Banti,” pp. 434-38.

¹⁰⁷² For a broad discussion of the intensity and chronology of the nationalization of different social strata, see Weichlein, *Nationalbewegungen und Nationalismus*, pp. 67-88.

¹⁰⁷³ “Banti’s analysis of nationalism” is discussed for instance by Lucy Riall, even if she rightly underlines problems in deducting the “mass movement” from Banti’s cultural analysis. Riall, “Nation, ‘deep images,’” p. 407.

Cecchinato, for example, speaks about the “voluntary nation” and even “voluntary cities”, claiming that “everything was ‘voluntary’ in the Risorgimento”.¹⁰⁷⁴ Similarly, Anna-Maria Isastia notes that voluntarism “was one of the most significant experiences of the Italian unification process and one of the constitutive elements of the myth of war experience that has accompanied entire generations of men.”¹⁰⁷⁵ Lucy Riall speaks of a “volunteer movement”, which according to her “had a powerful and prolonged appeal for young men across nineteenth-century Europe. Volunteering offered a new – youthful, energetic, romantic – model of political engagement that owed much to the fraternal ideal of the French Revolution.”¹⁰⁷⁶ She goes on to note the special role of the volunteer in Italian history: “In Risorgimento Italy, the volunteer took on a particular military and political meaning.”¹⁰⁷⁷ She continues, that “in the most crucial moments of the Risorgimento, they [the volunteers] personified the Italian nation.”¹⁰⁷⁸ But many studies¹⁰⁷⁹ – first those of Banti – do not openly discuss or address the topic, because, as will become clear in the following paragraphs, the problem is in a sense “hidden” behind the concept of the volunteer itself: in fact, the concept of the volunteer inherently depends on questions of intent. And simply because the historical analysis of underlying intent is particularly difficult in epistemological and empirical terms, some believe it better to avoid altogether.

In much of the work carried out in the last few years, the term volunteer is used unquestioningly, suggesting that according to the authors of these studies the motivation of the participants in the conflict was adequately clear. Remnants of this assumption can still be found in the tendency to label the pro-Risorgimental soldiers “volunteers”, and those of the “anti-Risorgimento” “mercenaries” or – less polemically – “professional soldiers”. In this sense, it is already a step forward if newer research “detects” volunteers on the legitimist and Catholic sides as well.¹⁰⁸⁰

¹⁰⁷⁴ Cecchinato and Isnenghi, “La nazione volontaria,” p. 697.

¹⁰⁷⁵ Isastia, “La guerra dei volontari,” p. 172.

¹⁰⁷⁶ Riall, “Martyr cults in nineteenth-century Italy,” pp. 277 and 278.

¹⁰⁷⁷ Riall, “Guerre et nation,” p. 55.

¹⁰⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 56.

¹⁰⁷⁹ Positive exceptions with regard to the *garibaldini* are: Cecchinato, *Camicie rosse*, and Angela Maria Alberton, “Perché partire? La scelta di indossare la camicia rossa. Percorsi in area veneta (1849-1866),” *Società e storia*, no. 131 (2011): pp. 68-103.

¹⁰⁸⁰ On the international volunteers in pro-Bourbon guerrilla warfare, see Sarlin, *Légitimisme en armes*; With regard to all Italian political sides I, too, initially adhered to the concept of the volunteer; on the comparison between the German fighters on the various sides made in these terms, see my earlier publication: Göhde, “German volunteers in the armed conflicts of the Italian Risorgimento 1834-70,” pp. 461-75; on the Catholic *volunteers* of the Pope as well as those with Garibaldi see also: Riall, “Martyr cults in nineteenth-century Italy”; Riall, “Guerre et nation”.

The problem regarding how concepts are used, or regarding the lack of problematizing them, also persists in the study of foreign soldiers on the various sides of the Italian conflict of this period.

Contrary to the idea of the “nation in arms” principle, armies of this century continued – as was shown above – to be supplied through multiple forms of recruitment. Even where one or another form of conscription existed, as in the case of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies or Piedmont, a portion of the soldiers continued to enlist on a formally voluntary basis; in states without conscription – e.g. Tuscany (until 1855) or the Papal States – all of the soldiers were formal volunteers the service of which was governed by contract.

These formal volunteers are easily confused with the politically driven war volunteer, which in the national context is considered proof of the reach of national discourse, or in the international context is used in many studies on foreign soldiers in nineteenth-century Italy. The encyclopaedias of the nineteenth century, however, already reflected the complexity and the confutation of such concepts as formal volunteers, mercenaries (which can formally be considered to be “volunteers”), national and political war volunteers, and the Prussian “one-year-volunteer”.¹⁰⁸¹ During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, old definitions have mingled with new ones, and after the “construction of the volunteer of the French Revolution as a mythical figure”¹⁰⁸², the war volunteer was highly moralized in public debates, as we have seen above.

But how foreign soldiers in Italy in this period are to be labelled can be called into question. The range of possible positions becomes clear when looking at the ways in which for instance Gilles Pécout on the one hand and Matteo Sanfilippo on the other have addressed the topic. Gilles Pécout proposed the following definition of the international political war volunteer:

“[The] phenomenon of the international volunteer fighter can in its simplest form be defined as the spontaneous movement of men who had no initial attachment to any regular or established army, who left their own country without having the need to earn money as their

¹⁰⁸¹ Christine G. Krüger and Sonja Levsen, "Introduction: Volunteers, war, and the nation since the French Revolution," in eadem, eds., *War volunteering in modern times. From the French Revolution to the Second World War* (Houndmills, Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 10-15.

¹⁰⁸² Thomas Hippler, "Volunteers of the French revolutionary wars. Myths and reinterpretations," *ibid.*, p. 23.

sole motivation (which does not mean that they would not earn some) in order to serve in a military and political struggle in a country other than their own [...].”¹⁰⁸³

In his paper on North American soldiers in the ranks of Garibaldi and the Pope, Matteo Sanfilippo expresses his fundamentally opposing criticism, according to which the “romantic idea of volunteers motivated only by their political fervour, either revolutionary or reactionary, often hides mercenaries, driven by the need of food and shelter.”¹⁰⁸⁴

Sometimes it is more a question of confusion than actual controversy. For instance some note that “all British ‘red shirts’ belong to the ‘amateur’, ‘citizen-soldier’ typology”¹⁰⁸⁵, while according to other authors “many of them had served in the Crimea in 1854 or in India”¹⁰⁸⁶”, indicating that they were far from amateurs militarily speaking.

This leads to the question: what type of soldier were the foreign participants on the various Italian sides of the Italian Risorgimento? Are they to be labelled as political volunteers, mercenaries, or professional soldiers?

6.4 Epistemology of the sorter: volunteers and mercenaries

There is a myriad of terms available to classify ‘weapon-bearers’: soldiers, mercenaries, warriors, warlords, partisans, guerilleros, pistoleros, militiamen, war volunteers, regulars, combatant, men-at-arms, etc. The terms are based on a variety of connected factors: form of recruitment, the type of weaponry, fighting method, type of group they fight for, relation to the state, type of adversary, motivation for fighting, payment, and form of armed group they are part of.¹⁰⁸⁷ In this study, it is not possible to discuss in depth all possible criteria for all of the aforementioned terms; instead, I have decided to focus more specifically on the concepts of the volunteer and the mercenary, insofar as these concepts are central to contemporary

¹⁰⁸³ Pécout, “The international armed volunteers,” p. 414.

¹⁰⁸⁴ Sanfilippo, “Fuggitivi e avventurieri,” p. 67.

¹⁰⁸⁵ Pellegrino Sutcliffe, “British Red Shirts,” p. 204.

¹⁰⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 216. The background for this conceptual ambiguity is of course the specific way in which British soldiers were recruited: the army consisted entirely of formal volunteers, because in contrast to continental Europe, conscription was introduced only during World War I. The point, however, is that this mode of recruitment did not mean that during the nineteenth century the British Army was a force comprised primarily of short-term, unexperienced soldiers; on the contrary, long-term professional soldiers were crucial, especially for its main role to “garrison a world-wide empire”, as is underlined by David French, “The nation in arms II. The nineteenth century,” in Chalmers Townshend, ed., *The Oxford history of modern war* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 82. For the introduction of conscription in Britain during World War I, see Janz, *14*, p. 194; on the provision of soldiers for the British Army from the dominions, see instead *ibid.*, pp. 166-170. The specificities of the British case already in the second half of the eighteenth century are the basis for a recent proposal to include irregular fighters into the concept of the “soldier” as well, a proposal advanced by Linch and McCormack, “Defining soldiers,” pp. 144-59.

¹⁰⁸⁷ See, e.g., Herberg-Rothe, *Der Krieg*, pp. 60-83.

polemics and constitute a major issue in the historiography on both Italian and foreign soldiers in the Risorgimento.

Payment is often thought of being a valid criterion to distinguish between professional soldiers and mercenaries on the one side and war volunteers on the other. For John Keegan, mercenaries “are those who sell military service for money”.¹⁰⁸⁸ Michael Howard similarly states that the sixteenth century mercenaries “served any master [...] so long as they were paid.”¹⁰⁸⁹ In this sense, the volunteer seems to be a fighter that receives no pecuniary or other form of economic recompense for his engagement, while the professional soldier and mercenary do. From this perspective, only a fighter that paid for his maintenance “out of pocket” would be a “war volunteer” in the strictest sense of the word. Such a stringent definition of war volunteer would necessarily exclude all fighters that had received economic rewards, and those who did must in turn be classified as professional soldiers or mercenaries. But as we have clearly seen, the foreign soldiers of nineteenth-century Italy were frequently paid or were granted at least the right to payment; similarly, other fighters in other conflicts that would normally be regarded as war volunteers were paid, one example being the members of the International Brigades of the Spanish Civil War.¹⁰⁹⁰ To regard them as ‘mercenaries’ would however be “little less than insulting”.¹⁰⁹¹

Worth noting is the fact that the designation ‘mercenary’ goes – etymologically and conceptually – beyond the criterion of payment as such. The issue of payment is intrinsically present in the Italian, German, English and French words for the ‘soldier’. This term in particular is sometimes used to designate arms-bearer in general, and, following the French Revolution, is sometimes specifically reserved for the conscript.¹⁰⁹² This may be traced in the etymology of the term, which derives from the Roman imperial coin ‘solidus’.¹⁰⁹³ Even in German, the term for the mercenary (‘Söldner’) may be traced back to the same origin. But the French, English and Italian word ‘mercenary’ etymologically stems from the Latin “merx” for goods, hence, the English expression “merchandise”. It is this etymology that coincides

¹⁰⁸⁸ John Keegan, *A history of warfare* (London: Pimlico, 2004), p. 228.

¹⁰⁸⁹ Michael Howard, *War in European history*, 2 ed. (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 29.

¹⁰⁹⁰ See, e.g., James K. Hopkins, *Into the heart of the fire. The British in the Spanish Civil War* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 171.

¹⁰⁹¹ Richard Holmes, “Mercenaries, modern,” in *The Oxford Companion to Military History*, ed. Richard Holmes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), Oxford Reference Online <http://o-www.oxfordreference.com.biblio.eui.eu/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t139.e817>, last accessed 19/05/2009. The Italians fighting in the Greek-Turkish War of 1897 were paid but were still considered to be volunteers by Pécout, “Philhellenism in Italy,” p. 419.

¹⁰⁹² See the typos ‘Soldat’, in Herberg-Rothe, *Der Krieg*, pp. 61-65.

¹⁰⁹³ See, e.g., Giacomo Devoti and Gian Carlo Oli, “soldo,” in Giacomo Devoti and Gian Carlo Oli, eds., *Il Devoto-Oli 2007* (Florence: Le Monnier, 2006).

with the analysis of the ‘mercenary’ made by Michael Sikora, who underlines the importance of the external perception of the intentions of the arms-bearer, the assumption the fighter is governed by venality: “Whether a warrior is to be considered a mercenary or not depends essentially on the external valuation of the legitimacy of his actions and his motives. [...] His [the mercenary’s] actions signify not more than a paid and reified service.”¹⁰⁹⁴ Therefore, it is not the pay as such that counts as the decisive criterion in identifying who is a mercenary, but rather the assumption of the individuals intentions, the idea that he fights only for the pay he receives for his service.¹⁰⁹⁵ Gilles Pécout’s definition is in accordance with this emphasis on intentions; it is not whether or not an individual is paid that according to him defines whether an individual is a volunteer or a mercenary, but rather whether that pay is the "sole motivation" or not. Therefore, it is pay as the "sole motivation" that becomes the discriminating principle.¹⁰⁹⁶

Economic considerations were sometimes quite relevant for the foreign soldiers. Before going to fight in Italy, some of the pro-Risorgimento volunteers had lived in exile, mostly in France and Switzerland. Financial problems tended to be a chronic and intrinsic element of the condition of exile, and fighting in Italy was an opportunity for paid employment.¹⁰⁹⁷ At times these financial difficulties could even lead to the point where exiles would join, against their political beliefs, the service of counter-revolutionary forces (for instance as spies) just to secure the means to survive.¹⁰⁹⁸

6.4.1 Foreign origin

The foreign origin of a soldier is another important element in current typologies of the warrior. It has been argued that mercenaries “generally serve foreign powers”¹⁰⁹⁹, i.e. serve a state/nation that is not their own. According to John Keegan, for instance, soldiers can be termed as “regulars” if they “already enjoy citizenship or its equivalent but choose military service as a means of subsistence”, while the mercenary is devoid of the citizenship of the

¹⁰⁹⁴ Sikora, "Söldner. Historische Annäherung an einen Kriegertypus," p.212.

¹⁰⁹⁵ Holmes, "Mercenaries, modern," Oxford Reference Online [http://o-
www.oxfordreference.com.biblio.eui.eu/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t139.e817](http://o-
www.oxfordreference.com.biblio.eui.eu/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t139.e817), last accessed 19/05/2009.

¹⁰⁹⁶ Pécout, "The International armed volunteers," p. 414.

¹⁰⁹⁷ On the economic situation of various German exiles in Switzerland during the 1830s, and on the payments by the French, Swiss cantonal and British governments as well as private payments made to some groups of exiles, see still Schieder, *Anfänge der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung*, pp. 110-118.

¹⁰⁹⁸ Ibid., pp. 117 and 330.

¹⁰⁹⁹ Holmes, "Mercenaries, modern," Oxford Reference Online [http://o-
www.oxfordreference.com.biblio.eui.eu/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t139.e817](http://o-
www.oxfordreference.com.biblio.eui.eu/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t139.e817), last accessed 19/05/2009.

country he fights for.¹¹⁰⁰ In other words, mercenaries do not have the “patriotic commitment to the state they serve”.¹¹⁰¹ Within the nationalization of the armies, patriotic commitment seems to be the only legitimate motivation of soldiers. However, it would be erroneous to perpetuate this view since it is possible that foreigners, too, “could have been motivated by their ideals”, even if they were not necessarily “patriotic”.¹¹⁰² By refusing to acknowledge that foreigners could also be motivated by ideals, we fall into the trap of nationalist argumentation which tends to overlook the possibility that a “transnational” political motivation for a cause can exist.

Even here one comes back to the issue of intentions and intent, insofar as it becomes necessary to assess whether there is or is not political "content" that can explain the choice of a foreigner to engage. In other words, the foreign origin of the soldier is not a sufficient criterion with which to make a distinction between mercenaries and/or professional soldiers on the one hand and war volunteers on the other. According to Michael Sikora, it is not the foreign origin of a fighter as such that dictates whether they are a mercenary or not, but rather the ‘arbitrariness’ of the soldiers’ origin. Only when it is not particularly important what army or country an individual is fighting for – indicated, for instance, by a multitude of politically different military engagements over the course of a soldier's lifetime – can one perhaps justify calling him a "mercenary".

6.4.2 Form of recruitment

Another of the criterion used to discern between types of warriors is the form of recruitment. Above, the distinction between conscription and voluntary enlistment as a valid criterion to distinguish between the volunteer and the mercenary was excluded because both enlistments – that of the political volunteer and of the mercenary – are voluntary in nature at the formal level.

Other criteria used in the identification of the war volunteer that are dependent on the form of recruitment are equally problematic. Contrary to Pécout’s definition, wherein international war volunteering was considered the “the spontaneous movement of men who had no initial attachment to any regular or established army”, I have tried to demonstrate how the recruitment of foreigners was often actively sought out, and the act of recruitment was to

¹¹⁰⁰ Keegan, *A history of warfare*, p. 228.

¹¹⁰¹ Alan Forrest, "The nation in arms I. The French Wars," in Charles Townshend, ed., *The Oxford history of modern war* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 70.

¹¹⁰² Sikora, "Söldner. Historische Annäherung an einen Kriegertypus," p. 216.

differing degrees well organized by the various armed groups, whether it occurred in Italy¹¹⁰³ or abroad. In the case of the International Brigades in the Spanish Civil War, for instance, Nir Arielli has shown how the “spontaneity of the first months of the war was replaced by an organized network of recruitment and transport.”¹¹⁰⁴ He then expresses the interesting idea that the “reliance on elaborate and secretive recruitment and transport networks distinguishes foreign volunteers from other transnational soldiers.”¹¹⁰⁵ While this may be true for the twentieth century, this is a problematic assertion for the nineteenth century: Not only were recruitment and transport networks typical elements that governed the use and employment of “mercenaries” between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries (it is enough to recall the recruitment structures in the Swiss cantons), but, due to the various bans on foreign recruitment, they were often at least partially secretive as well, (again, all one has to do is to recall how Austrian complicity with regard to Bourbon recruitment efforts were still subdued even in 1859 and 1860).¹¹⁰⁶

Regardless, governments, armies or semi-independent operating recruiters nearly always had to convince the prospective foreign soldier to enlist, and therefore necessitated organizational structures. Non-coercive practices played upon the putative intentions of future soldiers, by advertising economic rewards (mercenaries, professional soldiers), career prospects (professional soldiers) or arguments based on ideals (war volunteers). In other words, recruitment efforts can hint at what the enlisting armies and governments believed were the decisive interests of soldiers they wished to recruit: How did they advertise enlistment? What was the content of the enlistment contracts? The aforementioned criteria help us to gather data that are important for identifying the plausible intentions of potential soldiers. The various forms of advertising used for recruitment reveal what the armies or governments believed would be the motivations of these people for joining.

With regard to a soldier’s initial reasons to join, some authors make a distinction between distinct “waves” of “volunteers”¹¹⁰⁷, or they identify different motives for officers and for the rank and file.¹¹⁰⁸ In her work on the French soldiers in Sicily and Rome in

¹¹⁰³ See, e. g., Sarlin, *Légitimisme en armes*, chapter 3, pp. 133-186; see as well the foreign recruitment activities of the State of Sicily in 1848 or the Roman Republic in 1849 in Ignace, “French volunteers in Italy,” pp. 445-60. See also the chapter 4.2.2 on the organization of the papal recruitment.

¹¹⁰⁴ Arielli, “Getting there,” p. 225.

¹¹⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 229.

¹¹⁰⁶ See chapter 4.2.3.

¹¹⁰⁷ Pellegrino Sutcliffe, “British Red Shirts,” p. 207.

¹¹⁰⁸ Martin Robson, “‘Strangers, mercenaries, heretics, scoffers, polluters’. Volunteering for the British Auxiliary Legion in Spain, 1835,” in Nir Arielli and Bruce Collins, eds., *Transnational soldiers. Foreign military enlistment in the modern era* (Houndmills, Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp. 181-201.

1848/49, Anne-Claire Ignace proposes an interesting typology. With regard to the French “volunteers”, she identifies several types: she speaks first of the “political activist whose faith [...] was stronger than his military qualities”; and second, of the “military” man, who “if not exclusively motivated, [was] at least heavily incentivised by the prospects of promotion and Italian career”; and, third, “the old combatant for liberty”, “who combines real military experience obtained in the ranks of the French army with a sincere liberal conviction”.¹¹⁰⁹ However, due to their previous connection to “regular armies”, the last two types that Ignace mentions do not adhere to strict definitions of the political war volunteer. In his study on the Italian “volunteers” in the Portuguese Army of 1832–1834, Grégoire Bron similarly notes that “about half had previously pursued a military career in Italy”.¹¹¹⁰ Considerations regarding their military career could be found in their writings. Friedrich Wilhelm Rüstow, for example, had been expelled in 1850 from the Prussian officer corps because he had sided with the revolution, and his decision to serve with Garibaldi was a way to bridge a gap in his career aspirations, an intention that was indicated by his failed attempt to return to the Prussian Army in 1870.¹¹¹¹

These findings on foreign soldiers are in line with some new in-depth studies of the biographies and motivations of Italians that joined the armed groups. A rapid look at the biographies of Italian revolutionaries of the 1840s – e.g., Guglielmo Pepe, Carlo Bianco di Saint Jorioz, Attilio and Emilio Bandiera, to name just a few – shows that many of them had in fact had considerable contact with “regular” army institutions, be they the Bourbon or Austrian military academies or the Army of Piedmont. As Eva Cecchinato has emphasized, there was a significant level of mobility of these individuals between the “regular” corps of states’ armies and the various Garibaldian undertakings, both before and after 1860.¹¹¹² Contrary to a clear-cut conception of the war “volunteer”, many former participants of the campaign in the 1860s sought to enter “regular” service, and of the original “Thousand” more than 200 eventually found their way into the “regular” Italian Army, even if many of them were not assigned actual military duties. Furthermore, a recent study on several Venetian Garibaldians has revealed that many also joined armed groups for generational and family reasons.¹¹¹³ These studies hint at the plurality and complexity of the initial motivation factors

¹¹⁰⁹ Ignace, “French volunteers in Italy,” p. 450.

¹¹¹⁰ Grégoire Bron, “The exiles of the Risorgimento,” p. 429.

¹¹¹¹ Moos, “Streiflichter auf Wilhelm Rüstows Beziehungen zu Italien,” pp. 342–402.

¹¹¹² Cecchinato, *Camicie rosse*.

¹¹¹³ Alberton, “Perché partire?,” pp. 68–103.

underlying the choice to join the Garibaldian armed groups. Thus far, studies on the “reality” of foreign soldiering in the Risorgimento reveal varying degrees of divergence from the “ideal types” of the “political war volunteer” as defined by Pécout.

When considering the aforementioned criteria all together, it seems clear that the question of intentions cannot be overlooked, because it remains fundamental for the typological classification of warriors most interesting in our case, namely the differentiation between the mercenary and professional soldier on the one hand, the foreign war volunteer on the other.

6.5 Problems of intentional explanations

But the analysis of motives, for theoretical and empirical reasons, is particularly difficult.

6.5.1 Problems of proof

At the individual level, the principal theoretical problem is connected to the difficulties of finding acceptable proof of the agent’s intentions. In motivational psychology it is essentially accepted that an individual’s “motivation” cannot be directly observed an isolated object, but it can only “be unlocked” “via indications”.¹¹¹⁴ All too often and too easily, we as historians, however, tend to accept “utterances about intentions in the sources as proof of these intentions”.¹¹¹⁵ But this is only possible if we believe that our informant is sincere.¹¹¹⁶ To accept the agent’s statements as sufficient direct proof of their intentions runs the risk of being naïve: Agents can consciously hide their true motives, or can unconsciously express false motives, either because they lack the capacity of introspection or wish to transmit another self-image. Therefore, an agent’s statements can only at best be one element among others in the methods used to extract indirect proof, which rely on contextualization. By assuming an agent’s biographical coherence, we can try to demonstrate that a stated or assumed motive conforms to what we already know about the agent and the context within which he/she is placed.

A more specific type of error committed in historical analysis also applies here. It is the so-called problem of planning: “The rule that many historians tend to see actions as proof of an intention in the case of a striking analogy between plans and actions, has one exception. This is the case when planning is attributed the character of a standard. The eventual

¹¹¹⁴ Falko Rheinberg, *Motivation*, 7 ed. (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2008), p. 14.

¹¹¹⁵ Chris Lorenz, *Konstruktion der Vergangenheit. Eine Einführung in die Geschichtstheorie* (Cologne; Weimar; Vienna: Böhlau, 1997), p. 109.

¹¹¹⁶ Ivi.

execution is normally not seen here as proof of specific intent. An important example for this category lies with military plans and actions. Because officers are concerned professionally with the preparation of wars, their plans cannot be directly taken as proof of aggressive intentions.”¹¹¹⁷ This example is a clear reminder that the fact that foreign soldiers who joined groups that fought to accomplish specific political aims does not necessarily say anything about the underlying reasons for why these soldiers enlisted. Similarly, according to organizational theory, it is not uncommon to find that the aims of an organization do not have to correspond to those of its members.¹¹¹⁸

The description of an action is not independent from assumptions on the underlying intentions. If we look at the German soldiers in the armed conflicts of the Risorgimento, this knowledge leads us to bring our analysis into focus: Was it primarily going to war, going to war in another country than one’s own, going to war in a particular Italian armed force or just in Italy in general? Was it primarily to go far away, to Italy, to the Vatican? In some cases this line of questioning can lead us back to the aforementioned possible intentions, as among which the economic (mercenaries, professional soldiers), career-oriented (international officers), ideological (democratic or legitimist; Catholic and anti-Catholic fighters of the “European Culture Wars”), or even legal (fugitives) animating patterns. In all of these instances the actions can be explained by assuming that there are plausible “good reasons” for them.

Motivational psychology differentiates between motives and “motivational self-images”. The latter constitute an interesting object especially for historiography, because they are, according to the psychologist Rheinberg, informed not only by one’s “own perceptions”, but “as well by influences of socialization, especially by assessments, evaluations and wishes of important other individuals and cultural norms.”¹¹¹⁹ Motivational self-images, in other words, are especially open to historical variation. History consists partially of a chronological change of the respectively accepted, “legitimate” classes of motives. In our case we have noted that a politically defined ideal of volunteerism was present in all political sides of the Risorgimento and Anti-Risorgimento; it conceptually presupposed that the single volunteer believed in the political aims of the armed group he was fighting for. Society – on all political sides – expected, so to say, the political commitment of soldiers, and therefore this commitment began to take centre-stage in many recounts of the historical agents. By too

¹¹¹⁷ Ibid., 115.

¹¹¹⁸ On the (contemporary) military as an institution and organization, see Elbe and Richter, “Militär. Institution und Organisation”.

¹¹¹⁹ Rheinberg, *Motivation*, p. 199.

easily equating “uttered motives” to “factual motives”, and by the seemingly easy interconnection between the description of actions and the assumed intentions, it is no wonder that political commitment also takes centre stage in many studies. To claim, as I have done, that there were also, at least partially, economic, career-oriented or more specifically military motives in operation, seems to be in contradiction with this seemingly easy interlocking between self-disclosures, motives, and descriptions of actions.

6.5.2 *Intrinsic, extrinsic motives*

It is useful here to diversify the concept of motives. After some debate on the concepts of “extrinsic” and “intrinsic” motives¹¹²⁰, recent motivational psychology seems to revert to the idea of discrimination between stimulation by purpose and stimulation by activity. Those activities that “are executed for the activity alone, and not for the output” are intrinsically motivated. And conversely, those actions that are carried out for the output or the result are extrinsically motivated.¹¹²¹

In fact, in our case of foreign soldiers, extrinsic motivations (pay, political goals) were found alongside intrinsic motivations (preference for the military “lifeworld”, the possibility of visiting Italy).

If they did not already have it upon their arrival in Italy, some soldiers seemed to acquire a “taste for military life”¹¹²² while in the Italian armed groups. Emblematic is the aforementioned case of Joseph Alois Bach, who was perhaps much more a volunteer when he entered the Papal Army in 1860 than when he left it in 1870.

War in general and volunteering in a foreign war in particular offered opportunities to break with dull daily routine by doing something exceptional. The culture of Romanticism gave this kind of desire a much broader appeal.¹¹²³ Two contexts within which soldiering may be seen are the Romantic exaltation of adventure and the search for different forms of sociability, in this case within martial and male-dominated societies. Already since Klaus Theweleit’s much-debated book about the literature of the German Freikorps was published we are aware of the fascination that membership in a male group (a “Männerbund”) can

¹¹²⁰ To focus on the question of what exactly can be considered to be “inside” and “outside” in terms of motives. See *ibid.*, p. 153.

¹¹²¹ *Ivi.*

¹¹²² Leighton S. James, “For the fatherland? The motivations of Austrian and Prussian volunteers during the revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars,” in Christine G. Krüger and Sonja Levsen, eds., *War volunteering in modern times. From the French Revolution to the Second World War* (Houndmills, Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 51.

¹¹²³ Ginsborg, “Romanticismo e Risorgimento,” p. 7.

conceivably exert on at least parts of male society.¹¹²⁴ This form of “homosocial desire”¹¹²⁵ is particularly prominent in the military context. Jürgen Martschukat and Oliver Stieglitz, in accordance with the studies of Thomas Kühne on “comradeship” in World War II, write that the military “Männerbund” cannot be seen just as “an alternative to family and motherly love, but – due to its protective, affective as well as (homo-)erotic components – also as an analogue structure [to the family], and even as the central basis of the symbolic order of war.”¹¹²⁶ As Through his analysis of the painting “Léonidas aux Termopyles” by Jacques-Louis David, and by underlining the masculine way in which Garibaldi described his wife Anita, Alberto Banti has similarly shown that “friendship between fighting men” was an important topic in the cultural mobilization for war.¹¹²⁷

Finally, performative objectives – such as actions to overcome national decadence by “literally” exhibiting military and manly abilities – may also be seen in terms of intrinsic motivation.

6.5.3 Shared presence of different motives and overdetermination

Actions not only can be, but are, in fact, very often caused by receiving “multiple stimuli at the same time”.¹¹²⁸ The Romantic and the political elements could in fact co-exist with the quest for personal military glory, and with considerations of career and remuneration. An officer like Rüstow, for example, who had been expelled from the Prussian Army, may have chosen to join Garibaldi's ranks for a variety of intentions: ideals, career and economic considerations. As it has been shown above, the German commitment on the various sides was in fact informed by a plurality of motives that ranged from economic to political aims to the intrinsic stimulus of army life or adventure. Furthermore, evidence suggests that there was often a surplus of such motives: even if one of the aforementioned motives would theoretically be sufficient to determine action, frequently different motives were simultaneously manifest; hence, in terms of motivational psychology, the situation was “overdetermined”. It is far from evident, for instance, whether an economic motivation actually precludes *a priori* the existence of other motivating factors.

But a plurality of motives and overdetermination becomes problematic when we have to choose between concepts that are mainly linked to the presence of one, primary motive.

¹¹²⁴ Klaus Theweleit, *Männerphantasien*, vol. 1 (Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Roter Stern, 1977).

¹¹²⁵ Sedgwick, *Between men*. See as well Kraß, *Queer denken*.

¹¹²⁶ Martschukat and Stieglitz, *Geschichte der Männlichkeiten*, p. 100.

¹¹²⁷ Banti, *L'onore della nazione*, on David's Leonidas p. 292; and on the way in which Anita is described by Garibaldi, see pp. 329-334.

¹¹²⁸ Rheinberg, *Motivation*, p. 128.

That the “right” concept to name the agent intimately depends on motivational issues is only one further example of the known problem that the descriptions of actions are “always linked to interpretations and intentions: The designation of an action [...] therefore changes according to the aim that we see ‘behind’ this action.”¹¹²⁹ To assume “psychological coherence”¹¹³⁰ in the historical actors does not necessarily resolve the problem the moment that many of the foreign soldiers for a more or less lengthy period were members of other, regular as well as irregular armed groups before they joined their respective Italian armed group. Therefore, the agents at time demonstrated “biographical coherence” in their choice to lead a military life and at the same time a parallel coherence in their political activities.

Finally, the emphasis that has been placed on political motivation, so it seems to me, also informs a partially instrumental view of the military that is less interested in the “military life” as such. The study also proposes to shift this focus by having a more detailed look at the “lifeworld” of the military, by asking for the specificities of the subsystem of the military and the processes of mutual influences between this partially independent “world” and society at large.

6.5.4 “Unconscious” motives and historiography

As we have already seen above, motivational psychology differentiates between “basal” motives and “motivational self-images”. In fact it is important to see that the image “that the individual has of himself and of his preferences, wishes, values and long-living aims”¹¹³¹ does not necessarily have to be identical to the actual motives. Even if it is highly problematic to adopt this conceptualization from psychology and apply it to historiography – because in the former discipline “basal” motives are considered to be quite biological, hence by nature “unhistorical”, stimuli¹¹³² – a similar differentiation nevertheless exists in historiography as well. Carl Gustav Hempel, for instance, underlined that many humans are rational in a double sense, because, despite their real reasons, they also cultivate rationalizations.¹¹³³ Rationalizations are not a lie insofar as an individual sincerely believes that what they are saying is true and real. When an individual writes and speaks of these self-images, it constitutes more of an “unconscious” misrepresentation than an intentional lie.

¹¹²⁹ Lorenz, *Konstruktion der Vergangenheit*, p. 106.

¹¹³⁰ Ibid., p. 105.

¹¹³¹ Rheinberg, *Motivation*, pp. 193-194.

¹¹³² Ibid., pp. 194-202.

¹¹³³ Lorenz, *Konstruktion der Vergangenheit*, p. 105.

The “unconscious” (not necessarily the “subconscious” in the Freudian sense) is an important theoretical figure both in psychology and in historiography. In most of the more recent psychology it is seen (again?) to be an exception “that one has clarity down to the last detail as to why exactly an envisaged target is considered to be so desirable. It is from this point of departure that analyses of motivation that go beyond that which is already clear to the agent himself become possible.”¹¹³⁴ The idea of motives that are unconscious to the agents themselves has been a central aspect of classic social history since the 1960s. The words of Jürgen Habermas that “history is not exhausted by what human actors mutually intend”¹¹³⁵ was taken up by Jürgen Kocka as the basis of a historiography that reserved some space for “structures” of which the agents themselves were not necessarily aware. This was also directed against the “idealistic and increasingly ideological concept of liberty, action and personality”¹¹³⁶ that had been flourishing since the nineteenth century. Many of the recent works that were produced after the “cultural turn”, especially if linked to the concept of “agency”, tend to astonishingly re-establish the subject in its former central position. In opposition to these tendencies, however, some authors continue to underline the need for a more structural cultural history. In this sense, “structures are”, as Philipp Sarasin has written, “the denomination of something which the subject in his activity does not consciously have at his disposal.” Thus Sarasin places a “cultural history informed by theories of discourse” in opposition to a “hermeneutic cultural history”, which once again focuses on the subject. The difference between the two, according to him, precisely regards “the position of the subject and hence his subjective opinions and beliefs within the analysed historical context.” He refuses the “hermeneutic cultural history”, which runs the risk of “get[ting] caught in the old traps of the philosophy of the subject, centrality of consciousness and intentionality.”¹¹³⁷

6.6 Conclusions

On the basis of these theoretical and empirical problems in the analysis of motives, I propose several conceptual decisions. For studies that focus on the fighters in the Risorgimento (as well as those in other cases) it would be constructive to avoid the denomination of these soldiers as volunteers right from the outset, simply because this concept tends to hide, and

¹¹³⁴ Rheinberg, *Motivation*, p. 35.

¹¹³⁵ Cit. from Wolfgang Weber, “Historische Methode,” in Dieter Nohlen and Rainer-Olaf Schultze, eds., *Lexikon der Politikwissenschaft*, vol. 1 (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2002), p. 323.

¹¹³⁶ Jürgen Kocka, *Sozialgeschichte. Begriff - Entwicklung - Probleme* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1986), p. 57.

¹¹³⁷ Sarasin, *Geschichtswissenschaft und Diskursanalyse*, pp. 21 and 28.

even to cover, a series of ambiguities and problems that are interesting in their own right. Instead, I propose that a more neutral term be adopted, such as “foreign soldiers” or “transnational soldiers”¹¹³⁸, rather than foreign volunteers or mercenaries. These more neutral concepts can be seen as generalized terms for soldiers that serve in an armed group not of their nation or region. Under these terms, however, it is possible to subsume foreign mercenaries, professional soldiers or the political war volunteer. Of course these proposed “new” terms are not totally neutral either, in fact all one has to do is remember the etymology of the word “soldier” and how it stems from the word “pay”.¹¹³⁹ Nevertheless, they seem to me preferable, perhaps even in the sense of an initial overshooting, because of course the primarily politically motivated war volunteer may have and has existed as well. But by choosing to use these proposed terms, we have to justify our subsumption by making a more detailed analysis of motivational structures. Otherwise, to speak of “volunteers” runs the risk of creating a circular argument, where the term itself seems to prove the predominance of political motivation in the actors.¹¹⁴⁰

The highly moralized character of the concept of the volunteer in the nineteenth century and its central role in the political polemics between the opposing sides, encourages us to keep the concepts of the sources separate from our analytical concepts; if this is not done we run the risk of reproducing the contemporary polemics in our studies instead of critically questioning them.

Finally, it seems to me that the concepts of volunteer and mercenary force us, perhaps too much, to produce clarity in terms of intentions, which in reality only seldom occurred. This is not to say that studies that focus on the genesis of specific classes of motives are obsolete; but their perspective is necessarily different than that which seems to be appropriate for concrete studies on soldierly engagement. With regard to the latter, it still seems important to recall the difference between motives and motivation: Motivation in this case signifies the “aggregation of reasons” that incites an individual to act. And, as this study suggests, these motives originate from an entire spectrum of human life and experience. And these motives, as well this study is suggesting, are originating from a whole spectrum of human life; they are economic, professional, compassionate, political, and psychological in nature (and the list

¹¹³⁸ This term has been advanced in a recent anthology edited by Arielli and Collins, *Transnational soldiers*.

¹¹³⁹ For a similar proposal to use an expanded concept of the soldier, including irregular fighters see Linch and McCormack, “Defining soldiers,” pp. 144-59.

¹¹⁴⁰ I problematized the concepts, even if cautiously, in my previous publication: Göhde, “German volunteers in the armed conflicts of the Italian Risorgimento 1834-70,” pp. 461-75. A more bold discussion, based on other works on foreign soldiers, may instead be found in my publication: Göhde, “A new military history,” pp. 21-39.

goes on). Each one of these, in differing degrees, can inform the concrete motivation – i.e. the sum of motives of the single soldier.

Part 3 – The enlisted:

experiences, practices, transfers

7 Military experiences and practices

7.1 “Experiences” and “practices” and the “history of everyday life”

The following chapter examines the experiences and practices linked to the presence of German soldiers in the various Italian armed groups in this period. It aims to bring together the substantial literature on historical war and military experiences¹¹⁴¹ and the theoretical discussion on the concepts of “experience”¹¹⁴² and “practice”¹¹⁴³. Predominantly two different types of sources are used: The legal and administrative sources on the Italian armed groups and their foreign soldiers on the one hand and the reports of the German soldiers in Italy on the other.

As was briefly mentioned in the second chapter, different authors from different disciplines have addressed the issue of experience. The need for a more theoretically informed concept of experience was motivated by the growing unease with the common use of the notion of experience as the “authentic” individual understanding of that which is “real”. In

¹¹⁴¹ On war experiences, see first and foremost Nikolaus Buschmann and Horst Carl, *Die Erfahrung des Krieges. Erfahrungsgeschichtliche Perspektiven von der Französischen Revolution bis zum Zweiten Weltkrieg*, Krieg in der Geschichte (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2001); for World War II, see Neitzel and Welzer, *Soldaten. On fighting, killing and dying*. A collection of personal reports on World War I is Peter Englund, *Schönheit und Schrecken. Eine Geschichte des Ersten Weltkriegs, erzählt in neunzehn Schicksalen* (Berlin: Rowohlt, 2011); Englund, together with Oliver Janz and Emanuel Saint Fuscien, was on the advisory board of the international television series “14 – Diaries of the Great War”. Some of the diaries used by Englund in his book were used again in this television series.

¹¹⁴² In the historiographical field see Alf Lüdtke, ed., *Alltagsgeschichte. Zur Rekonstruktion historischer Erfahrungen und Lebensweisen* (Frankfurt am Main; New York: Campus, 1989); Raphael, “Diskurse, Lebenswelten und Felder”. For a discussion of historical experiences within the context of agency, see as well Lynn Hunt, “La critica non è più sufficiente,” in eadem, *La storia culturale nell'età globale* (Pisa: Edizioni ETS, 2010), pp. 61-96. More generally, on the self-interpretations of actors see Doris Bachmann-Medick, “Interpretive turn,” in eadem, *Cultural turns. Neuorientierungen in den Kulturwissenschaften* (Reinbek near Hamburg: Rowohlt, 2006), pp. 58-103. One of the earlier proposals on how to interpret experiences stems from Erving Goffman and his “frame” theory. Erving Goffman, *The presentation of self in everyday life* (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1959); Erving Goffman, *Frame analysis. An essay on the organization of experience* (New York; San Francisco; London: Harper & Row, 1974); an especially interesting publication for the “frames” that in the military perhaps summed up as a “total institution” is Goffman, *Asylums*. A recent historiographical study of war experiences that works with Goffman’s instruments is the aforementioned Neitzel and Welzer, *Soldaten. On fighting, killing and dying*.

¹¹⁴³ See, e. g., Andreas Reckwitz, “Toward a theory of social practices. A development in culturalist theorizing,” *European journal of social theory* 5, no. 2 (2002): pp. 243-63; Joachim Renn, “Nicht Herr im eigenen Hause und doch nicht eines anderen Knecht. Individuelle Agency und Existenz in einer pragmatisierten Diskurstheorie,” in Reiner Keller, Werner Schneider and Willy Viehöver, eds., *Diskurs, Macht, Subjekt. Theorie und Empirie von Subjektivierung in der Diskursforschung* (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2012), pp. 35-51. For the discipline of historiography see instead, e. g., Spiegel, *Practicing history*; Sven Reichardt, “Praxeologische Geschichtswissenschaft. Eine Diskussionsanregung,” *Sozial.Geschichte* 22, no. 3 (2007): pp. 43-65. For the individual in the specific context of the history of historiography and historical biography see Sabina Loriga, *Le petit x. De la biographie à l'histoire* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2010).

contrast to this illusion of reality, some authors have instead underlined how experiences are shaped by social and cultural structures. With her article on the concept of “experience”, for instance, historian Joan Wallach Scott instigated an intense debate in the field of feminist historiography, the reverberations of which continue to resonate within the rest of historiography.¹¹⁴⁴ Scott denied that it was possible to challenge the dominant discourses of a society by considering subjects to be “reliable sources of a knowledge that comes from access of that which is real by means of their experience”. Instead, she underlined “the necessarily discursive character of [...] experiences”.¹¹⁴⁵ The weighty emphasis Scott placed on (discursive) structures, however, nearly inevitably leads to new problems inasmuch as experiences, according to Scott, seem to be informed by discourse, or, more generally, by structure alone.

To a certain extent, the “naïve” reading of experience as a kind of genuine expression of that which is “real” and the opposite position of experience as, so to say, a genuine expression of “structure” are the two extreme positions of a continuum that informs all of the other positions. All authors that, regardless of their discipline, have contributed to the debate on experience, struggle with a basic tension between continuity and change; between experience as informed by the reconfirmation of or bringing into being discursive or semantic structures; and experience as the wedge that is driven between these structures. The theoretical proposals on experience differ according to the relative weight they attribute to continuity or change and according to the ways in which they try to connect the two, addressing hence the question of where change comes from. Of course these various positions must be considered within the context of the interminable debates on (post-)structuralism, the subject, and agency.¹¹⁴⁶

Niklas Luhmann, for instance, reserves the concept of “experience” for that which explicitly goes against our expectations; his conceptualization of experience, therefore, is totally different from that of Scott, who underlines the pre-configuration of experience according to precisely those (discursive and internalized) expectations. Among the concepts

¹¹⁴⁴ See as a recent example Harold Mah, “The predicament of experience,” *Modern Intellectual History* 5, no. 1 (2008): pp. 97-119.

¹¹⁴⁵ Joan Wallach Scott, “The evidence of experience,” in Hames Chandler, Arnold Davidson, and Harry Harootunian, eds., *Questions of evidence. Proof, practise, and persuasion across the disciplines* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), pp. 372 and 377. The text was initially published as Joan Wallach Scott, “The evidence of experience,” *Critical Inquiry* 17, no. 4 (1991): pp. 773-97.

¹¹⁴⁶ For a criticism of Scott that aims to rescue “agency” as well as “experience” – seen here as informed especially by encounters with others, by communication – see Laura Lee Downs, “If ‘woman’ is just an empty category, then why am I afraid to walk alone at night? Identity politics meets the postmodern subject,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 35, no. 2 (1993): pp. 414-37.

used by Luhmann, “semantics” is the analogy for that which, according to Scott, shapes experiences. In the Luhmannian sense, experiences that do not adhere to our expectations do not directly change the “semantics”, but rather prompt us instead to change or alter our level of observation. Experiences in this sense stimulate us to observe our observations. They introduce reflexivity by urging us to think about the “semantics”; this reflexivity can then become the basis for a change in the semantics themselves.¹¹⁴⁷

According to Luhmann, but also such theorists as Pierre Bourdieu or some exponents of discourse analysis – who place emphasis on the intersection between different discourses or situations where they “fail” – change seems very much to come from a situation of conflict or confrontation, to bring to the fore the possibility of different world views, or even to lead directly to “symbolic struggles over the perception of the social world”.¹¹⁴⁸ In contrast to this idea that change is a result open conflict, however, other authors underline instead the importance of slow, subliminal change. It is precisely through “practices” that discourse in the Foucauldian or Butlerian sense comes to life. These practices are, for instance for Judith Butler, primarily a continuous “citing” of discourse. Due to constantly changing situations, however, they are never a totally precise rendition of discourse. According to this position, it is precisely from the repetition of practices that change occurs; but for the actors, this change is slight, slow, and more or less goes unnoticed.

When this discussion on “experiences” and “practices” is looked at as a whole, it is possible to see the importance of everyday life: Discourse reveals itself not only in more restricted linguistic practices, but can be grasped as well by examining other types of action. Even more so, without its translation into daily life discourse remains unrealized; the *pervasive power* of discourse becomes evident by its ability to affect everyday life (and conversely, its lack thereof is evident when it does not affect this realm). Moreover, if we conceptualize change, for instance in agreement with Judith Butler, to be the slight alteration in the repetition of practices, an interest in the concrete analysis of practices is the obvious result. Even if the aforementioned authors conceptualize practice and agency differently, that which Alf Lüdtke has already written holds true with regard to his definition of

¹¹⁴⁷ See, e. g., Niklas Luhmann, “Sinn als Grundbegriff der Soziologie,” in idem and Jürgen Habermas, *Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie. Was leistet Systemforschung?* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1971), pp. 25-100; on Luhmann and system theory in the context of historiography see Frank Becker and Elke Reinhardt-Becker, *Systemtheorie. Eine Einführung für die Geschichts- und Kulturwissenschaften* (Frankfurt am Main; New York: Campus, 2001), Interestingly, some of the conceptualizations of change in discourse theory come astonishingly close to the Luhmannian idea of change. See for instance the idea of that which is “real” as an interruption in the symbolic structures and the need to think anew in Sarasin, *Geschichtswissenschaft und Diskursanalyse*, p. 60.

¹¹⁴⁸ Pierre Bourdieu, “Social space and symbolic power,” *Sociological Theory* 7, no. 1 (1989): p. 20.

Alltagsgeschichte “as the history of everyday behaviour and experience”, in which “historical change and continuity are understood as the outcome of action by concrete groups and individuals. Human *social practice* is shifted into the foreground of historical inquiry.”¹¹⁴⁹

The experiences and practices linked to the presence of German soldiers and officers in the Italian armed groups were, so to speak, informed by different contexts. As will be discussed below, a part of the concrete military life of these German soldiers and officers was very much informed by the same cadences, duties and problems that Italian or other foreign soldiers in Italy also encountered. Furthermore, in order to identify and understand the specificities of the practices and experiences of the German soldiers in Italy, it is necessary to compare the military life of the Italian soldier with that of the foreigners as well as that of the specific group of the Germans. The same holds true when analysing how the German presence brought about or triggered change in the Italian armed groups; if one were to note where transnational transfers have occurred, one must compare – however “artificial” such a logical operation may be in the intertwined world of history – different states, the before and the after. Unfortunately, the Italian pre-Unitarian armed groups of the nineteenth century have been studied very little and even less so from the point of view of everyday military life. There are large gaps in the basic information available on these armies because historiography has very much concentrated on either the armies of the Italian states leading up to the eighteenth century or – in a kind of history of the “victor” – on the new Italian Army following 1861. Only the military history of the pre-Unitarian army of Piedmont – for similar reasons – has been studied in more depth.¹¹⁵⁰ A study of the German soldiers and officers in the Italian armed groups, however, does not wish to nor cannot completely do away with these fundamental lacunae in the military history of the nineteenth-century Italian armed groups. It at best can provide a prism for such possible future research.¹¹⁵¹

¹¹⁴⁹ Alf Lüdtke, “Introduction. What is the history of everyday life and who are its practitioners?,” in idem, ed., *The history of everyday life. Reconstructing historical experiences and ways of life* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 6.

¹¹⁵⁰ This is not totally different in Germany, where the Prussian Army of the nineteenth century was traditionally in the historiographical focus. See especially the debate on the role of the Prussian Army with regard to the German Sonderweg, first and foremost by Demeter, *The German officer-corps*. Only recently, the military history of the other nineteenth century armies has been studied more in depth, see especially the works on the officer corps, e.g., Lutz, *Offizierskorps* and Gahlen, *Offizierskorps*.

¹¹⁵¹ For a call for a new military history of the Italian nineteenth century, see also my publication Göhde, “A new military history,” pp. 21-39.

7.2 The military: a “hyper-codified” world

The modern military as a social subsystem is characterized by its strong dependence on official rules and regulations. Hence, according to the military sociologist Lorenzo Greco, the military is a hyper-codified (“ipercodificato”) world.¹¹⁵² The highly codified as well as highly bureaucratic nature of the military is especially interesting for historians because it provides a variety of sources often unmatched by other parts of society. This variety of sources can be used not only for research on the military as such, but for a wide array of other questions, which touch upon such topics as nutrition, body or education history. Though, in the case of the regulations, the tension between legal prescription and actual execution must always be kept in mind.

In the nineteenth century, military regulations had already reached an extremely elevated level of comprehensiveness in the armed groups of the European states. These various regulations can be grouped into primarily three distinct categories:

1. Basic regulations, which concerned nearly every aspect of the concrete service in the army. For the greater part, they were common to all branches. In general terms, there was a trend to diversify these regulations: Whereas the regulations on drills and those on other important aspects of military life were still issued together in one single regulation during the eighteenth century, over the course of the nineteenth century many separate regulations on specific topics were issued.¹¹⁵³ Whether they were unified or not, these service regulations contained instructions on a vast variety of issues, such as for instance:

Regulations on the competences and duties of the different ranks and offices, the modes of inspection, the basic activities of troops such as building guards, the way of commanding and executing orders, the daily assemblies of the corps, the parades, on how to go on patrol, how to keep/preserve order in the places where they were stationed, on military hospitals and prisons, on the provision of beds and comestibles, on quartering in barracks or civilian households, on basic external features of

¹¹⁵² Lorenzo Greco, *Homo militaris. Antropologia e semiotica della vita militare* (Leghorn: Belforte, 2009), pp. 91-92.

¹¹⁵³ Entry “Exerzierreglement” in: Wörterbuch zur Deutschen Militärgeschichte, Band A-Me, Berlin (East) 1985, pp. 179-180.

instruction, on permissions to take leave, on the service of the military chaplaincy, on military honours and ceremonies, on the role of the army in civil ceremonies, etc.

Another class of regulations was comprised of

2. Drill books. These books were more strictly concerned with corporal instructions with and without arms, on the basic corporal posture of the single soldier, marching at military pace, presenting of arms, the formation of tactical groups such as columns and so on. That drill books were issued not only in every country but also within each country for the different branches of the army aims to transmit the fact that these drill books were widely copied throughout Europe.

Lastly, a third type of regulations consisted of

3. Military criminal laws. Although these laws specifically addressed military "misdeeds", more stringent penalties were also frequently contemplated for military subjects that committed "civil" offenses than for civilians that committed the same offenses.

For the Papal and Bourbon Armies¹¹⁵⁴, but also in part in the case of the Roman Republic or the State of Sicily of 1848-1849, the first type of regulation consisted of the comprehensive general service regulations¹¹⁵⁵ on the one hand, and on the other by single

¹¹⁵⁴ Even in the case of the pro-Bourbon guerilla groups the officer Zimmermann posted the regulations "on the outposts' service" and the camp and a "short extract from the previous Neapolitan military [criminal] code" and began to train the brigands with the "most necessary military movements". "Ich ließ Vorschriften über den Vorposten- und Lagerdienst, sowie einen kurzen Auszug aus dem früheren neapolitanischen Militärgesetzbuche publizieren und sogleich mit der Einübung des bürgerlichen Theiles der Truppe in die allernothwendigsten militärischen Bewegungen und Fertigkeiten beginnen [...]". Zimmermann, "Erinnerungen eines ehemaligen Briganten-Chef's," p. 64.

¹¹⁵⁵ Very comprehensive in terms of regulated issues is the Bourbon "Ordinanza di piazza" from 1831, which includes regulations on housing and food rations, military hospitals and prisons, military chaplains, veterinarians, competencies of the various ranks and the various services to be fulfilled by the troops. Less comprehensive is the still fundamental general service regulation of the Papal Army from 1866 (this was the first general regulation as opposed to the wide variety of single regulations that had previously been used). It focused more on the services that were to be performed in the garrison cities, while issues like housing or the service of the chaplains were regulated by own, separate and individual regulations. The Bourbon general regulation is the *Ordinanza di Sua Maestà pel governo, il servizio e la disciplina delle Reali Truppe nelle piazze*; the Papal is the "Regolamento sul servizio delle piazze forti e città di guarnigione dello Stato pontificio," in *Raccolta delle leggi e disposizioni di pubblica amministrazione nello stato pontificio emanate [...] Dal 1° gennaio al 31. dicembre 1866*, vol. 20 (Rome: Rev. Cam. Apostolica, 1866), pp. 406-732.

specific regulations such as on housing¹¹⁵⁶ or the military chaplaincy¹¹⁵⁷. In terms of the second category of regulations described above, the different branches of the armies had distinct and separate drill books, such as those used by the infantry in the Papal Army from 1858 onward¹¹⁵⁸ or in the Bourbon Army from 1833 onward.¹¹⁵⁹ Finally, the third group of regulations was comprised of the military penal laws. In the Papal Army, the same set of military penal laws applied to both indigenous and foreign soldiers.¹¹⁶⁰ In the Bourbon Army, however, the military penal laws differed according to whether the soldier was in an indigenous corps or in a foreigners' corps.¹¹⁶¹ On the opposite political side, at least at the legal level, the military criminal law used by the regular Army of Piedmont was applied (*garibaldini* of 1859 and 1866), or was based on this last albeit with some changes (Roman Republic 1849). In 1860, the decision was made in Garibaldi's Southern Army to apply the Piedmontese regulations to soldiers that had arrived from the north of Italy and to apply the regulations of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies to soldiers from the south.

The general service regulations combined with the drill books and the military criminal codes formed a tripartite foundation upon which the administration and education of the soldiers at least in the regular armies should have been based. Copies of the three were to be present in every place where troops were stationed, together with “a copy of the best works known on offence and defence”.¹¹⁶² Similarly, a copy of the general regulation was to always be on hand in each and every squad, as well as a copy of “the one on exercises and manoeuvres and the military criminal code.”¹¹⁶³ It was common that parts of the basic

¹¹⁵⁶ E. g., *Regolamento per il nuovo servizio del casermaggio delle truppe pontificie* (Rome: Vincenzo Poggioli Stampatore della Rev. Cam. Apost., 1822); in the Bourbon Army, the issue was instead regulated at the general level in the “Ordinanza di piazza”, but changes regarding the housing of officers were introduced by the special “Regolamento per gli alloggi degli uffiziali,” in *Collezione delle leggi e de' decreti reali del Regno delle Due Sicilie. Anno 1835. Semestre II. Da luglio a tutto dicembre* (Naples: Stamperia Reale, 1835), pp. 113-50.

¹¹⁵⁷ *Regolamento pel cappellano maggiore e pei cappellani militari delle truppe pontificie*, (s. l.: s. n., 1850); for the chaplaincy in the Bourbon Army, see instead the *Ordinanza di Sua Maestà pel governo, il servizio e la disciplina delle Reali Truppe nelle piazze*, chapter 3, art. 8, nos. 1359-1369, pp. 218-219.

¹¹⁵⁸ *Regolamento sull' esercizio e sulle manovre per le truppe pontificie di fanteria: pubblicato con sovrana approvazione*, (Rome: Rev. Cam. Apostolica, 1858); very interesting in this regard is a German translation of parts of the former regulation on the use of NCOs and corporals of the papal foreigners' regiments, the *Handbuch für die Unterofficiere und Corporäle der päpstlichen Fremden-Regimenter enthaltend die Soldaten- und Plotons-Schule in Fragen und Antworten*, (Macerata: Bianchini, 1858).

¹¹⁵⁹ *Ordinanza di Sua Maestà per gli esercizi e le evoluzioni delle truppe di fanteria*, (Naples: Reale Tipografia della Guerra, 1833).

¹¹⁶⁰ “Regolamento di giustizia criminale e disciplina militare,” in *Raccolta delle leggi e disposizioni di pubblica amministrazione nello Stato pontificio emanate nell'anno 1842* (Rome: Rev. Cam. Apostolica, 1843), pp. 77-162.

¹¹⁶¹ See for this the chapter 7.5.1.2.

¹¹⁶² “[..U]na copia delle migliori opere conosciute sull’attacco, e sulla difesa delle piazze [...]”. *Ordinanza di Sua Maestà pel governo*, § 100, p. 18.

¹¹⁶³ “[..C]opia della presente ordinanza, non che di quella per gli esercizi e le manovre, e dello statuto penale militare.” *Ibid.*, §1593, p. 246.

regulations as well as of the respective military criminal law relevant for the soldier were read regularly to soldiers. Explanations of the paragraphs on desertion were incorporated into the instruction given to new recruits. In the Bourbon Army, in the event this section was not read, deserters could not be punished; therefore, from 1859 onwards readings of the military criminal code had to be noted in the soldiers' service book.¹¹⁶⁴

7.3 From dawn to dusk: the history of everyday military life of the (foreign) soldier

7.3.1 The cornerstones of the day: From the assembly (assemblea) to the curfew (ritirata)

The general service regulations, which were valid for all corps including the foreigners' corps, can reveal how military life *should* have been in the respective armies.

7.3.1.1 The "visita" after dawn

In the Bourbon Army, for instance, the day of the common infantry soldier began when the respective corporal would wake the soldiers up; normally this would occur at dawn between May and October, but half an hour before dawn from November to April, so approximately between 04.30 and 6.30 a.m. After having dressed and made their beds, the soldiers were summoned to the "visit" (*visita*) by a drum roll half an hour after their wake-up call; the visit took place still in the dormitories or in specially designated places when accommodation was provided by civilians. The visit served first and foremost to control which soldiers were present, to report on those absent with permission and to note whether there were any soldiers missing. At the same time, the visit was a means to control the troops in terms of personal cleanliness, correctness and maintenance of the individual bed-places, clothing, equipment and arms.¹¹⁶⁵ There was then a second visit before soldiers took their only common meal together, known as the "ration" (*rancio*), at 9.30 a.m. (September to May) or 10 a.m. (June to August). New royal ordinances were read out loud during the first visit after the wake-up call, whereas the more specific regimental orders of the day were communicated during the assembly (*assemblea*), which was held at 10 a.m. in the winter months or at 6.30 a.m. in summer months.

¹¹⁶⁴ Boeri, Crociani, and Fiorentino, *L'esercito borbonico I*, p. 110. The service books contained the biographical data of the soldier; fields for the annotation of membership and ranks in the different corps; the text of the sworn oath; pages for entries on education, from basic instruction in reading and writing to the participation in regimental schools to the progress in the tri-partite "school of the soldier" and on the lessons in sharp-shooting; a section was dedicated for noting and controlling the – as we have seen, very complicated – various types of pay, provisions of clothing, contributions, withholdings for pensions and material, etc.; two pages on the ways to make the military salute; and finally three pages with an alphabetical chart on a series of misdeeds and their consequent punishments.

¹¹⁶⁵ For the details of the daily repartition according to two special regulations see *ibid.*, pp. 132-133.

7.3.1.2 The parade of the “assemblea”

The assembly was the daily gathering of all troops that were on guard duty in a garrison, the higher superiors such as the commandants, and at least one exponent of each of the other contingents not engaged in guard duties (present to receive the orders of the day). The parade of the “assemblea” also served to demonstrate the drills and test their effects, to test the responsiveness of the soldiers to orders and to simulate the interlocking of different branches and squads of the military.

The assembly consisted of both obligatory and facultative elements. Whereas the official call of each corps to control the presence of its own troops, the communication of the order of the day and the common parade on the ground – comprehensive of a parade in the narrower sense of the word whereby soldiers marched before the commander and the higher officers – were necessary parts of every assembly, in addition the commander of the garrison could pass in front of the lines to inspect the troops and there could also be manoeuvres to simulate war situations. At one point during the assembly, the respective heads of the contingents could communicate their reports, of which the commandant of the assembly was obliged to give notice to the governor or commandant of the whole garrison. At the end of the parade, the order of the day was given: this consisted in the repartition of military services and communications on the part of the governor or commandant of the garrison such as prescriptions; praise and reprimand; communications regarding orders from higher, civilian and military authorities, the advancements of officers and military decorations awarded, and military punishments.¹¹⁶⁶

In the Papal Army parades were similarly an important element of military life; Georg von Vollmar wrote that the “time – aside from the exercises – was taken up nearly exclusively by roll calls, of which at least one a day took place in all companies” and were linked to daily “parades”.¹¹⁶⁷

Parades were an important element of military life in the pro-Bourbon guerrilla groups of the 1860s¹¹⁶⁸ and in the Garibaldian actions as well. Rüstow reports on one that took place on 16 October 1860 in Caserta in the presence of Garibaldi. To Rüstow’s dismay, the British Legion – which according to him was the “most good for nothing, unusable corps of the

¹¹⁶⁶ *Ordinanza di Sua Maestà pel governo*, §§467-501 (“assemblea”) and 502-523 (“ordine”).

¹¹⁶⁷ “Die Zeit außer dem Exercitium wurde fast ausschließlich für Propretätsappelle in Anspruch genommen, deren täglich mindestens einer bei allen Compagnien stattfand. [...] tägliche[n] Propretätsparaden [...]” Lothar Herwart, *Zwei Jahre Schlüsselsoldat. Aus dem Tagebuche eines päpstlichen Soldaten* (Munich: Adolf Wagner, 1870), p. 100.

¹¹⁶⁸ Zimmermann feels he is reminded of the “drill ground of Schmelz” (a Viennese exercise ground) during a parade in the mountains of the Abruzzi. “Schmelzer Exerzierplatze”. Zimmermann, “Erinnerungen eines ehemaligen Briganten-Chef’s,” p. 63.

Italian southern army”¹¹⁶⁹ – also participated alongside his 15th Garibaldian division. The German-Swiss officer wrote that the “15th division was assembled in a parade on the esplanade in front of the royal palace [...]. On the right flank there was the un-mounted personnel of the general staff and the intendancy, followed by the Eber Brigade in two ranks, the Milano Brigade, and finally on the left flank the Spangaro Brigade also equally arranged in two ranks. The ambulance was positioned in the third column. [...] Garibaldi appeared with Türr and galloped along the fronts of the ranks; the music was playing; the arms were presented. In short, it was a parade that one sees in a standing army as well; but, here, everything was nicer: with only a few exceptions all were experienced soldiers, there was much red, as well as the different uniforms of the various corps. In short, the picture was more vivid than one is accustomed to seeing in a peace parade in Vienna or Berlin.”¹¹⁷⁰ Rüstow makes clear as well, that the parades were modes of communication and show, that they were typical practices that were to be followed in the intercourse between the corps and between the officers and the commander that originated from the regular armies but had to be adhered to in the Garibaldian forces as well. At the beginning of the parade, for instance, the officers had to ride into the middle of the esplanade to “await the dictator there”. After Garibaldi and Türr had visited the troops, the officers were called to gather around the “dictator of the two Sicilies” (*dittatore delle Due Sicilie*¹¹⁷¹), who “dismounted, and hence all other mounted officers had to dismount as well.”¹¹⁷² At this point Garibaldi gave a speech after which the troops were required to march past the officer corps and the “hero”.¹¹⁷³

¹¹⁶⁹ “[...]das nichtsnutzigste, unbrauchbarste Corps der italienischen Südmarmee [...]” Rüstow, *Erinnerungen aus dem italienischen Feldzuge von 1860*, 2, p. 98.

¹¹⁷⁰ “Am 16. Oktober morgens stand die 15. Division nach dem von mir ausgegebenen Befehle in Parade auf der Esplanade vor dem königlichen Palast [...]. Auf dem rechten Flügel das unberittene Personal des Generalstabs und der Intendantur, daran folgte die Brigade Eber in zwei Treffen, dann die Brigade Milano, endlich auf dem linken Flügel die Brigade Spangaro gleichfalls in zwei Treffen. Die Ambulance stand im dritten Treffen. [...] Garibaldi erschien mit Türr, galoppierte die Fronten der Treffen hinab, die Musik spielte, es wurde präsentiert, kurz es war eine Parade, wie man sie bei einer stehenden Armee auch sieht; nur war hier alles schöner: bis auf wenige Ausnahmen erprobte Soldaten, dazu das viele Roth, ferner die nach Truppencorps ziemlich verschiedenen Uniformen. Kurz das Bild war lebendiger, als man es bei einer Friedensparade in Wien oder Berlin zu sehen gewohnt ist.” Ibid., p. 98.

¹¹⁷¹ See the use of this title in, e.g., “Decreto no. 2 del 7 settembre 1860. Decreto circa la nomina o conferma di Ministri e Direttori di varii Dipartimenti,” in *Collezione delle leggi e de' decreti emanati nelle provincie continentali dell'Italia meridionale durante il periodo della dittatura. Da' 7 settembre a 6 novembre 1860* (Naples: Tipografia Nazionale, 1860), p. 2. On the previous “dictatorship” of Garibaldi in Sicily, see Lucy Riall, *Sicily and the unification of Italy. Liberal policy and local power, 1859-1866* (Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press, 1998), pp. 76-107.

¹¹⁷² “Der Dictator saß ab, und folglich mußten auch alle andern berittenen Offiziere auch absitzen.” Rüstow, *Erinnerungen aus dem italienischen Feldzuge von 1860*, 2, p. 98.

¹¹⁷³ Ibid., p. 100.

7.3.1.3 *The leave (libera uscita) and the curfew (ritirata)*

According to the general service regulations common soldiers spent much of the day in a military context. In the Bourbon Army, the "libera uscita", or the moment in which those with a permit could leave the caserns, was set to begin at 1 p.m. in the winter and 3 p.m. in the summer; in other words, up to this moment in the day most soldiers could be found in a military environment, either in the barracks, on the appositely created drill grounds, at military posts, or the sentry-box. This was even more the case with specific groups of soldiers – such as new recruits or those requested to carry out additional exercises and drills – which were excluded from leaving the camp altogether or could only leave when accompanied by higher ranking soldiers.

The “retreat” (*ritirata*) (the German “Zapfenstreich”), or the return to the caserns or military buildings, occurred half an hour before dusk. The soldiers were required to be in their beds and to go to sleep one and a half hours later during the summer months and two and a half hours later in winter months; once silence (*silenzio*), checks were carried out to ensure that no one spoke and that everyone was sleeping alone.¹¹⁷⁴

Table 7.1 – The time-table of the infantry corps in the Bourbon Army¹¹⁷⁵

<i>November-April</i>		<i>May, September-October</i>		<i>June-August</i>	
<i>Wake-up</i>	½ hour before dawn	<i>Wake-up</i>	at dawn	<i>Wake-up</i>	at dawn
<i>Visit</i>	½ hour after wake-up	<i>Visit</i>	½ hour after wake-up	<i>Visit</i>	½ hour after wake-up
<i>Exercises</i>	½ after the visit	<i>Exercises</i>	½ hour after the visit	<i>Exercises</i>	½ hour after the visit
<i>Assembly</i>	at 10 a.m.	<i>Assembly</i>	at 10 a.m.	<i>Assembly</i>	at 10 a.m.
<i>Leave</i>	at 1 p.m.	<i>Leave</i>	at 2 p.m.	<i>Leave</i>	at 3 p.m.
<i>Retreat</i>	½ hour before dusk	<i>Retreat</i>	½ hour before dusk	<i>Retreat</i>	½ hour before dusk
<i>Silence</i>	2½ hours after the retreat	<i>Silence</i>	2 hours after the retreat	<i>Silence</i>	1½ hour after the retreat

7.3.2 *The soldier's “work”*

Generally speaking the foreigners’ corps were very much integrated into the regular services of the infantry. This was, for instance, explicitly established in the 1852 law on the foreigners’ corps of the Papal Army according to which “a part of one of the foreign regiments

¹¹⁷⁴ “All’ora del silenzio dovrà trovarsi immancabilmente nelle camerate onde assicurarsi che gli uomini si pongano a letto, dormano soli, e che cessi ogni rumore.” *Ordinanza di Sua Maestà pel governo*, § 1603, p. 247.

¹¹⁷⁵ Boeri, Crociani, and Fiorentino, *L'esercito borbonico I*, p. 131.

contributes, in the same way as the indigenous troops, to garrison the capital and does service there.”¹¹⁷⁶ Furthermore, the regulations that contained prescriptions on what services were to be carried out were applicable to the foreigners’ and the indigenous corps alike. This was true for the 1854 regulation on the internal services of the infantry¹¹⁷⁷ and the 1866 rules on service in the garrison cities¹¹⁷⁸ as well as the 1858 regulations on the instruction and drills for the infantry.¹¹⁷⁹

Between the assembly and the curfew, soldiers in the regular armies were required to carry out various duties. During peacetime, the military services of the soldiers consisted mainly of five components: Executing special single missions (“corvées”), carrying out guard duty and providing sentinels at the various posts within and without the military camp, forming patrols so as to police military personnel, civilians or sentinels, to be present as an escort or as a corps in civil occasions, and finally exercising during drills or parades.

Troops on guard duty could be commanded to transport wood, coal, oil, candles, or to carry out cleaning services or buy the comestibles for the common meal (“rancio”). Even if it was underlined in the Bourbon Ordinance, / that every kind of work ordered to be carried out by the soldiers “will be considered honourable”, many of the less prestigious tasks were to be carried out, where possible, by punished soldiers as a part of their penal or disciplinary punishment.¹¹⁸⁰

An important portion of a soldier's time and effort were consumed by his guard and sentinel duties:: The papal soldier Georg von Vollmar wrote that in the city of Rome alone there were 72 posts that were to be manned each day, “of which the smaller ones take 8, the larger ones 30 men [...] The most pleasant are the posts at the 12 city gates. Here, the soldier has the possibility to get to know a piece of Roman life.”¹¹⁸¹

¹¹⁷⁶ “Ordinariamente, una parte di uno dei Reggimenti esteri, del pari che le truppe indigene, contribuirà a dare guarnigione nella Capitale e vi presterà servizio.” *Legge emanata dalla Segreteria di Stato li 7 gennaio 1852 per costituire dei corpi militari speciali d'individui di nazione estera al servizio della S. Sede*, art. 118, p. 39.

¹¹⁷⁷ *Regolamento sul servizio interno per le truppe pontificie di fanteria pubblicato con sovrana approvazione*, (Rome: Rev. Cam. Apostolica, 1854).

¹¹⁷⁸ *Regolamento sul servizio delle piazze forti e città di guarnigione dello Stato pontificio* (Rome: Rev. Cam. Apostolica, 1866); these rules were initially published in the law gazette: “Regolamento sul servizio delle piazze forti e città di guarnigione dello Stato pontificio”.

¹¹⁷⁹ *Regolamento sull' esercizio e sulle manovre per le truppe pontificie di fanteria: pubblicato con sovrana approvazione*; A German translation is *Handbuch für die Unterofficiere und Corporäle der päpstlichen Fremden-Regimenter enthaltend die Soldaten- und Platoon-Schule in Fragen und Antworten*.

¹¹⁸⁰ Boeri, Crociani, and Fiorentino, *L'esercito borbonico I*, p. 133.

¹¹⁸¹ “In Rom werden täglich 72 Wachen bezogen, von welchen die kleineren 8 Mann, die größeren 30 Mann verschlingen. [...] Am angenehmsten sind die Wachen an den 12 Thoren. Hier hat der Soldat die Gelegenheit, ein Stück römischen Lebens kennen zu lernen.” Herwart, *Zwei Jahre Schlüsselsoldat*, p. 113.

Guard duties were important in regard to the amount of time soldiers were expected to spend executing them, and they were also important in regard to the effort necessary to sustain a service that was often corporally and psychically “boring”. Soldiers while on duty were expected to remain in one place for long stretches, but always had to be ready to follow orders or to immediately take up arms should the need arise, including, for instance presenting them to higher ranking officials or when the guards were tested for their readiness. At the same time, it was explicitly forbidden to alleviate or make easier the sentinels’ service by removing and laying aside parts of the uniform or the equipment¹¹⁸², just as it was forbidden to become distracted¹¹⁸³: “It is forbidden for any chief of a post to have conversation, to gamble in the sentinels’ post or to allow others to do so. He must forbid that this is done on the part of the non-commissioned officers and soldiers” as well.¹¹⁸⁴

Rendering guard duty was hence an important source of boredom, exhaustion and last but not least led to the condition where the soldiers were thrown back on themselves. Because this specificity of guard service was well known, sentinels were closely and regularly controlled by patrols; therefore the military apparatus watched the watchmen.¹¹⁸⁵

Another important element of service consisted in providing patrols. According to the papal soldier Rottmund, especially “around Christmas and New Year’s Day we had to perform strong patrol service. The frequently occurring political demonstrations and activities of the revolutionary party especially made our service ever more trying because day and night plenty of patrols and pickets had to fill the streets of Rome.”¹¹⁸⁶

Such services as those of sentinel duty, guard posts and patrols in the civil sphere clearly demonstrate that the regular military was still used for services of “public order”. Studies on German garrison towns in the nineteenth century, for instance, confirm this

¹¹⁸² “Vieterà che i sotto-uffiziali e soldati tolgano alcuna parte del vestiario o del cuojame, o depongano le armi da fianco [...]” *Ordinanza di Sua Maestà pel governo*, § 548, p. 94.

¹¹⁸³ In today’s armies for instance it is forbidden to watch television or to listen to music, to eat, to drink, to smoke, or to carry on a conversation that is not strictly related to service; see the act ZDv 10/6 (Wachdienst), no. 802, e.g. in: *Taschenbuch für die Wehrausbildung/Heer* (Regensburg, 1987), F09, p. 3.

¹¹⁸⁴ “È vietato a qualunque capoposto di tener conversazione, di giuocare nel corpo di guardia o di permetterlo ad altri. Egli proibirà che ciò si faccia in quello de’ sotto-uffiziali e soldati [...]” *Ordinanza di Sua Maestà pel governo*, §548.

¹¹⁸⁵ About the system of the “gettoni”, see, e.g., *ibid.*, §§720 and 751.

¹¹⁸⁶ “Gegen Weihnachten und Neujahr hatten wir starken Patrouillendienst zu versehen. Besonders die häufig vorkommenden politischen Demonstrationen und Umtriebe der Revolutionspartei machten unsern Dienst immer strenger, da Tag und Nacht eine Menge Patrouillen und Piquets die Straßen Roms durchziehen mußten.” Rottmund, *Erlebnisse und Interessante Begebenheiten eines Deutschen in englischen, römischen, garibaldischen, neapolitanischen und französischen Kriegsdiensten. Genau nach den geführten Tagebüchern bearbeitet u. hsg. von J. R. [J. Rottmund]*, p. 48.

auxiliary role of the military in “maintaining order and tranquillity in the public sphere”.¹¹⁸⁷ These services of the regular military were added to the work of the more circumscribed police forces.¹¹⁸⁸

¹¹⁸⁷ Ralf Pröve, *Militär, Staat und Gesellschaft im 19. Jahrhundert*, Enzyklopädie Deutscher Geschichte (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2006), p. 90.

¹¹⁸⁸ In Rome, for instance, the much-hated “sbirri” (“cops”) were replaced in 1816 with the French-style “Carabinieri”, and therefore a police force organized militarily as was the gendarmerie in France. After the Roman Republic, they were referred to with the name “Gendarmeria”, but continued to be “included in the military forces, even if their duties were exclusively of internal defence.” Subsequently, the finance guard (“Guardia di finanza”) and the various civic and – in the revolutionary period – national guards were added to the militarily organized Gendarmerie. The citations are taken from Friz, *Burocrati e soldati*, pp. 84 and 86-89 respectively. For the history of the papal police between the seventeenth and mid-nineteenth centuries, see, e. g., Steven Hughes, “Fear and loathing in Bologna and Rome. The papal police in perspective,” *Journal of Social History* 21, no. 1 (1987): pp. 97-116. Both the “Gendarmerie” and the – auxiliary – role of regular military corps in policing are signs of a “state military”-conception of the police, as opposed to a state civilian and civilian municipal ideal type, as was elaborated by Clive Emsley, “A typology of nineteenth-century police,” *Crime, Histoire & Sociétés; Crime, History & Societies* 3, no. 1 (1999): pp. 29-44. For our case it is important to note, however, that despite the fact that the papal gendarmerie was first named “carabinieri”, as are the current “Carabinieri” in Italy, the similar terms used in reference to several of the foreigners’ corps in the Papal and Bourbon Armies (“foreign carabineers”) do not signify that they were ideated as police forces. Nevertheless, as we have seen, in times of peace these forces did indeed contribute – as did other, differently named indigenous as well as foreign corps – to upholding public order. The historiography on police forces in the nineteenth century is differently developed in the various countries of Europe. In Germany, for instance, there was a heightened interest in the issue especially from the mid-1980s onwards, wherein the transposal of early modern governmental concerns of prosperity (“Policey”) into the more circumscribed police forces dealing with public order and “tranquillity” was highlighted. This led to a comparatively wide comprehensiveness of “policed” social realities in Germany. For this, see Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Wolf-Dieter Narr, “Vom Polizey-Staat zum Polizeistaat? Ein Forschungsbericht anhand neuerer Literatur,” *Neue Politische Literatur* 23 (1978): pp. 185-218. Subsequently, especially political policing, from the nineteenth century (e.g. the work of Wolfram Siemann) to the Weimar Republic, and to a lesser degree the policing of general criminality as well, have been the focus of German historians. For our purpose, those works that highlight the complex relationship between military and police forces are of particular import. Not only did the French-style military gendarmerie model spread to many countries, but even the more strictly circumscribed police institutions were characterized by a great deal by military culture. This characteristic was carried well into the Weimar Republic, especially due to the military origin of the personnel of these institutions. Hence, the police forces indirectly contributed to the militarization of European societies. For a discussion of the major contributions in this field up to the mid-1980s and 1990s see respectively Wolfram Siemann, “Polizei in Deutschland im 19. Jahrhundert. Institutionen, Operationsebenen, Wirkungsmöglichkeiten. Mit neuen Dokumenten,” in Jörg Schömer, ed., *Literatur und Kriminalität. Die gesellschaftliche Erfahrung von Verbrechen und Strafverfolgung als Gegenstand des Erzählens. Deutschland, England und Frankreich 1850-1880. Interdisziplinäres Kolloquium der Forschergruppe 'Sozialgeschichte der deutschen Literatur 1770-1900', München 15./16. Januar 1981* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1983), pp. 68-95; Richard J. Evans, “Police and society from absolutism to dictatorship,” in idem, *Rereading German history. 1800-1996. From unification to reunification* (London; New York: Routledge, 1997), pp. 65-86. On the relationship between military and police forces, albeit if only for the Weimar Republic, see from the newer literature Daniel Schmidt, “Keine Kommissare. Preußische Polizeioffiziere zwischen soldatischem Selbstverständnis und polizeilicher Professionalität 1919 bis 1939,” *Militärgeschichtliche Zeitschrift* 69, no. 1 (2010): pp. 37-58. Historiography on the police in Italy has only very recently gained in momentum. There had been some studies on the general issue of crime and law enforcement before, though, most notably John A. Davis, *Conflict and control. Law and order in nineteenth century Italy* (Houndmills, Basingstoke; New York: Macmillan, 1988) or Lucy Riall, “Liberal policy and the control of public order in Western Sicily 1860-1862,” *The Historical Journal* 35, no. 2 (1992): pp. 345-68. In 2012, a centre for the history of the police force was founded, the “Centro Interuniversitario per la Storia delle Polizie e del Controllo del Territorio”; this is a joint project between the universities of Milan, Bergamo, Genoa, Messina, Naples (Fedderico II), Pisa and Siena. The Centre publishes a book series entitled “Stato, Esercito e Controllo del Territorio”, from which two volumes in particular are of interest here: Livio Antonielli, ed., *La polizia in Italia nell'età moderna. Seminario di studi, Messina, 26-27 febbraio 1998* (Soveria Mannelli, Catanzaro: Rubbettino, 2002); Livio Antonielli, ed., *La polizia in Italia e in Europa. Punto sugli studi e prospettive di ricerca* (Soveria Mannelli, Catanzaro: Rubbettino, 2006), neither of which, however, was I able to

But the presence of the military in the civil sphere was not confined to patrolling alone. The very fact that they were present at an ample number of civil as well as religious occasions, the Bourbon and Papal Armies also contributed to the display and visibility of the military, and hence the state, in the everyday life of the cities. The sheer number of these services becomes evident when looking at a calendar included in the papal military annual book of 1867.¹¹⁸⁹ Different branches of the army or parts of different corps were asked to be present at multiple religious and civil festivities. Therefore, a company of the infantry had to be stationed inside the church of St. Peter while the Pope held mass, from the feast of purification of the Virgin (2 February) to Christmas (25 December). Similarly, military corps were also required to be present when the Pope celebrated mass in other Roman churches. For the feast of ascension, for instance, there were to be placed “pickets along the route that the Holy Father takes from the Vatican to St. John Lateran”, while parts of the infantry and cavalry were to be stationed in the piazza in front of the church.¹¹⁹⁰ Infantry pickets, together with sections of the artillery and the dragoons were placed along the Via del Corso during the eight days of the Roman carnival¹¹⁹¹, which was traditionally the central street of the festival. In addition the military could be hired out “for decorating processions, non-military funeral processions, sacral occasions, or to assist at academies, receptions, mundane festivities”¹¹⁹², in which case soldiers and officers alike were to receive extra-pay from the respective authorities or private patrons.

Private companies were expected to pay for the presence of the troops when they were called in to ensure “good order”, for instance during theatre performances or public spectacles (spettacoli).¹¹⁹³ It is not astonishing, hence, that the papal soldier Georg von Vollmar noted

consult for temporal restrictions. Within the context of this relatively young interest in the history of the police, of note are several new questions addressed, see for instance on masculinities and the police in Simona Mori, “Becoming Policemen in nineteenth century Italy. Police gender culture through the lens of professional manuals,” in David G. Barrie and Susan Broomhall, eds., *A history of police and masculinities, 1700-2010* (London; New York: Routledge, 2012), pp. 102-22. See as well Enrico Francia, “La ‘cabala’ degli sbirri. Immagini della polizia nella rivoluzione del 1848,” *Contemporanea (Bologna)* 6, no. 3 (2003): pp. 447-74. It is not difficult to foresee a renewed interest in police forces and practices as well as secret services within the context of “counterterrorism” and especially the most recent NSA-scandal.

¹¹⁸⁹ *Annuario militare pontificio. Anno 1867* (Rome: Tipografia della Rev. Cam. Apostolica, 1867), pp. iii-xii.

¹¹⁹⁰ “Picchetti lungo lo stradale che percorre il S. Padre dal Vaticano a S. Giovanni in Laterano. Truppe di fanteria e Cavalleria sulla Piazza di S. Giovanni.” *Ibid.*, p. vi.

¹¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. iii-iv.

¹¹⁹² “[..P]er condecorare processioni, convogli funebri non militari, funzioni sacre, o ad assistere ad accademie, ricevimenti, feste profane [...]” “Decreto relativo alle percezioni straordinarie nel disimpegno dei servizi di lucro,” in *Raccolta delle leggi e disposizioni di pubblica amministrazione nello stato pontificio emanate [...] Dal 1 gennaio al 31 dicembre 1866*, 23 vols., vol. 20 (Rome: Rev. Cam. Apostolica, 1866), art. 9, p. 687.

¹¹⁹³ “per mantenervi il buon ordine” *ibid.*, art. 12-19, pp. 688-690.

the many “theatre and church piquets”, concluding that “in Rome nothing can happen without the military”.¹¹⁹⁴

Of note however, is the fact that the soldiers always participated in these regular services within the context of (or parts of) their respective corps. The papal general service regulation, for instance, stated explicitly: “The corps that are garrisoned in one place concur between them in the various turns of service, but the officers, non-commissioned officers, the corporals and soldiers that find themselves in the same place must always be part of the same corps.”¹¹⁹⁵ If we take into account the different uniforms of the corps, the soldiers remained distinguishable in the civil sphere, and for many civilians it was additionally clear which were the indigenous and which the foreigners’ corps. All of this of course suggests that it was possible for civilians to make a comparison of the various corps of one army.

7.4 Hot and cold/cool – military “emotional standards”, drill and exercise

When looking at the historiography on the nineteenth-century nationalisms alongside that of the military history of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, at a first glance there appears to be a contradiction between the persistence of a military quest for metaphorically “cold-blooded” soldiers (best symbolized by what has been called “old drill”, see below) on the one hand and the supposedly very “emotionally charging” effect of the legitimating constructions in general on the other hand. The extremes “hot” and “cold” and “cool”¹¹⁹⁶ symbolize seemingly opposed “emotional standards”.¹¹⁹⁷ In the nineteenth century there was a shift away from the cold metaphor of military drill; this is related to the tendency toward, as Andreas Reckwitz has written, a “*positive, productive emotionalization*”, which actually took place in modernity and is quite in opposition to the idea of “taming” male emotions in modernity according to Elias.¹¹⁹⁸

Some military historians have identified a series of interconnected changes that occurred in society in general and in the military in particular that, according to this position,

¹¹⁹⁴ “Da in Rom gar nichts ohne Militär vor sich gehen kann, so gaben wir auch noch Theater- und Kirchenpiquets.” Herwart, *Zwei Jahre Schlüsselsoldat*, p. 122.

¹¹⁹⁵ “I corpi che tengono guarnigione in una piazza concorrono tra loro pei varj turni di servizio, ma gli uffiziali i sotto-uffiziali, i caporali, e soldati che si trovano nello stesso posto, devono appartenere sempre al medesimo corpo.” “Regolamento sul servizio delle piazze forti e città di guarnigione dello Stato pontificio,” art. 46, p. 441.

¹¹⁹⁶ Historically, the terms “hot blooded” and “cold blooded” were quite similarly used the way “hot headed” and “cool headed” are used today.

¹¹⁹⁷ Stearns and Stearns, “Emotionology,” pp. 813-36.

¹¹⁹⁸ Andreas Reckwitz, “Umkämpfte Maskulinität. Zur Historischen Kultursoziologie männlicher Subjektformen und ihrer Affektivitäten vom Zeitalter der Empfindsamkeit bis zur Postmoderne,” in Manuel Borutta and Nina Verheyen, eds., *Die Präsenz der Gefühle. Männlichkeit und Emotion in der Moderne* (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2010), p. 60. Italics in the original.

also had significant effects on the circumscribed field of military education and military training.

Following the experiences made during revolutionary and Napoleonic warfare at the dawn of the century, war became increasingly more “ideologized”. The victories of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Armies had already contemporaneously been interpreted to have been based on a change in the motivation of the single soldier, who went from being a mere executor of orders (in the standing armies of the eighteenth century) to a politically convinced national or “citizen in arms”. In ideal terms, the highly professional, but less, or at least differently, motivated (pay, glory) soldier was to be replaced by the less professional, but ideologically motivated soldier. Changes in military education and military tactics were associated with this shift. Less orderly battle tactics – appropriated from the context of irregular warfare – were well suited to part-time soldiers, as for instance.

7.4.1 The pan-European drill and the “machine” metaphor

The fact that for centuries military drill has constituted the basic education of soldiers throughout Europe and beyond has long overshadowed the historicity of the phenomenon; from the Dutch regulations of the sixteenth century onwards, it became commonplace for the various armies to copy drill books. The resulting standardization of drill – from commands (or their respective translations) to exercises and movements – rendered it far easier for soldiers to change armies on the continent. Despite the circulation and persistence of certain forms of drill, historians have lately underlined that “manual drill has a history of its own”¹¹⁹⁹, even if changes occurred only very slowly.

The need for basic training in posture, movements and the execution of orders became increasingly important following the advent of standing armies in the sixteenth century. The consequent increase in the length of time a soldier was to serve was linked to a decisive intensification in military education. Moreover, new fighting techniques were based on the machine-like interaction between the single soldiers. In turn, this form of interaction was dependent on the habitualization of standardized movements. A sizeable portion of training consisted in inculcating the soldiers with a rather large number of these movements, the aim of which was to prompt the soldier to automatically execute such movements in response to orders: “infantrymen were subjected to regularised drill through which they were taught to enact prescribed bodily movements with their arms whenever fixed words of command were

¹¹⁹⁹ Harald Kleinschmidt, “Using the gun. Manual drill and the proliferation of portable firearms,” *Journal of Military History* 63, no. 3 (1999): pp. 601-31.

issued.”¹²⁰⁰ Historians have noted the similarities between this “old” form of drill with dancing: Much like the descriptions and recommendations on dance steps, drill books prescribed in every possible detail precise bodily movements on how to use and to place parts of the body in relation to such factors as height, direction, tension and so forth. Within this idea that the soldier, the military corps, and the army in general were a machine with interacting and interdependent parts, the emphasis that was placed on the precise interlocking of the soldiers' movements very much resembled social (i.e. regulated, couple or group) dancing.¹²⁰¹ The ultimate objective of this type of drill was not to increase the physical strength of the body but rather was intended to cultivate the “perfect” interaction and discipline within the army at all levels. This type of training was believed to be the best preparation for war, “so that in the chaos of battle they [i.e., the soldiers] would instinctively revert to their training, and perform these complicated physical tasks with firmness, speed and order [...]”¹²⁰² According to the same logic, firing along the line could be made more “effective” by dividing the tasks of firing and reloading to different (groups of) soldiers; this approach consequently necessitated a strict interlocking of the diverse respective movements necessary to carry out the action. Soldiers were expected to immediately and unquestioningly execute their orders by performing the meticulously prescribed movements, they “were trained to execute commands literally, without reflecting upon or attempting to understand their purpose.”¹²⁰³

7.4.2 Political motivation was unnecessary: *The precise man*

An active individual motivation, shared values or a “positive” political standpoint towards the respective war was not regarded as a necessary condition of being a “good” soldier. Rather, the soldier was only indirectly bound to the “aims” of a given war by way of his loyalty to the monarch and/or the commander of his regiment. This loyalty was, in this last instance, characterized by the traditional feudal reciprocity of duties expressed in a contractual manner, which in the long run depended more on a soldier’s conscience than on his emotions.¹²⁰⁴ This “contractual” conception of loyalty, hence without the presence of the “positive” motivation of the soldier, also played out in a series of concrete military practices. Sophisticated

¹²⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 607.

¹²⁰¹ William H. McNeill, *Keeping together in time. Dance and drill in human history* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995); Matthew McCormack, "Dance and drill. Polite accomplishments and military masculinities in Georgian Britain," *Cultural & Social History* 8, no. 3 (2011): pp. 315-30; Harald Kleinschmidt, "Militär und Tanz," *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 59, no. 9 (2011): pp. 705-72.

¹²⁰² McCormack, "Dance and drill," p. 321.

¹²⁰³ Kleinschmidt, "Using the gun," p. 607.

¹²⁰⁴ For the change in the discourse of loyalty in regard to the soldier see Buschmann, "Treue und Verrat".

measures of “outward” control (“close-order control”) were established that revealed the basic assumption of the authorities according to which soldiers that lacked this control would abscond from their duties: In the battle formation of the line, superiors were placed along every edge as a means to hinder soldiers from breaking formation. Hans Delbrück in his work already underlined the fact that “close-order control” in the standing armies rendered the understanding or conviction of the single soldier dispensable.¹²⁰⁵

Moreover, “too much” motivation was even regarded to be dangerous: To keep one’s calm not only reduced mistakes and loss of material, it also helped to avoid accidents. Moral qualities of the soldier did matter, but only strictly in terms of manners: Already the Oranian reforms aimed at transmitting self-control and the inculcation of some basic virtues. What is important, however, is that military and not political loyalty was required.

“Coldness” or “Coolness”, as in to “keep one’s cool”, was said to be especially necessary in order to handle weapons – the moment being too “emotional” was regarded as an important reason that led to the injury or death of the single soldier or even that of his “comrades”. In the eighteenth century, personal initiative – which can be seen as an efflux of emotional involvement – was considered to be counterproductive, and educating soldiers to have a machine-like response to orders was regarded as the best kind of preparation for war; this habitus can be described by such words as “cold” or “cool” to indicate the idea that the will of the commander passes directly to the physical bodies of the soldiers, for the most part circumventing the “brain” and “heart” of the single soldier.¹²⁰⁶

7.4.3 *New influences: nationalism, emotions and the impassioned soldier*

In contrast to the “calm”, “cold-blooded” qualities deemed ideal for serving in the standing armies, a new conception took hold during the Napoleonic Wars: the “mobilization of passions”¹²⁰⁷ is said to have underpinned a new kind of warfare. The skirmish as a less machine-like, more dynamic form of combat was introduced at this time and is a symbol of this change. The very nature of the skirmish dictated the necessary courage of the individual soldier and therefore could not be based on close-order control/drill. Within this combat

¹²⁰⁵ On this, see Hans Delbrück: *Geschichte der Kriegskunst*, vol. 2, *Die Neuzeit. Vom Kriegswesen der Renaissance bis zu Napoleon* (Hamburg, 2010), p. 348.

¹²⁰⁶ In the “machine” metaphor rather than applying the Cartesian dichotomy of a “cold” *ratio* (reason) and “hot” emotions, neither ratio nor emotions were considered necessary. Several caveats must be noted, however: First, it is important not to deduce the real “feelings” of soldiers from the prescriptions and aims of their instruction. Second, the metaphor of “hot” and “cold” in regard to emotions has a history all of its own, where it is in fact more complex than it is used here. For instance, with regard to the notion of “cold-blooded” as it is applied to a murder indicated *enhanced* hatred that leads to the dehumanization of the enemy.

¹²⁰⁷ See the title of the chapter on disciplinary techniques in Ulrich Bröckling, *Disziplin. Soziologie und Geschichte militärischer Gehorsamsproduktion* (Munich: Fink, 1997), chapter III, pp. 89-128.

context, the political loyalty of the soldier became more important. In the final decades of the eighteenth century, new impulses were incorporated into the first reformed drill books wherein dynamism, as opposed to the machine-like execution of orders, was introduced along with the first measures to provide the soldiers with a "moral education": "During the concluding decades of the century manual drill was reorganized in such a way that fixed sequences of action were no longer practiced and that infantrymen were expected to execute dynamic movements. In consequence, manual drill was transformed into an instrument for moral and physical education."¹²⁰⁸

The new emphasis that was being placed on the passions of the single soldier was intertwined with the diffusion of nationalism. Nationalism addressed and fostered a series of emotions in a special way.¹²⁰⁹ On the one hand, nationalism tried to cultivate emotions towards the nation itself, strengthening the "bond" between the individual and the nation through, for instance, the forms of "veneration, loyalty, submission and sacrifice" that had been appropriated from religion¹²¹⁰ or sexual feelings by depicting the nation as a woman. On the other hand, a series of emotions, such as hatred and revenge (connected to conceptions of honour), were "nationalized" and directed against the "enemies" of the nation, whether these last were internal or external to the national territory, whether inside or outside the national group. In fact, the opposing directionality of these emotions – i.e. directed at the nation and directed at its enemies – was intimately interconnected. The ultimate effect should ideally have been a much "emotionalized" state of the individual. But in the actual activities of the soldier, these emotions had to be tamed in a way. Garibaldi, for instance, in an order he gave the day before his arrival to Marsala in 1860, underlined that the character "of the brave jäger has to be based on cool blood" on the one hand, but on "verve" on the other.¹²¹¹

¹²⁰⁸ Kleinschmidt, "Using the gun," p. 618.

¹²⁰⁹ This was underlined especially from those historians working on national myths. See, e.g., Etienne François, Hannes Siegrist, and Jakob Vogel, "Die Nation. Vorstellungen, Inszenierungen, Emotionen," in eidem, eds., *Nation und Emotion. Frankreich und Deutschland im Vergleich* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1995), pp. 13-35; Rudolf Speth, "Nation und Emotion. Von der vorgestellten zur emotional erfahrenen Gemeinschaft," in Ansgar Klein and Frank Nullmeier, eds., *Masse-Macht-Emotionen. Zu einer politischen Soziologie der Emotionen* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1999), pp. 287-307. Emphasis on emotions in nationalism has also been expressed by Banti and Ginsborg, "Per una nuova storia del Risorgimento". A critique on the "hydraulic" model of emotions (Rosenwein, Solomon) that lay at the basis of Banti's work has been advanced by Riall, "Nation, 'deep images'," pp. 402-09.

¹²¹⁰ Etienne François and Hagen Schulze, "Das emotionale Fundament der Nation," in Monika Flacke, ed., *Mythen der Nationen. Ein europäisches Panorama. Begleitband zur Ausstellung vom 20. März 1998 bis 9. Juni 1998* (Munich; Berlin: Koehler & Amelang, 2001), p. 25.

¹²¹¹ "Il carattere del prode cacciatore deve essere basato sul sangue freddo e lo slancio." Cit. from Silvio Furlani, "Un inedito di Garibaldi. I 'consigli tattici'," in Filippo Mazzonis, ed., *Garibaldi condottiero. Storia, teoria, prassi* (Milan: F. Angeli, 1985), p. 33.

7.4.4 Exercising and drill in the Italian armies – the persistence of old models

A closer look at the available drill books enables us to analyse drill, bearing in mind, however, that actual practices may have differed from the prescriptions contained in the books themselves. A handbook for the non-commissioned officers and corporals of the papal foreign regiments, published in 1858 in German, uses a question and answer format to present the "school of the soldiers and the platoon".¹²¹² Whereas the orders themselves are given in French – this was the case for the foreign regiments of the papal army in general – the questions and answers are provided in German.

Image 7.1. Photograph – Papal Training Camp, Rocca di Papa



This anonymous photograph, taken at the papal training camp of Rocca di Papa, captures a group of Zouaves (left) and some infantry line officers (right). Source: Piero Raggi, *La nona crociata. I volontari di Pio IX in difesa di Roma, 1860-1870*, 2 ed. (Ravenna: Libreria Tonini, 2002), p. 165.

The first section of the book not only details the movements of the single soldier – with which the leading personnel must be familiar for obvious teaching purposes – it gives detailed descriptions on how to teach the soldiers how to learn and execute such movements. The second section of the drill book moves on to describe the respective movements of the

¹²¹² *Handbuch für die Unterofficiere und Corporäle der päpstlichen Fremden-Regimenter.*

officers and corporals during periods of training and battle. Therefore, the first section contains the usual tri-partition of elements pertaining to the “school of the soldier”: posture and basic movements of the single soldier without arms; movements linked to the management of arms; movements of the soldier when in groups, e.g. marching. The lectures first addressed how to establish a basic tense posture of the single soldier, “because the man, were he to hunch his shoulders forward and keep his back bent (as is common to peasants), would be unable to straighten up or to handle his gun with dexterity.”¹²¹³ The highly detailed descriptions of the movements associated with the (many) orders were clearly grounded in a strong anatomical understanding. Hence, in the lecture on the “school-footstep” (*Schulschritt*) – the French “pas d’école” or “pas ordinaire”, hence 76 steps with a step length of 26 inches per minute – the following explanation is given as to why the toe should be pointed earthward: “...by pointing the foot to earth, the knee is elongated, and the foot is disposed to be brought to earth evenly.”¹²¹⁴ Already this basic military footstep however, highlights how differently these movements were from “natural” body movements, where nearly the opposite applies, with a knee slightly flexed and the rear of the foot making contact with the earth first. This difference in the type of movement required – like with all the other detailed movements in the drill book – had to be assimilated. This requisite is an indication of how learning the military drill was still akin to learning social dancing. Within the context of the “school-footstep”, soldiers were also obliged to keep their feet as close to the ground as possible when marching. This was but one prescription of many throughout the drill-book that explicitly aimed to increase speed and reduce fatigue and exhaustion through the avoidance of unnecessary movements and deployment of strength: in this case “because the soldiers, if they raised their foot above what was strictly necessary, would lose time and exhaust themselves *without advantage*.”¹²¹⁵ The portion of the quoted text in italics is intended to highlight the fact that the maxim of avoiding fatigue, was relative insofar as only those movements ought to be avoided that were deemed unnecessary for carrying out the intrinsically tiring standardized movements.

Many of the movements were so complicated, that, as often occurred when learning social dancing, the steps were taught in several sessions characterized by increasing levels of

¹²¹³ „Weil der Mann, wenn er die Schultern vorgäbe und den Rücken gewölbt hielte (eine gewöhnliche Erscheinung bei den Landleuten) sich weder richten, noch sein Gewehr mit Gewandheit führen könnte [...]. Ibid., p. 8.

¹²¹⁴ „Weil durch das Abwärtsbringen der Fussspitze das Knie gestreckt, und der Fuss disponirt wird, flach auf den Boden zu kommen.“ Ibid., p. 15.

¹²¹⁵ „Weil die Soldaten, wenn sie den Fuss über Gebühr erheben, Zeit verlieren, und sich ohne Nutzen ermüden würden.“ Ibid., p. 16. Italics are mine.

complexity.¹²¹⁶ The exact execution of body movements was considered to be so important in maintaining order and ensuring the war-machine would work¹²¹⁷ that mistakes were punished harshly: “In the case of mistaken movements”, it was recommended that the instructor “send the soldier to the class of punishment or of instruction, depending on whether the mistake was committed as a result of inattentiveness or unskillfulness.”¹²¹⁸

Another recurrent issue in the text was the emphasis placed on the desirability of the cool-headedness of the soldiers. For instance, in the lectures on how to load the various weapons, it is recommended that the instructor pay attention and ensure that “all movements are executed with cold blood and without rush, because he cannot overlook the fact that those soldiers who, without apparently hurrying, load calmly and with cold blood, load their rifle the best and most quickly because they do not miss the muzzle of the barrel or the rings, they bounce the loading better, do not spill the powder and do not drop patrons or capsules.”¹²¹⁹ Ensuring the soldiers are calm and “cold-blooded”, it was said, “is the best measure to maintain order in a troop.”¹²²⁰ Accompanying this favour shown to the characteristic of being calm was the specification for the instructors that “all remarks and orders should be given to the soldiers very quietly to avoid fuss and disorder.”¹²²¹

Many instructions in the drill book established close-order control. It specified that the higher ranks were to be placed along the flanks, the head, and rear of each squad; experienced simple soldiers were to control the movements of one line of soldiers; and “serre-files” linked different squads of a platoon on march¹²²², establishing a chain of control comprised of controls of controls.¹²²³ In a single squad, the “instructor controls the first row, the chief of squad the second, the ‘remplacement’ the third; they ensure that posture of the feet, body and

¹²¹⁶ See, e.g., *ibid.*, p. 40.

¹²¹⁷ See the exact number of paces of the different steps specified throughout *ibid.*.

¹²¹⁸ „Bei fehlerhaften Bewegungen die er selbst wahrnimmt, oder die ihm von dem Plotonschef und den Serrefiles angedeutet werden, verschickt er die Fehlbaren entweder in die Straf- oder in die Instructionsclasse; je nachdem der Fehler aus Nachlässigkeit oder aus Ungeschicklichkeit begangen worden.“ *Ibid.*, p. 112.

¹²¹⁹ „Dass alle Bewegungen mit Kaltblütigkeit, und ohne Übereilung vollzogen werden, indem ihm nicht entgehen kann, dass die Soldaten die, ohne scheinbar sich zu eilen, die Ladung ruhig und kalten Blutes vollbringen, ihr Gewehr am besten und am geschwindesten laden, da sie weder die Mündung des Laufes, noch die Ringe verfehlen, besser die Ladung stossen, kein Pulver verschütten und keine Patronen oder kapsel [sic] fallen lassen.“ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

¹²²⁰ „Kaltblütigkeit [...] ist das erste Mittel für die Ordnung in einer Truppe [...]“ *Ibid.*, p. 94.

¹²²¹ „[...] alle Bemerkungen und Befehle sollen den Soldaten leise übertragen werden, um Lärmen und Unordnung zu verhüten.“ *Ibid.*, pp. 199-200.

¹²²² See, e.g., *ibid.*, pp. 91-94.

¹²²³ See, e.g., *ibid.*, p. 78.

rifle is always correct and that all movements are executed energetically and close to the body.”¹²²⁴

The machine-like execution of orders was the aim, which becomes clear, for instance, in the following passage: “141. Why should no man still move after the command *stand attention*, even if he was not yet aligned? To get accustomed to evaluating his line of direction quickly, and to insert himself in the latter without hesitation.”¹²²⁵

The aspects of training that are absent are also quite interesting: Building corporeal strength was perhaps a by-product of the mechanical drill, but training that pointedly aimed to increase physical strength, for instance in building muscles, was not mentioned at all in the papal drill book.

7.4.5 “Democratizing” armies? Exercise and drill in the Garibaldian armies

The topic of exercising and carrying out drill is especially thorny in the case of the Garibaldian undertakings.

At the formal level, it is opportune to recall the different official relationships the respective Garibaldian groups had with the regular army of Piedmont/Italy.¹²²⁶ The Garibaldian soldiers of 1859 were an official, albeit special, force in the Piedmontese Army; they were not only “trained by officers of the Army of Piedmont”, but the rules and regulations of this regular army should also have applied to them as well.¹²²⁷

The soldiers’ training in the southern army of 1860 depended even more than usual on the respective superiors of each corps the moment official guidelines for the education of the Garibaldian troops were never issued.¹²²⁸ Rüstow, for instance, established his own regime of exercises and drills for his corps; he commanded his brigade to exercise already in Genoa, and upon its arrival in southern Italy, he ordered several days of basic training:

¹²²⁴ „Der Instructor beaufsichtigt das erste, der Platoonchef das zweite, und der Remplacement das dritte Glied; sie sorgen dass die Stellung der Füße, des Körpers und des Gewehrs immer richtig sei, und dass alle Bewegungen lebhaft und dicht am Leibe vorbei vollzogen werden.“ Ibid., p. 102.

¹²²⁵ „141. Warum soll auf’s Commando fixe kein Mann mehr rühren, auch wenn er noch nicht ausgerichtet wäre? Damit er sich angewöhne, seine Richtungslinie schnell zu beurtheilen, und ohne Zaudern in dieselbe einzurücken.“ Ibid., p. 73. Italics in the original.

¹²²⁶ For this, see p. 167.

¹²²⁷ Isastia, “Cacciatori delle Alpi,” p. 175.

¹²²⁸ In terms of military criminal law, however, the complicated decision was taken to subject “the Italians of the continent” to the Piedmontese military criminal law, while the Neapolitan code before 1849 (so, before the second Restoration) was to be applied to “the islanders”. Regardless, both groups would be guaranteed the milder penalty of the two laws. In fact, not even adherence to this decision was ensured, simply by the fact, as Rüstow reports, that he was not provided with and could not himself find a copy of either law. See “Decree from 17 May 1860,” in *Collezione delle leggi, decreti e disposizioni governative compilate dall’avvocato Nicolò Porcelli*, 2 ed. (Palermo: Carini, 1860), no. 8, pp. 9-10. On Rüstow’s decision to exert “arbitrary but just” disciplinary measures, see Rüstow, *Erinnerungen aus dem italienischen Feldzuge von 1860*, 1, p. 107. On the issue of comparative military criminal law see the dedicated chapter 7.5 below.

“I thought of dedicating only two days to making the soldiers familiar with how to handle a gun and with the elementary movements; then two days of exercise in the battalion should follow, a further two days of manoeuvres in the brigade, and finally two more for exercising in the division with an associated field manoeuvre.”¹²²⁹

In terms of time, this was of course far less than the soldiers of the regular armies were subject to, these last of which drilled for months. In spite of this temporal difference, even Rüstow’s basic training – regardless of all of the different ideas he had on organizing the military into Swiss-type militias – replicated the usual tripartite education of the “school of the soldier”: individual movements, gun handling, followed by training exercises pertinent to the interrelation of the different military corps. In fact, as Rüstow wrote in his “military handbook” in 1858, for him exercising in basic movements remained a decisive part of military education, even if he abhorred “exercise pedantism” (*Exerzierpedantismus*), and consequently there should be avoided “all ridiculous playing around with an unnecessary dull accuracy and precision in the execution of irrelevancies”.¹²³⁰

7.5 Disciplinary measures and military criminal law – “indigenous” and “foreign” soldiers

The means available to punish soldiers, be this in terms of the disciplinal power of the officers or be it in terms of military criminal law, must not be overlooked.¹²³¹

With regard to the *foreign* regiments of the regular armies, military criminal law¹²³² was traditionally a prerogative of the special foreigners’ corps. Generally speaking, there were

¹²²⁹ „Ich dachte nun etwa zwei Tage dazu zu verwenden, die Leute mit der Handhabung des Gewehres sowie mit den elementaren Bewegungen bekannt zu machen; dann sollten zwei Tage Bataillonsexerciren, ferner zwei Tage Brigadenmanöver ausgeführt werden, und die beiden letzten Tage wollte ich auf ein Divisionsexerciren und damit verknüpft Feldmanöver verwenden.“ Rüstow, *Erinnerungen aus dem italienischen Feldzuge von 1860*, 1, p. 110.

¹²³⁰ „[.]D]aß bei seiner Uebung alle lächerlichen Spielereien mit einer unnützen geisttödtenden Genauigkeit und Präcision in der Ausführung von Nebendingen vermieden werden sollen [...].“ Friedrich Wilhelm Rüstow, “Ausbildung,” in idem, *Militärisches Hand-Wörterbuch nach dem Standpunkte der neuesten Literatur und mit Unterstützung von Fachmännern* (Zurich: Friedrich Schultheß, 1858), p. 53.

¹²³¹ Military criminal law was partially differentiated according to rank; this holds true – at least at the legal level – for the Garibaldian undertakings as well.

¹²³² For the history of military criminal law in nineteenth century Germany, see Sylvia Kesper-Biermann, “Jeder Soldat ist Staatsbürger’. Reformen im Militärstrafrecht in Deutschland 1800 bis 1872,” in Karl-Heinz Lutz, Martin Rinke, and Marcus von Salisch, eds., *Reform - Reorganisation - Transformation. Zum Wandel in den deutschen Streitkräften vor der preußischen Heeresreform bis zur Transformation der Bundeswehr. Im Auftrag des Militärgeschichtlichen Forschungsamtes* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2010), pp. 131-51; for Italy during the same period, see Carlotta Latini, *Cittadini e nemici. Giustizia militare e giustizia penale in Italia tra Otto e Novecento* (Florence: Le Monnier, 2010). On the Bavarian legislation see Hubert Schmid, *Die Gesetzgebungsgeschichte des Militärstrafrechts für das Königreich Bayern zwischen 1806 und 1900. Zugl. Augsburg, Univ., Diss.* (Munich: Kommissionsverlag Uni-Druck, 2000); on the papal military criminal code of 1842, see instead Carlotta Latini, “La giustizia militare pontificia tra privilegium fori e specialità giurisdizionale. Il processo militare e l’inchiesta nel ‘Regolamento di giustizia criminale e disciplinale militare’ (1842),” *Le carte e la storia* 13, no. 2 (2007): pp. 141-55.

four possible solutions: The first, which left the procedural and substantive competencies to the regiments themselves, was a feature common to the armies of the *condottieri* of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The second applied the substantive general (and/or general *military*) criminal laws of the hosting country but preserved the procedural competency of the regiments. Like the second, the third possibility, which was characterized by special criminal laws issued specifically for foreign regiments without touching their procedural prerogative, was typical of the following centuries.¹²³³ The fourth, wherein procedural and substantive law were applied equally to foreigners and indigenous troops, was really a quite late development.

7.5.1 *Military criminal law and foreigners in the Papal Army*

In the foreign regiments of the Papal Army, there was a shift from the second to the third solution in the nineteenth century. For the papal Swiss regiments the (last) capitulations from 1825 had established that for the more specific criminal law, the Papal Codes were fully applicable in terms of substantial law, but they were to be applied by the superiors of the Swiss regiment itself¹²³⁴: “Should one of the guards commit a crime, God forbid!, a criminal court [...] judges according to the contents and procedures of the criminal laws that exist for the Papal Army.”¹²³⁵ In Naples, the punishments of foreign soldiers were not based on the general military criminal law (as established in 1819), but instead on the published draft of a special criminal code for the Swiss regiments of France from 1817.¹²³⁶

In terms of how the more strictly (not merely disciplinary) military criminal law applied to the foreign regiments, the recruitment law from 1852 is quite vague: “The foreign corps administer the military judicature within their own corps on the basis of the criminal code and the respective methods of procedure, which the commander of this corps will propose and submit to the revision of the Ministry of Arms for the purpose of receiving the

¹²³³ For the conception of the three solutions, see Pietro Vico, “Diritto penale militare,” in Enrico Pessina, ed., *Enciclopedia del diritto penale italiano*, vol. 11 (Milan: Società editrice libraria, 1908), pp. 58-60.

¹²³⁴ Judgments passed down by superiors in a given regiment, at least in the first level, was, however, also a feature of many general military criminal laws of the time.

¹²³⁵ See art. 136-138 of the capitulation with the canton of Bern in: *Neue Sammlung der Gesetze und Dekrete des Großen und Kleinen Rathes der Stadt und Republik Bern*, 5 (1831), pp. 37-88 or art. 20 in the excerpt from the previous capitulations of 1825 with other Swiss cantons in: Maag, *Schweizertruppen in neapolitanischen Diensten*, pp. 625-636, art. 20 is on p. 634.

¹²³⁶ Jean-Antoine-Charles-Nicolas de Gady, *Entwurf eines Straf-Gesetzbuchs für die Schweizer-Regimenter im Dienste seiner allerchristlichsten Majestät / Projet d'un code pénal militaire pour les régimens suisses au service de sa Majesté très-chrétienne* (Bern: s. n., 1817); an overview of this code and a harsh critique on its “barbarian” nature was written by who was by then a major magistrate of the Swiss regiments of Naples, H. Pfyffer von Heidegg, “Ueber die Gerechtigkeitspflege bei den capitulirten Schweizerregimentern im ausländischen Kriegsdienste,” *Kritische Zeitschrift für Rechtswissenschaft und Gesetzgebung des Auslands* 9 (1837): pp. 250-83.

sovereign approval.”¹²³⁷ Behind the patent brevity of this article stood a dispute within the Ministry itself, as is revealed by the archival material regarding the preparation of the recruitment law of 1852. In preparation of the promulgation of the recruitment law of 1852, the issue had been discussed amongst the generals and the Ministry. The Swiss general, Wilhelm von Kalbermatten,¹²³⁸ laid down in a memorandum the reasons why, in his view, the existing military criminal law of 1842 should not apply to the foreign regiments. He stressed that the old traditions of the Swiss regiments had their own regulations on disciplinary and penal sanctioning: “That which has always distinguished the Swiss corps in all of their services has been their excellent discipline. To deprive the regiment of its own particular justice, is to remove its ability to provide those good services that the government has a right to expect from it.”¹²³⁹ And, further on in the same document, Kalbermatten underlined that this tradition continued to be upheld in the Swiss regiments of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies: “In the service of Naples, as in all of those of the Swiss under foreign powers, the regiments have always had their own discipline and military justice.”¹²⁴⁰ The Ministry had a different opinion on the matter: In response to Kalbermatten’s memorandum, it stated that until the issue was once again taken up by the government, military justice in the foreign regiments had to adhere to the general military criminal law: “For the present moment it is indispensable that everything functions according to the [...] regulations of the year 1842!” According to these documents, it indeed seems that for the time being military justice for the foreign regiments was dictated by the general code that was valid for all corps of the Papal

¹²³⁷ “I corpi esteri amministeranno la giustizia militare nell’interno del proprio corpo sulle basi del codice dei delitti, e delle pene, e dei metodi di procedura relativa, che dal comandante del corpo medesimo verranno proposti e sottomessi alla revisione del Ministro delle Armi, per riportarne in appresso la Sovrana approvazione.” *Legge emanata dalla Segreteria di Stato li 7 gennaio 1852 per costituire dei corpi militari speciali d’individui di nazione estera al servizio della S. Sede*, art. 132, p. 43.

¹²³⁸ Wilhelm von Kalbermatten entered papal service in 1848, where he was General until 1870; his brother, Theodor von Kalbermatten, was for a brief period (16 February 1850 – 1 November 1850) pro-Minister of Arms. See the biographies of both in *Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz*, online at <http://www.hls-dhs-dss.ch> (last accessed: 21/08/2008).

¹²³⁹ “Ciò che ha sempre distinto i Corpi Svizzeri in tutti i loro servizi, è stata l’eccelente loro disciplina. Privare il reggimento della sua giustizia particolare, si è levargli la facoltà di rendere quei buoni servizi che il Governo è in diritto di aspettare da lui.” Untitled document in ASR, Fondo Ministero delle Armi, busta 1143.

¹²⁴⁰ “Nel servizio di Napoli [...] come in tutti quelli degli Svizzeri presso Estere Potenze, i reggimenti hanno sempre avuto in proprio la loro disciplina e giustizia militare.” Untitled document in ASR, Fondo Ministero delle Armi, busta 1143.

Army¹²⁴¹, even if the regulation in the recruitment law of 1852 contemplated the introduction of special codes at the regimental level.¹²⁴²

7.5.2 Military criminal law and foreigners in the Bourbon Army

In the foreign regiments of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies that were assembled in 1859 to replace the former Swiss regiments, special legislation continued to govern military justice. Hence the former practice to exclude foreign regiments from the general (military) laws of the receiving country continued to be upheld. The Swiss-Neapolitan capitulations of the 1820s had explicitly established that the Swiss regiments had their own judicature. It went on to specify: “They will execute the latter according to the military criminal code instituted for the Swiss regiments in French service as it is at present or as it will be changed or modified.”¹²⁴³ Furthermore, even the non-military criminal offences committed by Swiss/foreign soldiers came under the jurisdiction of the regiments themselves: “The personnel of these regiments cannot, in any case, be brought to trial for disciplinary offences, misdeeds or offences before any other tribunal than that of their respective corps.”¹²⁴⁴ Until 1859, hence, judicature in the Swiss regiments was based on the rather harsh “Gady’s Draft”, the “Draft of a military criminal code for the Swiss regiments at the service of his most Christian Majesty”.¹²⁴⁵ A revised draft of the code was worked out for the Swiss regiments in France in 1829, abolishing some of the corporal punishments of the previous edition; this draft never came into force in France. Only in 1859, when the Swiss regiments of Naples were reconfigured

¹²⁴¹ Alessandro Mancini-Barbieri, erroneously, takes for granted the continued validity of a much more severe “Military Criminal Code for the foreign regiments” which can be found in fact in ASR, Ministero delle armi, box no. 1144; but this code must have been issued prior to 1846, because it was signed by the secretary of the Presidency of Arms (the precursor to the Ministry of Arms between 1828 to 1847), Filippo Contini, who died in 1846.

¹²⁴² In the respective boxes of the Archivio di Stato, I found no such special code; the only code that exists dates to before the law of 1852. For this, see footnote no. 1241.

¹²⁴³ „[.W]erden dieselbe nach dem für die Schweizer-Regimenter in französischen Diensten bestehenden Militärstrafgesetzbuch, so wie dieses gegenwärtig besteht, oder mit der Zeit abgeändert oder modifiziert werden dürfte, ausüben.“ Art. 20 of the capitulations between the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies and the cantons of Freiburg and Solothurn from 1825; the same wording is found in art. 137 of the capitulations with the canton of Bern from 1828. Militär-Kapitulation mit Sr. M. dem König beider Sizilien für ein von den hohen Ständen Freyburg und Solothurn zu stellendes Schweizer-Regiment, for instance in: Ludwig Snell, ed., *Handbuch des schweizerischen Staatsrechts*, vol. 1 (Zurich: Orell, Füssli und Compagnie, 1837), pp. 556-580, art. 20 is on p. 573-574; Militair-Kapitulation mit S. Maj. Dem König Beider Sizilien, for instance in: Neue Sammlung der Gesetze und Dekrete des Großen und Kleinen Rathes der Stadt und Republik Bern, vol. 5, 1828-1831 (Bern: L. A. Haller, 1831), pp. 37-88, art. 137 is on p. 78.

¹²⁴⁴ „Alle zum Regiment gehörigen Personen können in keinem Falle für Disziplinsfehler, Vergehen und Verbrechen vor andere Tribunale als vor diejenigen ihres eigenen Corps gezogen werden.“ Ibid., art. 20 (capitulations of 1825) and art. 138 (capitulations of 1828).

¹²⁴⁵ Gady, *Entwurf eines Straf-Gesetzbuchs*.

into new foreign regiments did the second draft enter into force in southern Italy, constituting the valid effective legal basis for punishments in the Bourbon foreigners' regiments.¹²⁴⁶

7.5.3 Military criminal law and the Garibaldian campaigns

The practice of adopting (parts of) other legislations also occurred on the political opposite side. While the provisory government of Rome in January 1849 had issued its own military penal code that was modelled partially on the Piedmontese code¹²⁴⁷, this last as such applied to the *garibaldini* of 1859. In 1860, it was decided to apply the Piedmontese regulations for those soldiers that came from northern Italy and the Bourbon legislation instead for the southern soldiers, guaranteeing for both groups, however, the milder of the penalties found in either code. Although this might seem like a somewhat complex decision, it was most likely motivated by the idea to subject the soldiers to more or less "their" respective legislation, and in doing so to create an economizing effect by already counting on the familiarity that the soldiers from Piedmont on the one hand and those taken over from the Bourbon Army on the other would have with these respective codes.

7.6 The performative aspects of the soldiers' free-time

When looking at the service regulations and personal reports on the time spent in Italy it immediately becomes clear that the soldiers, more than the officers, passed most of their time in the presence of their respective battalions.

In times of peace, at least until 1 p.m. (winter) or 3 p.m. (summer), the Bourbon soldiers were exclusively occupied with military tasks. were obliged to remain very much in a military context: This first part of the day was dedicated to visits, exercises, the common meal ("rancio", at 9.30 a.m. or 10 a.m. depending on the season), the assembly, and services of various nature, such as post and sentinel duty.¹²⁴⁸

¹²⁴⁶ Boeri, Crociani, and Fiorentino, *L'esercito borbonico I*, p. 108. The link was created by the regulations for the formation of the new foreign regiments: *Regolamento per l'organizzazione del 1° e 2° battaglione carabinieri leggieri e del 13° battaglione cacciatori approvato da Sua Maestà il dì 10 novembre 1859 in Portici*, in: STABS, Nachlass Johann Lucas von Mechel, PA 149 2a.

¹²⁴⁷ "Codice penale militare," in *Raccolta delle leggi e disposizioni del governo provvisorio pontificio che incominciò col 25 novembre 1848 ed ebbe termine il 9 febbraio 1849, epoca in cui fu proclamata la Repubblica romana* (Rome: Tipografia governativa, 1849), appendix, pp. 1-111.

¹²⁴⁸ See the time tables in *Ordinanza di Sua Maestà pel governo, il servizio e la disciplina delle Reali Truppe nelle piazze*, modello no. 16, pp. 360-361.

7.6.1 “Outward” order – in and after service

Whereas the drill books aimed at a “disciplinization” in terms of corporal movements, habituating the trooper to automatically execute specific moves when a command was issued, the Bourbon General Ordinance (*ordinanza di piazza*) envisaged a control of the soldier that was far more comprehensive and broad reaching. One of the main considerations contained therein regarded the “outward” order of the troops. In this part of the regulations, outward appearance took centre stage and was measured according to the cleanliness, posture and elegance of the soldiers. The soldiers were urged to keep their uniforms and possessions clean: “The soldier must very much care for the neatness of his person; it contributes to his health and distinguishes the educated from the coarse man. His clothing, leathers and every other type of possession must always be clean and without stains: he must change his underpants”, and as strange as it may sound to our ears today, it went on to specify “every time there is a need to do so.”¹²⁴⁹

These regulations were concerned with the “outward” order also because they were explicitly directed, at least in part, to the non-military sphere. This is evident, for instance, in the regulations on how to go out in public: “When he leaves his quarters, he has to compose exactly his clothing and to keep it in good order without minimally changing his posture: in the streets he will walk with composure, with his body erect, and with that elegance and that esprit that are suitable for he who is attired in Our Royal uniform.”¹²⁵⁰ Although this was most certainly a measure put in place to avoid deterioration of the attire and possessions of the soldier, these prescriptions on cleanliness had a symbolic function as well, and served to demonstrate that the king’s soldiers were different from the unpolished and unkempt soldiery of former times. Standards of personal cleanliness, however, seem to have been far from those of today¹²⁵¹: Superiors were to watch over their soldiers and ensure that the latter were provided with freshly-laundered underwear at least once a week and with new bedclothes every two, as well as with new straw for the paillasse every three months. They were also to make sure that their soldiers took care of their beards, kept their hair and their fingernails

¹²⁴⁹ “Il soldato dee curar molto la mondezza del suo individuo; essa contribuisce alla salute, e distingue l’uomo educato dal rozzo. I suoi abiti, il cuojame ed ogni altro genere saranno sempre puliti e senza macchie: egli cambierà di mutande ogni qual volta lo richiegga il bisogno.” Ibid., art. 29, §1724, p. 261.

¹²⁵⁰ “Allorquando uscirà di quartiere, dovrà comporre esattamente il suo vestiario e mantenerlo netto senza alterarne menomamente la postura, o mutario: nelle strade camminerà con compostezza, col corpo dritto, e con quella eleganza e quel brio che si ben convengono a chi è rivestito della Nostra Real divisa [...]” Ibid., art. 29 (“De’ soldati”), § 1727, p. 260.

¹²⁵¹ On the history of hygiene within the larger context of the techniques of “care of the self” (Foucault), see, e.g., Philipp Sarasin, *Reizbare Maschinen. Eine Geschichte des Körpers 1765-1914* (Frankfurt on Main: Suhrkamp, 2001).

short, and “that they washed their hands and faces frequently, as well as their feet every 15 days [...]”¹²⁵²

7.6.2 *Drinking, Gambling and Prostitution*

Aside from cleanliness, posture and therefore outward physical appearance both in and outside the military environment, military regulations were also expressly concerned with the “holy trinity” of traditional “dangers” to which the soldiers were exposed and vulnerable: drinking, gambling and prostitution. Most likely the first and last were seen to be particularly problematic for the outward appearance of the military, i.e. for the public “image” that civilians had of the military. While Scott Hughes Myerly in his book on “British Military Spectacle”¹²⁵³ spoke of the performative features of military life as positively contributing to military public image, another such instrument was the prevention of soldiers from availing themselves of excessive amounts of alcohol, gambling and prostitutes. As it seems, attempts to rehabilitate the image of the military were not made only with the colourful display of military spectacle, but also through the disciplinization of soldiers in terms of general mores, and especially when this occurred publically before the common civilians. These were measures to counter what Christoph Kucklick has described as “problematic masculinity” in the sense of a “negative andrology” in the transition period (*Sattelzeit*) around 1800.¹²⁵⁴ Alcohol and prostitution were in fact a central theme in the reports of German and other foreign soldiers.

Whether prostitution was openly addressed or had been “camouflaged”, by speaking of prostitutes as “waitresses” in inns, etc., a fair amount of space was dedicated to it in the soldiers’ reports. However, despite the official prohibitions to partake in such activities, “half-official” brothels that were provided with a military guard did exist, in the Bourbon Army for instance.¹²⁵⁵ The Garibaldian Rüstow also spoke a great deal about prostitution. During his soldiers’ stay in Salerno in 1860, according to Rüstow, “officers had made a visit to”, as he calls it in German “a funny house”.¹²⁵⁶ The degree of detail included in his reports on prostitution render his claim that he had never participated in such arrangements rather questionable.

¹²⁵² “[..C]he si lavino le mani ed il viso frequentemente, non che i piedi ogni 15 giorni [...]” *Ordinanza di Sua Maestà pel governo*, §1542; see as well §1616.

¹²⁵³ Myerly, *British Military Spectacle*.

¹²⁵⁴ Kucklick, *Das unmoralische Geschlecht*.

¹²⁵⁵ Boeri, Crociani, and Fiorentino, *L'esercito borbonico I*, p. 138.

¹²⁵⁶ “Offiziere hatten in einem lustigen Hause einen Besuch gemacht.” Rüstow, *Erinnerungen aus dem italienischen Feldzuge von 1860*, 1, p. 210.

Prostitution was identified as a concern in the Bourbon general service regulation as well. Every soldier seen in public with “obviously immoral women” was to be arrested, whereas non-commissioned officers and soldiers, but not officers, who were caught engaging with these “immoral women” in military buildings and grounds, were to be punished. The prostitutes were to be turned over to the civil authorities to be punished according to civil criminal law. In general terms, commandants of the fortified town and civil authorities – while perhaps aware that prohibition had never truly functioned well in this context – were to act in concert to take at least “the necessary measures to reduce the number of these women”, or, in the event these last were unsuccessful, to at least take measures to “remove the infected ones”.¹²⁵⁷ Similarly, the respective medical practitioner was asked to visit at least once a month “all non-commissioned officers and soldiers, in order to discover those infected with skin and venereal diseases [...]”; those who were infected were prohibited from going on leave.¹²⁵⁸

Prostitution was not the only concern; more generally speaking sexuality was another issue of import. Uniforms that had been designed appositely to showcase the musculature, the elongation and rigidity of male bodies were capable of arousing civil interest; it is difficult to say, however, whether this form of attraction was more the imagination of the soldiers or was indeed a reality manifest in the reaction of civilians. In fact, placing excessive emphasis on the “sexual-attraction thesis” creates the risk of glossing over or diminishing the very probable violent character of many of these sexual encounters between members of the armed forces and civilians, which was most likely downplayed in the soldiers' reports. In fact, many soldiers' songs played out this motive to such an extent that they were generally regarded to be “dirty”: See for instance the hidden, and as such open, refrain (“Schingderassa...”) in the German song “Wenn die Soldaten durch die Stadt marschieren”, most probably written between the 1830s and 1870s.

The continual mention of the “good” but “heady” quality of Italian and especially Sicilian wines exemplifies how omnipresent alcohol in this context was. Alcohol was not only officially and regularly distributed to the soldiers¹²⁵⁹, but it also took centre stage in the reports on meals and drinks that were taken outside of the official meal that was provided.

¹²⁵⁷ “[..D]onne patentemente scostumate [...]”; “[...] le misure necessarie per scemare il numero di esse donne [...]”; “[...] allontanare le infette [...]”.

¹²⁵⁸ “[..T]utt’i sotto-uffiziali e soldati, onde conoscere gl’infetti da malattie cutanee e veneree [...].” *Ordinanza di Sua Maestà pel governo*, §1387.

¹²⁵⁹ And hence without the possibility noted by Frevert to ask to be paid instead of obtaining the ration of alcohol in Prussia.

Drunken soldiers, according to the regulations, were to be withdrawn: When “[e]ncounter[ing] a non-commissioned officer or soldiers inebriated from wine, [the patrols] will conduct him or have him conducted to the nearest sentry point, where he is to remain as long as the effects last, to then be sent to the guard house for the providence of the governor or commandant of the fortress.”¹²⁶⁰ The Bourbon Ordinance also repeatedly reiterated the ban on gambling: “The games of hazard are absolutely forbidden, and the chiefs of the corps will attentively ensure that this prescription is executed, severely castigating the transgressors.”¹²⁶¹ The main concern with gambling appears to have been to avoid the incurrence of excessive debt on the part of the soldiers and officers, most probably because the pressure to settle ones debts could lead them adopt fraudulent behaviour with regard to the goods supplied by the military administration. A rule was established for officers, for which they should generally be punished in the event they spent more than they could from their pay. Officers were, however, allowed to incur debts – reaching a maximum of one-third of their pay – only in special circumstances, i.e. in case they had to pay for “costly diseases, or when an officer must equip himself or become mounted”¹²⁶²; at any rate, it was necessary to first obtain permission from the colonel.

7.6.3 Desertion and its prevention

Specific measures were devised to prevent desertion. Because new recruits were considered to be particularly susceptible to desertion, it was established that they were not allowed to leave military quarters without being accompanied, and in the event they were encountered without the latter they were to be immediately arrested. To facilitate the identification of the new recruits, the letter “R” of the dimension of 3 inches (ca. 7.6 cm) was sewn on the right arm of their uniform. Similarly, for the accompanying soldiers, i.e. those who were no longer new recruits – this occurred after 4 months of instruction for the infantry and 8 months in the other branches of service – and were charged with accompanying the new members, the letter “P” was added to their uniform.¹²⁶³ In the event numerous desertions were discovered for instance, two cannon beats were to go off, “to advise the inhabitants of the near villages and fields to take the appropriate measures needed to arrest the deserters, and to occupy the

¹²⁶⁰ “Incontrando un sotto-uffiziale o soldato preso dal vino, [le pattuglie] lo condurranno o faranno condurre al corpo di guardia il più vicino, ove resterà finché ne durino gli effetti, per indi esser inviato alla gran guardia per le provvidenze del governatore o comandante di piazza.”

¹²⁶¹ “I giuochi d’azzardo sono assolutamente vietati, ed i capi de’ corpi vigileranno attentamente onde questa prescrizione sia eseguita, castigando severamente i trasgressori.”

¹²⁶² “[...] malattie dispendiose, o quando debba un uffiziale equipaggiarsi o montarsi”.

¹²⁶³ *Ordinanza di Sua Maestà pel governo*, §§870 and 871 respectively.

previously identified routes and locations.”¹²⁶⁴ Aside from these “outward” measures to contain and deal with the act of desertion, however, the commandants were to also try to understand the “internal” reasons for desertion, and therefore it was recommended “they investigate whether the soldiers had reason for complaint, whether this be for a lack of administration, for excessive rigour, or faulty methods, or on the contrary whether there was a slackening in the application of the rules of discipline.”¹²⁶⁵

7.7 *Officers and soldiers*

As aforementioned, in the various armed groups of the Italian Risorgimento, Germans together with other foreigners were present in various ranks, be it that of simple soldier, officer, or general. Is it possible to detect in these higher-ranking soldiers loyalties or German-Italian experiences that differ from those of the rank and file? What role did they play in the German-Italian and European processes of transfer regarding the general culture of war, military cultures and issues of military organization?

Second, if inquiring into the roles and specificities of the group of “German” officers, the more general issues of the composition and function of officer corps in European armies must be discussed¹²⁶⁶ before the Italian armed groups and the respective role of foreign officers in general and German officers in particular is to be analysed.

7.7.1 *Officers as “military elite”*

While there are good reasons to attempt a “military history from below” that would shed light on the experiences of “simple soldiers” that have normally been neglected by traditional military history, the officer corps nevertheless remains an important object of study. As Eckart Conze has written, to concentrate only on the simple soldier is to “overlook the simple fact of the hierarchical organization of the military, and, as a result of this, the decisive importance of officers, of their leading and mediating role in the processes of development

¹²⁶⁴ “[...] onde avvertire gli abitanti de’paesi convicini e delle campagne di prendere le convenevoli misure per arrestare i disertori, occupando i passaggi e siti preveduti.”

¹²⁶⁵ “[...] indagare se abbiano i soldati motivi di dolersi, sia per difetto di amministrazione, sia per soverchio rigore, o mancanza di modi, o per contrario se vi sia rilasciamento alle regole di disciplina [...]” *Ordinanza di Sua Maestà pel governo*, §868.

¹²⁶⁶ See, e.g., the very exhaustive statistical data provided by Gahlen, *Offizierskorps*. Much quantitative information can also be found in Lutz, *Offizierskorps* or in Deák, *Beyond nationalism*. All the aforementioned studies contain much more statistical data than provided by the study of Demeter, *The German officer-corps*, which is more selective in terms of statistics, but precisely for the importance of the questions chosen for quantitative exploration it remains a “classic”.

and change in the military itself, but in the relationship between the military and society as well.”¹²⁶⁷

The word “officer” (“Offizier” in German, “ufficiale” in Italian) etymologically relates to the office-holder (“officiarius” in medieval Latin, which traces back to *opi-facium*, carrying out a certain job/task or service). Historically, both civil and, later, military “officials” were those charged with performing a specific function within the administration and armies. The establishment of officer posts must be considered within the context of the general development of division of labour: in the armies of the late medieval knights, there was not much more of a differentiation than that between the mounted knight on the one hand and the array of foot soldiers on the other. The knight was merely the vessel of the higher ranking noble, and foot soldiers were quite unconnected to the knight in the battle itself.

This level of differentiation had increased already with the advent of the mercenary armies of the Italians, Swiss and Germans. Here, a series of specific “offices” were introduced. The office-holders were nominated either by the colonel– who had contracted with a sovereign as “warlord” – or were chosen by the soldiers themselves. Along with the captain of a given squad, a series of more specific office-holders were responsible for such tasks as the administration regarding wages, accommodation or discipline; many of the names for these offices, created within the mercenary armies of the fifteenth century and before, survived and were transferred over to the officer corps of armies in the following centuries, among which the sergeant-major (*Feldwebel*) who was responsible for drilling and the internal organization of service and the ensign who was responsible for giving the signals to the soldiers in formation. The power relation between these “officers” and the soldiers originated from two different sources: from the delegated power of the colonel and the election of a portion of the officers directly by the soldiers. The power of the “officers” in these mercenary armies before the introduction of the standing army, however, was far from absolute and was restricted in varying degrees by the self-government of the soldiers, which reflected traditions of communal self-government and the guild tradition; moreover, this self-governing power was most visible in the forms of military justice.

The advent of the absolute state brought about the further development of the commissioning of officers. The power of the traditional intermediate estates, such as the nobles, was seriously reduced by absolute monarchy, where all decisions and power ideally

¹²⁶⁷ Eckart Conze, “Vom ‚vornehmsten Stand‘ zum ‚Volks-offizierkorps‘. Militrische Eliten in Preuen-Deutschland 1850-1950,” in Frank Bosbach, Keith Robbins, and Karina Urbach, eds., *Geburt oder Leistung? Elitenbildung im deutsch-britischen Vergleich* (Munich: K. G. Saur, 2003), p. 104.

derived from the sovereign. This absolutist ideology is evident in the tendency of sovereigns to appoint “not only generals and colonels, but officers of every grade. The officer thus became both servant and representative of the power of the absolute State, and of its monarch as a person.”¹²⁶⁸ The concentration of power that came with the creation of the absolute state also occurred in the military organization, where the officer formed, *cum grano salis*, his own kind of “monarchy”: he was a nearly absolute monarch over the soldiers he commanded. The typical idea, as aforementioned, that both the state and the military were “machines” that adhered to the concepts of force and function in mathematical and physics terms¹²⁶⁹ was added to this increased level of authority. This idea, in fact, informed not only the conceptualization of strategy and tactics, but the relation with the “soldiers as material” as well. Getting the soldier to do what the officer wanted was based on ideas of a mechanistic vision of the relationship between action and reaction. Automatic and immediate obedience was the expected direct response to commands from superiors. Where this response was lacking, enforcement – in the form of corporal enforcement – also adhered to a specifically “mechanical” logic. Only in the late eighteenth century did “humanitarian” thought call into question this dynamic in the officer-soldier relationship.

Another effect of the Enlightenment was the idea that in order to make the military machinery function properly, one had to increase knowledge of this very machinery. It was here that the idea of training both soldiers and officers took root, challenging the traditional legitimation of assigning officer positions due to an individual's (noble) status. The late eighteenth century – hence, before the French Revolution – was already a period of intensified debates on the purportedly “scientific” nature of war. Consequently, a series of fundamental military reforms were projected, and a real “mania to subordinate everything to prescriptions” bloomed. One result of this reformatory “furore” was the formation of military institutions of education. The number of military publications increased considerably, military academies were instituted, cadet corps assembled or reformed, and prescriptions on the education of future officers issued. These reforms also brought about an increase in the cross-border circulation of military knowledge: Officers were sent to foreign countries with the deliberate aim to “copy” from other armies¹²⁷⁰, not only in terms of natural sciences in regard

¹²⁶⁸ Demeter, *The German officer-corps*, p. 159.

¹²⁶⁹ See for this p. 311.

¹²⁷⁰ Anna Maria Rao, “Esercito e società a Napoli nelle riforme del secondo Settecento,” in Claudio Donati, ed., *Eserciti e carriere militari nell'Italia moderna* (Milan: Ed. Unicopli, 1998), p. 182.

to armament, artillery and fortification – “today one would call this industrial espionage”¹²⁷¹ – but also to obtain information and understanding of the foreign military organization, from their recruitment procedures to their officer-soldier relations. The prime objective was nothing short of “a comprehensive rationalization and professionalization of the army”.¹²⁷²

The connection to one’s royal court – or one’s supreme commander – however, remained strong: Careers were, at least formally, decided at court, and this was even more so for foreign soldiers.¹²⁷³ The courts were and continued to be to a certain degree multinational societies. In the early modern period, they were important nodes in the “noble international universe.”¹²⁷⁴ Due to the partial merging of nobility and officer corps at the courts, the “cosmopolitanism of the upper ranks of both the nobility and army”¹²⁷⁵ that had already characterized the eighteenth century was further developed in the following century.¹²⁷⁶

The beliefs and behaviour of the officer corps and nobility converged on the issue of honour as well. Carmen Winkel maintains that the “noble point d’honneur” functioned as a “benchmark” for the behaviour of officers, at least in the eighteenth century. But even in the nineteenth century, Gundula Gahlen asserts that for “bourgeois officers the duel constituted an instrument with which to gain access to the culture of the noble estates. By the near affinity between the concept of honour of officers and the noble point d’honneur it was possible for bourgeois officers to participate in a culture of behaviour to which they were otherwise

¹²⁷¹ Vincenzo Ferrone, “Un re, un esercito, una nazione. Il riarmo italiano nel Settecento tra innovazioni tecnologiche, assolutismo e identità nazionali d’Antico Regime,” in Walter Barberis, ed., *Guerra e pace*, Storia d’Italia. Annali 18 (Turin: Einaudi, 2002), p. 391.

¹²⁷² Rao, “Esercito e società a Napoli,” p. 182.

¹²⁷³ See p. 187 above.

¹²⁷⁴ Montroni, *Gli uomini del re*, p. 101.

¹²⁷⁵ Storrs and Scott, “The Military Revolution and the European nobility,” p. 22.

¹²⁷⁶ Generally speaking, officers took part in such events as “costume balls, charitable benefits, and solemn state occasions” in Turin (Cardoza), or were allowed to become members in noble circles in Naples (Montroni). How far this applied to foreign officers, or only portions of them, such as those parts of the general staffs, could not be understood from the source material analysed here; in the German reports, apart from invitations for accommodation or dinner by private individuals, even if these last were sometimes accompanied by music performances or dances, I did not find more than mere hints at an officer’s participation in the more formal circles of “high society”. For an example of an invitation to dinner and dance, notably wherein some young women were present, see, e.g., Hoffstetter, *Tagebuch*, p. 87. On the general integration of (indigenous) officers into the high society of Turin (the citation above comes from here) see Cardoza, “An officer and a gentleman,” p. 197. On Naples, see instead Montroni, *Gli uomini del re*, p. 19. The issue can be developed further only by consulting different source material than is used here. For such an analysis and the types of sources needed in the partially comparable case of both German and Italian Austrian officers in Austrian Lombardy, that calls into doubt a too strong integration of officers into the Milanese “high society”, see Marco Meriggi, “L’ufficiale a Milano in età liberale,” *Rivista di storia contemporanea* 17, no. 4 (1988): pp. 524-45; see also some of the contributions to Deputazione di Storia Patria per l’Umbria, ed., *Esercito e città dall’unità agli anni trenta. Atti del convegno di studi, Perugia, 11 - 14 maggio 1988*, 2 vols. (Rome: Ist. Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato, 1989).

strictly excluded.”¹²⁷⁷ The duel formed one of the instances in which the “bourgeoisie” adapted to and appropriated noble standards.¹²⁷⁸

7.7.2 Officers and soldiers: maintaining distance

As previously discussed, officers and soldiers were treated very differently in material terms, not only in State armies but often in the Garibaldian troops as well. In many of the Italian armed groups, the different treatment reserved for officers and for soldiers was not limited to questions of pay, but also applied to provisions and housing. Even if huge wage differences are a characteristic in today’s “bourgeois” society, in the armies of the nineteenth century this difference was connected to keeping distance between soldiers and officers. Many bourgeois officers appropriated the nobility’s tendency of “conspicuous consumption”.

Officers and soldiers continued to live in partially separated worlds, and this was the case in all of the Italian armed groups regardless of political side. As aforementioned, officers were treated better in terms of pay, accommodation and provisions. When looking at how housing worked in the regular armies, this becomes evident. The accommodation for foreign soldiers in the papal barracks was regulated according to the rules governing indigenous regiments. Regular mattresses were provided only for non-commissioned officers upward, whereas the simple soldier had to sleep on a wooden panel filled with paille and was supplied a change of straw once every four months.¹²⁷⁹ Separate accommodation from the rest of the soldiers was provided only for some of the higher ranked officers, particularly those with administrative competences. Furthermore, it seems that – at least according to the specific regulations from 1822 on barracks for the indigenous troops – two soldiers were to sleep in one bed of straw.¹²⁸⁰

Accommodations in the Garibaldian armed groups also differed for officers and soldiers. In the Roman Republic in 1849, for instance, many officers, including Garibaldi himself, lodged in the Hotel Cesari in via di Pietra.¹²⁸¹ Ernst Haug also boarded there. According to him, the hotel “was not one of the cleanliest, but offered, due to its central

¹²⁷⁷ Gahlen, *Offizierskorps*, pp. 508-509.

¹²⁷⁸ Ute Frevert, *Ehrenmänner. Das Duell in der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft* (Munich: Beck, 1991).

¹²⁷⁹ *Regolamento per il nuovo servizio del casermaggio delle truppe pontificie*, art. 2-3, pp. 3-4.

¹²⁸⁰ “All non-commissioned officers, corporals and brigadiers, vice-corporals, workers, musicians, drummers and trumpeters sleep alone; the rest of the soldiers sleep in pairs.” „Tutti i Sotto-Uffiziali, Caporali e Brigadieri, Vice-Caporali, Operaj, Musicanti, e Tamburini e Trombettieri dormono soli: il resto della Truppa dorme a due.” Ibid., Art. 4, p. 4.

¹²⁸¹ Loevinson, *Giuseppe Garibaldi e la sua legione nello Stato romano*, 1, p. 67. See, in the sources, e.g., Hoffstetter, *Tagebuch*, p. 51.

location, many comforts”¹²⁸²; the soldiers – including the Garibaldian legionnaires for a time – were accommodated instead in the very nearby convent of San Silvestro in Capite. But in the hotel, the officers could make use of the personnel provided by the hotel in addition to the military adjutants that they often kept by their sides. Hoffstetter, for instance, kept a Swiss “orderly”, and he translates the word without hesitation as “servant”.¹²⁸³ Haug, directly upon his arrival ordered a barber, and let a bath be prepared for him. That there were other types of comfort in close reach becomes clear from Haug’s observation of the scene from his window: opposite to his room, he could see “an opulent Roman woman” (*donna romana* in the original), “looking out for the newly arriving guests of the hotel Cesari. She looked at me curiously with an ambiguous half smile.” And Haug asks: “Does she count amongst the effective defenders of Rome?”¹²⁸⁴

These differences in accommodation were common during many of the Garibaldian campaigns. Gustav von Hoffstetter, for instance, reports that while in the near vicinity of Palestrina, the troops of Garibaldi and Manara were housed in a convent, the single companies were “lead into the hallways of the cloister, where they bedded down on the hard stone, their hat as a pillow.” The officers, instead, lodged “in their own big hall on mattresses”, and they were provided with “wine, cheese and cigars” and therefore very “cheery”.¹²⁸⁵ During the various Garibaldian undertakings, the officers and especially those of the general staffs¹²⁸⁶ were often invited to stay in private houses and/or enjoyed their dinner there.¹²⁸⁷ In Frosinone, where in 1849 the Roman officers as well as Garibaldi took quarter in the pontifical palace; they were even entertained by the “unforgettable cook”, one of the members of the palace household.¹²⁸⁸

In the military environment even the *bourgeois* officers kept their distance from the simple soldiers adopting behaviour typical of a stratified society, which was a noble legacy,

¹²⁸² “Das Hotel zählt nicht zu den reinlichsten, gewährte aber in seiner centralen Lage viele Bequemlichkeit [...]” Haug, *Des Republikaners Schwertfahrt*, p. 217. For those who can afford it, the hotel is in operation still today, the room rate should guarantee at least a bit more cleanliness.

¹²⁸³ “Meine Ordonnanz (Diener) [...]” Hoffstetter, *Tagebuch*, p. 49.

¹²⁸⁴ “[..E]ine üppige donna romana und lauerte auf die angekommenen Gäste des Hotels Cäsari. Sie guckte neugierig nach mir herüber mit einem zweideutig halben Lächeln. – „Die zählt zum Effektivstande der Verteidiger Roms?“ Haug, *Des Republikaners Schwertfahrt*, p. 217.

¹²⁸⁵ “Die Mannschaft wurde kompagnieweise in die Gänge des Klosters geführt, wo sie auf harten Steinen, den Hut als Kopfkissen, sich zur Ruhe legten. [...] Wir Offiziere lagerten in einem großen Saal auf Matratzen, waren mit Wein, Käse und Zigarren wohlversehen und seelenvergnügt.” Hoffstetter, *Tagebuch*, p. 30.

¹²⁸⁶ The point here is not to insinuate that the officers and the general staff were “lazy”; they took huge risks and carried out exhausting services, even if their duties often differed from the rank and file. The point here is to see how much distance was kept between officers and troopers or how close they were depending on area or topic, and how the manners of officer-soldier relationship continued to be informed by the stratified society consolidated in previous times.

¹²⁸⁷ See, e.g., Hoffstetter, *Tagebuch*, p. 84.

¹²⁸⁸ “[..S]einem unvergeßlichen Koch [...]” *ibid.*, p. 87.

even if at times they used a functional argument to legitimize their behaviour. The Garibaldian officer Rüstow, when writing of his better treatment in terms of provisions, expresses a modicum of remorse when seeing around him “many who had nothing. But I, first of all others, was in need of strength. And this thought comforted me in some way on the inequality of property that always seemed to me scandalous, scandalous especially among comrades.” Notwithstanding, he continuously asserts his right to this much better treatment in terms of room and board and warns his fellow officers not to appear too frequently in camp alongside the simple soldiers.¹²⁸⁹ Hoffstetter writes that he, as a staff officer, did not interfere much in the “inner service of the regiment, and I kept myself busy for the greater part of the day with the amenities of the ‘dolce far niente’.”¹²⁹⁰

7.7.3 *Excursus: Rüstow and the quest for “Adeligkeit”*

In some papers of the Southern Army of 1860, Wilhelm Rüstow is denoted as a count (*conte*). Some of the literature also refers to “Wilhelm von Rüstow” as a noble.¹²⁹¹ This is of note because Rüstow himself never used the title. The registers and literature, however, were perhaps not entirely wrong. As Marcel Herwegh reveals in one chapter, entitled “The origins of the Rüstows”, in his 1935 biography of Wilhelm Rüstow, this family had been “barons and counts of the German empire”¹²⁹² at least until the eighteenth century. Marcel Herwegh had obtained his information on this matter from a letter written by Rüstow’s daughter, Marie. According to her, the family was originally from Hannover, but moved eastwards in the twelfth century during the conquest of Pomerania by Henry the Lion. Marie went on to write that the Rüstows became imperial barons and counts following this period of conquest, even if she does not know exactly when. Skimming through the available registers on the German and Prussian nobility, there are two most probably unconnected families: the Ristow family, with their ancestral home near Schlawe (Sławno in today’s Polonia) in Pomerania, and the Rueste or Rüstow family in the district of Randow (the area surrounding Stettin (Szczecin). According to Marie Rüstow, the family papers were kept in the church of Bublitz (Bobolice),

¹²⁸⁹ „[...]viele um mich herum sehen mußte, die nichts hatten. Ich brauchte schließlich vor allen andern Kraft – und diese Betrachtung tröstete mich einigermaßen über die mir immer anstößige ungleiche Vertheilung des Besitzes – anstößig vor allem im Kreise von Kameraden.“ Rüstow, *Erinnerungen aus dem italienischen Feldzuge von 1860*, 1, p. 196.

¹²⁹⁰ “Der innere Dienst beim Regimente berührte mich nur wenig, und ich beschäftigte mich den größten Theil des Tages mit den Annehmlichkeiten des ‘dolce far niente’ [Italian in the original].” Hoffstetter, *Tagebuch*, p. 59.

¹²⁹¹ Even when referring to his grandnephew, the sociologist and economist Alexander Rüstow, some authors use the “von” erroneously. Alexander Rüstow, since the 1930s, was an important exponent of ordo-liberal economic theories and lived in Istanbul in exile since 1933.

¹²⁹² “Les Origines des Rüstow”; “[...] barons et comtes de l’Empire germanique [...]”. Marcel Herwegh, *Guillaume Rustow. Un grand soldat, un grand caractère (1821-1878)* (Paris ; Neuchâtel: Attinger, 1935), pp. 170 and 172.

which is, however, roughly 50 kilometres from the Schlawe (Sławno) and hence of the first mentioned family Ristow but 200 kilometres from Stettin (Szczecin). According to Marcel Herwegh, Wilhelm Rüstow was interested in his own possible noble descent: “Guillaume Rüstow affirmed to have found their coat of arms still in churches and cemeteries, while he was garrisoned in Danzig and roamed through the surrounding environs. Moreover, it was there that he gathered the greatest amount of information on his family. A knowledgeable man, an architect probably, having heard that a young officer that went by the name of Rüstow was in town, went to visit him and he [Rüstow] learned details on the history of his pedigree that he still did not know.”¹²⁹³

But to which family did Rüstow belong? Danzig (today Gdańsk) is approximately 340 kilometres away from the ancestral home of the Rüstow family, while Bublitz – where according to Marie the papers of the family went up in flames, is 170 kilometres from this city. In the end, given the available information, it is not possible to irrefutably remove all doubt surrounding from which family Wilhelm and Marie descended; it is even possible that they did not belong to either of the two. But the point to underline is not whether or not Rüstow had noble roots. It was the fact that, Marcel Herwegh and, according to him, Wilhelm Rüstow himself wished to *believe* he was from noble descent – as is demonstrated by Rüstow's search for his coat of arms in the vicinity of Danzig. The mention that “all the papers and documents of the Rüstows” in Bublitz had been burnt is particularly revealing here: Documents were crucial to the “proof of nobility” (*Adelsprobe*), especially when attempting to regain a title that had at some point been lost. Therefore it is somewhat contradictory when Marie Rüstow writes in her letter to Marcel Herwegh: “If my father did nothing to regain his old title (as far as I know, already his father did not wear it) it was probably because it was no matter to him. Marcel, you would do well not to expatiate this old stuff, which gets lost in the mists of time. All this has no sense and reason anymore.”¹²⁹⁴

Even a decidedly “democratic” officer such as Rüstow, a partisan of a militia system of defence, therefore, may not have just cleaved to the many manners of intercourse between

¹²⁹³ „[..A]ffirmé avoir trouvé encore leurs armoiries dans des églises ou cimetières, pendant qu’il se trouvait en garnison à Dantzik [sic], et qu’il parcourait le pays environnant. C’est là, du reste, qu’il eut de plus amples renseignements sur sa famille. Un savant, architecte probablement, ayant appris, par hasard, qu’un jeune officier du nom Rüstow se trouvait dans la ville, vint le trouver et lui apprit des détails sur l’histoire de sa race qu’il ignorait encore.” Ibid., pp. 171-172.

¹²⁹⁴ “Wenn mein Vater nichts dafür that, seinen alten Titel wieder zu erlangen (soviel ich weiß, trug ihn schon sein Vater nicht mehr) so war es wahrscheinlich, weil er ihm ganz egal war. Marcel thäte gut daran, diesen alten Kram, der sich im Dunkel der Zeiten verliert, nicht breit zu treten. Das Alles hat ja keinen Sinn und Verstand mehr.” Letter from Marie Herwegh to the wife of Marcel Herwegh, 11 March (without year, most probably from the 1930s), in the Nachlass of Wilhelm Rüstow in: Dichter- und Stadtmuseum Liestal/BL (Switzerland), Rü M 51, p. 3.

soldiers and officers derived from noble traditions, but he could have been interested in improving his standing and reputation by availing himself of his possible noble descent. He, like other portions of the bourgeoisie, strove to enjoy the social capital possessed by the nobility. Similarly, democratic officers may have been interested in having official proof for their military value; medals of military merit¹²⁹⁵ continued to be an important form of capital in the military and civil spheres, not only for legitimists¹²⁹⁶ but for democrats as well.¹²⁹⁷

7.7.4 Officers and soldiers: keeping closeness

While esprit de corps, social and educational background, and noble traditions served to maintain a basic distance between officers and soldiers, a certain closeness between the two groups nevertheless became increasingly important.¹²⁹⁸ According to Morris Janowitz, the professionalization of the officer corps came about also in part because of a “change in the basis of authority and discipline in the military establishment, a shift from authoritarian domination to greater reliance on manipulation, persuasion, and group consensus.”¹²⁹⁹ Even if Janowitz was not a historian but a sociologist, and wrote on the officer corps of his time, it is possible to see this type of “closeness” already in the armies of the nineteenth century; an example of such may be seen in the use of different metaphors taken from the family sphere. Especially because they did not (completely) overturn authority, parental metaphors were quite commonly used to describe the role officers and their duties held in regard to the soldiers.¹³⁰⁰ At times the officers might feel like a nineteenth-century “mother”, when they wrote about such problems as how to provide enough food or good accommodation to their men. The planning, organization or at least securing provisions or accommodation was just

¹²⁹⁵ For the analysis of symbolic capital by assessing the practices linked to medals and orders, see Ralph Winkle, “Für eine Symbolgeschichte soldatischer Orden und Ehrenzeichen,” in Nikolaus Buschmann and Horst Carl, eds., *Die Erfahrung des Krieges. Erfahrungsgeschichtliche Perspektiven von der Französischen Revolution bis zum Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Paderborn et al.: Schöningh, 2001), pp. 195-214.

¹²⁹⁶ In 1867, the Pope issued a medal for the combatants of the “Battle of Mentana”. This was sometimes included in the *carte de visite* photographs of single soldiers, as was the case for instance with the portrait of the papal officer Joseph Alois Bach, see the image A2.2 in appendix II, on p. 506.

¹²⁹⁷ Ernst Haug, who took part in the defence of the Roman Republic in 1849 and the 1866 Garibaldian Trentino campaign, was awarded the medal in the officer’s rank of the Savoyard Army. Friedrich Wilhelm Rüstow received his diploma of appointment as a Cavaliere dell’Ordine militare di Savoia in 1862.

¹²⁹⁸ The following paragraphs up to p. 346 are a revised version of my forthcoming publication: Göhde, “La fraternité d’armes des peuples. Champ sémantique fraternel et soldats transnationaux au cours de l’(Anti-)Risorgimento. Le cas des combattants allemands,” in an anthology edited by Catherine Brice.

¹²⁹⁹ Janowitz, *The professional soldier*, pp. 8-9.

¹³⁰⁰ It would be important to have a more detailed look at the history of parent-child relationships in this period: As Catherine Brice has rightly argued, the history of the family must be seen as a (necessary) contextualization of the history of the use of family metaphors in different contexts. See for this in relation to monarchism and nationalism, Brice, “Métaphore familiale”.

one of the duties of the officers.¹³⁰¹ They also carried out functions that for this period would have been more typical of a father, e.g. commanding or drilling. The officers frequently used the word “children” in reference to the soldiers, which for them “were the children, under the obligation to obey, love and respect their parents unquestioningly, and meet their siblings with fraternal and comradely feelings.”¹³⁰² The officer-soldier relationship underwent a significant period of development, particularly from the Enlightenment onward. The more benevolent treatment of soldiers by officers was clearly informed by ideas of individual and then later constitutional liberties, even more so if the military wished to attract members of the bourgeoisie (as well) to its ranks. A different way to think of the officer-soldier relationship, therefore, took centre stage in liberal and democratic military conceptions.¹³⁰³ How much these conceptions still influenced the practices linked to the Garibaldian armed groups of the 1860s is still open to debate. When one bears in mind some elements of the democratic military conceptions of the 1840s that were never put into practice in these armed groups, such as the election of officers, they seem in some regards more regular.¹³⁰⁴ In 1860, the initial Thousand were given the possibility to decide under whose command they wished to serve, even if the officers had already been nominated beforehand; the foreign soldiers of the national and foreigners’ legions, however, did not enjoy this freedom.¹³⁰⁵ At the same time we should not underrate the change that was underway in the regular armies: The Bourbon Army, at least in the indigenous corps, was still very much characterized by Murattian personnel: Although they were old, they were not necessarily conservative. Furthermore, in the 1830s and 1840s, many officers – including the quintessential democrats Carlo Pisacane and Enrico Cosenz – were influenced by liberal and democratic thought.¹³⁰⁶ In addition, before the kingdom toppled, the military was very much based on regulations that

¹³⁰¹ See, e.g., the respective chapters on the planning of accommodation and provisions in Friedrich Wilhelm Rüstow, *Anleitung für die Dienstverrichtungen im Felde für den Generalstab der eidgenössischen Bundesarmee* (Basle: Schweighauser'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1855), pp. 15-47, 245-255. In 1860, Rüstow ordered a dozen copies of the French translation of these regulations and distributed them in southern Italy in order to organize the work of the general staff. See Rüstow, *Erinnerungen aus dem italienischen Feldzuge von 1860*, 1, p. 80.

¹³⁰² Frevert, *A nation in barracks*, p. 183.

¹³⁰³ For Germany see *ibid.*; for Italy see instead Banti and Mondini, “Da Novara a Custoza”; the degree to which these conceptions (still) informed both military thinking and practices in the case of the *garibaldini* of the 1860s is however disputed. See two contrasting contributions, e. g., Virgilio Ilari, “L'esercito dell'utopia. I modelli militari 'alternativi' della sinistra risorgimentale e la questione della guardia nazionale (1821-1881),” in *idem*, *Storia del servizio militare in Italia. Dall'ordinanza fiorentina di Machiavelli alla costituzione dell'esercito italiano, 1506-1870* (Rome: Rivista militare, 1989), pp. 377-430 on the one hand, and Riall, “Guerre et nation,” pp. 49-64 on the other.

¹³⁰⁴ Banti and Mondini, “Da Novara a Custoza,” p. 422; Frevert, *A nation in barracks*, p. 183.

¹³⁰⁵ Giuseppe Capuzzi, “La spedizione di Garibaldi in Sicilia. Memorie di un volontario,” in *Vita di Giuseppe Garibaldi. Con la giunta di Garibaldi in Sicilia di Giuseppe Capuzzi*, ed. Pier Carlo Boggio (Turin: s. n., 1860), p. 226; Cecchinato, *Camicie rosse*, pp. 201-202.

¹³⁰⁶ Argiolas, *Storia dell'esercito borbonico*, p. 89.

had been enacted under the Ferdinandean military reforms of the 1830s; these last, for instance, were characterized by a more dynamic way to carry out the exercises and drills, the publication of military works and journals, and the reduction of corporal punishment.¹³⁰⁷

Military theorists, already at the beginning of the century, believed that the amelioration of the officer-soldier relationship would result in an increase in the performance of the soldiers, and hence increasingly comradeship and ideas of “brotherhood of arms” were consciously promoted, because they were thought to improve military discipline and performance. Brian Joseph Martin in his book on the politics and practices of friendship in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Armies shows that both good horizontal (between soldiers) and vertical (between officers and soldiers) relations were also systematically invoked and sustained from “above”. Martin incisively wrote “Friendship, therefore, becomes a military technique for individual survival and collective success in combat, where men are trained to love and protect their fellow comrades in order to better hate and kill their enemies.”¹³⁰⁸

Garibaldi was well aware of the potential that this form of discipline had. In a text from August 1860 he advised his officers:

“Of the qualities that must be primary among the officers of the Italian Army, other than valour, amiability, which attracts and binds the affection of the soldier, must be counted. It is difficult that an officer that is valorous and beloved by his subordinates does not obtain from them such discipline, subordination and verve as are necessary [...] With vigour one can obtain a severe discipline, but it is preferable to obtain it through affection and positive influence. [...] It is impossible that a soldier would abandon his dear officer on the battlefield, he who treated him well, helped him when in need, and with whom he shared the hardships and glory of the campaign. Therefore, it has to be a special duty of the officers to remain with their soldiers, and take care of them as they would their own family.”¹³⁰⁹

¹³⁰⁷ Ibid., pp. 68-90. The issue should be developed further by having a look at the practices of the indigenous soldiers of the kingdom.

¹³⁰⁸ Brian Joseph Martin, *Napoleonic friendship. Military fraternity, intimacy, and sexuality in nineteenth-century France* (Durham, N.H. et al.: Univ. of New Hampshire Press; Univ. Press of New England, 2010), p. 11. On the both the functionality and disfunctionality (subversive potential) of comradeship see as well Kühne, “Kameradschaft,” p. 510.

¹³⁰⁹ “Tra le qualità che devono primeggiare negli ufficiali dell’esercito italiano, oltre il valore, deve contarsi l’amabilità, che attrae e vincola l’affetto del soldato. È difficile che un ufficiale valoroso, ed amato da’ suoi subalterni, non ottenga da loro, quella disciplina, subordinazione, e slancio necessari [...] Col vigore si può ottenere una severa disciplina; ma è preferibile ottenerla coll’affetto e coll’ascendente. [...] È impossibile che il soldato abbandoni sul campo di battaglia il suo caro ufficiale, che lo trattò benevolmente, che lo sorresse nei bisogni e con cui divise fatiche e glorie della campagna. Perciò dev’essere cura speciale degli ufficiali di stare coi loro militi, e prenderne cura, come della propria famiglia.” Garibaldi, “Alcune parole agli ufficiali”.

The ways in which officers treated their soldiers, however, became an issue of comparison between the officers themselves. Rüstow, despite the fact that in other passages of his report he underlined the need to maintain distance between officers and soldiers, criticizes the Italian officer Giuseppe Sirtori for “lacking comradely affection with the soldiers, which nearly instinctively makes possible to identify the officer [...] There are some formalities, the violation of which offends the soldier, the observation of which wins him over easily. Of this Sirtori knew nothing. To the comfort and the care for a soldier he had nearly no regard.”¹³¹⁰

Sometimes the soldiers, however, seemed to be able to differentiate between the real human affection of the officers toward their soldiers, and mere functional friendliness. Georg von Vollmar notes a situation that occurred before his papal corps had to return to the battle: “The officers approached us in a friendly way, adulated and asked us, if the abundantly distributed hard liquors and coffee were sufficient [...] But the soldier is disgusted by such a sudden and egoistic amiability, and he holds his superior in even less esteem.”¹³¹¹

7.8 Brothers in arms, companions and comrades¹³¹²

Military historians have pointed out with insistence, that the reference group for the individual soldier in the nineteenth century was still primarily his own regiment rather than the army as a whole. Rather than speaking of a homogenous army, therefore, “it is more accurate to say that a collection of regiments was put together for some time for action”.¹³¹³

Here, the topic somewhat opens onto a minefield of a military history¹³¹⁴ that is articulated along a spectrum, the two extremes of which are: the cohesion that came out of a

¹³¹⁰ “daß ihm der Sinn für die kameradschaftliche Zuneigung zum Soldaten fehlte, welche den Offizier gewissermaßen instinctiv erkennen läßt [...]. Davon wußte Sirtori nichts. Auch auf die Bequemlichkeit und die Sorge für den Soldaten nahm er so gut als keine Rücksicht.” Rüstow, *Erinnerungen aus dem italienischen Feldzuge von 1860*, 2, p. 22.

¹³¹¹ “Die Offiziere kamen freundlich heran, schmeichelten und befragten uns, ob uns der reichlich vertheilte Schnaps und Kaffee genüge [...]. Den Soldaten aber widert eine so plötzliche und egoistische Freundlichkeit an, und er achtet seinen Vorgesetzten nur noch weniger.” Herwart, *Zwei Jahre Schlüsselsoldat*, p. 26.

¹³¹² This section up to p. 346 is a translated and revised version of my Göhde, “La fraternité d’armes des peuples. Champ sémantique fraternel et soldats transnationaux au cours de l’(Anti-)Risorgimento. Le cas des combattants allemands”, forthcoming in an anthology edited by Catherine Brice.

¹³¹³ Myerly, *British Military Spectacle*, p. 1.

¹³¹⁴ This is a highly debated field, especially in German historiography on the Second World War insofar as it apparently leads to the question of individual responsibility for the crimes committed by the Wehrmacht. Two examples of this are, on the one hand, the work that has been carried out on the protocols on German POWs by Neitzel and Welzer, *Soldaten. On fighting, killing and dying*, which emphasizes the importance of a general frame of war; and on the other the work carried out on the relationship between Nazism and “comradeship” by Thomas Kühne, “Zwischen Männerbund und Volksgemeinschaft. Hitlers Soldaten und der Mythos der Kameradschaft,” *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 38 (1998): pp. 165-89; Thomas Kühne, “Comradeship. Gender confusion and gender order in the German military, 1918-1945,” in Karen Hagemann and Stefanie Schüler-Springorum, eds., *Home - front. The military, war and gender in 20th century Germany* (Oxford; New York: Berg, 2002), pp. 233-54.

common objective and the common ideological convictions of the combatants on one hand, and the cohesion that resulted from living in close quarters within the military groups themselves on the other.

The military traditionally reserves a series of specific words, or words with a specifically military denotation and frequency of use, to express loyalty within the military sphere. These words could actually be used to express the bonds within the formal groups of the regiments and smaller military corps, but they could also be used between soldiers of more informal or transversal groups respectively.¹³¹⁵

The specific use of the words "brotherhood in arms", "companion" and "comrade" in the military has a long history; no new words were invented during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, however. The "brotherhood in arms" in particular has a long history that stretches back from antiquity up through to today.

In the Middle Ages, the knights in particular formed "brotherhoods of arms"; these "brotherhoods in arms" and the idea of "blood brotherhood" were intimately connected in the Middle Ages. The word companion also possesses a long military history; the word originally used to denote a member of a "company", i.e. of a legal society, came to be used in Italian, French and Spanish in the more strictly military sense following the creation of the "compagnie di ventura" (lit. venture companies) of the fourteenth century.¹³¹⁶

"Comrade" was originally used to indicate the community of people living in the same "camera" (room); it seems that its military use already had an extended acceptance – i.e., it was not limited only to the community living in a single habitation – by the sixteenth century; most likely, this too emerged from the mercenary context in Italy.

Even if this term has a particular history of use especially in the twentieth century¹³¹⁷, comrade is often used in the written texts of soldiers, for example Germans in the nineteenth

¹³¹⁵ I will discuss the various possible group loyalties (political party, sovereign/commander, regiment, national and/or regional etc.) in the chapter 8.3.

¹³¹⁶ R. Manselli, "Compagnia di ventura," in Robert-Henri Bautier, ed., *Lexikon des Mittelalters* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1999); J. L. Bermejo Cabrero, "Compañía," in *Lexikon des Mittelalters*, vol. 3 (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1999), col. 100; Ph. Contamine, "Kompagnie, 1. Frankreich," in *Lexikon des Mittelalters*, vol. 5 (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1999), cols. 1291-92.

¹³¹⁷ The history of the concept has been studied first and foremost within the context of "comradeship" in the nineteenth century, hence in the use extended to the whole population (women included) of a "blind obedience" to the "Führer" or "duce", and its integration with racism and martial tendencies. See first and foremost the publications of Kühne, "Kameradschaft," pp. 504-29; Kühne, "Zwischen Männerbund und Volksgemeinschaft," pp. 165-89; in English see Kühne, "Comradeship. Gender confusion and gender order in the German military, 1918-1945".

century, while it seems that in Italy at that time the word companion (*compagno*) was more commonly used.¹³¹⁸

First is the connection of the concept, mirrored already in the word comrade (French *camerade*) itself, with an important characteristic of the military of modern times that was discussed above: the close physical proximity of the soldiers in the armies, with regard to the physical interdependence of war movements and to living together day in and day out.

These connotations are inherent to the nineteenth century use of these words. Therefore, in 1793, for example, the German dictionary Adelung considers one of the examples of comradeship (*Cameradschaft*) to be the cohabitation of soldiers or apprentices, "when they travel together, also when they live in the same room together, and when they have shared domestic responsibilities."¹³¹⁹

That the soldiers lived together is to be taken literally, seeing as it was still quite frequent in the nineteenth century for common soldiers to sleep in a communal bed, perpetuating the phenomenon of the "bedfellow" (*camerade de lit*).

This idea that there was a special corporal closeness between the soldiers is emphasized in the poem "Ich hatt' einen Kameraden", which was written by the (democrat and) poet Ludwig Uhland at the beginning of the nineteenth century¹³²⁰; it is often used even today as a song during funerals, both military and civilian. The first stanza reads, the "comrade went alongside me in matched pace and footstep", while in the second, the dying comrade was "as though he were a part of me".¹³²¹

Like Thomas Kühne, it seems right to view comradeship not as a practice that evolves on its own, but more as a specific discourse that has a series of functions. As a discourse, comradeship is a very obvious example for the "prefiguration and discursive limitation of the war experience."¹³²²

¹³¹⁸ At least this is how it seems based on a rapid search in Garibaldi's texts; therefore, perhaps it is telling that the word "Kamerad" in Gustav von Hoffstetter's diary on the defence of the Roman Republic in 1849 appears as "compagno" in the Italian translation of 1851. See Hoffstetter, *Tagebuch*; Gustavo de Hoffstetter, *Giornale delle cose di Roma nel 1849* (Turin; Capolago: Cassone; Tip. Elvetica, 1851), passim.

¹³¹⁹ „[...] Cameradschaft, wenn sie mit einander in Gesellschaft reisen, ingleichen, wenn sie in Einem Zimmer wohnen und eine gemeinschaftliche Haushaltung führen.“ Johann Christoph Adelung, "Cameradschaft," in idem, *Grammatisch-kritisches Wörterbuch der Hochdeutschen Mundart*, vol. 1 (A-E) (Leipzig: Breitkopf, 1793), p. 1295.

¹³²⁰ Thomas Nipperdey, *Deutsche Geschichte 1800-1866. Bürgerwelt und starker Staat* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1983), p. 25.

¹³²¹ "Er ging an meiner Seite, / In gleichem Schritt und Tritt. [...] Als wär's ein Stück von mir." Ludwig Uhland, "Der gute Kamerad," in idem, *Gedichte* (Stuttgart; Tübingen: J. G. Cotta'sche Buchhandlung, 1815), p. 219.

¹³²² Kühne, "Zwischen Männerbund und Volksgemeinschaft. Hitlers Soldaten und der Mythos der Kameradschaft," p. 175

The main function of comradeship was, without doubt, that of harmonizing the reciprocal relationships of the soldiers. It had a "gentle" side to it that allowed for emotions and tears and open displays of affection; it was a special "habitus" between men, incorporating practices that at the time were considered to be "feminine".

These "rituals of tenderness" were put into practice to enable the soldiers to bear the brutal realities, both emotional and physical, that were connected to military life and war. This "gentle" comradeship was one of the ingredients of a special "homosocial desire" in which "the men seemed to be more comfortable being amongst other men than with women [...]".¹³²³

This special male society in the army explains why many soldiers could speak of their time in the army as a period that was (also) characterized by love¹³²⁴, friendship and joy.

Hoffstetter reports on his time in the Roman Republic in 1849, that the soldiers sometimes put on puppet shows: "Behind a bed sheet or tablecloth – accompanied by an orchestra (harmonica or trumpet) – the stupidest things in the world were performed; we almost laughed ourselves to death."¹³²⁵ On other occasions, according to the reports of the German soldiers and officers, soldiers would prank the population or they would dance like couples in their camp.¹³²⁶

Head-brigand Ludwig Richard Zimmermann wrote of his first contact with the brigands' camp: "What a happy and bellicose life here in and between the huts made of leaves, around an enormous and beating fire. [...] Oh! To suffer together, common peril so rapidly create friendship and trust! How healthy it would be for a cold and proud heart, that would only govern and not love, to transfer to the brigands for several months!"¹³²⁷

Soldiers effectively filled typically familial roles with regard to their comrades. During the procedures connected to the death of a soldier in battle is one example of such, this being

¹³²³ Banti, *L'onore della nazione*, p. 291.

¹³²⁴ On homoeroticism and the military, see the discussion of the painting by David, "Leonidas at Thermopylae", in *ibid.*, p. 292.

¹³²⁵ "Marionettenaufführung [...] Hinter einem Bett- oder Tischtuch wurde nun unter Orchesterbegleitung (Harmonika oder Trompete) das dümmste Zeug von der Welt aufgeführt; wir lachten uns oft bald zu Tode." Hoffstetter, *Tagebuch*, p. 58. According to Hoffstetter, later there was again performed a puppet play, see *ibid.*, p. 83.

¹³²⁶ See the Garibaldian Rüstow, *Erinnerungen aus dem italienischen Feldzuge von 1860*, 1, p. 210; the papal Eickholt, *Roms letzte Tage unter der Tiara*, p. 96; Hoffstetter, *Tagebuch*, p. 73.

¹³²⁷ „Welch ein lustiges, kriegerisches Treiben in und zwischen den vielen Laubhütten, um die mächtigen, prasselnden Feuer. [...] O! das gemeinschaftliche Leiden, die gemeinschaftliche Gefahr schaffen die Freundschaft und das Vertrauen ganz schnell! Wie heilsam wäre für manches kalte, stolze Herz, das nur beherrschen und nicht lieben will, eine mehrmonatige Transferirung zu den -Briganten!“ Zimmermann, "Erinnerungen eines ehemaligen Briganten-Chef's," pp. 46-47.

the frequent topos based on the model of the "Pietà" where a soldier would fill the role of mother to caress his dying friend and comrade.

Gustav von Hoffstetter wrote of one such scene that occurred during the defence of the Roman Republic in 1849: "A bullet" struck Colonel Laviron "in his lower abdomen. The soldier-priest Ugo Bassi [...] gathered him in his arms. The dying man haltingly uttered several intelligible [the German version: unintelligible] words, made one more effort then to kiss his friend, and then gave up his soul to the Creator."¹³²⁸

It remains unclear whether Hoffstetter really saw this scene with his own eyes, however, because this story is similarly recounted by many authors.¹³²⁹

Analogously, in the "old habit of bringing their fallen with them", the soldiers – to be able to bury their comrades as would a family – "extended their hands to them". This at times proved to be a deadly habit because, as Hoffstetter wrote, "the hand that reached out for that extreme task, promptly pulled back, more than zealously, to press over their own mortal wound. Others, already safe behind the ally's house, or having reached the entrance to the garden, would run forward to succour their wounded comrade, who lay so close by, but after a convulsive and fearful jerk of the limbs, they too would lie still alongside their friend."¹³³⁰

But comradeship, or brotherhood-in-arms, was not limited to this "maternal" role alone insofar as it seemed that, like the ritual of blood brotherhood, it also encompassed the duty to help one's brother on the battlefield and also the "vendetta di sangue" (lit. "blood vendetta"). In fact, the obligation to pursue a vendetta was inherent to blood brotherhood between non-relatives.¹³³¹

Zimmermann wrote of how several peasants had helped the "brigands", and he imagined that they thought that "the brothers, for whom we risked everything, will try to liberate us! They will risk their lives, as we have for them!"¹³³²

The duty to carry out a vendetta for one's fallen comrades was, as aforementioned, closely connected to the "blood brotherhood" and the "brotherhood in arms". Therefore, the

¹³²⁸ „[...]n den Unterleib. Der Priester-Soldat Ugo Bassi [...] fing den Sterbenden in seinen Armen auf. Laviron flüsterte noch einige unverständliche Worte, machte eine Anstrengung, seinen Freund zu küssen und verschied.“ Hoffstetter, *Tagebuch*, p. 252.

¹³²⁹ For the various authors that describe this or similar scenes, see George Macaulay Trevelyan, *Garibaldi's defence of the Roman Republic* (London et al.: Longmans, Green and Co., 1912), p. 212.

¹³³⁰ „[...]A]llein die zum letzten Dienst ausgestreckte Hand fährt schnell nach der eigenen Todeswunde zurück. Andere, schon hinter dem schützenden Hause oder dem Eingange des Gartens angekommen, springen wieder vor, um einem naheliegenden noch lebenden Kameraden Hülfe zu bringen, ein kurzer Seufzer, eine krampfartige schauerähnliche Bewegung der Glieder, und sie liegen neben den Freunden.“ Hoffstetter, *Tagebuch*, p. 120.

¹³³¹ Belgrader, "Blutsbrüderschaft," col. 523.

¹³³² „Die Brüder, für die wir Alles gewagt, werden uns zu retten versuchen! – sie werden ihr Leben für uns einsetzen, wie wir es für sie gethan!“ Zimmermann, "Erinnerungen eines ehemaligen Briganten-Chefs," p. 85.

German soldier Maier in the Bourbon Army, described a moment just before they were to be transferred from Sicily to Calabria on 13 June 1860: "But before leaving, we still wished to take out our revenge for our fallen comrades and leave the City of Palermo with the memory of its lack of faith. We set fire to all of the neighbourhoods we had taken. The damage caused was enormous, but our exacerbation was equally great."¹³³³

When their wounded comrades beseeched them to end their suffering, the soldiers were confronted with the inability to carry out the act. Maier related: "Taking leave of our poor, sick comrades who were to be left behind was poignant. Knowing that they would fall into Garibaldi's hands and would have nothing but an ignoble death, they asked us to kill them with well-aimed shots. But who would have been able now, when they hadn't even the physical strength to come with us, to kill his comrade, who since 6 April had shared all of these difficulties?"¹³³⁴

It, however, would be erroneous to consider comradeship the simple and inevitable "social-psychological" result of the soldiers living together. From the outside, the "brotherhood in arms" and comradeship were not the antithesis of discipline; on the contrary, it seems that the appellation "brother in arms" could also be accompanied by general calls to discipline. For example, Garibaldi stated in one of his orders of the day to the *Cacciatori delle Alpi*: "I recall with emotion the affection and obedience demonstrated to me by my brave companions in arms; however, for the good of all, and availing myself of my experience, I must counsel our soldiers and recommend the officers never to tire of inculcating and practicing the following principles, which (just) the other day were flouted for a moment."

What follows are a series of problems that Garibaldi noticed, be it from a lack of "cold blood" (in the sense of cool-headedness) to the chaotic deployment in sequence. He goes on to conclude with a Garibaldian carrot: a "special report will indicate those that distinguished themselves most in the last two campaigns, and I will ensure them the veneration of their brothers in arms."¹³³⁵

¹³³³ „Doch bevor wir abzogen, wollten wir noch unsere gefallenen Kameraden rächen, und der Stadt Palermo ein bleibendes Andenken für ihre Treulosigkeit hinterlassen. Wir steckten alle genommenen Stadttheile in Brand. Der verursachte Schaden war ungeheuer, aber unsere Erbitterung war ebenso groß.“ Maier, *Der Kampf zwischen der deutschen Fremden-Legion und den Garibaldianern*, p. 17.

¹³³⁴ „Der Abschied von den armen, zurückgelassenen, kranken Kameraden war herzergreifend: wohl wissend, in die Hände Garibaldi's zu gerathen, nichts anderes als einen schmachlichen Tod sterben zu müssen, verlangten sie von uns, sie durch gutgezielte Schüsse zu töten. Wer aber wäre im Stande gewesen, seinen Kameraden, der seit dem 6. April alle Strapazen mit ihm getheilt hatte, jetzt, wo ihm die körperliche Kraft gebrach, mit uns zu gehen, zu tödten?“ Ibid., p. 27.

¹³³⁵ “Io rammento commosso l'affetto e l'obbedienza manifestatami dai miei prodi compagni d'armi; però [...] devo ammonire i nostri militi, e raccomandare agli ufficiali, non si stanchino d'inculcare e porre in atto i seguenti principii, trasgrediti ieri un momento.” “[...S]angue freddo”, “rapporto speciale farà cenno di coloro che

It is not surprising, therefore, that the military penal codes served not only to discipline soldiers in order to make the military service more effective but also to discipline the daily communal lives of the soldiers: the regulations on theft and swindling, whereby a soldier was punished much more severely if found stealing "from his comrade", is a good example of this.¹³³⁶

Rüstow, recounting how several soldiers had sold materials that were reserved for the Southern Army, goes on to mock the "brotherhood": "Amongst the sellers, there were even some that had with the utmost urgency asked that we view each other as brothers. I charged the officers to tell the soldiers that this pretext of brotherhood [Brüderschaft in German¹³³⁷] toward honest men was sorely unjust on the part of such louts."¹³³⁸

But regardless of the function they served in rendering the army more efficient, comradeship and the brotherhood also had subversive potential, and this with regard to the relationship between the officers and soldiers. These ties could be invoked to call for less hierarchy and more equality. The word "comrade" is associated with a strong connotation of equality because it refers – already in the history of the word itself – to living together under the same roof, i.e. to being in the same condition.

At times, (common) soldiers use this acceptance of "equality" to demand a more equitable culture and less hierarchy.

Rüstow relates a scene where Captain Francesco Taddei within the Garibaldian army "spoke with the general staff on the part of the soldiers. [...] He primarily requested that we all regard each other as brothers." But according to Rüstow, Colonel Luigi Pianciani "responded kindly but firmly to all this", declining the request.¹³³⁹

più si distinsero nei due fatti d'armi passati, e li porgerò alla venerazione dei loro fratelli d'armi." Garibaldi, "Ordine del Giorno, Ai Cacciatori delle Alpi, Como, 28 maggio 1859," pp. 97-98.

¹³³⁶ Terminology used in the military penal code in use for the Bourbon foreigners' regiment after 1859, the code of the Swiss soldiers in service to France: *Entwurf eines Straf-Gesetzbuchs für die Schweizer-Regimenter im Dienste Seiner Allerchristlichsten Majestät / Projet d'un code pénal militaire pour les régiments suisses au service de Sa Majesté Très-Chrétienne*, (Naples: Richter, 1858), § 134, p. 54.

¹³³⁷ For the German words, see Meriggi, "Fraternité/Brüderlichkeit".

¹³³⁸ „Es waren unter den Verkäufern gerade auch einige, die am dringendsten begehrt hatten, daß wir uns alle als Brüder betrachten sollten. Ich trug den Offizieren auf, der Mannschaft zu sagen, daß die Brüderschaft von seiten von Spitzbuben eine einigermaßen unbillige Forderung an ehrliche Männer sei.“ Rüstow, *Erinnerungen aus dem italienischen Feldzuge von 1860*, 1, p. 93.

¹³³⁹ „Auch ein Unteroffizier betrat die Kajüte, um im Namen der Soldaten zum Stabe zu reden. Dieser Mann war der Fourier Taddei's. Er verlangte vor allem, daß wir uns sämtlich als Brüder betrachten wollten. Pianciani antwortete darauf mild, aber fest.“ Ibid., 92.

Soldier *fraternization* against military leaders was a constant risk. According to the common soldier Rottmund, within the Papal Army "the officers were second-rate", but "the supplies and the common man, they were excellent".¹³⁴⁰

At times the ties among a group of common soldiers was so strong that they seemed to desert as a group: this seemed to have happened with Rottmund, who with a group of papal soldiers joined the Garibaldian ranks; this was also what occurred with the desertion of a group of "brigands", who left because they felt their head brigand, Luigi Alonzo, was incompetent.¹³⁴¹

7.9 Conclusions

If we wish to understand the specificities of a foreign group such as that of the German soldiers in the Italian armed groups of the nineteenth century in terms of their experiences, practices and contribution to foreign-Italian and German-Italian transfers, it is helpful to have an idea of what military life in the nineteenth century armies was like in general, and how it was in the Italian armed groups in particular. Unfortunately, daily life in many Italian pre-Unitarian armed groups has been studied very little. This chapter, therefore, aimed to bring to light some aspects of military life in the various armed groups; a comparative approach was adopted to indicate in which regards the life of the foreign soldiers resembled that of their "indigenous" colleagues in the various groups, and in which instances it tended to differ.

The military in the nineteenth century is a highly codified world, and the number of different aspects of military life that were meticulously regulated by legislation is extremely high. There are three main fields of governmental intervention: The first are the regulations on the services to be fulfilled by the military together with rules on the administrative and logistical aspects; the second is constituted by the drill books for the various branches of the armies (infantry, artillery, etc.), while the third is constituted by military criminal law. Codification was not only important in the regular armies of the states, but it also informed the various Garibaldian undertakings, even those in which the *garibaldini* were not officially linked to the Army of Piedmont or Italy. At times the regulations that were used in these latter cases were officially those of the states' armies, an example of which were the criminal codes that were taken over from Piedmont and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies and applied to the

¹³⁴⁰ „[...] Offiziere [...], die unfähig waren [...]“. „Das eigentliche Material, der gemeine Mann, war vortrefflich.“ Rottmund, *Erlebnisse und Interessante Begebenheiten*, p. 84.

¹³⁴¹ Zimmermann, "Erinnerungen eines ehemaligen Briganten-Chef's", p. 470.

Southern Army of 1860. In those instances in which specific regimes were not specified with regard to the other areas of regulation, commanders such as Wilhelm Rüstow established their own regime. At times the regulations from other armies would be applied, and at others the commanders would simply resort to what they knew and what they thought were adequate practices. Hence one would have to go into more depth and look at the varying practices that were established in the different military subgroups of these armies; this however was more than could be done here.

Although the regulations cannot provide us with a complete view of how military life actually was, they can, nevertheless provide us with an idea of how it should have been.

In all of the armed groups, the services expected of the foreigners' corps – from the Papal Zouaves to the Papal Carabineers and the Bourbon foreigners' regiments to the Garibaldian foreign company of 1860 – essentially mirrored the duties assigned to the other regiments of the same branch (i.e., in this case, the infantry). In the Bourbon and Papal Armies, the foreign soldiers basically adhered to the same time-table as the Italians; this applied not only to when they were woken up and when they went to bed but also to the time in between, when they had to, like the indigenous corps, carry out the typical services of nineteenth-century armies in peacetime. Such activities included providing sentinels and patrols in more or less little groups formed of soldiers from the same corps, doing specific work ("corvées"), drilling, exercising and parading, and finally forming escorts and showing their presence in a significant number of civil and – particularly for the papal soldiers – religious occasions. In providing these services, alongside their war training, the foreigners' and indigenous corps of the regular armies participated in preserving the public "order" that was primarily maintained by the more circumscribed, but nevertheless militarily organized police forces. Herein lays one further, possible ingredient for negative views on these soldiers by democrats or liberals. Both the foreign and indigenous corps also contributed to the "military spectacle" put on by the states to display their power and presence. The emphasis placed on order, cleanliness and posture, and therefore aesthetics – both on and off duty – that was typical of the military regulations was not only functional for economic or disciplinary purposes so as to avoid the wear on the provisions/equipment and to reduce the number of desertions caused by friction within the corps, but it was functional for the theatrical role filled by the military as well, insofar as it was intended to help rehabilitate the image the civil sphere had of the military. For the soldiers, however, this amounted to an extremely strong and far reaching conditioning of their behaviour on the part of the state. Furthermore, the sheer quantity of controls carried out on the soldiers during the day without doubt led to the

internalization of controlling practices on the part of the soldiers, which became their own, individual control before they were then controlled from above; this seems to work very much in the way that the processes of disciplinization, as they have been described by Foucault or Goffmann, do.¹³⁴²

At least until the eighteenth century, military training and drill were also meticulously regulated. As many authors have noted, traditional military drill may be compared to dancing, with regard to both the process of learning individual movements and the choreography with others. While the mechanisms to learn the movements and how to coordinate the personal movements of each soldier with that of the others were likened to the processes used in social dancing, the military apparatus as a whole was considered to be a machine comprised of many interlocking parts. This idea of the military as a machine with perfectly interlocking parts could go together with aesthetic considerations. But the question remains as to how much drill in the Italian armies continued to rely on traditional close-order control and on training each soldier the many different and precise movements that went with it. A comparison of the various armed groups reveals some differences. Based on the analysis of the drill book of the Papal Army, it seems that the exercises did not differ much from the old models. At the legal level, the Bourbon Army already differed quite a bit more. This was because the regulations in use up to the fall of the Kingdom stemmed from the period of the Ferdinandean military reforms of the 1830s; the regulations, in fact, were characterized not only by a conscious copying from abroad, but had introduced dynamic, less corporal punishments (even if this for the military criminal law applied to the foreigners' regiments happened later) and, as we will see in the following chapter, military gymnastics at a relatively early stage.

With regard to the Garibaldian armed groups, the issue of training was more complicated, for several reasons. In some cases, the *garibaldini* were to be trained using the Piedmontese regulations, or were even – as was the case in 1859 – trained by Piedmontese officers, if hastily. In other cases, official decisions were never taken, and therefore the methods adopted depended, even more than was usual in the regular armies, on the respective superiors of each corps. It is important to note, however, that the duration of training that the

¹³⁴² Michel Foucault, *Surveiller et punir. La naissance de la prison* (Paris: Gallimard: 1975); Goffman, *Asylums*. There are differences in both authors, however: While Goffman in “Asylums” sees the disciplinization in the “total institution” to primarily destroy the ability of the individual to take up civil life again, Foucault, on the contrary, sees the discipline of prison life to be a “prototype of bourgeois society”. This is pointed out rightly so by Maja Apelt, “Militärische Sozialisation,” in Nina Leonhard and Ines-Jacqueline Werkner, eds., *Militärsoziologie. Eine Einführung*, 2 ed. (Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2012), pp. 428-46. Goffman also leaves more possibilities for opposition by the individual by underlining the difference between “primary and secondary adjustment”, the latter of which is characterized by the use on the part of the individual of “unauthorized means” that are nevertheless partially accepted by the institution: Goffman, *Asylums*, p. 189.

Garibaldian soldiers were subject to was not even close to the amount of time that most of the soldiers of the regular armies were subject to. This was most probably due to a variety of reasons: To differing ideas regarding the aims and necessary level of precision that “drill” was to reach in the liberal-democratic political field could have argued that the *garibaldini* had to be ready for combat as soon as possible and therefore their training could not be as extensive; this in a sense is confirmed by the equally short training the pro-Bourbon “brigands” of the 1860s received or that of the lately arriving German soldiers of the new Bourbon foreigners’ regiments, who were nearly immediately sent into battle upon their arrival in 1860. In contrast, since the regular armies were not dismantled in times of peace, they could use these periods for more substantial training. Another factor that must be taken into consideration is the fact that varying numbers of foreign and Italian soldiers alike had already had some military experience that they had acquired while serving in other armies and/or armed groups prior to joining Garibaldi’s forces. As I wrote above, however, one would have to look more in depth into the variety of the military subgroups; the practices in a group such as the British Legion – of which at least a part of its members seems to never have previously been part of a military¹³⁴³ – necessarily differed from those of the Germans, Austrians and Swiss ex-bourbon soldiers who were in the Garibaldian “foreign company”. Nevertheless, some basic training in an abbreviated version of the tripartite “school of the soldier” remained important for the *garibaldini* as well, if only to calm and tame possible “hot” emotions before moving on to tasks such as handling the gun, which necessitated a “cool” head.

Despite informing the practical work of the soldiers to varying degrees, the regulations were also an important tool for discursive imprinting within the armies themselves. Parts of these regulations, such as the general service regulations or military criminal law, were not only distributed – e.g. in the printed form of the soldiers’ service books or Rüstow’s distribution of the instructions for the duties of the general staff, and parts of service regulations and military criminal law issued for the “brigands” by Zimmermann – but regularly read to the common soldiers in the regular armies, thus reaching those who could not read as well. Specifically military texts such as the orders of the day (including those of Garibaldi), given by both the supreme commander and the respective heads of corps, conveyed specific values, be it cleanliness and posture or the harmonization of soldier-soldier and soldier-officer relationships. The particularly harsh punishment of property crimes, when

¹³⁴³ The relative weight of militarily inexperienced soldiers does not seem to have been fully assessed as of yet, as it is confirmed by the ambiguous information for instance in Pellegrino Sutcliffe, “British Red Shirts,” p. 204 against the footnote on p. 216.

they occurred between soldiers is an indication that regulations could, for instance help to inform practices of harmonious “comradeship”. The regulations and orders of the day as important media for the dispersion of values and concepts, e.g. honour and comradeship, would be worthwhile elements for further analysis.

Furthermore, more study is needed to make a greater distinction between legal prescriptions and the actual practices in these armed groups than was possible here; one aspect that has yet to be analysed is how the practices in the foreigners’ corps of the Papal and Bourbon Armies were influenced and changed by foreign officers that had previously served in other European armies. It was possible in this chapter to only partially compare the legal level with the practical through the integration of the German soldiers' reports. Nevertheless, this chapter serves to indicate some of the possible directions of further inquiry.

The same may be said, *mutatis mutandis*, for some of the other issues addressed in this chapter.

Since 1846, military criminal law was the same for the foreigners’ and indigenous regiments in the Papal Army. This was not the case for the foreign regiments in the Bourbon Army, where a more or less dynamic connection to the code used by the Swiss corps in the French Army had been established. Essentially this guaranteed the group of German Bourbon soldiers, that had served between 1859 and 1860, with an at least partially humanized treatment – compared with the previous version of the French code that had been valid for the former Bourbon “Swiss” regiments; this took the form of a reduction of corporal punishment. Again, practices could partially differ according to how the law was interpreted by the officers or the judicial bodies of the first instance, which normally was comprised of members of the regiment itself.

Although some work could still be done with regard to the practices of military criminal law, thanks to the German soldiers’ reports used in this chapter, more can already be said about officer-soldier relationships, for instance.

As always, the comparative method helps to “render the invisible visible”¹³⁴⁴, which in this case applies to aspects, for instance, of the *garibaldini* that are often not touched upon in Risorgimento historiography. From the role of previously militarily experienced foreign and Italian soldiers mentioned in the previous chapter, to military criminal law and punishment practices (including martial law and executions), and to officer-soldier relationships we can discover aspects of the *garibaldini* that call into question some of the images of these armed

¹³⁴⁴ Green, “Forms of comparison,” p. 42.

groups that have been established and perpetuated in much of the Risorgimento historiography, images that at times tend to exclude beforehand everything that has to do with the military as such. However, despite the multiple changes brought about in the Garibaldian armed groups compared with the states' armies, the entanglements between the two must not be underrated: There were various ways in which the regulations and practises of the states' armies were incorporated at least partially into the Garibaldian armed groups, either by adopting these laws or through the practices brought to the groups by officers and experienced soldiers. Despite all of the politically and functionally motivated changes in the officer-soldier relationships that occurred in both the regular and the Garibaldian armed groups, the fact that the two groups remained partially separated in all of the armed groups studied here – whether this took the form of different wage levels (though not always), and different accommodations and provisions, the different types of duties and hence “work” that were assigned, and the different possibilities and quantity of free-time allowed – must not be underestimated. Furthermore, based on the sources analysed, it seems that in terms of closeness or distance between officers and soldiers, the inter-soldier relationships in the *garibaldini* of 1860, for instance, were not so totally different from those of the regular armies. However, it was possible to find instances in which partially differing ideas on the officer-soldier relationships conflicted one with the other; a good example is the admonition (whether it was motivated by questions of humanity or/and functionality is not entirely clear) Garibaldi made to his officers to be present among the soldiers, and the opposite view represented by Rüstow, for whom nevertheless the care an officer took of his soldiers seemed to be an important quality of a “good officer”.

Furthermore, the specific communication methods typical of the military – which were partially derived from the nobility-nobility and nobility-sovereign forms of intercourse – were not totally discarded in the Garibaldian case; a number of instruments were preserved and used such as “orders of the day”, the role of military ceremonies (namely the aforementioned parade of the different brigades, including the “Hungarian Legion”, before Garibaldi in Caserta), or – last but not least – the ascendancy that the noble world and costumes still exerted at least on some bourgeois officers. Despite the many professionalizing tendencies especially in the officer-corps as described in a previous chapter, even if one were to want to, it was not easy to disentangle the nobility and the officer corps, which were so historically intertwined especially in terms of the traditions of social intercourse. Moreover, it seems to me that much remains to be written on the interrelated topic of a “military history from below” of the *garibaldini*. In other words, much of the historiography on the *garibaldini*

carried out to date is particularly valid for the history of Garibaldian officers, while the experiences of the many common soldiers, whether foreign or Italian, have not yet been studied in as much depth.¹³⁴⁵

With regard to the discourse of comradeship in the nineteenth century, it has been shown here how regulations, officer-soldier relations, and the discursive embossments of military practices were in fact intertwined. Without a doubt, the soldiers developed forms of small-group identity, which however in varying degrees were informed by general as well as more circumscribed military media, such as the regulations governing soldier-soldier and soldier-officer-relationships or the particular military forms of individual and military unit communication with each other. At times small-group identity could lead to acts of brutality, an example of which was the revenge taken out on the civil population as recounted by the Bourbon soldier Maier. At the discursive level, group-identity or fidelity toward a group was also influenced by specific ideas surrounding the concept of the "brotherhood of arms" among which duties to exact or inflict vengeance. Here, in this context as elsewhere, it is important to bear in mind the qualifying additions to words such as "brotherhood" or "solidarity": This makes an obvious difference when speaking of concepts such as "brotherhood" and "solidarity" or "solidarity between nations" and "brotherhood of arms", which on the surface are apparently positive concepts. Among these would also be the military duties that specifically go beyond the single isolated act of cooperation and take the form of repayment of bloodshed for one's own cause wherein one's own blood is sacrificed to the causes of the other. Despite the specificities and functionalities of the discourse of comradeship, however, this last has always contained a certain degree of subversive potential, for example, when it was used by the soldiers to unite against officers or more generally the military establishment. While this chapter seems to indicate that there is much in common between the foreigners' and indigenous soldiers' practices in the various Italian armed groups, the next chapter aims to look more carefully at the peculiarities as well as consequences of the presence of foreign, and among them German, soldiers and officers. It will examine the ways in which the institutional structures discussed here overlapped and were interrelated, but also superseded by national grouping especially, and how this informed transnational comparisons, clashes as well as transfers that occurred within the *single* Italian armed groups.

¹³⁴⁵ It may well be that the world of many Garibaldian soldiers in fact exhibited some traits that were characteristic of the "inmates" of the "total institutions" described by Goffman. One of Goffman's aims is to underline the difference between the worlds of the "inmates" from that of the keepers/staff; it is of note that among his examples of "total institutions" Goffman does not count the military or army as a whole, but – in this military sphere – only the "army barracks". See: Goffman, *Asylums*, pp. 7 and 5.

8 Contemporary comparisons, circulation and transfers

8.1 Military masculinities, corps-to-corps and individual physical interactions

Both the military and masculinity can be partially understood from a performative and/or theatrical perspective: Military rituals and ceremonies such as parades, marching, or military salutations consist very much in the planned exhibition of an army and of its more or less distinguishable component parts, the corps. The history of the military and masculinities can hence profit from those strands of scientific discussion that centre on performativity and/or “theatricality”.

Mere linguistic practices are often important in establishing meaning at the level of (structures of) words. But at least some of them also function in a “performative” manner, namely, because there are “cases [...] in which to *say* something is to *do* something; or in which *by* saying or *in* saying we are doing something.” These are referred to as, in the words of John L. Austin, “performatives or performatives. These have on the face of them the look – or at least the grammatical make-up – of ‘statements’; but nevertheless they are seen, when more closely inspected, to be, quite plainly, *not* utterances which could be ‘true’ or ‘false’.”¹³⁴⁶ A classical example of such is the declaration of the marriage registrar, “I now pronounce you man and wife”: this statement is not just a simple declaration of the facts, but it actually brings into being the couple’s officially married status. Such linguistic practices are even more complex: They behave as “interpellations” – a concept developed by the philosopher Louis Althusser, which profoundly informed the work of Michel Foucault (who was one of his students) and Judith Butler respectively.¹³⁴⁷ Interpellations must necessarily fulfil what they state: e.g. upon the pronouncement “husband and wife”, the two must behave as such. Or, a little new-born girl ought to be as such once the words “It’s a girl” have been uttered upon her birth.

The military is not just a world based on linguistic structures and commands, it is also a world comprised of physical individuals.¹³⁴⁸ Erving Goffman’s sociological work is

¹³⁴⁶ John L. Austin, *How to do things with words*, 2 ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975), p. 12, italics in the original.

¹³⁴⁷ Judith Butler, *The psychic life of power. Theories in subjection* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1997), on Althusser, see especially pp. 95-96 and 106-131.

¹³⁴⁸ In our case, we are dealing nearly exclusively with men as soldiers, despite the fact that instances in which women dressed as men, especially on the Garibaldian side, have been confirmed. I, however, did not come

dedicated especially to the interaction between corporally co-present individuals and groups, and delves into the rules and concrete effects the individuals' actions have upon one another. Goffman's work, due to the emphasis he places on physical presence as well as the use of metaphors from the world of the theatre to describe social interaction, is particularly interesting with regard to those later strands of discussion that go beyond the performativity of acts of speech at the linguistic level alone and instead (or as well) go on to emphasize the ways in which cultural performances can be understood in terms of the theatre proper. This type of "theatrical" inflection of the "performative turn" can be found in concepts of "theatricality" that underline the role of corporal performances in society, i.e. staging practices precisely for the perception of others.¹³⁴⁹ The role of the body; the actual physical presence in social situations; and the differentiation, the interaction of corporally present actors, and audiences as well as the changes that arise from the repetition of a performance are all aspects that belong to the more circumscribed area of theatre studies, but also to the study of society at large insofar as they can be productively transferred and applied to this sphere. Some of these aspects figure prominently in gender studies: "The acts through which gender is constituted show similarities with those performative acts that can be found in theatrical contexts."¹³⁵⁰ The invocation "Be a girl!" is therefore (also, or even "only") "a request to perform, a self-staging, in which the girl must 'cite' the norm", and so to be a "subject".¹³⁵¹ In fact, the perlocutionary aspect of this gender invocation consists in the directive to literally accomplish, according to Judith Butler, the embodiment or performance of gender norms.¹³⁵² It is therefore not astonishing that many authors find similarities between Butler and

across any German women as soldiers in the Italian armed groups in this period. Of note, however, is Marie Esperance von Schwartz and her nursing activities ; despite the fact that she was the daughter and wife (second marriage) of a banker from Hamburg, she would not fall within our definition of "German", insofar as she was born in the UK and had lived the greater part of her life outside Germany. A partially different issue is the presence of women who had for instance accompanied their husbands or lovers; even here I could find no German cases. Furthermore, on the basis of both regulations and German reports, it seems to me that, in spite of the aforementioned female presences, a kind of male Arcanum dominated, both in the regular armies and in the Garibaldian undertakings. There is an ongoing debate on both mentioned points. On the issue of women dressing as men and participating on the Garibaldian side, underlining however the important point that not every act of cross-dressing is necessarily subversive and equivalent to a non-hegemonic gender conception, see Guidi, "Patriottismo femminile e travestimenti," pp. 571-87. On the same aspect and that of women following their husbands and lovers into the Garibaldian context, see Riall, "Men at war. Masculinity and military ideals in the Risorgimento," pp. 160-164. On the crucial role of women in the Risorgimento in general as well see p. 88.

¹³⁴⁹ See, e.g., Fischer-Lichte, *Performativität*.

¹³⁵⁰ Uwe Wirth, "Der Performanzbegriff im Spannungsfeld zwischen Illokution, Iteration und Indexikalität," in idem, ed., *Performanz. Zwischen Sprachphilosophie und Kulturwissenschaften* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2002), p. 40.

¹³⁵¹ Ibid., pp. 41-42.

¹³⁵² Judith Butler, *Bodies that matter. On the discursive limits of 'sex'* (New York; London: Routledge, 1993), p. 231.

Goffman's later work, in particular, insofar as the scholars both underline that (gender) identity is a "doing" rather than a "being".¹³⁵³

Masculinities¹³⁵⁴, which are of paramount importance especially in the military, can be seen not only as "gender-as-performativity" in the Butlerian sense, but "as sets of socially specific performances"¹³⁵⁵ in a dramaturgical sense: "The masculine self can be understood as reflexively constructed within performances; that is, performances can construct masculinity rather than merely reflect its pre-existence [...] Researchers can investigate how masculinities are done and how these performances are received within social interaction [...]."¹³⁵⁶

The utility of the theatre metaphor is not limited to the issue of gender;; not without reason, it is often used within the context of the military and war as well; it is, for example, embodied in such expressions as the "theatre of war"¹³⁵⁷, even if this can at first seem euphemistic in regard to the violence, deprivation and harshness that war normally represented for soldiers. However, be it in times of war or peace, the military is already very much a "theatrical" institution due simply to the role that military rituals and ceremonies of display play in the daily life of the soldiers.

But "theatricality" as has been theorized by some exponents of "performativity" is also important for the place that literal embodiments take in the everyday life of the soldiers. The imperatives of dress, drill and discipline are nearly always (or at least also) directed at the soldiers' bodies. The body of the soldier and the military corps are, finally, interconnected by way of social interaction. At the individual level, close physical interaction is involved for instance in much of the concrete war making activities, or the corporal closeness of everyday life, from housing to eating. At the same time, the military is characterized by the specific interactions between military units. Armed groups are formed of different military corps, which in turn are characterized by specific forms of interaction. In this analysis, the

¹³⁵³ For the similarities and differences between Goffman and Butler see, e.g., Chris Brickell, "Masculinity, performativity, and subversion," *Men and Masculinities* 8, no. 1 (2005): pp. 24-43. In contrast to the essentialist reading of (early) Goffman by Butler, see instead Greg Smith, "Reconsidering gender advertisements. Performativity, framing and display," in Michael Hviid Jacobsen, ed., *The contemporary Goffman* (Milton Park; New York: Routledge, 2010), especially pp. 170-173.

¹³⁵⁴ The two gender conceptions are of course relationally intertwined, and "femininities" are also "gender-as-performativity" and a quest for feminine performances.

¹³⁵⁵ Brickell, "Masculinity," pp. 25 and 29.

¹³⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 32.

¹³⁵⁷ See the definition of the war arena as a "whole, complete in itself" ("ein kleines Ganzes") by Clausewitz, book 5, chapter 2. For the early-modern metaphor of the "theatrum belli" see, e.g., Marian Füssel, "Theatrum Belli. Der Krieg als Inszenierung und Wissensschauplatz im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert," *Metaphorik.de* 7, no. 14 (2008): pp. 205-30. A study that takes the metaphor, so to speak, even more seriously, to research the theatricality of war as well as the presence of soldiers in theatres and the soldiers performing acts of theatre for themselves, is Gillian Russell, *The theatres of war. Performance, politics and society, 1793-1815* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).

interaction between the various national groups present in the single armies must be considered as well.

This chapter demonstrates that the German soldiers and officers were placed in different institutional contexts in the various armies. To this must be added the complexity of the foreigners' various group memberships and loyalties, from their relationship with the respective Italian sovereign or commander, with their – at times primarily foreign, at times Italian – regimental “comrades” and their national but also regional and other biographical allegiances. The chapter is based on a rich variety of sources, which include the German soldiers' reports, pamphlets, and songs.

One objective of the chapter is to elucidate the ways in which these different loyalties informed, cut across or superseded the formal institutional structures of the armies. Another is to examine how visible these different allegiances were made to other militaries and/or civilians, and how much they were institutionally sustained in the various armed groups. Lastly, the chapter aims to identify what main issues were involved in the transnational comparisons and what clashes and transfers occurred within the *single* Italian armed groups.

8.2 Foreign soldiers and their different institutional placements

As we have seen in the chapter on mobilization, the projects to create nationally homogeneous military corps for the various Italian sides were very widespread. These attempts conformed to the particular way in which solidarity was often conceived in the nineteenth century eventually by all political sides: i.e., as solidarity between nations or by nations. There were two underlying motives to the plans to create “national legions” on the part of foreign nations: the exaltation of solidarity with the respective Italian parties, and frequently the idea that such groups would serve a functional purpose for their own nation.; the Italian experience was, in fact, considered as the area within which to prepare for the future struggles and wars in their own nation.

But the reality of the actual situation was far more complex than these grandiose plans admitted. In fact, foreign soldiers were not confined to just foreign regiments during their participation in the Italian conflict and often were found in different institutional settings in the Italian armed groups. Though not many, some joined corps in which the majority of soldiers were subjects of the respective Italian states, therefore of units that in the contemporary regulations, in the case of the Bourbon and Papal Armies, often figured as “indigenous” military groups. At the same time, many were part of dedicated foreigners' corps – such as the “Foreign Carabineers” of the Papal Army, the “foreign regiments” of the

Bourbon Army, and the Garibaldian “foreign company” in 1860. As opposed to other nationalities, such as the Irish in the papal case or the Polish, British or Hungarians in the Roman Republic in 1849 and the various Garibaldian undertakings in the 1860s¹³⁵⁸, the Germans never came to have an official “German Legion” in one or another of the Italian armed groups.

8.2.1 Foreign soldiers and officers in “indigenous” corps, general staffs, and the ministry and administration

The initial division into national battalions (including a German one) failed to materialize during the invasion of Savoy in 1834, when many exiles were blocked from reaching Savoy; consequently, the national and mixed corps were combined: “Two Polish, two Italian and two mixed divisions, , comprised of Savoyards, Germans, Swiss and Frenchmen, were created.”¹³⁵⁹

In subsequent armies, single Germans continued to be part of indigenous regiments, but only in limited number. The possession of specifically requested professional expertise could lead to the transferal of the individual from the foreigners’ corps into for instance the ambulance, artillery or engineer corps.¹³⁶⁰

Like the common soldiers, foreign officers were found in different institutional contexts. Most carried out their service in the aforementioned constellations of the foreigners’ corps, such as the German officers in the Papal Zouaves or Carabineers, or as Garibaldian officers for the “foreign company” in 1860. Some, however, held officer posts in the so-called indigenous corps, and yet several others were part of general staffs, or placed in the military administration or ministries, working alongside primarily Italian and foreign officers of different nationality.

Gustav von Hoffstetter, as part of Lucio Manara’s “Lombard Sharpshooters” and eventually captain in Garibaldi’s general staff in 1849, or Ernst Haug, as colonel in the general staff and commander of the second division of the regular Army of the Roman

¹³⁵⁸ See on this chapter 4.2.4.

¹³⁵⁹ Prechner, “Savoyezzug,” pp. 490 and 492.

¹³⁶⁰ The precise number of soldiers serving in “indigenous” corps has yet to be determined, however. It was not possible to analyse all of the armies’ soldiers’ registers for this study. Nevertheless, based on a cursory look at the registers of the papal artillery, where Germans could be found only sporadically, the relatively small number of people that transferred to other corps from the foreigners’ corps (see footnote no. 927), the reports of the German soldiers themselves, the rare reporting on Germans in “indigenous” corps, and last but not least the official denomination of these corps as “indigenous” on the part of the military administration and official regulations, it seems more than fair to conclude that in fact these corps for the most part consisted of Italian soldiers and especially subjects of the respective states.

Republic in 1849, were positioned in an institutional sphere dominated by Italians and other foreigners of nationalities different from German. The same may be said of Hermann Kanzler's experience in the Papal Army after having left the foreign corps in 1848. Once he became Minister of War in 1865, Kanzler was surrounded by other foreign officers as well as pontifical citizens. In 1867, for instance, his aide-de-camp was from Bologna (Giacomo Ungarelli), his three batmen were from Savoy (Francesco de Maistre), from the French Auvergne (Gaspardo de Bourbon) and from Bavaria (Ludovico Filchner) respectively. The members of the Council of the Ministry were predominantly Italian (with only one Swiss presence, Wilhelm Kalbermatten), while the general staff was half Italian, half French and Savoyard.¹³⁶¹ Like Hoffstetter or Haug, Kanzler definitely had more occasions already within the military institutional setting to come into contact with Italians and other foreigners. Even more than Friedrich Wilhelm Rüstow¹³⁶², Kanzler reached a position where he could have a decisive influence on the organization of the army.

8.2.2 Foreigners in foreigners' corps and National Legions

Quantitatively, it is of note that most foreigners, and especially those of the rank and file, were integrated into special foreigners' corps be they in the Papal or Bourbon Armies or in Garibaldi's armed groups. These groups differed in terms of the "homogeneity" of the origin of their members. Some were more mixed in terms of nationality, such as the Papal Zouaves. Others were more "homogenous" using language as the common denominator, such as the Papal Carabineers, the foreigners' units of the Bourbon Army since 1859, and the part of this last that went on to form Garibaldi's "foreign company" in 1860. Some corps were strongly characterized by one nationality that was reflected in the official denomination of the corps, among which were Garibaldi's British and Hungarian Legions. In all these different cases, however, the foreigners were, at least at the formal level, more or less separated from their Italian "comrades".


These foreigners' corps were generally identified as such in the Italian armies of the nineteenth century through the official name of the corps, which communicated this foreign composition, e.g., the "Foreign Carabineers" in the Papal Army or the "Foreign Jägers" in the

¹³⁶¹ See, e.g., *Annuario militare pontificio. Anno 1867*, pp. 9-10, 28-29, 30-31.

¹³⁶² When he was a colonel, Rüstow commanded, in several battles, up to three brigades, and therefore approximately 2,400 men; as chief of the general staff of the 15th Garibaldian division, he commanded together with the Hungarian István Türr a total of about 5,200 men. See for these numbers, e.g., Herwegh, *Guillaume Rüstow*, p. 47 (2,400) or Di Fiore, *I vinti del Risorgimento*, footnote no. 57, p. 288 (5,200).

Bourbon Army. Sometimes these names were also included on the company's flag, for instance like that in Image 8.1 below.

Image 8.1. Maneuver flag of one of the Bourbon foreigners' regiments, 1859-1860.



Source: Boeri, Crociani, Fiorentino, *L'esercito borbonico II*, p. 473.

Uniforms and parts of uniforms (shoulder plates, headpieces, military cap badges, etc.) were sometimes so specific, that it was evident that one was dealing with a member of a special corps, regardless of the rank of the soldier. The most emblematic is of course the uniform of the Papal Zouaves, with its baggy trousers and prominent ornamental details, the style of which stems from its origin as a corps in colonial France.¹³⁶³

¹³⁶³ See, e.g., Coulombe, *Pope's legion*, p. 24.

Image 8.2. Uniforms of papal Zouaves



Non-commissioned officer (left) and captain (right). Vatican Historical Museum (Lateran), Photograph: FNG, Rome 2010.

Image 8.3 Uniforms of the officers in the papal corps of the Foreign Carabineers and the Papal Zouaves



Unter-Lieutenant. Ober-Lieutenant. Hauptmann. Unter-Lieutenant
(Interimsuniform). (Parade).
Fremden-Karabiniers. der
Zouaven.

1860—70.

Die Uniformen der Fremden-Karabiniers (Carabinieri uesteri) sind nach Originalmonturstücken im Besitze des Herrn Hauptmann Stsmaier in Polenzwerder bei Eberswalde, eines ehemaligen Offiziers dieser Truppe, gezeichnet. Wir beschreiben hier die einzelnen Theile der Uniform, soweit die Einzelheiten aus dem Bilde selbst nicht genügend klar hervorgehen. 1. Das Käppi. Auf dem Sammetrande ist ein silbernes Jagdhorn angebracht, darüber die weisgelbe päpstliche Kokarde. Zur Parade ein kurzer Busch von herabhängenden Hahnenfedern. Für gewöhnlich statt dessen ein einfaches kugelförmiges grünes Pompon. Der Deckel ist von schwarzem lackierten Leder. 2. Die Feldmütze. Sie zeigt ebenfalls auf dem Sammetrande das Jagdhorn. Die Zahl der Silberschnüre, welche die Verzierungen bilden, zeigt den Rang an. Auf Märschen etc. weissleinerer Nackenschutz. Er wird um die Mütze gelegt und vorn über dem Schirm festgeknüpft. 3. Der Waffenrock (tonique). Auf dem gelben Kragen silbernes Jagdhorn. Die Aufschläge sind durch schmale gelbe Vorstösse markiert. Silberne Epaulettes. Dieselben geben den Rang an (genau nach Französ. Norm). 4. Der Interimsrock. Schnitt wie der des Waffenrockes. Da keine Epaulettes ad interim getragen werden, so zeigt die Zahl der Schnüre, welche an den Ärmeln Verschlingungen bilden, den militärischen Rang an. 5. Die Schärpe. Gelb, zweimal weiss durchgezogen. Sie wird zur Parade in der sonst gebräuchlichen Weise umgelegt, auf Märschen dagegen en bandolière getragen. 6. Säbel mit gelbmetallenen Gefäss in Stahlscheide an weisser dreimal schwarz durchzogener Koppel. Portepée, bestehend aus einer goldenen Quaste an schwarzer Rundschnur. 7. Beinkleider wie die Französischen Fussjäger. Die graue Uniform der Zouaven hatte für die Offiziere schwarzen, für die Mannschaften rothen Besatz.

Source: Richard Knötel, *Uniformenkunde* (Rathenow: Babenzien, 1890), vol. 3, p. 48.

But foreign soldiers were also visible in varying degrees on the opposite political side. According to Vigeveno, the soldiers of Garibaldi's "foreign company" of 1860 continued to serve in their Bourbon uniforms.¹³⁶⁴ However, whether these last were foreign or not could not be readily determined by observing the soldiers' uniforms alone. For a civilian to understand that these soldiers in particular were foreign, however, they would have had to have had additional information or specific knowledge of the fighting forces before them.¹³⁶⁵

8.3 *Overlapping and conflicting loyalties*

It is important to bear in mind the various ways foreign soldiers and officers are placed in the army corps insofar as they – as I will try to show – affected the complicated issue of "loyalties" of the foreign soldiers. A soldier's institutional placement was only one element that informed their life. In fact, foreign soldiers were contemporaneously part of different groups: namely Italian armed groups of a given political orientation or another, their respective military corps, and their respective national group. It is also possible that regional and other communalities between soldiers may have been important. Several questions spring from this observation: what is the relative weight these different memberships had on the foreign soldiers' experiences; and how did these memberships overlap or enter into conflict with one another.

¹³⁶⁴ Vigeveno, *Compagnia estera garibaldina*, pp. 3, 4, and 6.

¹³⁶⁵ The question of uniforms and their design opens a rich field of possible further investigation, especially from a cultural historical perspective: On the one hand, the uniform is interesting from a gender perspective, from the interplay between clothing and posture (think of the neck-stock) to the question as to what type of image of the man should be displayed. To this one can add the supposedly high aesthetic and sexual attractiveness that men wearing uniforms exert(ed) over at least some parts of society and in some periods of history, while for other parts of society and in other times uniforms could be seen in a negative light insofar as they became symbols of particularly hierarchical organizations. On these civilian aspects of uniforms, and for instance on the uniformity of brand-name clothing or the use of typically military elements for uniforms today, see Gabriele Mentges and Birgit Richard, *Schönheit der Uniform. Körper, Kleidung, Medien* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2005). These questions should not be left only to the more circumscribed enthusiasts and collectors, but their work ought to be used to contribute to the history of the "development of the uniform and the relationships between soldiers' and civil fashionable clothing" according to Nowosadtko, *Krieg, Gewalt und Ordnung*, p. 178. One example of such a study is Sabina Brändli, "Von 'schneidigen Offizieren' und 'Militärcrenolinen'. Aspekte symbolischer Männlichkeit am Beispiel preußischer und schweizer Uniformen im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert," in Ute Frevert, ed., *Militär und Gesellschaft im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1997), pp. 201-28; for the role of the uniform within the context of military display as well, see Myerly, *British military spectacle*, passim. Intertwined with the former question is to more general question regarding the function of the uniform as a highly intense "text" in terms of the quantity of information encapsulated within the uniform itself and consequently the highly communicative function the uniform held when soldiers independently changed parts or added other pieces to their uniform. For the uniform as a "text", see e.g., Lorenzo Greco, "Semiotica della divisa," in idem, *Homo militaris. Antropologia e semiotica della vita militare* (Leghorn: Belforte, 2009), pp. 165-77.

8.3.1 Italian allegiances

The German and foreign soldiers in the Papal and Bourbon¹³⁶⁶ Armies were bound to the Pope and the king respectively, by the oath they had to swear upon entering into service. In the Papal Army, the text of the oath was not only printed in the laws on recruitment for the foreigners' corps¹³⁶⁷, but in the individual soldiers' service book as well.¹³⁶⁸ The simple soldier in the Papal Army, for instance, had to swear to be forever "loyal and obedient" to "my sovereign the Roman Pontiff", not to be part of "any secret society", to "obey to all my legitimate superiors [...]" and to execute all of their orders in everything that concerns the observance of religion and the loyal service for the Holy See", and finally to observe the regulations regarding capitulation, military regulations and more generally all the laws of the Papal States.¹³⁶⁹ Therefore, the oath not only demanded loyalty to the Pope as a sovereign but in a much wider sense it also demanded certain moral and political qualities, among which the respect for religion.

The oaths were still the expression of an (imagined) personal relationship between an individual and a sovereign (even "foreign"). The papal soldier swore his oath to "my sovereign", the Pope. This type of personal relationship of loyalty was also evident in the writings of the Bourbon soldier Maier, who recounted that his corps of foreign Bourbon soldiers marched "with a happy 'Hurrah' to *our* king".¹³⁷⁰ The democrat Hoffstetter speaks without hesitation of the Triumvirate of the Roman Republic as "*our* government".¹³⁷¹ Similarly, anthems of the Italian "party" of affiliation were sung by the foreign soldiers as well, be it in Italian or translated.

This connection to the sovereign – or the supreme commander – was of course especially important for officers: Not only were their "careers" in the end officially dictated by these last – to a far greater extent than the careers of the common soldiers and non-

¹³⁶⁶ The foreign soldiers had to swear the same oath as the "indigenous" soldiers in the Bourbon Army, see *Regolamento per la reclutazione del 13° battaglione cacciatori e de' due battaglioni carabinieri leggieri sovranamente approvato il dì 10 novembre 1859 in Portici*, art. 9, p. 4.

¹³⁶⁷ *Legge emanata dalla Segreteria di Stato li 7 gennaio 1852*, pp. 57-58.

¹³⁶⁸ See the service books contained in the ASR, Ministero delle armi, busta 2180 ("corpi diversi – arruolamenti e carte personali – esteri), p. 2.

¹³⁶⁹ "[..E]ssere fedele ed obbediente al mio Sovrano il Romano Pontefice"; "ad alcuna società segreta"; "di obbedire a tutti i miei leggitimi superiori [...]" e di eseguire ogni loro ordine in tutto ciò che concerne la osservanza della Religione, ed il fedele servizio della Santa Sede." *Legge emanata dalla Segreteria di Stato li 7 gennaio 1852*, p. 57.

¹³⁷⁰ "Mit einem freudigen 'Hurrah' auf *unsern* König" Maier, *Der Kampf zwischen der deutschen Fremden-Legion und den Garibaldianern*, p. 6, the italics are mine.

¹³⁷¹ "[..U]nsere Regierung" Hoffstetter, *Tagebuch*, p. 54, the italics are mine.

commissioned officers and those of their Italian colleagues – they, as “military notables”, had easier access to the court. The German officer in the Zouaves, Franz von Schmising-Kerssenbrock, enthusiastically told of his private audience with the Pope to his father in Westphalia, remarking upon the Pope’s ease of manner and kindness.¹³⁷² When Franz Xaver died in 1911, the Pope allowed a telegram to be sent in Latin to Korff’s family, expressing his personal grief and imparting the apostolic benediction.¹³⁷³ As in earlier times, to be near to the monarch (or, *mutatis mutandis*, to Mazzini or Garibaldi¹³⁷⁴) or even to have personally met him was a privilege that “took a prominent place in the testimonies of officers”.¹³⁷⁵

8.3.2 *National allegiances*

8.3.2.1 *National groups in the Italian armies*

The origin of the national corps was often made visible through the use of typically national symbols. The Germans that were to be part of the invasion of Savoy appeared before Mazzini’s house in Geneva wearing a black-red-golden cockade on their hats.¹³⁷⁶ According to Marcella Pellegrino Sutcliffe, with regard to Garibaldi’s “British Legion” in 1860, “the national identity [...] was potentially underlined by the British Legion’s flag, especially designed [...] for their expedition.”¹³⁷⁷

Sometimes the composition of these specifically national corps was more variegated than the national symbols would indicate. Rüstow, in his report on the war in southern Italy in 1860, ventured the guess that the “Hungarian Legion” in reality consisted of soldiers of different nationalities.¹³⁷⁸ In fact, when the “Hungarian Legion” was reviewed in January 1861 with the intent to integrate the remnant soldiers of the corps into the Italian Army, it was revealed that many “German” Austrians were part of the Legion.¹³⁷⁹

Despite the fact that in many cases different foreign nationalities were integrated into one single military corps, i.e. the “multi-national” corps, the concept of grouping the soldiers

¹³⁷² Franz Xaver von Korff gen. Schmising-Kerssenbrock to his father, 10 January 1868, in: VWA, Personal estates of Clemens August von Korff gen. Schmising-Kerssenbrock, VWA, Bri.N.XII-35.

¹³⁷³ VWA, Personal estates Franz Xaver von Korff gen. Schmising-Kerssenbrock, Bri.N.XVI-3.

¹³⁷⁴ See, for instance, the dedication to Mazzini (signed “your trustful Ernst Haug”) in the Report of the Prussian Ernst Haug, a colonel in the “regular” part of the Army of the Roman Republic in 1849, and especially his narration of encounters with the “triumvir”. Haug, *Des Republikaners Schwertfahrt*, dedication pp. viii-xxii, the description of meeting Mazzini is on pp. 229 (“I was standing alone in front of the greatest conspirator, writer and philosopher of Italy – in front of Mazzini”).

¹³⁷⁵ Winkel, *Im Netz des Königs*, p. 125.

¹³⁷⁶ Haug, *Des Republikaners Schwertfahrt*, p. 250.

¹³⁷⁷ Pellegrino Sutcliffe, “British Red Shirts,” p. 205.

¹³⁷⁸ Rüstow, *Erinnerungen aus dem italienischen Feldzuge von 1860*, 1, p. 51-52.

¹³⁷⁹ See Vigevano, *Legione ungherese*, pp. 102-104.

according to nationality nevertheless took centre stage in many reports of the German and other foreign soldiers. So, for instance, with regard to the foreigners' corps of the Army of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies that were recreated in 1859 – wherein primarily German, Austrian and Swiss soldiers were grouped *together* – the German soldier Maier when he spoke of the Bourbon corps he exaggerated the national homogeneity of the group by speaking of a “German foreign legion” (see the title of his report).¹³⁸⁰ Even if he acknowledged the presence of Swiss soldiers, he did so by pointing out their differences from the Germans. According to him, the Swiss possessed “neither military knowledge nor military education”; they, “due to their boastfulness, were not very liked, because one could sufficiently verify for oneself their cowardice on the battlefield of Naples”; captives “could and should not hope for a human treatment by Swiss soldiers.”¹³⁸¹

In an equally exaggerated manner, the German papal soldier Eickholt spoke of the “Foreign Carabineers” as “Deutsche Jäger”¹³⁸². His compatriot Georg von Vollmar, who was obliged to enter the Foreign Carabineers in 1867 instead of the much desired Papal Zouaves, (based on the numbers, also erroneously) asserted that the former was actually a “Swiss battalion”¹³⁸³: “Because one hears talk in Germany always and only about the Zouaves”, Vollmar writes in his recount on the two years he was member of the Papal Army, “to some readers it may be of interest that the Germans serve in this regiment.”¹³⁸⁴ Nevertheless, in his opinion, despite “the fact that the majority of it is comprised of Germans, it is however not a German, but a Swiss regiment”, because the “officer corps is composed mainly of the Swiss”¹³⁸⁵.

As discussed above, when reporting on the goings-on in the Papal Army, many publications divided multinational battalions into their separate national components and

¹³⁸⁰ Maier, *Der Kampf zwischen der deutschen Fremden-Legion und den Garibaldianern im Königreich beider Sicilien vom 6. April bis 28. October 1860*.

¹³⁸¹ „[..W]eder militärische Kenntnisse noch militärische Ausbildung besaßen.“, „[...] welche aber durch ihre Prahlucht nicht sonderlich beliebt waren, da man sich von ihrer Feigheit auf dem Kampfplatze von Neapel genügend überzeugt hatte.“ [...] von den Schweizern konnten und durften sie nicht menschliche Behandlung erwarten.“ Ibid., pp. 3-4 and 30.

¹³⁸² Eickholt, *Roms letzte Tage unter der Tiara. Erinnerungen eines römischen Kanoniers aus den Jahren 1868 bis 1870*, p. 81.

¹³⁸³ “Schweizer-Bataillone”. Herwart, *Zwei Jahre Schlüsselsoldat*, p. 14.

¹³⁸⁴ “Da man in Deutschland immer nur von den Zuaven reden hört, so dürfte es für manchen Leser Interesse haben zu erfahren, daß in diesem Regimente die Deutschen dienen.” Ibid., p. 94.

¹³⁸⁵ “Obwohl die Mehrzahl dieser Deutsche sind, so ist es doch kein deutsches, sondern ein Schweizerregiment. Das Offizierkorps besteht größtentheils aus Schweizern [...]” Ibid., pp. 96-97. It is important to note that Vollmar hopes to rapidly advance in his career in the Papal Army, as he notes from a talk with a lieutenant in the recruitment office of St. Louis that he had “the officers’ epaulets nearly already” on his shoulders. (“daß ich die Offiziersepauletten schon so viel wie auf den Achseln hätte.”) Ibid., p. 6.

spoke of each component separately; an example of which would be how they spoke of the “Dutch Zouaves” in the Papal Army rather than just the Zouaves in its entirety.¹³⁸⁶

National grouping within the corps was also reinforced by the fact that some specific institutions were foreseen for the single nationalities. In the Papal Army, for instance, a series of foreign military chaplains were taken on to care for the needs of the soldiers of the various participant nationalities; one such individual was the Rhenish chaplain Anton de Waal. Since 1868, he was the chaplain of the German national church, Santa Maria dell’Anima as well. In 1871, he even published a theatre piece about the Papal Army.¹³⁸⁷


In Rome, some nationalities had their own military circles. Therefore, not only was there a general officers' club for all of the officers in the army – which was located after 1868 in the Palazzo Wedekind in Piazza Colonna, in the rooms of the former casino of the French soldiers of the Papal Army, but there were also national casinos open to both officers and soldiers. There was a French, Dutch, and Belgian casino, and from 1868 to 1870 a German military casino operated in the convent of San Francesco di Paolo on the Esquiline Hill. The club boasted three levels and contained a “German” restaurant, rooms for gambling, billiards, music, reading and writing, and a library with German literature. According to a list that Korff wrote, military works, from Clausewitz to Decker and Willisen¹³⁸⁸, were contained therein as well.

¹³⁸⁶ N., “Die holländischen Zuaven im päpstlichen Heere,” pp. 670-90.

¹³⁸⁷ Anton de Waal, *Die Streiter des heil. Vaters. Episode aus der jüngsten Geschichte der Eroberung Roms*, 20. September 1870. *Schauspiel in drei Aufzügen* (Regensburg; New York; Cincinnati: Friedrich Pustet, 1871).

¹³⁸⁸ That “scientific” military works transcended political boundaries and loyalties is attested by the fact that the works of Karl Wilhelm von Willisen on the Italian wars of 1848 and 1849, written from the Austrian point of view, were – according to Korff’s list – in the library of the Papal German club, just as they were highly acclaimed by Ernst Haug on the opposite political side of the conflict. On Willisen as the “brilliant thinker of the theory of the great [i.e. ‘regular’] war” see Haug, *Des Republikaners Schwertfahrt*, p. 86.

Image 8.4 – Korff's list of the military works in the library of the German military Casino, Rome ca. 1869



(Source: Vereinigte Westfälische Adelsarchive (VWA) Münster, Nachlaß Franz Xaver von Korff gen. Schmising-Kerssenbrock (1838-1910), Bri. N. XVI-3.)

Georg von Vollmar complained, however, that the non-military section of the library contained only “legends of saints and novels on the holy Genovesa.”¹³⁸⁹ Aside from books, several German and foreign newspapers were made available by the soldiers’ club as well.

The casino was financed by donations from the German Archbrotherhoods of Saint Michael. In December 1868, the beer, wine and cigars were free at the inauguration of the club,¹³⁹⁰ but it seems this changed not long after. Vollmar, for example, complained that the

¹³⁸⁹ “Die Bibliothek [...] enthält natürlich nur Heiligenlegenden und Romane im Sinne der heil. Genovesa [sic].” Herwart, *Zwei Jahre Schlüsselsohdad*, p. 141.

¹³⁹⁰ "Politische Angelegenheiten. Italien. Rom," *Freisinger Tagblatt*, no. 1: p. 1.

“cigars, which were destined to be distributed for free in high quantity for the German soldiers” were in fact put on sale.¹³⁹¹

According to a German newspaper report, the German club had “3,000 members”, most of which served in “the courageous regiment of the Foreign Carabineers which consists nearly entirely of Germans”. The article naturally does not fail to underline that in the “mentioned regiment perhaps the most rigid discipline of all regiments in the world” was rigorously upheld.¹³⁹²

Even if one newspaper regretted that there was “no garden for gymnastic exercises and no bowling alley”¹³⁹³, another underlined that the casino disposed of “three long corridors that served for gymnastic exercises”.¹³⁹⁴

The casino was often visited by church and state dignitaries. Hermann Kanzler during a visit was “highly content with the whole institution”¹³⁹⁵. The bishop of Mainz, Wilhelm Emanuel von Ketteler, held a speech there in December 1869.¹³⁹⁶ In January 1870, to entertain the “German, Austrian and Swiss bishops present for the council”, the German military casino put on a theatrical performance.¹³⁹⁷ The soldiers thought it amusing “to dress the master Beelzebub with a red shirt” and to present him as Garibaldi.¹³⁹⁸ In the “intervals, the German soldiers’ choral club of the casino performed select four-part songs, the last of which was a medieval battle song sung by the Germans to Saint Michael; this song in particular was met by rapturous applause and had to be sung for a second time.”¹³⁹⁹

¹³⁹¹ “Cigarren, welche in großer Menge für die deutschen Soldaten zur unentgeltlichen Vertheilung bestimmt wurden, werden [...] verkauft.” Herwart, *Zwei Jahre Schlüsselsoldat*, p. 141.

¹³⁹² „[..D]as tapfere Regiment Carabinieri esteri beinahe zu ganz aus Deutschen besteht [...]“ „[...] genannten Regiment - in welchem wohl die strengste Disciplin von allen Regimentern in der Welt geübt wird“. “Das deutsche Militärcasino in Rom,” *Augsburger Postzeitung. Beilage*, no. 10 (1869): p. 40.

¹³⁹³ “[..W]äre nur noch ein Garten für gymnastische Uebungen, Kegelbahn u. s. f. zu wünschen.” N. N., “Das deutsche Militär-Casino in Rom [24. Januar 1869],” *Der Traunbote. Gemüthliche Volksschrift für den Bürger und den Landmann* 2, no. 4 (1869): p. 316.

¹³⁹⁴ “Politische Angelegenheiten. Italien. Rom,” p. 1.

¹³⁹⁵ „[..S]ehr zufrieden mit der gesamten Einrichtung [...]“ N. N., “Das deutsche Militär-Casino in Rom [24. Januar 1869],” p. 317.

¹³⁹⁶ *Neue Bamberger Zeitung*, 12/12/1869, p. 347.

¹³⁹⁷ Florian Rieß and Carl Weber, *Das Oekumenische Concil. Stimmen aus Maria-Laach. VI. Das Vaticanum im Lichte des katholischen Glaubens* (Freiburg: Herder'sche Verlagshandlung, 1870), p. 172.

¹³⁹⁸ “Der Soldatenwitz hat dem Meister Beelzebub ein Rothhemd und das wohlgetroffene Porträt Garibaldi's gegeben.” *Ibid.*, p. 173.

¹³⁹⁹ “In den Zwischenpausen trug der deutsche Soldaten-Gesangverein des Casino ausgewählte vierstimmige Lieder vor, unter welchen besonders das letzte, ein mittelalterliches Schlachtlied der Deutschen zum hl. Michael, stürmischen Beifall fand und zum zweiten Mal gesungen werden mußte.” *Ibid.*, p. 173.

8.3.2.2 “Show that you are men”: foreigners’ (national) war songs

Songs were an important part of the more strictly military life, as well. The author of *Olderic*, the Catholic Zouave novel discussed in Chapter 3, after having presented several sections of the song of the French Zouaves, incorporates this observation through the persona of a duke: “All martial poetry [...] is this way. Four weighty words combined with each other and sung to galloping rhythm; instil great heart and verve in the warriors when proceeding to battle [...]”¹⁴⁰⁰ The fictional duke was, I would suggest, both right and wrong. He was clearly right in his assertion described by Martin van Creveld as: A “very important factor in cohesion is music.”¹⁴⁰¹ For this reason, the songs in this paragraph are only single isolated cases extracted from a “sea of war songs”.¹⁴⁰²

In October 1860, following a stretch of bad weather, intense outpost service, fatiguing marches, and last but not least more frequent battles, Rüstow reported that the morale of his soldiers was flagging. Therefore, he wanted to do “something for the inner man, both materially and mentally”. He not only doubled the quantity of wine and coffee available to his soldiers, he promoted entertainment through song, observing: “Even if the Italian soldiers are very much less song-loving than the Germans, I did not doubt that they too could be encouraged a bit by singing, and be sustained despite the many sufferings that the bad weather was procuring them. I had the Garibaldi anthem printed in many hundreds of copies.”¹⁴⁰³

Below follows a comparison of this Garibaldi anthem¹⁴⁰⁴ with several songs of the other warring parties. While the Garibaldi anthem and a song sung by the (French) Zouaves¹⁴⁰⁵ are two prominent examples of the more circumscribed songs of the battalions (of Garibaldi’s alpine chasseurs and the papal corps of the Zouaves respectively), others have to be seen more generally as war songs (two Dutch¹⁴⁰⁶ and an English¹⁴⁰⁷ Zouave song). The

¹⁴⁰⁰ “Le poesie marziali [...] sono tutte così. Quattro paroloni cuciti insieme, e cantati sopra un tuono concitato al galoppo, e che infonde gran cuore, e grand’estro nei guerrieri nel procedere alle battaglie [...]” Bresciani, *Olderic*, p. 107.

¹⁴⁰¹ Martin van Creveld, *The culture of war* (New York: Ballantine Books, 2008), p. 116.

¹⁴⁰² On German soldiers’ songs, see the comprehensive handbook and collection by Uli Otto and Eginhard König, *‘Ich hatt’ einen Kameraden...’. Militär und Kriege in historisch-politischen Liedern in den Jahren von 1740 bis 1914* (s. l.: ConBrio Verlagsgesellschaft 1999). With regard to France see, e.g., Thierry Bouzard, *Histoire du chant militaire français, de la monarchie à nos jours* (Paris: Grancher, 2005).

¹⁴⁰³ “Obgleich nun die italienischen Soldaten viel weniger sanglustig sind als die Deutschen, war es mir doch nicht zweifelhaft, daß auch jene durch Gesang ein wenig angeregt und in den mancherlei Leiden, welche ihnen das schlechte Wetter bereitet, aufrecht erhalten werden würden.” Rüstow, *Erinnerungen aus dem italienischen Feldzuge von 1860*, 2, p. 710.

¹⁴⁰⁴ See the print of the text in Pivato, *Bella ciao*, pp. 19-20.

¹⁴⁰⁵ See the print of this song in Oscar Philippe Francois Joseph de Poli, *Souvenirs du bataillon des zouaves pontificaux (franco-belges)* (Paris: Imprimerie de H. Carion, 1861), pp. 67-68.

¹⁴⁰⁶ See the prints of the songs in N. N., *Pius IX en zijn roemrijk leger, of 's pausen tijdelijke macht en hare dappere verdedigers* (s'-Hertogenbosch: Henri Bogaerts, opvolger van P. N. Verhoeven, Drukker en Boekhandelaar van Z. H. Paus Pius IX., 1869), pp. 226-227.

songs differed also for the fact that, strangely enough, the Garibaldi anthem is not an anthem sung directly about or to Garibaldi, since he is not directly or indirectly mentioned in the text, whereas Pius IX figures prominently in some of the Zouave songs and in an “Anthem to the Papal Army of 1867” as well.¹⁴⁰⁸ Those, “whose hearts are glowing for Pius”, for the “great Pius” (Dutch Zouave Song)¹⁴⁰⁹, for “Father Pius” (both a Dutch Zouave Song and a Dutch Zouave War Song) fought for the Pope.¹⁴¹⁰

Songs and anthems aimed to mobilize the soldiers both before and during military deployment. They were set to a rhythm that rendered them “very useful in countering fatigue”¹⁴¹¹, a fact often expressed in the songs themselves, for instance in the *Marseillaise*, originally a war song of the Army of the Rhine. The form of incitement expressed in the *Marseillaise* can also be found in the songs pertinent to this context as well, such as in the refrain of the French song of the Papal Zouaves: “Forward! Let us march / Zouaves of the Pope, up to the front”.¹⁴¹² The “su” (“up”) in the Garibaldi anthem, corresponds to the “Vooruit maar!” (“Go ahead!”) found in the Dutch Zouaves’ War Song¹⁴¹³ and the “march, march, to the combat” in the song of the English Zouaves.¹⁴¹⁴ Incorporated into these songs, alongside this function to facilitate the mobilization of the soldiers, was a subtle mechanism intended to counterbalance the fear of combat and more specifically of dying in combat; this often took on the form of a secondary theme. The examples abound. One such is found at the end of the second stanza of the “Camp Song of the Dutch Zouaves”:

“We fear no menacing lead¹⁴¹⁵,
We shy not from steel,
We fly willingly into death
for the triumph of Pius.”¹⁴¹⁶

¹⁴⁰⁷ Printed in Powell, *Two years in the pontifical Zouaves*, p. vii.

¹⁴⁰⁸ Printed in Coulombe, *Pope's legion*, pp. 220-221.

¹⁴⁰⁹ “Wien t’Neêrlandsch hart voor PIUS gloiet”; “Den grooten PIUS trouw”. N. N., *Pius IX en zijn roemrijk leger*, p. 225.

¹⁴¹⁰ “Vader Pius”; *ibid.*, p. 226-227.

¹⁴¹¹ Creveld, *The culture of war*, p. 117.

¹⁴¹² “En avant ! Marchons ! / Zouaves du Pape, à l’avant-garde.” English translation in Coulombe, *Pope's Legion*, p. 224.

¹⁴¹³ “Vooruit maar!” N. N., *Pius IX en zijn roemrijk leger*, p. 227.

¹⁴¹⁴ Powell, *Two years in the pontifical Zouaves*, p. vii.

¹⁴¹⁵ Lead as in lead bullets.

¹⁴¹⁶ “Wij vreezen voor geen dreigend lood, / Wij schrikken voor geen staal, / Wij vliegen willig in den dood / Voor PIUS ‘zegepraal.” N. N., *Pius IX en zijn roemrijk leger*, p. 226.

The theme of taming the fear of dying lies at the heart of many of these stanzas. The song in French has a stanza that says: “And when comes / The moment to die, / Without fear and reproach, / The Zouaves [“All riflemen” in the French original] will see it coming.”¹⁴¹⁷ In the English song, this impetus is openly expressed in the last stanza: “March, march to the combat and fear not”, since “A light play our weapons will play”.¹⁴¹⁸ Combat itself is presented in the songs as an easy act; this is because the leaders will conduct the soldiers “to victory as they would a dance” (“a la victoire comme au bal”).¹⁴¹⁹ Although one element of the songs is to calm a soldier's fears, the songs actually determine the essence of courage by establishing the emotional requirement not to feel fear or to show it; this occurs by the negation of fear through the elements of manliness and religious faith and can be clearly seen in one stanza of the Dutch War Song:

“No, no, no Christian heart,
Fears once the snake head.
Go ahead!
No danger is under the cross;
Christ himself leads you into battle,
Show that you are men.”¹⁴²⁰

Another approach to fear is addressed in the songs, however; why should the soldiers not be afraid of the battle and their possible death in it? From this perspective, the battle songs moved away from the internal perspective of the soldier to take a more external perspective. Here, the attention is turned toward the Pope, but also toward the glory of the leading general(s); the French Zouave song is an example, wherein three famous Zouave leaders are mentioned in the first three stanzas: Lamoricière, is openly mentioned right at the beginning, and Becdelièvre and Charette are in the following stanzas.¹⁴²¹

In the songs of the Papal Zouaves there are also elements that call into question the idea that the Zouaves are a cosmopolitan, nearly a-national force. When the Zouave songs are looked at in their collectivity, it becomes clear that all of them are national Zouave songs. One

¹⁴¹⁷ “Et quand il sera proche / Le moment de mourir, / Sans peur et sans reproche / Tout chasseur le verra venir.” Poli, *Souvenirs du bataillon des zouaves*, p. 68. English translation taken from Coulombe, *Pope's legion*, p. 225.

¹⁴¹⁸ Powell, *Two years in the pontifical Zouaves*, p. vii.

¹⁴¹⁹ Poli, *Souvenirs du bataillon des zouaves*, p. 67.

¹⁴²⁰ “Neen, neen, geen eerlijk christenhart / Vreest ooit den slangenkop. / Vooruit maar! / Onder t kruis is geen gevaar; / CHRISTUS-zelf voert u ten strijd, / Toont dat gij mannen zijt.” N. N., *Pius IX en zijn roemrijk leger*, p. 227.

¹⁴²¹ Coulombe, *Pope's legion*, pp. 222-224.

of the final stanzas of the French Zouave song states: “For the Church and France / We march forever united!” (“Pour l’Eglise et la France / Marchons toujours unis!”).¹⁴²² In the “War March of the Dutch Zouaves”, this element is taken a step further, with its repeated calls to the “Bataver”, the former tribe and Latin name for the Dutch; its final lines conclude with “Selected host of Christians, Netherlands’ love and Netherlands’ pride, / Ahead for the glory of God!”¹⁴²³ Descriptions of the native countries figure prominently in these songs:

“We come from the blue shores of England,
From the mountains of Scotia we come,
From the green, faithful island of Erin,
Far, far, from our wild northern home.”¹⁴²⁴

In this way, the war for the Pope in Italy does not seem to be in contrast to or separate from the warfare of the represented nations, but rather intertwined with it. This is most openly expressed in the Dutch Camp Song:

“For him [the Pope], we left you, o beach,
Wrested from the sea and tide,
For him, o dear Netherlands,
our last blood will be spilled”¹⁴²⁵

The author of the Dutch War Song linked three different kinds of wars together: The actual war between the Pope and his enemies, those wars fought by the Netherlands, and the internal ‘wars’ of the Netherlands (Dutch *Kulturkampf*):

“Provider of our destiny all,
Give us once your hand,
If this pleases you, all good God,

¹⁴²² Ibid., pp. 223-224.

¹⁴²³ “Uitgelezen Christenschaar, / Neêrlands liefde en Neêrlands trots, / Vooruit ter glorie Gods!” N. N., *Pius IX en zijn roemrijk leger*, p. 227.

¹⁴²⁴ Powell, *Two years in the pontifical Zouaves*, p. vii.

¹⁴²⁵ “Voor hem verlieten we u, o strand, / Ontruikt aan zee en vloed, / Voor heem, o dierbar Nederland, / Stroome ook ons laatste bloed.”

For the lovely fatherland.”¹⁴²⁶

In the English Zouave Song the presence of a hierarchization, without however any juxtaposition, leaves unquestioned the legitimacy of making war in the name of the nation: “If ‘tis sweet for our country to perish, / Sweeter far for the cause of today”¹⁴²⁷

Along with these songs, other songs were sung by the soldiers, independent of which Italian side they were serving. In the reports of the German soldiers, the song “Was ist des Deutschen Vaterland” (“What is the German’s Fatherland”) – written by Ernst Moritz Arndt, which stems from the period of the anti-Napoleonic Wars at the beginning of the century – is almost always mentioned.¹⁴²⁸ Ludwig Richard Zimmermann, an officer in the pro-Bourbon guerrilla groups of the 1860s, wrote about how he felt during the campaign in southern Italy: “The German brigand [!] thinks melancholically of his German sky [...] He cries desperately into the dark night: ‘What is the German’s fatherland?’”¹⁴²⁹ According to the papal soldier Eickholt, German folk songs could also be heard from the camp of the Papal Foreign Carabineers, “sung with splendid voices”.¹⁴³⁰

8.3.2.3 *Italian publics and national groups of soldiers*

The nationalities as such were “addressed” (in the Althusserian way of “interpellation”) also by the kind of “direct” communication that developed between the various national groups of foreign soldiers and the Italian public. The French soldiers in 1848 Sicily, who – having previously been part of the regular Bourbon Army – now found themselves in the new “national Sicilian Army” of the revolutionary Sicilian government¹⁴³¹, felt obliged to express their (new!) “loyalty” to the Sicilians in a bilingual pamphlet: “We want to fight, win or die

¹⁴²⁶ “Beschikker van ons aller lot / Hergeve ons eens uw hand, / [...] Behaagt U dit, algoede God, / Aan’t lieve Vaderland.” N. N., *Pius IX en zijn roemrijk leger*, pp. 226-227.

¹⁴²⁷ Powell, *Two years in the pontifical Zouaves*, p. vii.

¹⁴²⁸ Schulze, *Staat und Nation in der europäischen Geschichte*, p. 171. Aside from including a strongly anti-French stanza, the song still seems to define the nation on the ground of shared language. Furthermore, it highlights piety as a specific “quality” of the German “character”, according to Jörg Echternkamp, “Religiöses Nationalgefühl oder ‘Frömmerei der Deutschtümler’? Religion, Nation und Politik im Frühnationalismus,” in Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Dieter Langewiesche, eds., *Nation und Religion in der deutschen Geschichte* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2001), footnote no. 12, p. 147.

¹⁴²⁹ “Der deutsche Brigant denkt dabei wehmütig an seinen deutschen Himmel. [...] Er ruft verzweifelt in die dunkle Nacht hinein: ‘Was ist des Deutschen Vaterland?’” Zimmermann, “Erinnerungen eines ehemaligen Briganten-Chefs,” p. 553.

¹⁴³⁰ “[...] von prächtigen Stimmen gesungen [...]” Eickholt, *Roms letzte Tage unter der Tiara*, p. 101.

¹⁴³¹ Therefore, this pamphlet does not stem from the French “volunteers” that were appositely recruited by the revolutionary Sicilian government in France; on these recruits, see instead Ignace, “French volunteers in Italy,” pp. 445-60.

with you. (“Nous voulons combattre, vaincre ou mourir avec vous [...]”).¹⁴³² Reciprocal attempts of the various political parties to (de-)mobilize and (de-)legitimize the other were often directed at the different national components present in the various armies. The aforementioned pamphlet, for instance, addressed the “German soldiers in the service of King Francis II of Naples”: “Germans and Italians are brothers. Do you want to be an exception, undermining the core of the nation and committing murder? [...] Accept a friendly suggestion from us and leave a cause that is lost anyway. [...] In the name of the nation we make you a brotherly offer: [...] Return to your homeland without charge, and with adequate travel expenses. Think about what you are doing; the choice is not difficult. If you stick to the bad cause notwithstanding our well-intended warning, then beware; the vengeance of an embittered people is terrible. The National Committee.”¹⁴³³

8.3.2.4 *Foreign soldiers and civilians*

The history of the contact between foreign soldiers and the Italian civilian population was – as in other cases¹⁴³⁴ – variegated. It ranged anywhere from fierce opposition between the two to total indifference – this last of which Rüstow noted in some places in southern Italy¹⁴³⁵ – to the founding of friendships as reported by the Zouaves regarding their campaign in the mountains near Frosinone, where they engaged in joint celebrations or were well received by local families.¹⁴³⁶

The German soldiers left Germany with an idea of Italy and the Italians that was based on prejudices and stereotypes that had their roots in contexts such as the tradition of the “journey to Italy”. Here, climatic theories dating back to the Enlightenment contributed in shaping images of the assumed physical and particularly psychological and behavioural traits

¹⁴³² “Proclama al popolo siciliano degli ufficiali francesi in servizio nello esercito nazionale siciliano”, Museo del Risorgimento “Vittorio Emanuele Orlando” Palermo, permanent exhibition (seen in July 2012).

¹⁴³³ „Deutsche und Italiener sind Brüder. Wollt ihr eine Ausnahme machen, an dem Marke der Nation zehren und dann auch morden? [...] Nehmt einen freundlichen Wink von uns an; und verlasst eine Sache die ohnehin verloren ist. [...] Im Namen der Nation machen wir euch einen brüderlichen Antrag [...] Kostenfreie Rückkehr in euer Vaterland, und angemessenes Reisegeld. [...] Bedenkt wohl, was ihr thut, - die Wahl ist nicht schwer: Bleibt ihr ungeachtet unsener [sic] gutgemeinten Warnung, der schlechten Sache an hänglich [sic], - dann weh euch; die Rache eines erbitterten Volker [sic] ist fürchterlich. Das national [sic] Comité“. Proclamation: “An die Deutschen Soldate im Dienste des Königs von Franz II von Neapel”, State Archive of the Canton Basel-City, Personal Estates of Johann Lucas von Mechel, PA 149 5 (Akten 1849-1873), fasc. “Akten August 1860”. According to a handwritten note in the top righthand corner, the pamphlet was from Salerno and printed in August 1860.

¹⁴³⁴ See, e.g., Ute Planert, *Der Mythos vom Befreiungskrieg : Frankreichs Kriege und der deutsche Süden. Alltag - Wahrnehmung - Deutung 1792-1841* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2007), passim.

¹⁴³⁵ On the inhabitants of Milazzo see, e.g. Rüstow, *Erinnerungen aus dem italienischen Feldzuge von 1860*, 1, p. 108; see as well *ibid.*, p. 199.

¹⁴³⁶ Guénel, *Dernière guerre du pape*, p. 75.

of the Italians.¹⁴³⁷ Those images were related to the perception on the part of Northern Europeans of larger areas – such as the south of Europe, Italy or southern Italy – as an inner-European, “oriental” and “feminine” colonial “other”.¹⁴³⁸ More often than not, the German soldiers did not describe the (southern) Italians as being wholly “others”, but rather considered them more as a people that lay somewhere in the middle, between Orient and Occident.¹⁴³⁹ In Rüstow’s opinion, for instance, the Sicilians were “funny” because they seemed to him like “savages” and only partly European: “Like the island, due to its position it builds the bridge from Europe to Africa, the same can be said of its inhabitants and their nationality”.¹⁴⁴⁰ Similarly, Haug noted the historical connection created by the Port of Genoa (“the sea-queen of the Orient”) between the Orient and the Occident¹⁴⁴¹, and takes the time to describe the incoming goods: “The Orient sent her [the city of Genoa] the soft shawls from Cashmere, iced attar of roses from Mecca, embroidered carpets from Persia, the sweet fruits of the Levant.”¹⁴⁴² He described his sea voyage along the coast between Nice and La Spezia to be comparable to the “most abundant tales of Scheherazade” of the Arabian Nights.¹⁴⁴³

Orientalizing tendencies were also to be found in the ways in which the Italians, and Italian women in particular, were described by the German soldiers.¹⁴⁴⁴ Vollmar noted that the “Italian ladies all sleep in their beds as Eve in paradise, and shamefacedness is totally alien to Italian women.”¹⁴⁴⁵ He went on to write, in the typical combination of orientalism with anti-clericalism and anti-Catholicism¹⁴⁴⁶ – that the “the clerics [...] for time immemorial provide for the fact that no Roman woman remains a virgin for long”. Vollmar is not

¹⁴³⁷ Brillì, *Il viaggio in Italia*, pp. 278-286.

¹⁴³⁸ Schultz, “Italien und der Mittelmeerraum”; Schenk, “Mental Maps”; Müller-Funk and Wagner, *Eigene und andere Fremde*; Thies Schulze, “Conference Report: Der Süden Europas - Strukturraum, Wahrnehmungsraum, Handlungsraum? 10.02.2005-12.02.2005, Berlin,” <http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/tagungsberichte/id=728> (last accessed: 20/01/2008); Richter, *Der Süden*.

¹⁴³⁹ I surmise that this was informed by the trading myth of Italian port cities (see the citations from Haug that follow in the main text), just as it could have informed a contemporary image that Italians could be perhaps more easily “bettered” and “civilized” than the inhabitants of countries further south. The topic strays from our main topic of interest here, but could be developed further by more in-depth research on the orientalizing images of Italy.

¹⁴⁴⁰ „Wie die Insel durch ihre Lage den Uebergang von Europa nach Afrika bildet, so kann man Gleiches von ihrer Bevölkerung, von deren Nationalität sagen.“ Rüstow, *Erinnerungen aus dem italienischen Feldzuge von 1860*, 2, p. 87.

¹⁴⁴¹ Haug, *Des Republikaners Schwertfahrt*, p. 64.

¹⁴⁴² “Der Orient sandte ihr weiche Shawls von Kaschmir, geeistes Rosenöl von Mekka, gestickte Teppiche von Persien, die süßen Früchte der Levante.” Ibid., p. 65.

¹⁴⁴³ “[...] gleich den üppigsten Märchen von Sheherezade [...]”. Ibid., p. 82.

¹⁴⁴⁴ On orientalism and sexuality see, from the broad and still growing literature, the recent publication: Ulrike Stamm, “Oriental sexuality and its uses in nineteenth-century travelogues,” in James Hodkinson et al., eds., *Deploying orientalism in culture and history. From Germany to central and eastern Europe* (Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2013), pp. 228-41. See as well Aldrich, *The Seduction*.

¹⁴⁴⁵ “[...] die italienischen Damen schlafen ja alle im Bette wie Eva im Paradiese, und Schamhaftigkeit ist den Italienerinnen ganz fremd.” Herwart, *Zwei Jahre Schlüsselsoldat*, p. 120.

¹⁴⁴⁶ See Borutta, *Antikatholizismus*; in English see Borutta, “Settembrini's world”.

embarrassed to confess: for “my part I have found the women of Rocca [Rocca di Papa, where the papal troops regularly held their manoeuvres] in this regard already highly progressed in ‘civilization’.”¹⁴⁴⁷ The reports of the German soldiers are replete with references to this topos of the supposed sexual lasciviousness of the southern population. The pro-Bourbon Zimmermann reports about a mother of two “pretty” daughters – aged 13 and 15 years. She wished him to “enjoy your meal”: he went on to specify that whether this was said in regard to the melons they had provided him “or in regards to the children, I was unable to decipher from her voice.”¹⁴⁴⁸ If we are to judge by the importance attributed to chastity in Italian women towards foreigners in national discourse, the talk of foreign soldiers stressing the supposed ease with which sexual encounters occurred between Italian women and the foreign soldiers must have been quite inflammatory for the Italians.¹⁴⁴⁹ A further example of this condition was the instance included in Zimmermann's report wherein he asserted that he had committed adultery with the wife of the brigands' "general", Luigi Alonzo, who went by the nickname Chiavone.¹⁴⁵⁰ As Zimmermann writes, he did so as well because he subjected himself “always willingly to the malediction of the original sin.”¹⁴⁵¹ Quite happily Zimmermann, after having had his amorous encounter with Olimpia Alonzo, began to refer to Chiavone as the “general-en-corne”.¹⁴⁵²

¹⁴⁴⁷ “die Geistlichen [...] sorgen von jeher dafür, daß keine Römerin zu lange Jungfrau bleibt. Ich meinerseits habe die Roccanerinnen in dieser Hinsicht schon weit in der ‚Civilisation‘ vorgeschritten gefunden [...]” Herwart, *Zwei Jahre Schlüsselsoldat*, p. 108.

¹⁴⁴⁸ “Jetzt kam die Mutter der beiden hübschen Kinder, um mir ‚guten Appetit‘ zu wünschen (ob zu den Melonen oder zu den Kindern, vermochte ich an der Stimme nicht zu erkennen) [...]” Zimmermann, “Erinnerungen eines ehemaligen Briganten-Chef's,” p. 408.

¹⁴⁴⁹ The issue can be developed further by analysing the military criminal cases of the foreign soldiers since sexual misdeeds were given a prominent place in the military criminal codes (in the indigenous and foreigners' codes alike). Court records exist for the various armies and armed groups in the various Archives of State in Italy. An example – for the Papal Army – are the records in the ASR, Ministero delle armi, buste no. 1412-1421 and 3032-3062.

¹⁴⁵⁰ Even if this nickname is said to have been attributed to him because he, as a child, wore the keys on a keychain around his neck, it seems that the “double entendre” of the nickname in Italian (which refers to the sexual sphere) was noted already at his time; see Giordano B. Guerri, *Il sangue del Sud. Antistoria del Risorgimento e del brigantaggio* (Milan: Mondadori, 2010), p. 125.

¹⁴⁵¹ “[...]M]ich stets willig dem Fluche der Erbsünde unterworfen.” Zimmermann, “Erinnerungen eines ehemaligen Briganten-Chef's,” p. 42.

¹⁴⁵² Ibid., p. 42. In the Italian (as well as French) culture, to refer to a man as “having horns” (uno che ha le corna) or “being horned” (cornuto) is to call him out as a cuckold.

8.4 *Transnational comparisons, clashes and transfers*

8.4.1 *Corps comparisons and national group comparisons*

Many elements rendered evident the division of the single Italian armies into distinct military groups. In most cases, each regiment had its own uniform¹⁴⁵³, which differed from the others in colour, style and a series of minor and major stylistic details. While some of these particularities could more easily be understood by military personnel¹⁴⁵⁴, some of the distinctive characteristics of the uniforms of the various corps were also understood by the civilian population as well. As with other armies and centuries, past and present, the various corps of the Italian armed groups enjoyed different levels of prestige. However, given that any regiment, as based on the "quality" of its constituent corps and their soldiers, could improve or decline, comparisons were constantly being made.

Furthermore, despite the foreigners' regiments had a more diversified national makeup, many soldiers began to see some of the corps as national ones, which confirms the quest for their institutionalization in the form of national "Legions" encountered above in my analysis on mobilization. By viewing existent corps as "national" corps, the traditional competition between military corps in terms of prestige overlapped with nationality related comparisons.

Therefore, not only was the quality of each corps constantly compared to the others by foreign and "indigenous" soldiers, so were the national groups that comprised the various armed groups. The papal carabineer Vollmar, while acknowledging there were Germans in the Papal Zouaves, asserted all the same that the Zouaves were "good-for-nothings". He went on to argue against the usual image of the Zouaves as the best corps in the Papal Army: "In

¹⁴⁵³ Due to the integration of corps that retained their uniforms from their previous engagements, such as the "foreign company" and most probably also caused by smaller or bigger changes brought about by the production of "red shirts" in different places, it seems that the Garibaldian Army in fact was more "multi-coloured" than one would normally expect. For the Bourbon uniforms of the "foreign company" see Vigeveno, *Compagnia estera garibaldina*, pp. 3, 4, 6; for the production of "Red shirts" in Prato, see Antonio Mauro and Piero Fiorenzani, "Sulle camicie rosse di Garibaldi tra storia e manifattura," *A Campione* 59, no. 1 (2012): pp. 5-11. In the splendid Textile Museum ("Museo del Tessuto") in Prato "Garibaldi's fulling mill" ("follone di Garibaldi") is on display; that this fulling mill was used for the fabrication of the Garibaldian uniform has been passed down orally. On this question, which lies somewhere between history and myth, see Antonio Mauro and Piero Fiorenzani, "Sul 'follone di Garibaldi' esistente a Prato," *A Campione* 59, no. 2 (2012): pp. 8-12. It seems that the "red shirts" used by the British Garibaldians may have been produced in the UK itself, and at the very least they were provided by the military outfitters S. Isaac, Campbell & Co. in Jermyn Street, London, according to Pellegrino Sutcliffe, "British Red Shirts," p. 206.

¹⁴⁵⁴ On the military as not only a hypercodified institution but – due the multitude of smaller and bigger distinctive symbols used – also as "hyper-symbolic" ("ipersegnico") wherein the uniform may be conceived as a text, see Greco, *Homo militaris*, on the "semiotics of the uniform" ("semiotica della divisa") see the chapter of the same name, pp. 165-177.

Germany, one normally thinks of the Zouaves as real hotshots. [...] In reality, the Zouaves are worse soldiers than their comrades in the line." Vollmer inveighed against the publication of the theologian Georg Möisinger¹⁴⁵⁵, who according to him erroneously adulated the Zouaves by attributing "all merits of the other troops [...] only to the Zouaves."¹⁴⁵⁶ Vollmar also makes a comparison of the qualities of the various nationalities present in the Papal Army. He believed that the Dutch soldiers were the worst servicemen; the French soldiers of the Legion d'Antibes not only behaved "casually in the French way in service", they were not interested in "accuracy", and were, moreover, lazy: "Where the German on the drill-ground swings his cane around for hours, he [the Frenchman] puts his hands into his pockets and smokes [...]."¹⁴⁵⁷ The Italian gunners were similarly lazy "because the hot blood of the southerner leaves no room for mathematical calculations and cool-headed guidance."¹⁴⁵⁸ The pro-Bourbon officer Zimmermann, equally asserted that the "indigenous officers were for the large part wretched creatures".¹⁴⁵⁹

German soldiers and officers not only regarded themselves as Germans¹⁴⁶⁰ and were also regarded as such by the Italians, they nearly always considered themselves to be the best soldiers in the armed groups. According to Zimmermann, upon his arrival, the "brigands curiously came running out of their huts and from their fires, to see the German officer [*ufficiale tedesco* in the German original] arriving from Rome."¹⁴⁶¹

Having to act against a conspiracy during his service in the Papal Army, Rottmund is pleased to be able to form a detachment of men comprised mostly "of Germans and Swiss,

¹⁴⁵⁵ Möisinger, *Wozu braucht der heilige Vater eine Armee?*; see for the contents of the booklet chapter 3.

¹⁴⁵⁶ "In Deutschland stellt man sich gewöhnlich unter Zuaven wahre Teufelskerle vor. [...] In Wirklichkeit aber sind die Zuaven schlechtere Soldaten, als ihre Kameraden in der Linie." "[..A]lle Verdienste der anderen Truppen [...] nur den Zuaven zugeschrieben werden." Herwart, *Zwei Jahre Schlüsselsoldat*, p. 77.

¹⁴⁵⁷ "Im Dienste sind die Antibeslegionäre französisch *legère* [...] nichts auf Accuratesse. [...] Wo der Deutsche Stunden lang seine Spazierhölzer auf dem Exerzierplatze herumschlenkert, steckt er beide Hände in die Taschen und raucht [...]." Ibid., p. 82.

¹⁴⁵⁸ "[..W]eil das hitzige Blut des Südländers eine kühle mathematische Berechnung und besonnene Führung nicht zuläßt." Ibid., p. 92.

¹⁴⁵⁹ "[..D]ie eingeborenen Offiziere [...] wirklich zum größten Theile ganz erbärmliche Wichte." Zimmermann, "Erinnerungen eines ehemaligen Briganten-Chef's," p. 554.

¹⁴⁶⁰ In their reports, the self-naming by the Germans is ubiquitous. Only rarely do they refer to other allegiances, such as regional ones; an example of this for instance may be seen in the case of those German soldiers and chaplains who knew each other from their time together in the Austrian boarding school in Feldkirch, see footnote no. 669. Other soldiers, although they normally wrote of themselves as Germans, sometimes referred to themselves as Austrians (which, however, due to the "German question", which was still open at the time, is not in total contrast with their identification as Germans), given they had been part of the Austrian Army before joining the Italian group, see for instance *ibid.*, p. 63. On the interconnection of, rather than contrasting national and regional identities in nationalism, see, e.g., Confino and Skaria, "The local life of nationhood," pp. 5-24.

¹⁴⁶¹ "Neugierig eilten die Briganten aus den Hütten und von den Feuern herbei, um den vom Rom kommenden *ufficiale tedesco* [so in the original] zu sehen [...]." Zimmermann, "Erinnerungen eines ehemaligen Briganten-Chef's," p. 47.

upon which, because we had to act against Italians, I could rely the most [...].”¹⁴⁶² The Bourbon soldier Maier reveals his hubris when he writes that had “only the German Legion been sent to Sicily [...] we would certainly have come to terms with Garibaldi and his bands, and Francis II would still today be in possession of the royal throne of the Two Sicilies.”¹⁴⁶³

8.4.2 *The main objects of comparison*

The comparison between the military corps and/or the nationalities present within each single Italian armed group regarded four qualities in particular: humane or harsh treatment (whether it be that of the soldiers by their officers, or of civilians by the soldiers); cleanliness or uncleanness; courage, cold-bloodedness (in the sense of “cool-headedness”) and endurance as opposed to fear, indolence and laziness; and finally loyalty versus treason.

In many German soldiers’ reports, one quality of the German soldier as well as officer is described as being supposedly more humane in the treatment of other individuals. The Bourbon soldier Maier observes of his Swiss comrades (in the same regiment) that captives “could not expect humane treatment from the Swiss.”¹⁴⁶⁴ Similarly, the pro-Bourbon Zimmermann criticizes Chiavone for being more interested in finally acquiring the title of “general” and especially in “obtaining a complete Neapolitan general’s uniform”, than in caring for his soldiers: “I believed this man capable of giving the order to execute officers for a missing button on his general’s trousers [...] German officers would surely have cared more about their subordinates’ buttons than their own.”¹⁴⁶⁵ And Rüstow accused Sirtori of not being interested enough in the humane and benevolent treatment of his soldiers. Of course one of the reasons for placing such emphasis on humanity (in a national light) was linked to the attempt to dismantle the perception of the Germans as “barbarians”, and more specifically as being barbaric in their treatment of civilians. According to the German reports, these images were quite widely diffused.¹⁴⁶⁶ In this regard, the Bourbon soldier Maier stated “Garibaldi

¹⁴⁶² “[..M]eist Deutsche und Schweizer, auf die ich meines Erachtens, da es gegen Italiener ging, am meisten rechnen konnte [...]” Rottmund, *Erlebnisse und Interessante Begebenheiten eines Deutschen in englischen, römischen, garibaldischen, neapolitanischen und französischen Kriegsdiensten. Genau nach den geführten Tagebüchern bearbeitet u. hsg. von J. R. [J. Rottmund]*, p. 53.

¹⁴⁶³ “Wäre die deutsche Legion einzig gewesen in Sicilien [...] wären wir sicherlich mit Garibaldi und seinen Banden fertig geworden, und Franz II. wäre heute noch im Besitze des königlichen Thrones beider Sicilien.” Maier, *Der Kampf zwischen der deutschen Fremden-Legion und den Garibaldianern im Königreich beider Sicilien vom 6. April bis 28. October 1860*, p. 17.

¹⁴⁶⁴ “[...] denn von den Schweizern konnten und durften sie nicht menschliche Behandlung erwarten.” Ibid., p. 4.

¹⁴⁶⁵ “Erlangung einer kompletten neapolitanischen – Generalsuniform [...] Ich hielt den Mann für fähig, wegen eines fehlenden Generals-Hosenknopfes ein paar Offiziere erschießen zu lassen [...] Deutsche Offiziere hätten sich gewiß mehr um untergebene als eigene Knöpfe gekümmert [...]” Zimmermann, “Erinnerungen eines ehemaligen Briganten-Chef’s,” p. 478.

¹⁴⁶⁶ Haug, *Des Republikaners Schwertfahrt*, pp. xxi-xxii.

must have told the Sicilians terrible things about the Germans, because when we met several mostly elder people, they crossed themselves, loudly imploring God and all the saints to intercede on their behalf for their protection.”¹⁴⁶⁷

Cleanliness was not only regulated and governed by the military regulations, it constituted an object of comparison specifically between Italians and Germans¹⁴⁶⁸, but also between the soldiers and officers of differing nationality. Zimmermann spoke of Chiavone as a “dirty” individual, insofar as this last had the habit of “cleaning his nose with his dirty fingers and then wiping them clean” on his clothing¹⁴⁶⁹; and Haug spoke of a French officer, who was “dirty from the ribbon of his cross of the Legion of Honour to his [...] fingernails with black borders”, and in short, “an un-groomed litter lout”.¹⁴⁷⁰

The various national groups of soldiers often found the others wanting in courage, cool-headedness and endurance; the French and Italian soldiers in particular are characterized as lazy and prone to committing treason by the German soldiers. In his report written by the Bourbon officer Zimmermann, the other German officers, as well as an Irish officer, were all “brave and courageous”, while the others – among which a Swiss officer – revealed their lack of courage by “the audible chattering of their teeth.”¹⁴⁷¹ For the Bourbon soldier Maier, his Swiss comrades had given proof of “their cowardice on the battle field of Naples”.¹⁴⁷² And Hoffstetter reports that in the defence of the Roman Republic in 1849 his commandant Luciano Manara referred to him as “hard-hearted” (*cuore duro*)“, because in the pandemonium of the fight he did not notice any outwardly visible emotion in me.”¹⁴⁷³

¹⁴⁶⁷ [...M]ußte Garibaldi den Sicilianern Schreckliches über die Deutschen aufgebunden haben, denn wo wir noch auf wenige, meistens alte Leute stießen, bekreuzten sie sich und riefen Gott und alle Heiligen laut bestend um Schutz an.“ Maier, *Der Kampf zwischen der deutschen Fremden-Legion und den Garibaldianern*, p. 12.

¹⁴⁶⁸ The topos of the “unclean” or “dirty” is of course linked to the discourse of indolence and decadence. The topos colours the descriptions of Italian cities by the German soldiers, see, e.g., Zimmermann, “Erinnerungen eines ehemaligen Briganten-Chef’s,” pp. 14 and 23; the exception proves the rule in the case of Rottmund, who likes Florence due to its relative cleanliness as compared to other Italian cities. Rottmund, *Erlebnisse und Interessante Begebenheiten eines Deutschen in englischen, römischen, garibaldischen, neapolitanischen und französischen Kriegsdiensten. Genau nach den geführten Tagebüchern bearbeitet u. hsg. von J. R. [J. Rottmund]*, p. 75.

¹⁴⁶⁹ “[..P]utzte seine Nase mit den schmutzigen Fingern und wischte diese am Futter [...] ab.” Zimmermann, “Erinnerungen eines ehemaligen Briganten-Chef’s,” p. 518.

¹⁴⁷⁰ “[..S]chmutzig vom Bande seines Ehrenlegionkreuzes bis zu [...] Fingernägel mit einer schwarzen Bordur unterlegt [...] der ungebürstete Schmutzhammel.” Haug, *Des Republikaners Schwertfahrt*, pp. 145-146.

¹⁴⁷¹ “[..K]lapperten hörbar mit den Zähnen [...]” Zimmermann, “Erinnerungen eines ehemaligen Briganten-Chef’s,” p. 546.

¹⁴⁷² “[...] Feigheit auf dem Kampfplatze von Neapel [...]” Maier, *Der Kampf zwischen der deutschen Fremden-Legion und den Garibaldianern im Königreich beider Sicilien vom 6. April bis 28. October 1860*, p. 3.

¹⁴⁷³ “[..C]uore duro (hartherzig), weil er [...] äußerlich keine Regung an mir bemerkt hätte.” Hoffstetter, *Tagebuch*, p. 121. Hoffstetter notes in this context, however, that “perhaps those that [...] can weep, may be more enviable than those that seem to be stolid but in fact aren’t.”

According to Vollmar, the fact that the French officers of the Papal Legion of Antibes deserted was not in and of itself a trait particular to these men (the same happened as well with other nationalities), but he stated: “compared to the Germans, who all deserted northwards, these legionnaires are directing mostly toward Naples, where they get gratifications and support from Garibaldian committees.”¹⁴⁷⁴ Therefore, the accusation is not so much desertion, but more precisely treason, because they had left to join the “enemy”. This is clearly Maier’s position on the matter as well when he pointed out that those Bourbon officers and soldiers that had defected to the Garibaldian Army “had sworn to the King never to take service against him”.¹⁴⁷⁵

The result was a world of continuous and mostly unjust comparisons (unjust in the sense that the outcome was already predetermined beforehand), a world of mutual accusations, denigrations and degradations amongst the various corps and/or nationalities within the single armies. Comparisons among the different nationalities sometimes overlapped with the formal institutional structure, particularly when the corps were perceived as “national corps” despite their more multinational makeup, as was the case with the supposedly German Papal Carabineers and the Bourbon “German Foreign Legion”. In other instances, multinational corps were split into distinct national components in order to carry out national comparisons; this occurred with the differentiation between the “French Zouaves” or the “Dutch Zouaves” and the Swiss members of the Bourbon foreign regiments. Therefore, alongside the attraction that existed between nationalities as expressed through ideas of “brotherhood” and “solidarity” between and by nations, there also existed a type of repulsion between the various nationalities present. It is not astonishing that verbal as well as corporal disputes ensued. Maier speculated, for instance, that “in those corps that consist of different nationalities”, such as the Garibaldian Army, it must be almost certain that “scenes and incidents” occur.¹⁴⁷⁶ Vollmar wrote that in the Papal Army the indigenous line regiments “and the Germans continuously bicker, and resolve their national quarrels in broad daylight with weapons laid bare. In June 1869, for instance, three companies of papalini [i.e. indigenous soldiers] at the

¹⁴⁷⁴ “Zum Unterschiede von den Deutschen, welche alle nordwärts desertiren, wenden sich diese Legionäre meistens nach Neapel, wo sie von gaibaldinischen Komitè’s Belohnung und Unterstützung erhalten.” Herwart, *Zwei Jahre Schlüsselsoldat*, p. 84.

¹⁴⁷⁵ “[...] die dem König eidlich gelobten, nie gegen Ihn Dienste zu nehmen [...]” Maier, *Der Kampf zwischen der deutschen Fremden-Legion und den Garibaldianern*, p. 5.

¹⁴⁷⁶ “Daß es in denjenigen Corps, die aus so manchen Nationalitäten zusammengesetzt sind, öfters besondere Auftritte und Vorkommnisse gibt”. Ibid., p. 78.

change of the guard were kicked out of the small town of Albiano by a company of Germans, resulting in loss of lives and wounded, and in the serious flogging of their officers.”¹⁴⁷⁷

8.5 From comparisons to change: transnational clashes and transfers

8.5.1 Conflict and change

But even in those instances in which corporal violence did not break out as a result, these competitive comparisons were never really “fair”. Despite the differences in the criticisms expressed by the nationalities toward another, there were also shared hetero-stereotypes passed between nationalities; however, these were nearly never “proved wrong” by “direct experience”, barring isolated exceptions made for single foreign individuals.¹⁴⁷⁸ In nearly no instance did a change occur in the level of observation in a Luhmannian sense, and therefore resulting in the identification of these comparative assessments for what they really were: stereotypes. Nevertheless, it can be argued that a heightened atmosphere of continuous contemporary comparison could have been the first step towards bringing about changes and transferral of practices.

Change can be triggered by open conflict. Moreover, the foreign soldiers with military experience did contribute to these transnational transfers, insofar as they helped to “regularize” such aspects of the armed groups, for instance the war making in the Garibaldian groups. Rüstow, for instance, believed it was particularly important to establish and strictly adhere to the military, hierarchical chain of command. He systematically complained to his fellow officers of the violations of this principal, especially when higher ranks passed him over to give direct orders to his troops, or went directly to Garibaldi, ignoring the hierarchical procedures according to which officers were only to address the general through their superiors. Hence, during the preparations for the southern campaign, he emphasized the need for there to be one undisputed commander in chief, a stance that according to him ironically led Mazzini to refer to him as a “monarchist”.¹⁴⁷⁹

¹⁴⁷⁷ “Sie [the papal indigenous line regiments] und die Deutschen liegen sich fortwährend in den Haaren und kämpfen oftmals ihren Nationalitätenhader auf offener Straße mit blanken Waffen aus. So wurden im Juni 1869 drei Compagnien Papalini bei Gelegenheit der Ablösung von einer Compagnie Deutschen mit Verlusten an Todten und Verwundeten [gramatically it remains unclear, if there were dead and wounded soldiers among the Papalini, the Germans or both] zu dem Städtchen Albiano hinausgeworfen und ihre Offiziere beträchtlich durchgeprügelt.” Herwart, *Zwei Jahre Schlüsselsoldat*, pp. 85-86.

¹⁴⁷⁸ But these exceptions were often formulated in such a way as to confirm the rule, when for instance an Italian sergeant is seen as “the only brave man of the whole guard” according to Zimmermann, “Erinnerungen eines ehemaligen Briganten-Chef’s,” p. 547.

¹⁴⁷⁹ Rüstow, *Erinnerungen aus dem italienischen Feldzuge von 1860*, 1, p. 52.

The importance Rüstow placed on military “regularity” and “order”, however, was heavily contested by other officers; they accused him of not understanding what they saw as necessary differences between the “Garibaldian” type of war making and the practices typical of regular armies. One officer, who like Rüstow was part of the same General Staff of the 15th division (under Colonel István Türr), described this difference of opinion as follows: “Rüstow was not familiar with this type of Garibaldian war making, as he was with regular war [...], and so, as a purely scientific man, he did *not* find himself at ease.”¹⁴⁸⁰

Rüstow himself, in his report on the campaign that was already published by 1861, was well aware of this difference of opinion: “Several commanders had the particular view that order was not suited for the type of warfare of Garibaldi, while I am of the opinion, however, that order is necessary for any kind of warfare [...]. As a result of this contradiction of views I have heard reproaches of all types, that I, despite the fact that I know regular warfare better than anyone else and everything connected to it, had the defect of wanting to transfer regular war making and the use of these instruments to ‘our’ conditions.”¹⁴⁸¹

Similarly, the ex-Austrian officer Ernst Haug underlines the necessity to maintain strict levels of discipline, which he felt was important in situations of revolution such as the one of the Roman Republic in 1849: “In no historical period does the necessity of the most strict discipline make itself more felt than during the revolution; never is its absence more fatal than during the revolution.”¹⁴⁸²

The emphasis that Rüstow and Haug place on order and discipline seemed to be connected to the stereotypes held by foreigners and Italians that particularly Italians lacked this quality. The response directed toward Rüstow that he did not understand the typically “Garibaldian” style of war making may have been an excuse of sorts. Namely, by hiring experienced foreign officers for their “expertise” and the implementation of military “order”, the Italian

¹⁴⁸⁰ “D'altronde il Rustow non abituato a quella specie di battaglia Garibaldina, ma alla Guerra regolare [...] e come uomo puramente scienziato, trovavasi fuori del proprio elemento.” Carlo Pecorini Manzoni, *Richiami del già capitano di stato maggiore Pecorini-Manzoni sopra alcuni appunti fatti alla storia della 15. divisione Turr* (Catanzaro: Tip. G. Dastoli, 1882), p. 13.

¹⁴⁸¹ „Mehrere Befehlshaber hatten nämlich die eigenthümliche Ansicht, daß sich die Ordnung nicht mit der Kriegführungsweise Garibaldi's [sic] verträge, während ich allerdings der Meinung bin und war, daß die Ordnung für jede Art von Kriegführung nothwendig ist [...]“. Infolge dieses Widerspruchs der Ansicht habe ich denn den Vorwurf in allen Gestalten hören müssen, daß ich zwar den regelmäßigen Krieg und was dazu gehört besser verstehe als einer, aber den Fehler habe, die Art der regelmäßigen Kriegführung und die Ordnung der Mittel auf ‚unsere‘ Verhältnisse übertragen zu wollen.“ Rüstow, *Erinnerungen aus dem italienischen Feldzuge von 1860*, I, pp. 251-252.

¹⁴⁸² “In keiner historischen Periode macht sich die Nothwendigkeit der strengsten Disziplin fühlbarer, als in der Revolution, nie wirkt deren Absein verhängnisvoller als in der Revolution.” Haug, *Des Republikaners Schwertfahrt*, p. 227.

nationalists effectively “imported” a type of “loudspeaker” that emphasized the supposed Italian military decline.

Differences in terms of imposing strict hierarchy and establishing a distinct order between the regular and the Garibaldian armies¹⁴⁸³, in the end, seem to be confirmed by the German soldier Rottmund – who had served at one time in the militaries of Pius IX, Francis II, and Garibaldi – and his written comparisons of the three. In his short memoir, he specified which army he liked most: Garibaldi’s. The hierarchy that existed between soldiers and officers was, he wrote, less pronounced: “the men enjoyed more freedom, officers and soldiers lived more in harmony”.¹⁴⁸⁴ Although it was true that levels of discipline were worse, in contrast to the regular armies, the “mistreatment of the troops did not happen.”¹⁴⁸⁵

8.5.2 *Practices and change: military Turnen all’italiana*

In terms of concrete foreign-Italian military transfers that are linked to the presence of foreign soldiers and officers in the Italian armies, the diffusion of military gymnastics proves to be a good example.

The history of gymnastics (*Turnen*), however, has been researched mostly within the context of gymnastics’ associations and the incorporation of gymnastics in the school curricula.¹⁴⁸⁶ Furthermore, these studies focused primarily on political, social and organizational questions, thus overshadowing the strictly physical practices. The question as to when and in which forms gymnastics found their way into the standard education of the European *armies* has not been asked, even if this is decisive for resolving the question of when physical and especially muscular strength was officially incorporated (and hence was no

¹⁴⁸³ The point therefore is not to do away with the existing differences, but simply to moderate – at least based on the assertions of the German foreign soldiers and officers studied here, which consisted very much in their attempts to “regularize” army practices – the idea that there were absolutely contrasting “military cultures” between the “regular” armies and the supposedly “irregular” *garibaldini*. On this issue, see my Göhde, “A new military history,” pp. 31-34. On the idea that Garibaldian military culture clearly differed from that of the regular armies see, e.g., Lyttelton, “The hero and the people,” p. 307 and Riall, “Guerre et nation,” p. 58.

¹⁴⁸⁴ However, even this point was relative and at the same time dependent on the position adopted by the superiors. According to Rüstow’s memoirs, at least in his own practices the separation from the common soldiers was clear; for instance he never ate with his men, preferring instead the usual “officers’ or generals’ tables”, the existence of which relativizes Rottmunds’ statement. According to Rüstow, however, some superiors had a different attitude, which he criticized.

¹⁴⁸⁵ „[...] Maltraitirung der Mannschaft kam nicht vor [...]“ Rottmund, *Erlebnisse und Interessante Begebenheiten*, p. 78.

¹⁴⁸⁶ From the comprehensive literature, see George L. Mosse, *The Nationalization of the masses. Political symbolism and mass movements in Germany from the Napoleonic wars through the Third Reich* (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994); Langewiesche, *Nation, Nationalismus, Nationalstaat*; Svenja Goltermann, *Körper der Nation. Habitusformierung und die Politik des Turnens 1860-1890* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1998). Regardless of the fact that its title is more general, focusing on the links between gymnastics and irredentism in Trieste, and hence on the post-unification period is Stefano Pivato, “Ginnastica e Risorgimento. Alle origini del rapporto sport / nazionalismo,” *Ricerche storiche* 19, no. 2 (1989): pp. 247-79.

longer merely a bi-product of “drill”) into the educational aims of the armies. Those authors who have thus far lightly touched upon the issue erroneously suppose that gymnastics spread to schools and armies at the same time.¹⁴⁸⁷ The issue, however, is far more complicated due to the relationship between the political, education and military dimensions of gymnastics and “Turnen”, which differed quite a lot amongst the various national cases.

In Prussia, after the initial interest in gymnastics was sparked during the Napoleonic Wars, there was a period in which gymnastic associations were prosecuted between 1819 and the 1840s, only to see their subsequent rehabilitation in 1842 upon monarchical decision. The sport was initially understood as a primarily pre-military education of “military masculinity” that was particularly suited to schools; the introduction of these physical practices into the army met with far more reluctance. Two Prussian officers in the 1840s were sent to Sweden and Denmark, where dedicated military academies for gymnastics had already been established at the beginning of the century, with the aim to collect knowledge and based on this to then build a “Royal Central Gymnastics Institute” (“Königliche Central-Turn-Anstalt”) in Berlin; this last was to be under the control of both the Ministry of War and the Ministry of Education and would go on to train school teachers and army officers alike. One of the two officers was the Prussian artillerist Hugo Rothstein, who was placed in charge of the newly founded Gymnastics institute from 1847 to 1863. Whereas this institute contributed to the general establishment of gymnastics in the schools from the 1840s onwards, its integration into the more strictly *military* education occurred more slowly. In 1845, the Minister of War von Boyen only “recommended” that military officers read a manual on gymnastics written by Rothstein, which was based on the Swedish gymnastics of Pehr Henrik Ling and conformed for the most part to the ideas of Adolf Spieß¹⁴⁸⁸ (and as such was not directly connected to Friedrich Ludwig Jahn)¹⁴⁸⁹. He left it entirely up to the officers as to whether they wished to read the manual and/or to follow gymnastic courses at the institute. In 1860,

¹⁴⁸⁷ See, e.g., Forth, *Masculinity in the modern West*, p. 135. Ute Frevert leaves this question open, even if she integrates “strength” and “Turnen” into the lists of educational aims of the armies throughout the book; see Frevert, *A Nation in barracks*, passim.

¹⁴⁸⁸ Among the conceptions particular to the method put forth by Spiess were the so-called “exercises on order” (Ordnungsübungen), which essentially consisted in making complex geometric formations that very much resembled group drill in the army; considering that the gymnastics taught in schools had to be officially based on the proposals released by the “Central-Turn-Institut” (which was strongly reinforced by the compulsory education of teachers at this institute), and not those propounded by Jahn, “Ordnungsübungen” were a decisive part of the educational programme in the schools. Herein lies an important nexus for the “militarizing” function of school gymnastics, that is present at least since the 1860s.

¹⁴⁸⁹ Methodologically speaking, between the “schools” of Rothstein and Jahn in 1860, was the “Barrenstreit” (“parallel-bars-controversy”), where political and “scientific” issues were intimately linked, in which the gymnasts underlined the “Germanness” of Jahn’s ideas by referring to his methods as “Deutsches Turnen”, while, upon the initiative of Rothstein, artistic gymnastics and a series of apparatuses were banned.

instructions on gymnastics were still only “experimentally” approved for the military, and the full integration of these exercises had been postponed to an indefinite future and the ambiguous condition of “when sufficient teachers for it have been educated”.¹⁴⁹⁰ Even if the number of gymnastically educated military personnel rose from 18 officers and 58 non-commissioned officers (in 1859) to 27 officers and 68 non-commissioned officers (in 1860), in 1863 the implementation of gymnastics was still heavily dependent upon the stance adopted within each regiment and their respective commanders.¹⁴⁹¹ Furthermore, due to the persisting conflict between the “Central-Turn-Anstalt” and the (civil) gymnasts’ associations that conformed to Jahn’s methods – this conflict was fuelled by not only political conflict but also by “scientific” differences between the approaches – there were those officers in the army who followed Jahn’s exercises, and those that stood by Rothstein’s methods.

The process of diffusion of more strictly *military* gymnastics in the *Italian* armies, apart from virtually not having been studied¹⁴⁹², is interesting for this study for several reasons. Despite its pre-nineteenth century roots and ancient sources, by the nineteenth century, it, in its “Turnen” form, was seen as a Prussian (Friedrich Ludwig Jahn), German and/or Swiss “invention”. This view of gymnastics is confirmed by the decisive role appositely hired German and Swiss immigrants played in its European diffusion.¹⁴⁹³

The diffusion of gymnastics showcases how new conceptions of military masculinity “travelled” between European countries – from Sweden and Denmark to Germany to France and from Switzerland to Italy – in the mid-nineteenth century; they also travelled between political sides, if one considers the early institution of the initially liberal “Turnen” into the regular armies of Piedmont and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.

In Prussia, as aforementioned, gymnastics were incorporated first and quite early on into school curricula, and only later and slowly adopted by the *army*. In Italy on the other

¹⁴⁹⁰ The words of the “Kabinetsordre” that introduced the “Instruction für den Betrieb der Gymnastik bei der Infanterie” on 21 October 1860, are cited from H. Berger, “Die Turnübungen der Soldaten nach ihrer jetzigen Methode und den etwa wünschenswerten Veränderungen,” *Deutsche Klinik. Zeitung für Beobachtungen aus deutschen Kliniken und Krankenhäusern* XVI-XVII, nos. 25, 29, 31, 41, 48, 49, 52, 10 (1864): pp. 237-39, 73-75, 93-96, 393-97, 461-64, 73-77, 501-03, 89-93, no. 41, p. 395.

¹⁴⁹¹ Ibid., no. 41, p. 395; Hermann Kaiser, *Das Rothstein'sche System der Gymnastik in seiner Stellung zur Deutschen Turnkunst. Ein Wort zur Verständigung an alle Freunde geordneter Leibesübungen* (Berlin: Verlag von G. Schroeder, 1861), p. 15.

¹⁴⁹² See, recently, the 15th Congress of the Italian Physical Education Association, on occasion of the 150-year jubilee of the Risorgimento, titled: “La ginnastica militare e la ginnastica educativa nella costruzione dell’Italia unita”, Turin, 28 – 29 October 2011. The programme is available on the website www.sief.eu/attivita/congressi_e_convegni/convegno_nazionale_salute_e_sport/programma/; some of the presentations may be found at this link http://www.sief.eu/attivita/congressi_e_convegni/convegno_nazionale_salute_e_sport/programma/; both websites were last accessed 9 October 2012.

¹⁴⁹³ Klemens Wildt, *Auswanderer und Emigranten in der Geschichte der Leibesübungen* (Schorndorf near Stuttgart: Karl Hoffmann, 1964).

hand, some armies actually “imported” the German-Swiss exercises – which in turn were imported from further north, i.e. Sweden and Denmark – for military purposes not only before they were used in schools but also relatively early on.¹⁴⁹⁴ Swiss grammar school teacher Rudolf Obermann, who had been member of the Zurich gymnastics association – which was in direct contact with southern German associations – and was quite familiar with Jahn’s method of gymnastics, was invited in 1831 by King Carl Albert of Savoy to teach gymnastics to the artillery and to the students of the Military Academy in Turin. Although at first he only taught gymnastics within a military setting, in 1844 Obermann helped found the – still existing – “Royal Gymnastics Association of Turin” (“Reale Società Ginnastica di Torino”), which was “open to all classes and strata of society without restriction.”¹⁴⁹⁵ In the schools, gymnastics – after having been incorporated in the reform plans of the Bourbon King in 1848 that never went into effect due to the revolution – were officially introduced in 1859 in Piedmont, within the context of the school reforms laid out in the “Legge Casati”¹⁴⁹⁶, and were extended to the new Italian monarchy in 1860¹⁴⁹⁷; similar to the Prussian model, teachers had to come to the central institute in Turin to be taught by Obermann.

Manuals on military gymnastics were published quite early on in both the Bourbon and Piedmontese Armies: within the context of the inauguration of the first “military gymnasium” (in the sense of gym) built in Naples in 1846, under the auspices of the Bourbon General Carlo Filangieri and King Ferdinand, one of the first (and most probably *the* first) Italian manuals on military gymnastics, written by the infantry officer Niccolò Abbondati,¹⁴⁹⁸ was published by the official royal military publishing house in the same year. Shortly thereafter, other military gyms were erected in Capua and Nocera.¹⁴⁹⁹

In the north, Piedmontese officers and non-commissioned officers that were interested in gymnastics initially followed Obermann’s courses on their own initiative. Most of these officers were from the newly instituted riflemen’s corps of the “bersaglieri”, whose founder

¹⁴⁹⁴ See, in general, the informative presentation at the Congress of the Italian Society of Physical Education given by Roberta Benedetta Casti, “L’addestramento militare e l’educazione dei giovani allievi Carabinieri nella storica caserma Cernaia. Il contributo dell’Arma alla unificazione italiana,” in *La ginnastica militare e la ginnastica educativa nella costruzione dell’Italia unita* (Turin, 2011) (last accessed: 10/09/2012).

¹⁴⁹⁵ Angela Teja and Marco Impiglia, “Italy,” in James Riordan and Arnd Krüger, eds., *European cultures in sports. Examining the nations and regions* (Bristol et al. : Intellect, 2003), p. 139.

¹⁴⁹⁶ See Gigliola Gori, “La ginnastica,” in Arianna Arisi Rota, Monica Morandi, and Matteo Morandi, eds., *Patrioti si diventa. Luoghi e linguaggi di pedagogia patriottica nell’Italia unita* (Milan: Franco Angeli, 2009), pp. 105-108.

¹⁴⁹⁷ Michele Di Donato, “Cenni storici sulla ‘ginnastica’ e sull’educazione fisica’ in Italia dal XIX alla metà del XX secolo,” in Jacques Ulmann, ed., *Nel mito di Olimpia. Ginnastica, educazione fisica e sport dall’antichità ad oggi* (Rome: Armand, 2004), p. 371.

¹⁴⁹⁸ Nicolò Abbondati, *Istituzione di arte ginnastica per le truppe di fanteria di S. M. Siciliana* (Naples: Reale Tipografia Militare, 1846).

¹⁴⁹⁹ Boeri, Crociani, and Fiorentino, *L’esercito borbonico I*, p. 128.

Alfonso La Marmora (the future Prime Minister of Italy from 1864 onwards) urged the bersaglieri officers and non-commissioned officers to become educated by Obermann¹⁵⁰⁰, having identified gymnastics as one of the central points of their education.¹⁵⁰¹ La Marmora sensibly reduced the quantity of “old drill”, i.e. the pan-European “school of the soldier and platoon”, and resorted instead to new training techniques such as less orderly battle tactics, shooting exercises and gymnastics.

Travelling German and Swiss soldiers “brought” gymnastics “with them” as well. Rüstow, according to a military handbook he had written in 1859¹⁵⁰², adhered to the military gymnastics method, i.e. that of the Prussian gymnastic institute and its principal Hugo Rothstein, who had gone on to develop his own method of military gymnastics that was only partially based on Friedrich Ludwig Jahn's method. According to Rüstow, military gymnastics had the primary aim of “strengthening the muscles of the male body”.¹⁵⁰³ But even where gymnastics had not been introduced officially, e.g. the Papal Army, the German soldiers did not abstain from practicing it: As aforementioned, they simply took to training in the German military casino.¹⁵⁰⁴

8.6 Conclusions

The military is – or, if the most recent developments in war and the military today are taken into consideration, perhaps “was” – a world that was particularly characterized by corporal presence and embodiments. The soldier's body is regulated in the military with an extensive series of imperatives, from drill and dress to discipline. “Emotional standards”, such as having no fear and being courageous, being disciplined and loyal were also imperatives; because it is not possible to look into the “mind” of another, many of these emotional standards were often measured using physical parameters. While a portion of these “emotional” requirements more or less differ from those that governed civilian life, others overlapped or informed this last – taking the form of “militarization” of the civil sphere.

¹⁵⁰⁰ For biographic information on Obermann see the website: Rudolf Obermann [Museo virtuale della Reale Società Ginnastica di Torino], <http://www.museorealeginnastica.it/?q=node/366>, (last accessed 10.09.2012).

¹⁵⁰¹ Di Donato, “Cenni storici sulla 'ginnastica',” p. 370. Still today, “La Marmora's Decalogue” for the bersaglieri is known, of which one “commandment” reads as follows: “Ginnastica di ogni genere fino alla frenesia”: “Gymnastics in every form until a frenzy (has been reached)”.

¹⁵⁰² See the entry “Turnen” in Friedrich Wilhelm Rüstow, *Militärisches Hand-Wörterbuch nach dem Standpunkte der neuesten Literatur und mit Unterstützung von Fachmännern bearbeitet und redigiert*, vol. 2 (Zurich: Druck und Verlag von Friedrich Schultheß, 1859), pp. 338-340, the “Centralturnanstalt in Berlin” and Rothstein are named explicitly (p. 339).

¹⁵⁰³ „[..D]ie Muskeln des menschlichen Körpers zu stärken“ Rüstow, „Turnen“, p. 338.

¹⁵⁰⁴ See p. 368.

Individual soldiers were members of specific groups or military units that were made more or less visible through the development of a series of differentiating signs and symbols; the military units also interacted with each other in ways in which their differences from each other as corps came to the fore.

Aside from the respective formal military unit of each soldier, other types of groups receive the soldiers' loyalty, among which are more institutionalized groups such as the army as a whole or the respective state or political party to which this army belongs. Other communalities between soldiers tend to overlap or cut across these more institutional memberships; in the case of multinational armies for instance the national groups of the soldiers or other perceived communalities, be these regional or biographical connections between portions of the soldier population as a whole. At times these communalities are supported by or tend towards an independent institutionalization, and as such become increasingly visible.

This chapter discussed how the membership of German soldiers in their military corps related with other group loyalties, as these last became increasingly more important for them.

It must first be recalled that the institutional placement of foreign soldiers in the Italian armed groups, among which the Germans, differed considerably from soldier to soldier: Some served in military units that were predominantly comprised of Italians or at least subjects of the state, in other words corps that in the case of the Papal and Bourbon Army were referred to as "indigenous corps". Others served in either a mostly Italian-dominated or more decisively multinational context, whether this was the military administration or the general staffs and ministries. Most foreign soldiers, however, served in specifically created foreigners' regiments, and in some cases these last were further divided into "national" units.

In the latter two cases, the nature of these regiments and corps was made visible, in varying degrees, through the use of cockades, flags, uniforms; this however was an aspect that, for temporal and space issues, could not be developed in depth here. It seems however, that these differentiations were at times so distinct that not only did military personnel recognize them, but civilians did as well; in other cases, these types of symbols were not as obvious, and in order to recognize or understand their meaning, civilians would have had to have at least some basic knowledge of the armies and their inner workings. Given the hyper-symbolic nature of armies, which characterized the ways in which other differentiations were made visible, soldiers were far more used to reading even these smaller more subtle signs and symbols.

Based on these observations, this chapter discussed a series of developments. First, soldiers tended to make comparisons not only between themselves individually, but between their respective groups as well: One such comparison was that of their own army and that of the enemy – e.g. by making a distinction between mercenaries and volunteers. Another placed the various military units within the single armies in contrast to each other. Second, many soldiers tended to identify as “national” groups even those military units that were in fact of a more multinational makeup; one such example was that the Papal Foreign Carabineers or the Bourbon foreigners’ regiments were considered German or Swiss corps, even if these last were characterized by a number of different nationalities within their ranks. Third, in other cases such as the multinational corps of the Zouaves, the soldiers as well as publications on the Zouaves tended to subdivide the corps into national segments, making reference to “Dutch Zouaves” or “English Zouaves” for instance. A further example of this subdivision, which was so commonplace and rooted in the minds of the soldiers, is the fact that some nationalities created their own Zouave war songs, which bound rather than opposed the national cause to that of the Pope.

In other words, foreign soldiers increasingly began to refer to themselves as members of a nation and were referred to as such by others as well. In their reports, German soldiers and officers speak of themselves as “German”; other biographical elements, such as regional origin, or biographical communalities were named as well, though much less. The German soldiers and officers openly distinguished themselves from the Italians or other nationalities, such as the Swiss with whom they were often grouped in the military setting. Moreover, at least partially orientaling images of southern Europe, Italy or southern Italy can be detected in the German soldiers’ descriptions of the Italians, most emblematically in the idea that Italian women were “sexually wild”. As aforementioned, German soldiers were also addressed as such by external sources as well, e.g. in the press and in pamphlets and by a population that seemed to be informed by the typical image present in the Italian national discourse at the time of the German (soldier) as a “barbarian”.

The continuous comparison in terms of military ability and manliness of the “nationalities” was connected to the overlap between military units and national grouping and the separation of these units into national segments; therefore, alongside the attraction between nations, expressed in terms such as “brotherhood of peoples” and international “solidarity”, the repulsion and competitiveness between nations existed. The object of these comparisons took the form of four “qualities”: humane treatment (between officers and soldiers, or soldiers and civilians), cleanliness, courage and discipline, and loyalty. These

objects were, however, very much bandied about regarding the different nationalities, so that the same quality could be acknowledged in oneself by a given group, while a member of another national group could at the same time doubt its presence in that very group. The heightened atmosphere of continuous and “unfair” comparisons (insofar as they were informed by static stereotypes), however, led at times to violent clashes between the members of the various national groups of foreign soldiers.

Despite the nationality-related clashes between soldiers of different national groups and military units, clashes and conflict were also often a sign of partially differing ideas on military organization. There was a controversy for instance between officers like Rüstow and some of his colleagues regarding the necessity of maintaining a strict hierarchy or discipline within the ranks, or the extent to which officers should spend their time among their soldiers. The need to maintain strict discipline had already been underlined by Haug in his writings on the Roman Republic in 1849. This, of course, is an instance in which regular army officers were expressing their opinions; these officers were able to keep their differing political beliefs and their individual ideas regarding the organization of “democratic” armies but nevertheless highlighted questions of discipline and hierarchy in the military. Certainly, the results of these partially differing ideas and practices on the “reality” of the situation, in the Garibaldian armed groups in particular, remain to be analysed in more depth; but if it is taken into account that at least some foreign officers informed the practices of considerable segments of the southern army and that the number of ex-regular soldiers and officers serving in these “democratic” forces was higher than often acknowledged, the probability that there was total opposition between the “military culture” of the *garibaldini* and that of the “regular” armies diminishes.

Though it was not the only way, conflict within the armies was often a sign of (the beginning of) change. Another channel of change was based on consciously copying other armies; and another means still resulted from slightly differing practices.

Conscious copying and change through the modification of internal practice were both involved in the transnational transfer of gymnastics and its integration into the official army practices of Piedmont and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. The presence of German soldiers not only played a role in this transfer with regard to these two armies, but – through their personal initiative to pursue and practice military gymnastics – also in the case of the Papal Army, which did not officially integrate the practice. The analysis here is only a first contribution to the possible further inquiry into the history of the more circumscribed military gymnastics, which, as opposed to the history of gymnastics in the schools, has hardly been

studied. While in Prussia, for instance, gymnastics was first implemented into the school curricula and only subsequently into the army, in some of the Italian armies the opposite seems to have occurred. Furthermore, despite the fact that it was an import from further north, i.e. Sweden and Denmark, gymnastics in general came to be seen as a German and/or Swiss invention, and Germans and Swiss individuals contributed to its early implementation in the Armies of Piedmont and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. In fact, German officers (among which Rüstow) were supporters and practitioners of military gymnastics. Even in the absence of an official decision to adopt it, the German soldiers continued to pursue their practice of gymnastics, apparently unable to abstain from practicing it, as may be surmised by the allocation of rooms in the German military casino in Rome for gymnastic exercises.

9 General conclusions

When I began to examine the German soldiers on the various Italian sides, the differences are what, first and foremost, surfaced.

The German soldiers fought for fundamentally opposed political Italian sides, and hence effectively – but not necessarily subjectively – for different political aims: For democracy and/or the Italian nation under Mazzini and Garibaldi, and therefore what may be described as being “on the left” or the “centre-left”; and for the “legitimate” rights of the Bourbon monarch or the Pope as monarch to govern over their own territory and people, hence on the counter-revolutionary or “right” side of the political spectrum. From this perspective, the Germans served in armed groups that seemed to be fundamentally different in their nature: On the one side there were the “democratic”/“liberal” irregular combatants, while on the other the “conservative” “regular” armies; the first more a group of revolutionaries than an “army”, the second official state armies.

But as this research suggests, there were other differences and communalities as well, some of which cut across this political divide.

As the chapter on mobilization has shown, there was a series of elements that essentially behaved in an international or even a-national manner. Other forms of mobilization however established links between foreign regions and nations and the respective Italian side; an example of such was the development in the German-Italian case of “minor” personality cults around figures like Hermann Kanzler or Marie Sophie of Bavaria. Especially after 1860 Catholic publications generated by Rome provided elements for “national” and “regional” stories about the Papal Army, which were then be further “mythologized” in the “periphery”. What emerged from this research was that regional and national “identity” were not so much in opposition with one another as much as they informed one another, and regional and national references were often to be found in the same texts by the same authors, among which the poems on the “Bavarian-German” Marie Sophie, Kanzler “from Baden” as the “pride of Catholic Germany”, and Bach as the “Bavarian” that shot in the “Prussian way” (regardless of the fact that he had never been a member of the Prussian Army).

These national stories coming out of Rome and the consequent emergence of national groupings assimilated what was initially the democratic idea of “brotherhood of peoples”.

This concept was previously developed and put into practice especially from the 1830s and 1840s onwards by the democratic “party”. In fact, this concept was one of international bonds that was intimately bound to the separation of the world into different nations; brotherhood within this context was imagined to engender solidarity between and by nations. But, as aforementioned this specific vision had also taken hold in the world-views of the political opponents, of legitimists and Catholics, at least by 1860.

From the internalization of this concept sprang the desire, on all political sides to create “national legions” that would be sent to the different Italian parties; with regard to the German-Italian case these included the various projects put forth by Johann Philipp Becker – first for Sicily and the Roman Republic in 1848-49 and then for the southern campaign in 1860– and the endeavours to create just such a Legion for the Pope within the context of the German Catholic Assemblies in the 1860s. This planning of such legions exemplifies how discourses tend to undergo a process of institutionalization. In contrast to Garibaldi’s British Legion or the St. Patricks Irish battalion that fought for the Papal Army, in fact, none of the attempts to create an *official* “German Legion” in Italy was successful.

Whether in terms of the ideas that intertwined nationalism and internationalism, the nation and the Italian “parties”, or of the elements of political and cultural mobilization that functioned alongside the nation, this study shows that they all were important for the actual outcome of German soldierly engagement in Italy. They engendered private activities to support the respective Italian armed group in Germany whereby other people were prevailed upon to enlist or donate money. But this type of mobilization did not necessarily directly reach the single recruit.

For the recruits, political considerations were frequently mixed with economic and career prospects, though it was not uncommon for these last to take precedence. This is confirmed by the fact that alongside the political and cultural driving forces, the concrete recruitment of foreigners for all the Italian armies also made use of economic incentives which were rooted in the traditions of mercenary recruitment of former centuries.

On all sides, regular pay was foreseen for the soldiers and officers. Wages often differed, though not so much between the pro- and anti-Risorgimento armed groups, but along other lines of differentiation: First, wage differentiation was to all effects based on rank and therefore wages differed between officers and common soldiers even in nearly all Garibaldian campaigns, but often also according to hierarchical order among these two groups. Second, the payment schemes in the regular armies often differed from corps to corps, dictating wage-level according to whether one was a member of the foreigners’ corps or the “indigenous”

corps; this difference in wages was particularly pronounced in the Bourbon Army, but was present albeit to a lesser degree (and only until 1866) in the Papal Army as well. As exploration has revealed, these differences informed and reinforced a negative imagery of the foreign soldier as a foreign “mercenary” amongst indigenous soldiers and the *garibaldini* alike. Third, it is opportune to note the differences between the various Garibaldian undertakings in terms of monetary retribution: At times, wages were officially anchored in the regulations of the states’ armies, and so in 1849, 1859 and 1866. But already with regard to the 1860 campaign the decision was made to align wages to those established in the Piedmontese Army; the same decree communicated that actual payments would be reduced to half-wages but specified that soldiers and officers could ask for the rest at war’s end. This was regardless of the fact that during times of war wages were often irregularly paid in all armies.

Enlistment premiums were not only offered in the Papal and Bourbon Army, but were at least in 1860 offered by Garibaldi’s Southern Army as a means to induce Bourbon (and among them foreign and German) soldiers to desert or to join the pro-national side.

The results of this study show that for a large number of German soldiers and officers on all sides, economic and career considerations were in fact important. It was not uncommon for higher ranking foreign officers – in the case of the Sicilian State in 1848, the Roman Republic in 1849 or the Southern Army of 1860 for instance – to negotiate individual wages that were greater than the standard, and to ask to be engaged at the highest rank possible. For many, the Italian commitment was also a way to continue a military career that had been interrupted for mostly political but also other reasons (another hint at the interweaving of politics and military careers) – for instance in the case of Rüstow due to his revolutionary commitment or in that of Korff and – probably – Kanzler, who had refused duels because of their Catholic beliefs.

Furthermore, while changing sides to fight in a different armed group or army in the Italian conflict was not unheard of, this study also brought to light the fact that many soldiers – and not just officers – served at one time or another in more than one European army: work on the archival material and namely the soldiers’ registers revealed that there were soldiers that fought in the Crimea, Algeria and Mexico *before* they joined the Garibaldian ranks, or those of the Papal and Bourbon Armies. What this means is that former “enemies” became “comrades”, and vice versa: perhaps one of the most evident examples of this was the ex-Bourbon German soldiers of the Garibaldian “foreign company” who were now required to fight against their former colleagues. Another is the soldiers that fought against each other in the Austro-Prussian war of 1867, that were then put together in the same corps of the Papal

Carabineers. The Austrian Officer Haug is an example at the individual level; this last fought the Italians in 1848 and joined the Army of the Roman Republic in 1849 in order to – as he saw it – bring some “order” to its ranks. Of course it would be necessary to further examine this phenomenon of cross-army mobility within a broader context than is offered by this specific bilateral study.

The contemporaneity of political and cultural mobilization and of economic and career incentives used to attract (foreign) soldiers rendered it necessary to discuss in a more substantial manner the question of motives and motivation. This issue was addressed from multiple angles. First, the question of motives and motivations was assessed from a theoretical perspective by having a look at how these objects are addressed both in historiography (especially the field of intentional explanations) and in motivational psychology. From this analysis, three salient points emerged: it is possible for there to be more than one, or even one primary motive; “motivation” can be understood as the sum of an individual's different motives; and that research on the relationship between motives and “motivational self-images” ought to be carried out. It is of note, that this last point in particular, would clearly lend itself to further study. Second, this study empirically showed not only the importance of economic and professionalizing elements, it revealed that motives from very different spheres, e.g. political, cultural, economic and private, in fact overlapped in many individual cases.

The controversies between the political sides at the time were based on a strong opposition between two motives in particular: the political and the economic. This opposition manifested in the counterposition of volunteers and mercenaries, whereby each political side described their adherents as politically driven volunteers while the adherents of their political opponents were denounced as mercenaries, exclusively motivated by economic interests. Within this context, the image of the mercenary was used by each side to attack the soldiers of the other. Each side rejected that the soldiers of the other were or could be politically motivated, and hence directly attacked the heart of the idea of the volunteer as sacrificing any and all personal interests to a political cause.

As I expressed in my work, classifying these soldiers into these two categories of the volunteer and the mercenary hinges on identifying *one*, or at least one *primary*, motive, and hence necessitates a clarity that is very seldom present in historical reality.

The study underlined two points in particular: First, it wasn't necessary that each individual soldier come into contact with the political and cultural mobilization to induce him to enlist into one of the Italian armed groups; notwithstanding, it is likely that this level

contributed to the outcome; what came to light here was that these elements affected the members of the associations that channelled recruits to the official recruitment offices more than they did many enlisting soldiers; at other times, associations (and specifically the Catholic associations) raised money to cover the wages of soldiers that enlisted and went to serve in the Papal Army in Rome. Second, it is worthy of note that in many instances the different types of motives often overlapped, as is suggested by the cases of many German officers, from Haug to Korff to Rüstow. That different motives were at stake is also indirectly confirmed by the combination of political and economic incentives adopted in the Garibaldian armed group in its attempt to induce the Bourbon soldiers to desert and/or to change sides and come over to fight with the “red shirts” in 1860. By deciding *a priori* in favour of one of the two labels – the “real” political war volunteer or mercenary – historians run the risk of unnecessarily narrowing the analysis: In this regard, the history of soldiers that actually enlisted is necessarily different from studies that – with good reason – concentrate on a specific class of motive(s), be it economic, political, religious, cultural etc.

Although this opposition between volunteer and mercenary, wherein the positive political motives of the political volunteer are separated from the negative economic image of the mercenary, there are elements in the recruitment practices of the various Italian armed groups of the nineteenth century that were a continuation of those of the *historical* mercenaries. One typical instrument of the era of the (foreign) mercenary was the practice of establishing recruitment offices in foreign states. As in previous centuries, the location of these offices was very much informed by the prohibitions on the recruitment of subjects for foreign countries that were still in place in the nineteenth century in many countries. But during the period studied here, there was significant development in the German case, and it would be interesting to see how this was in other cases. While at the beginning of the century freedom of emigration and the possibility to enter foreign military service were a prerogative first and foremost for some groups of German nobles (the Standesherren and – to a lesser degree – the Reichsritter), the constitutional debates and reforms, particularly those enacted following the period of revolution of 1848-49, informed the legal situation of non-nobles entering foreign military service. There was a progressive relaxation in the legal situation as it applied to the potential *recruits* due to the equation of foreign military service with emigration; furthermore as the right to emigration gained recognition, the traditional bans that prohibited recruitment for foreign armies in general were limited to the recruitment of the subjects of the said territory, and often only those subjects that were still liable in one way or another for their military service at “home”.

While in regard to the recruits the “freedom to enter foreign military service” gained momentum especially from the mid-century on, the bans placed on recruiters as well as on the advertisement of foreign recruitment continued to remain in effect in nineteenth-century Germany. This informed the practice of placing the recruitment offices in the regions that lay on just the other side of the border. In fact, recruitment offices for the Papal and Bourbon Armies were erected in countries where recruitment was more or less openly allowed by governmental decision, hence in France, Belgium and – partially – Austria (this last especially with regard to recruitment for the Bourbon Army). In this context, Germans had to turn toward these offices on foreign ground; the offices in St. Louis in France, in the near vicinity of Basle and Baden; Feldkirch in Austria, which “serviced” the southern German states; and in Brussels in Belgium which bordered the southern Rhineland were all important. The fact that German recruits had to reach foreign soil before enlisting in one of the Italian armies, regardless of political orientation, seemed to have affected the regional origin of the Germans that eventually enlisted in the Italian forces.

The recruitment offices and structures for *different* European armies were often located in the same cities: Feldkirch, for example, was an important place to recruit for the Papal and Bourbon Armies, while British recruitment offices were to be found along the French-German border just as those for the Italian armed groups. In the port cities, the flux of soldiers directed toward the different European armies overlapped as well; this was particularly true for Trieste and Marseille, which channelled many of the northern European recruits for various European armies, and among them the Italian ones. The presence of multiple recruitment offices along the border regions and this funnel-like effect generated by and in the port cities without doubt informed the persistence of a “European soldier market” even in the nineteenth century.

Another element often considered to be typical of mercenaries, in that it seemed to symbolize arbitrariness of origin, was the soldier's service in more than one army over the course of his life. Many German soldiers had already led for some time a more decidedly military life (in their national/regional armies) before they joined the Italian armed groups, and went on to join others after they had completed their Italian commitment. There were also those that had already served in foreign armed forces, among which the French Foreign Legion, especially in Algeria, the different sides in Mexico, the British foreign Legions in the Crimea or in India, many of which also went on to join other armies, for instance those of the different sides of the American Civil War, once they had completed their Italian service.

Although many had led a military life for an extended period of time, it was nonetheless not uncommon to find civil professions noted down in the soldiers' registers next to their names: What this indicates is that entries on professions are not always sufficient proof – and this could also have applied to the *Italian* members of the Garibaldian armed groups as well – as to whether or not a soldier was an "amateur" or not; in order to substantiate (or, conversely, disprove) this classification, one would need to examine more closely each single biography. This study further suggests that rather than (only) underlining the differences between political commitment and military life, it would be more appropriate to see that the two were often intimately linked.

Due to the absence (in the Papal Army, *garibaldini*) or much-reduced practical role (Bourbon Army) played by military conscription in this period, many of the soldiers in general, and the foreigners in particular, were *formal* volunteers. In fact contracts governed and established their terms of service; depending on the contract that was signed, the period of enlistment was set for a specific duration that ranged between 6 months and 4 years. The possibility to re-enlist was not only possible it was incentivized by pay packages and the promise of a dismissal fund or pensions. The conditions – usually in terms of length of service – that had to be met in order to obtain the latter remained so high (for the “jubilee” pension normally a minimum 20 years of service), however, that they proved extremely difficult to meet. In light of the fact that the average and median length of time served on the part of German soldiers in the Papal Zouaves and the Foreign Carabineers was around two years, it becomes clear indeed how difficult it would be to meet the necessary conditions for the pension plan.

The abovementioned points demonstrate that there are elements of continuity between the foreign soldiering of the eighteenth century and that of the nineteenth. What changed is perhaps not so much the role of economic rewards, the contractual nature of the service or the succession of different military engagements, but the way in which foreign soldiers were perceived by public opinion. The terms mercenaries and volunteers were increasingly used as counter-concepts in the antagonistic communications between the various political sides, especially with regard to foreign soldiers. In fact, as of at least 1860, the papal institutions spoke of their foreign soldiers as "volunteers", and the military groups of the pro-Bourbon forces were referred to by these last as "volunteer" corps in the same period.

A comparison of the available numbers on foreigners in the European armies of the nineteenth century with those of the Italian armed groups reveals the absolutely remarkable status of the Papal Army in this period; the percentage of foreigners in the Papal Army went

against the general trend and actually saw an increase. The ratio of foreigners serving in the Bourbon but also Garibaldian armed groups – even if caution must be made with this latter due to the particularly difficult archival situation – more or less corresponded to the similar percentages verified in other European armies at the time, which hovered around 5%. This is telling especially with regard to the *garibaldini*, because these numbers suggest that the fascination of European publics with Garibaldi in many cases did not lead to a particularly strong foreign presence in the Garibaldian ranks, even if there were noticeable differences among the various (individual) foreign national groups that were present.

The numbers of German soldiers very much conform to these general findings, but are not without their specificity as well. The greatest number of Germans by far was to be found in the Papal Army; and while only some served in the corps of the Zouaves, many more were listed in the ranks of the heretofore unstudied corps of the Foreign Carabineers; altogether, approximately 1,800 Germans enlisted from 1861 to 1870 in these corps of the Papal Army. They were, however, outnumbered by many other nationalities; a good example was the larger numbers of French and Belgians. It is clear that these numerical differences without doubt were informed by the fact that Frenchmen and Belgians did not have to face the legal obstacles to foreign recruitment and to recruitment advertising that the Germans did.

Some 500 Germans are recorded to have enlisted in the foreigners' regiments of the Bourbon Army that were assembled in 1859; even if there were many more Austrians and even Swiss than there were Germans, it is of note that the latter came not only from Bavaria, but also from Württemberg and – counter to the official decision not to recruit from there – Prussia.

In comparison, the number of Germans in the Garibaldian ranks seems particularly small: the multiple attempts Becker mounted to form German Legions for Garibaldi were always set in motion too late. Among the German Garibaldian officers figure more or less the names that were already known and noted in the existing literature – some even had to be excluded from this study because they were in fact not German, even when considering a definition of this that included subjects born in Austria. In terms of soldiers the 200-strong “foreign company” comprised of ex-Bourbon soldiers, among which 64 soldiers that are of ascertained German origin, is of note; they indubitably constitute a specificity, even if only a partial one, if we take into account other cases of ex-Bourbon soldiers in the Southern Army.

Thus far the thesis has examined aspects connected to the motivation of the German soldiers that underpinned their choice to enlist in the Italian armed groups, to their enlistment itself, and the actual numbers of Germans that went on to actually enlist. But in addition to

this line of inquiry, I thought it opportune to also propose a shift in the perspective and to look at what kinds of experiences the German soldiers and officers in the Italian armed groups had.

In this regard, the study underlined that it is important to bear in mind the different institutional placements of the foreign, and among them German, soldiers. While most, regardless of armed group and political side, were placed in foreigners' regiments or in (at least nominally) national military groups, some of the foreign soldiers and officers served in other contexts: from "indigenous" regiments to the military administration, from general staffs to the ministry. The experiences they had differed in part according to these different placements: While for a common soldier in the foreigners' regiments "horizontal cooperation"¹⁵⁰⁵ with other military corps was the norm, for officers that did not serve in the foreigners' corps an Italian and/or foreign, sometimes "cosmopolitan" context, was their reality. And of course it is possible to ask whether it would be correct to identify single figures, such as Hermann Kanzler, that had been in Italy for more than 30 years and pursued their whole career (in his case within the Papal Army) in Italy as "Germans" or whether it would be more appropriate to consider them papal subjects or even Italians.

In the regular armies, the service of the (foreign or "indigenous") soldier that formally enlisted on a voluntary basis was still linked to the idea that there was a personal relationship of loyalty between the individual and the respective sovereign and that this sovereign could even be a "foreign" head of state. The oath the German soldier was expected to swear in the Papal or Bourbon Armies still contained the words "to my sovereign", hence the respective Italian sovereign (the Pope or the Bourbon king). In their own writings, the Germans do in fact refer at times to the Italian sovereign or state or – *mutatis mutandis* – to the Italian political party they had adhered to by using the possessive pronouns ("my", "our").

But, given that the presence of foreign soldiers was increasingly seen through the filter of national grouping, there was a clear shift in the history of foreign soldiers from that of the previous century.

The foreign regiments of the Papal and Bourbon Armies remained multinational regiments, even if they continued to differ in national composition, mostly because of the aim to put soldiers with linguistic similarities together. Nevertheless, both the general public and

¹⁵⁰⁵ The two concepts of "horizontal cooperation" (the coordination of different national corps by a more or less multinational leading level) and "vertical integration" (the integration of soldiers from different nationalities into the same military corps) were developed from the military sociology on "multinational corps" of today, but I found them very stimulating for the study of the foreign soldiers in Italy in the nineteenth century. On the concepts see Sven Bernhard Gareis, "Militärische Multinationalität," in Nina Leonhard and Ines-Jacqueline Werkner, eds., *Militärsoziologie. Eine Einführung*, 2 ed. (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2012), especially pp. 344-345.

the soldiers themselves began, to see these corps in national terms. One perspective exaggerated the national homogeneity of these groups, for instance by seeing the Papal Foreign Carabineers or the Bourbon foreign regiments as “German” corps, or the Zouaves as “French”; another was to divide these corps into smaller national components, for instance referring to these different groups in the Zouaves as the “Dutch Zouaves” and “English Zouaves” for example. The separation and institutionalization of national groups did not occur only at the linguistic level however. In fact, some features of the armies provided focal points that reinforced these processes of consolidation of national grouping; such examples include the national military chaplains or the creation of national military casinos in the Roman case.

The “quality” of corps and the “quality” of their soldiers had already traditionally been subject to comparison in the European armies. By viewing the multinational corps of the Papal and Bourbon Armies as “national” corps, the differences in prestige of each corps could be translated into a battle over the prestige of the different nationalities in these armies. These battles were first and foremost symbolic fights regarding the “honour” of the national groups that could lead to “real” and violent clashes between different corps and/or national groups of soldiers.

In this way, the experiences of the foreign soldiers in the Italian armed groups increasingly became nationalizing experiences and this was valid on all political sides; despite the question how foreign soldiers could be and have been motivated to enter these armies, their military experiences in Italy, whether on the side of the *garibaldini* or, especially from 1859 onwards in the Bourbon or Papal Armies, not only functioned as a “school of men”, but as “school of the nation”¹⁵⁰⁶, this last in the sense that the world-views were nationalized. The soldiers were increasingly addressed, and increasingly addressed themselves, as members of national groups. The mutual views between the national groups of soldiers incorporated the existing assumptions and stereotypes on different military national characters that had already developed in the eighteenth century. To a great extent, these longstanding stereotypes informed the reciprocal comparisons between the national groups and/or different corps of the armies. The traditional image that Germans were “calm, obedient and disciplined”, was combined with the seemingly opposing image of them as “barbarians”, and the view that the Italians were “hot-headed” both continued to inform these comparisons, which revolved around issues such as the treatment of others (whether this was of soldiers on the part of the

¹⁵⁰⁶ For the concepts see Frevert, *A Nation in barracks*.

officers or the civilians or captives on the part of the soldiers), cleanliness, courage and discipline, and loyalty. To this nationalizing effect were added foreign-Italian transfers, whereby new practices from abroad were introduced and spread in the military context; such was the case of the "German-Swiss" gymnastics, the incorporation of which led to a partial shift away from mechanistic military drill and toward an active focus on the cultivation of physical fitness and strength. Military gymnastics were adopted very early on in the Bourbon Army, but were practiced at the informal level by the German soldiers in other armies as well, e.g. by Rüstow in the Garibaldian Army and the soldiers in the Papal Army. All of these dimensions were intimately linked to images of masculinity, and therefore these comparisons between national groups or corps were ultimately a comparison in terms of masculinity and virility as well. It is for this reason that the single Italian armies, including the "anti-national" Papal and Bourbon Armies, became important places for the struggles surrounding the concept of "revirilization" and the "military" Risorgimento of both Italians and other nationalities. Hence, the history of the Risorgimento unfolded, so to speak, not only in the pro-national field via the various activities of liberals and democrats, but also in the spheres of the political opponents as well.

Within the concept of revirilization, a decidedly "military" Risorgimento, and the understanding that the Italians necessitated this process, the stereotypes of the German character – i.e. that they were innately organized, disciplined, cool-headed and calm – and the often opposite "negative" stereotypes of the Italians created tensions within the ranks of the Italian armies and armed groups. Many Germans, and specifically the German officers, believed that their function was to introduce order, discipline, and organization to what they often considered to be poorly organized and undisciplined Italian fighting forces. This belief resulted in the tendency of some to behave arrogantly toward the Italian soldiers, and often they became rigid, refusing to accept much variation on their sense of limits and discipline.

Therefore, perhaps more than in other foreign-Italian cases, the German foreign soldiers and officers tried to "regularize" the *garibaldini*, by bringing the service regulations or military criminal law from the other armies they had served in and/or by behaving accordingly. Differences of opinion informed not only clashes between the officers, but were the reasons why military practices could differ considerably from corps to corps. This type of variation in military practices leads to the observation that, particularly with regard to the Garibaldini, it would be important to study the *worlds* of the various military subgroups more than was possible in this thesis. The former Bourbon soldiers that joined the Garibaldian "foreign company", after having changed sides together with some of their Bourbon officers,

could more or less continue on “as usual” under the new flags. The practices of this company necessarily differed from groups that had a higher percentage of inexperienced soldiers.

Despite the fact that the study does not delve further into the topic of the diversification of practices within the various Garibaldian subgroups, the study nevertheless underlines the communalities that exist between the “regular” and Garibaldian armed groups. For instance, the physical separation of officers and soldiers, specific modes of military communication, and military criminal law were present on all sides. Based on the differences that existed between the Garibaldian officers and common soldiers and on the different placements – e.g. in the general staffs or in that of one of the national legions – it very well may be that the histories of the *garibaldini* that underline their “cosmopolitan” character may apply more to (a portion of) the Garibaldian officers than to the common soldiers; therefore, a “military history from below” of the *garibaldini* remains yet to be written.

On the history of the foreign and German soldiers in Italy, the study has clearly evidenced the specific ways in which in the nineteenth century “humanity” and internationalism were conceptualized as solidarity, first and foremost, between and by nations; it is in this *specific* way that internationalism and nationalism were in fact intertwined instead of being placed in opposition to each other. As it obviously makes a difference whether one speaks of “brotherhood” in general or “brotherhood of peoples” instead, one must not forget the specific declinations that characterized the concept of “brotherhood” when used within the context of the nineteenth-century military. The “brotherhood of arms of the peoples” created through the common shedding of blood by others in support of the cause of the one generated a duty to be “repaid” with the blood of this last for the cause of the other. Horizontal “comradeship” between officers and soldiers was, at least since the Napoleonic times, also considered to be functional with regard to discipline and military performance; by the documented content of Garibaldi’s communications to his soldiers, this last seems to have understood this idea as well.

These additions used to qualify concepts in history are important, regardless of whether they apply to society in general or only to the military context, and hence they ought to be kept in mind. Both their existence and use are a crucial sign that internationalism has its *own* history and that there are different ways to conceptualize international bonds. Rather than seeing internationalism only in a positive light, at the political level – and this moves a bit away from the historiographical work done here – some of the qualified ideas of internationalism and brotherhood of the nineteenth century can rightly be criticized.

This study clearly could not cover every ambit comprehensively and therefore there are several aspects that either have not been touched upon at all or have not been sufficiently addressed but ought to be in the future. The processes of “remembering and forgetting” the foreign participation should be investigated for instance by analysing the virtually unstudied monuments of the “Anti-Risorgimento” such as the “Monument for the Papal Army” of 1867 that lies in the cemetery of Verano in Rome. Furthermore, it would be worthwhile to rethink the role of actual physical presence in the processes analysed in this study in a more substantial manner than has been done here within the context of the contemporary comparisons between soldiers and corps, and specifically with regard to the case of military gymnastics. Finally, as I have already emphasized above, the complex nature of the composition of the Garibaldian undertakings in particular suggests that more detailed research could be carried out on the military subgroups and the variations that existed in the different practices of these groups.

Despite these lacunae and given that the history of the German soldiers in the various Italian armed groups, for the sake of intelligibility, had to be seen within the context not only of the history of the pre-Unitarian armed groups in Italy in general but also of the more circumscribed history of foreigners in these armed groups in particular, the study constitutes a contribution – even if this was not its primary aim – to a possible comparative military history of the pre-Unitarian Italian armed groups and also to the transnational transformation of what has traditionally been a nationally-oriented military history of the nineteenth century in general.

Many extremes have been discussed herein. Some, however, only seem to be but are not in fact oppositions. There were also many stories that have been told. In this study, I have tried to show how they were or were not connected. And although there are already many valuable stories told by others, my aim was to approach this theme from a slightly different perspective and therefore tell a new story. At the same time, it was not possible to embark upon several paths in that the stories would have been too implausible or because the source material necessary was different from what I had at my disposition. There are also several storylines that beg further work, and others – based on what I now know – that would need re-working. No stories of a “glorious” German Legion or of “valorous” German soldiers in Italy have emerged or been recounted. Nor was this story one of “mercenaries” or only and exclusively of “political war volunteers”. Lastly, it was not possible to recount stories of a transnational “idyll”, for they simply were not there.

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APPENDIX 1 – Numbers on Italian and European armies and armed groups and lists of

German soldiers and officers

A1.1 Total number of soldiers in Italian and other European armies in the nineteenth century

Table A1.1 Total number of soldiers - Papal Army, 1848-1870

<i>Year</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Source</i>
1848	13,000	Correlates-of-War.
1859	11,000	Correlates-of-War.
1860	19,000	Correlates-of-War.
1848	16,020	Dalla Torre, "Materiali".
1859	15,305	Dalla Torre, "Materiali".
1860	23,342	Dalla Torre, "Materiali".
1867	14,000	Vigevano, <i>La fine</i> .
1870	14,000	Vigevano, <i>La fine</i> .
1859	16,864	Torre, "Relazione".
1860	22,820	Torre, "Relazione".
1853	12,828	Killmeyer, p. 239.

Table A1.2 Total number of soldiers - Bourbon Army, 1849-1860

<i>Year</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Source</i>
1849	46,000	Correlates-of-War.
1859	93,000	Correlates-of-War.
1860	92,000	Correlates-of-War.
1859	92,436	"Neap. Armee," 29.
1851	48,882	Gotha 1852, p. 361.
1859	88,162	Torre, <i>Relazione</i> , p. 271.
1860	99,432	Torre, <i>Relazione</i> , p. 275.
1857	69,160	Killmeyer, <i>Militärgeographie</i> , p. 243.

Table A1.3 Total number of soldiers - Invasion of Savoy 1834

1834	ca. 100	Harring; Ramorino, <i>passim</i> .
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Table A1.4 Total number of soldiers - Roman Republic

1849	19,000	Caneloro, <i>Storia dell'Italia</i> III, p. 444.
1849 – “regular”	12,000	Caneloro, <i>Storia dell'Italia</i> , III, p. 444.
1849 – “volunteers”	8,000	Caneloro, <i>Storia dell'Italia</i> , III, p. 444.
Garibaldi Legion – 21.12.1848	482	Loevinson, II, p. 32-33.

Table A1.5 Total number of soldiers - State of Sicily 1848-1849

March 1848 – Messina	4,000	Pieri, <i>Storia militare</i> , p. 491.
1 September 1848 – Messina - “regulars”	2,500	Pieri, <i>Storia militare</i> , p. 500.
1 September 1848 – Messina - “irregulars”	5,500	Pieri, <i>Storia militare</i> , p. 500.
1 September 1848 – Messina – total	8,000	Pieri, <i>Storia militare</i> , p. 500.
Palermo – September 1848	3,000	Pieri, <i>Storia militare</i> , p. 505.
Sicilian Army – “regulars” – September 1848	4,300	Pieri, <i>Storia militare</i> , p. 520.
Sicilian Army – “regulars” – at the end of 1848	8,000	Pieri, <i>Storia militare</i> , p. 521.
Sicilian Army – estimate of all troops at the end of 1848 (national guard and other corps included)	15,000	Pieri, <i>Storia militare</i> , p. 525
Total – March 1849	4,000	Pieri, <i>Storia militare</i> , p. 529.

Table A1.6 Total number of soldiers - garibaldini 1859

<i>Cacciatori delle Alpi</i>	3,200	Caneloro, <i>Storia dell'Italia</i> IV, p. 318.
<i>"Hungarian Legion"</i>	3,200	Isastia in Albònico, p. 173.
<i>Cacciatori delle Alpi + Cacciatori degli Appennini</i>	6,700	Isastia in Isnenghi, p. 174.

Table A1.7 Total number of soldiers - Southern Army 1860

Southern Army	52,839	Torre, <i>Relazione</i> , p. 294.
volunteers	21,000	
First "Thousand"	1,089	Miani-Calabrese, <i>Lineamenti</i> , p. 562.
Later volunteers	20,000	Riall, <i>Hero</i> , p. 216.
Hungarian Legion	218-448	Vigevano, <i>Legione ungherese</i> , p. 79.

Table A1.8 Total number of soldiers - garibaldini 1862

1862	ca. 5,000	Cecchinato, <i>Camicie rosse</i> , p. 73.
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Table A1.9 Total number of soldiers - garibaldini 1866

"volunteers" commanded by Garibaldi	40,000	Isastia in Isnenghi, p. 178.
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Table A1.10 Total number of soldiers - garibaldini 1867

	12,000	Cecchinato, <i>Camicie rosse</i> , p. 109.
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Table A1.11 Strength of European armies 1848

<i>Country</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Total strength</i>	<i>Source</i>
Russia	1848	526,000	Correlates-of-War
Austria-Hungary	1848	409,000	Correlates-of-War
France	1848	387,000	Correlates-of-War
United Kingdom	1848	208,000	Correlates-of-War
Prussia	1848	135,000	Correlates-of-War
Ottoman Empire	1848	135,000	Correlates-of-War
Spain	1848	120,000	Correlates-of-War
Piedmont	1848	70,000	Correlates-of-War
Bavaria	1848	58,000	Correlates-of-War
Two Sicilies	1848	49,000	Correlates-of-War
Belgium	1848	33,000	Correlates-of-War
Netherlands	1848	32,000	Correlates-of-War
Hannover	1848	22,000	Correlates-of-War
Saxony	1848	16,000	Correlates-of-War
Papal States	1848	13,000	Correlates-of-War
Württemberg	1848	8,000	Correlates-of-War
Baden	1848	7,000	Correlates-of-War
Tuscany	1848	6,000	Correlates-of-War
Modena	1848	3,000	Correlates-of-War

Table A1.12 Strength of European armies 1859

<i>Country</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Total strength</i>	<i>Source</i>
Russia	1859	850,000	Correlates-of-War
France	1859	465,000	Correlates-of-War
Austria-Hungary	1859	355,000	Correlates-of-War
United Kingdom	1859	315,000	Correlates-of-War
Ottoman Empire	1859	160,000	Correlates-of-War
Prussia	1859	153,000	Correlates-of-War
Spain	1859	124,000	Correlates-of-War
Bavaria	1859	104,000	Correlates-of-War
Two Sicilies	1859	93,000	Correlates-of-War
Piedmont	1859	53,000	Correlates-of-War
Belgium	1859	40,000	Correlates-of-War
Netherlands	1859	38,000	Correlates-of-War
Saxony	1859	27,000	Correlates-of-War
Tuscany	1859	18,000	Correlates-of-War
Papal States	1859	11,000	Correlates-of-War
Württemberg	1859	10,000	Correlates-of-War
Baden	1859	8,000	Correlates-of-War
Modena	1859	5,000	Correlates-of-War
Parma	1859	3,000	Correlates-of-War

Table A1.13 Strength of European armies 1870

<i>Country</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Total strength</i>	<i>Source</i>
Russia	1870	738,000	Correlates-of-War
France	1870	452,000	Correlates-of-War
Germany	1870	319,000	Correlates-of-War
United Kingdom	1870	257,000	Correlates-of-War
Austria-Hungary	1870	252,000	Correlates-of-War
Italy	1870	174,000	Correlates-of-War
Ottoman Empire	1870	153,000	Correlates-of-War
Spain	1870	124,000	Correlates-of-War
Belgium	1870	40,000	Correlates-of-War
Netherlands	1870	39,000	Correlates-of-War
Papal States	1870	14,000	Vigevano, <i>La fine</i> .

*A1.2 Number of officers and their percentage of the total army of several Italian armies
and armed groups*

Table A1.14 Number of officers and their percentage - Kingdom of Sardinia

<i>Army</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Total number of soldiers</i>	<i>Number of officers</i>	<i>Officer- soldier-ratio</i>	<i>Source</i>
Infantry	1859	28,441	1,547	5.4%	Mazzetti, <i>Dagli eserciti</i> , p. 564.
Sharp Shooters (<i>bersaglieri</i>)	1859	3,755	197	5.2%	Mazzetti, <i>Dagli eserciti</i> , p. 564.
Cavalry	1859	5,215	306	5.9%	Mazzetti, <i>Dagli eserciti</i> , p. 564.
Artillery	1859	4,557	237	5.2%	Mazzetti, <i>Dagli eserciti</i> , 564.
Engineering Corps	1859	1,213	114	9.4%	Mazzetti, <i>Dagli eserciti</i> , p. 564.

Table A1.15 Number of officers and their percentage - Kingdom of the Two Sicilies

<i>Army</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Total number of soldiers</i>	<i>Number of officers</i>	<i>Officer-soldier-ratio</i>	<i>Source</i>
Kingdom of Two Sicilies	1857	69,160 ¹⁵⁰⁷	1.334 ¹⁵⁰⁸	1.9%	Killmeyer, <i>Militärgeographie</i> , p. 243.
Sicilian infantry	1857	56,088	1.002	1.8%	Killmeyer, <i>Militärgeographie</i> , p. 243.
Sicilian cavalry	1857	6,840	180	2.6%	Killmeyer, <i>Militärgeographie</i> , p. 243.
Sicilian artillery	1857	6,232	152	2.4%	Killmeyer, <i>Militärgeographie</i> , p. 243.
Only troops on Sicily	1860	26,667	897	3.4%	Delli Franci, <i>Cronica</i> , pp. 328-329.

Table A1.16 Number of officers and their percentage - Papal Army

<i>Army</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Total number of soldiers</i>	<i>Number of officers</i>	<i>Officer-soldier-ratio</i>	<i>Source</i>
Papal	1844	12,531	550	4.4%	Friz, <i>Burocrati e soldati</i> , p. 163.
Papal	1850	17,778	570	3.2%	Friz, <i>Burocrati e soldati</i> , p. 167.
Papal	20/09/1870	12,976	485	3.7%	Vigevano, <i>La fine</i> , p. 485.

¹⁵⁰⁷ Only in the three main branches of the army (infantry, cavalry, artillery).

¹⁵⁰⁸ Only in the three main branches of the army (infantry, cavalry, artillery).

Table A1.17 Number of officers and their percentage - Sicilian Army 1848

<i>Army</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Total number of soldiers</i>	<i>Number of officers</i>	<i>Officer-soldier-ratio</i>	<i>Source</i>
Sicilian Army	end of 1848			ca. 9% ¹⁵⁰⁹	Pieri, <i>Storia militare</i> , p. 526.

Table A1.18 Number of officers and their percentage - Roman Republic 1848-49

<i>Army</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Total number of soldiers</i>	<i>Number of officers</i>	<i>Officer-soldier-ratio</i>	<i>Source</i>
Garibaldi Legion ¹⁵¹⁰	21.12.1848	482	45	9.3%	Loevinson, <i>Garibaldi e la sua legione II</i> , pp. 32-33.
Garibaldi Legion ¹⁵¹¹	03.01.1849 ¹⁵¹²	535	24	4.5%	Loevinson, <i>Garibaldi e la sua legione II</i> , pp. 35-36.
Garibaldi Legion	end of April 1849	ca. 1,200-1,300	? ~54-59 ¹⁵¹³	? 4.5%	Loevinson, <i>Garibaldi e la sua legione I</i> , p. 160; <i>II</i> , pp. 48-49.

¹⁵⁰⁹ Pieri notes as well that according to the plans, the ratio should have been smaller: 3 officers to 10 soldiers, Pieri, *Storia militare del Risorgimento*, p. 526.

¹⁵¹⁰ This included the corps of the lancers (*lancieri*), a type of cavalryman.

¹⁵¹¹ This included the corps of the lancers (*lancieri*).

¹⁵¹² Loevinson writes that these numbers were the result of the re-organization of the legion on the part of the Roman government; this re-organization also led to the reduction of officers, which were now similar to many other armies (around 4 to 5%).

¹⁵¹³ Loevinson does not provide numbers on the officers for this period; hence, it is only possible to assume and insert a number from the last statistical data available.

Table A1.19 Number of officers and their percentage - Southern Army 1860

<i>Army</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Total number of soldiers</i>	<i>Number of officers</i>	<i>Officer-soldier-ratio</i>	<i>Source</i>
Southern Army	1860	52,839	7,343	13.9% ¹⁵¹⁴	Torre, <i>Relazione</i> , p. 296.

Table A1.20 Number of officers and their percentage - Cacciatori del Tevere – Luigi Masi

<i>Army</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Total number of soldiers</i>	<i>Number of officers</i>	<i>Officer-soldier-ratio</i>	<i>Source</i>
<i>Cacciatori del Tevere</i>	1860-1862	1,613	43	2.7%	Torre, <i>Relazione</i> , p. 300.

¹⁵¹⁴ That the percentage of officers in the Garibaldian troops was much higher than in the “regular armies” is an acknowledged fact in many studies.

Table A1.21 Number of officers and their percentage - Foreign corps of the Papal Army

<i>Army</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Total number of soldiers</i>	<i>Number of officers</i>	<i>Officer-soldier-ratio</i>	<i>Source</i>
Papal – Foreign Carabineers	1864	636	42	6.6%	Friz, <i>Burocrati e soldati</i> , p. 238.
Papal – Papal Zouaves	1865	563	32	5.7%	Friz, <i>Burocrati e soldati</i> , p. 239.
Papal – Foreign Carabineers	1861-1870	ca. 4,900	ca. 100	2%	ASR, Soldiers' registers
Papal - Zouaves	1861-1870	ca. 9,000 ¹⁵¹⁵ (10,920 entries in the registers)	ca. 150 ¹⁵¹⁶ (183 entries in the officer registers ¹⁵¹⁷)	1.7%	ASR, Soldiers' registers

¹⁵¹⁵ The entries in the registers of the common soldiers of the regiment between 1861 and 1870 exceed 10,000 entries, but when re-engagements and annulations are excluded – according to Jean Guenel – that number lies at about 9,000. Guénel, *Dernière guerre du pape*, p. 40.

¹⁵¹⁶ This number holds if one accepts a similar ratio of re-engagements.

¹⁵¹⁷ Elio Lodolini, "I volontari del Canada nell'esercito pontificio," *Rassegna storica del Risorgimento* 56 (1969), p. 645.

Table A1.22 Number of officers and their percentage - Other European armies

Army	Year	Total number of soldiers	Number of officers	%	Source(s)
Baden	1849	9,000 (COW) ¹⁵¹⁸	368 (Lutz)	4.1%	COW, Lutz, 99.
Baden	1860	8,000 (COW)	421 (Lutz)	5.3%	COW, Lutz, 99.
Baden	1871 ¹⁵¹⁹	14,000 (COW)	478 (Lutz)	3.4%	COW, Lutz, 99.
Bavaria	1849	58,000	2,033 (Gahlen)	3.5%	COW, Gahlen, 604.
Bavaria	1860	104,000	2,367	2.3%	COW, Gahlen, 604.
Austria-Hungary	1896	305,000 (COW)	15,580 (Deák)	5.1%	COW, Deák, 161.
Austria-Hungary – infantry	1906	300,512	14,471	5.3%	Löbell 1906.
Germany	ca. 1874	401,660 (Wehler)	17,000 (Wehler)	4.0%	Wehler, III, p. 875.
France (according to the budget of 1906)	1906	570,213	22,213	3.9%	Löbell 1906, 62.
United Kingdom – Home army	1906	213,780	9,505	4.4%	Löbell 1906, 93.
United Kingdom – Indian army	1906	288,788	12,513	4.3%	Löbell 1906, 93.
Italy	1906	235,658	10,959	4.4%	Löbell 1906, 111.
USA – infantry	1906	68,556	3,884	5.7%	Löbell 1906, 247.
Ottoman Empire	1906	286,908	24,548	8.6%	Löbell 1906, 239.

¹⁵¹⁸ Correlates-of-War-Project (“COW”, University of Michigan; University of California, Davis, since 1963), subset “National Material Capacities”. The numbers given here are the values given in the subset for the variable “military personal”. The definition for this variable in the COW-project is the following: “Military personnel are defined as troops under the command of the national government, intended for use against foreign adversaries, and held ready for combat as of January 1 of the referent year. [...]. On occasion, however, there are instances where there are rapid changes in troop strength, such as mobilizations for conflicts and wars. Short-term variations in strength are not reflected in the project's data unless the changes remained in effect until the following January 1.” Moreover, “reserve” and “irregular” forces are not comprised in the COW calculations either. In sum, the numbers come very close to the usual army strengths “in peacetime”. See for the definitions and sources of COW the pdf “Correlates of War Project. National Material Capacities. Data Documentation, Version 4.0, Last update June 2010”, online http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/Capabilities/NMC_Codebook_v4_0.pdf (last accessed: 12./11/2013).

¹⁵¹⁹ The numbers in this line are valid for the period just prior to the reorganization according to the convention with Prussia.

Table A1.23 Number of officers and their percentage - Militia and part-time reserve corps

<i>Army</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Total number of soldiers</i>	<i>Number of officers</i>	<i>Officer-soldier-ratio</i>	<i>Source</i>
USA – militia/national guards	1906	119,501	9,154	7.7%	Löbell 1906, 247.
Austria-Hungary – Imperial-Royal Landwehr (<i>kaiserlich-königliche Landwehr</i>)	1906	34,355	2,679	7.8%	Löbell 1906.
Austria-Hungary – Royal Hungarian Landwehr (<i>königlich ungarische Landwehr</i>)	1906	26,894	2,298	8.5%	Löbell 1906.

A1.3 Numbers on the percentage of officers and generals from the nobility in some European armies of the nineteenth century

Table A1.24 Noble and bourgeois officers in European armies in the nineteenth century

<i>Army</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Percentage of noble officers</i>	<i>Source</i>
Prussia	1817	55.1%	Demeter, p. 15.
Prussia	1860	65%	Demeter, p. 28.
Bavaria	1815	31.9%	Gahlen, p. 604.
Bavaria	1846	43.1%	Gahlen, p. 604.
Bavaria	1860	33.4%	Gahlen, p. 604.
Baden	1815	29.4%	Lutz, p. 99.
Baden	1846	46.7%	Lutz, p. 99.
Baden	1860	30.7%	Lutz p. 99
Saxony	1828	30%	Matzerath, p.295.
Saxony	1847	20%	Matzerath, p. 295.
Saxony	1865/66	37%	Matzerath, p. 265.
Great Britain	1830	21% aristocracy 32% landed gentry	Razzell, p. 253.
Great Britain	1875	18% aristocracy 32% landed gentry	Razzell, p. 253.
Denmark	1814	ca. 22%	Lind, p. 229.
Denmark	1847	ca. 23%	Lind, p. 229.
Denmark	1864	ca. 20%	Lind, p. 229.
France	1789	80%	Bodinier, p. 297.
France	1792/93	5%	Bodinier, p. 297.
Austria	1870	ca. 20%	Deak, p. 262.
Piedmont	1820s	66% of cadets	Del Negro, pp. 63-64.
Piedmont	1850s	33% of cadets	Del Negro, p. 63-64.
Italy	1863	6.5 – 7%	Ceva, p. 285.

Table A1.25 Noble and bourgeois generals in European armies in the nineteenth century

<i>Country</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Total number of generals</i>	<i>Number of noble generals</i>	<i>Percentage of noble generals</i>	<i>Percentage of bourgeois generals</i>	<i>Source</i>
France – generals of brigades	1876			ca. 33%		Haupt, <i>Sozial- geschichte Frankreichs</i> , p. 131.
United Kingdom	1870			50%		Banti, <i>Storia della borghesia</i> , p. 54.
Italy	1863			39,7%		Bertinaria, 85.
Italy	1872			35,4%		Bertinaria, 85.
Germany	1860			86%		Banti, <i>Storia della borghesia italiana</i> , p. 54.
Germany	1900			61%		Banti, <i>Storia della borghesia italiana</i> , p. 54.

A1.4 German Officers in the Papal Army

Table A1.26 German officers in the foreign corps of the Papal Army

<i>Corps</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Total number of officers</i>	<i>Number of German officers</i>	<i>Percentage of German officers</i>	<i>Source</i>
Papal Foreign Carabineers	1861-1870	ca. 100	21	21%	ASR, Soldiers' registers
Papal Zouaves	1861-1870	183 (registers) – ca. 150	7	4.6%	ASR, Soldiers' Registers

Table A1.27 Entries in the soldiers' registers on the German Officers (7) in the corps of the Papal Zouaves

Surname ¹⁵²¹	First Name	Date of Birth	Place of Birth - Town	Place of Birth - State	Profession	Last Residence - Town	Last Residence - State	Last Residence - State - Province	Previous military engagements	Part of the Corps from - Date	Rank at Time of Entry	Highest Rank	Highest Rank - Date
Hefner (B) ¹⁵²²	Ferdinand	16.01.1829	Munich	Bavaria	n.d.	Munich	Bavaria	Upper Bavaria	Papal Army since 1854	01.01.1861	Second Lieutenant	Major	30.11.1867
Poncin de Casaquy (B) ¹⁵²³	Félix Wilhelm Erasmus	18.02.1834	Houffalire	Luxembourg ¹⁵²⁴	ex-military	Liège	Belgium		Belgian Army 1853-1860	01.01.1861	Sergeant Major	Lieutenant	19.03.1861
Mousty (B)	Viktor Joseph	12.11.1836	St. Hubert	Luxembourg ¹⁵²⁵	n. d.	Namur	Belgium		?	01.01.1861	Sergeant	Lieutenant	11.08.1862
Hefner (B) ¹⁵²⁶	Maximilian	12.04.1832	Zusmarshausen	Bavaria	n. d.	Zusmarshausen	Bavaria	Swabia	Papal army since 1855	01.09.1861	Second lieutenant	Captain	27.10.1866
Bach (B)	Alois	19.05.1838	Rülzheim	Bavaria	student	Rülzheim	Bavaria	Rhenish Palatinate	no previous engagement	19.10.1867	Second Lieutenant	Lieutenant	23.11.1867
Kligge (B)	Albert	05.07.1827	Paderborn	Prussia	n. d.	Paderborn	Prussia	Westphalia	?	01.01.1861		Lieutenant	02.05.1868
Schmising-Kerssenbrock (N) ¹⁵²⁷	Xaver	22.10.1838	Schellenberg	Prussia	landowner	Brincke	Prussia	Westphalia	Prussian army 1860-1864	21.12.1867		Second Lieutenant	20.03.1869

¹⁵²¹ In the following, after the surname, the letter (B) stands for bourgeois, the letter (N) for noble officers.

¹⁵²² The first name of the father of this individual was listed as “Ignaz”; this is interesting insofar as in the relevant time-span there were two Ignaz Hefners that were prominent in Bavaria: One noble, Ignaz von Hefner-Alteneck, and a bourgeois judge Ignaz Hefner, who married an Afra Reitschuster. In the matriculation lists of the officers of the Papal Zouaves, the mother of both is indicated as “Maria Reitschuster”, so that it seems fair to conclude that the two brothers were not bourgeois.

¹⁵²³ The family Poncin-Casaquy had a castle but nevertheless does not seem to be noble, because “Casaquy” (which most likely stems from a Spanish noble family Casajuis or Casajui of the 15th century) was added to the name when Ferdinand Joseph Poncin married Catherine-Josephine Casaquy. Despite their castle being visited for instance by Clemens Metternich, in the available registers of nobles I could not find any reference to the existence of a noble family Poncin nor that of a Casaquy.

¹⁵²⁴ This part of Luxembourg remained in the German Bund until 1839, before being handed over to Belgium.

¹⁵²⁵ This part of Luxembourg remained in the German Bund until 1839, before being handed over to Belgium.

¹⁵²⁶ See footnote no. 1522.

¹⁵²⁷ See for his biography Appendix II, A2.2, p. 506.

Table A1.28 Careers of the German officers in the Zouave corps

Ferdinand Hefner: Joined the papal corps “1^o Reggimento Estero” on 4 February 1854 as a “common” (“comune”) soldier; he became a caporal on 1st October 1854, a furir on 1st January 1855, a sergeant major on 6th April 1856, an adjutant non-commissioned officer on 1st July 1857, and a second lieutenant on 14th July 1859. He then transferred to the “Tirailleurs Franco-Belges” and the “Carabinieri Esteri” on 9th November 1860 as a second lieutenant; after which, he transferred to the Papal Zouaves on 1st January 1861 where he was raised to lieutenant (of administration) on 18th January 1861, captain (of administration) on 19th March 1861, and major on 30th November 1867. He left the army in 1868. He was awarded the medals of Castelfidardo 1860, “Benemerenti” in gold, of Mentana in 1867, and knight of the Equestrian Order of St. Gregory the Great.

Maximilian Hefner: Joined the papal corps “1^o Reggimento Estero” on 17th February 1855 as a common soldier; he was promoted to caporal 16th July 1855, sergeant 1st October 1856, sergeant major 6th December 1858, and second lieutenant 1st August 1860; he then transferred to the Papal Zouaves on 1st September 1861; he was promoted to lieutenant 11th August 1862, captain 27th October 1866, and then captain of clothing 1st January 1867. He was awarded the medals of Castelfidardo 1860, Benemerenti, Mentana 1867, and knight of the Equestrian Order of St. Gregory the Great.

Xaver Schmising-Kerssenbrock: Joined the Papal Zouaves 21st December 1867; he was promoted to caporal 16th June 1868, to sergeant 26th October 1868, and to second lieutenant 20th march 1869; he transferred to the “Carabinieri esteri” in 1869 (as second lieutenant).

Félix Poncin de Casaguy: Joined the Papal corps of the “Tirailleurs Franco-Belges” on 1st June 1860; he became a sergeant-major 16th August 1860; he then transferred to the Papal Zouaves as a sergeant-major 1st January 1861, where he was promoted to second lieutenant 18th January 1861, and lieutenant 19th March 1861. He left the army in 1862. He was awarded the medal of Castelfidardo 1860.

Albert Kligge: Joined the Papal corps of “Tirailleurs Franco-Belges” on 11th October 1860; he then transferred to the Papal Zouaves 1st January 1861, was promoted to caporal 11th November 1867, then sergeant 26th September 1863, Second lieutenant 23rd November 1867, and lieutenant 2nd May 1868. He was awarded the medal of Mentana 1867.

Victor Mousty: Joined the Papal corps of “Tirailleurs Franco-Belges” 6th June 1860; he was promoted to caporal 14th August 1860 and then to sergeant 2nd September 1860. He transferred to the Papal Zouaves 1st January 1861, where he became sergeant major 21st April 1861, second lieutenant 26th October 1861, and lieutenant 11th August 1862. He left the army in 1866. He was awarded the medal of Castelfidardo 1860, Mentana 1867, and became a knight of the Equestrian Order of St. Gregory the Great.

Joseph Alois Bach: Joined the Papal corps of “Carabinieri Esteri” 26th March 1860 and became a caporal 26th June 1860 and a sergeant furir 1st October 1860. He transferred to the Papal Zouaves 16th November 1861, became a caporal 21st November 1863, a sergeant furir 26th November 1865, a sergeant-major 16th April 1867 a second lieutenant 19th October 1867, and a lieutenant 23rd November 1867. He was awarded the medals of Castelfidardo in 1860, Mentana 1867 and Benemerenti. He was a commander of the order of Pius IX.

Table A1.29 Entries in the soldiers' registers on the German Officers (21) in the corps of the papal Foreign Carabineers (21)

Surname	First Name	Date of Birth	Place of Birth - Town	Place of Birth - State	Place of Birth - State - Province	Last Residence - Town	Last Residence - State	Last Residence - State - Province	Part of the Corps from - Date	Rank at Time of Entry	Exit Date	-Reason for leaving
Hefner (B) ¹⁵²⁸	Ferdinando	16.01.1829	Munich	Bavaria	Upper Bavaria	Munich	Bavaria	Upper Bavaria	01.11.1860	Second Lieutenant	01.01.1861	transferred to the Zouaves
Schmid (B)	Carlo	24.03.1840	n.d.	n. d.	n. d.	Emmendingen	Baden		07.12.1860	Second Lieutenant		
Prip (B)	Guglielmo	19.03.1824	Lohnau	Prussia	Silesia	n. d.	n. d.	n. d.	01.11.1860	Second Lieutenant	25.09.1867	died
Schäfer (B)	Paolo	07.04.1833	Bebenhausen	Württemberg		Ludwigsburg	Württemberg		07.12.1860	Second Lieutenant	05.01.1865	died at the military hospital
Lütje (B)	Carlo	16.05.1837	Westernhorn	Holstein		Homerbuck	Holstein		07.04.1861	Second Lieutenant		
Hayler (B)	Carlo	23.09.1835	Rosenheim	Bavaria	Upper Bavaria	Rosenheim	Bavaria	Upper Bavaria	01.04.1861	Adj. Surgeon-Major	01.10.1864	transferred to the administrative officers
Rux (B)	Alberto	12.11.1829	Marienwerder	Prussia	Brandenburg OR West Prussia	Rome	Papal States		16.07.1861		01.06.1864	dismissed
Süssmaier (B)	Corrado	10.11.1829	Munich	Bavaria	Upper Bavaria	Rome	Papal States		01.09.1861	Second Lieutenant		
Bongers (B)	Giulio	18.02.1817	Schwedt	Prussia	Brandenburg	Schwedt	Prussia	Brandenburg	01.09.1861	Second Lieutenant	01.10.1864	transferred to the administrative officers
Hilchner (B)	Ludovico	18.10.1832	Bayreuth	Bavaria	Upper Franconia	Munich	Bavaria	Upper Bavaria	28.12.1861	Second Lieutenant		

¹⁵²⁸ See footnote no. 1522.

Schroeder (B)	Francesco	28.09.1827	Trier	Prussia	Rheinland	Sidi-Bel-Abbes	Algeria	05.10.1867	Second Lieutenant	
Hofstetter (B) ¹⁵²⁹	Giacomo	19.07.1827	Atting	Bavaria	Lower Bavaria	Lindau	Bavaria	21.12.1867	Second Lieutenant	
Kugler (B) ¹⁵³⁰	Roberto Federico Giulio	06.03.1840	Berlin	Prussia	Brandenburg	Rome	Papal States	21.12.1867	Second Lieutenant	
von Cancrin (N) ¹⁵³¹	Costantino	14.07.1846	Karlsruhe	Baden		Karlsruhe	Baden	21.12.1867	Second Lieutenant	
Zahn (B) ¹⁵³²	Carlo Augusto	01.12.1837	Rheinau/ZH	Switzerland		Donaueschingen	Baden	21.03.1868	Second Lieutenant	
Ruedorffer (N) ¹⁵³³	Guglielmo Giuseppe Federico	08.11.1835	Munich	Bavaria	Upper Bavaria	Marseille	Frankreich	21.03.1868	Second Lieutenant	died at the military hospital
Clossmann (N) ¹⁵³⁴	Giovanni	08.10.1826	Mannheim	Baden		Emmendingen	Baden	21.03.1868	Captain	

¹⁵²⁹ This soldier does not seem to be related in terms of kinship with Gustav von Hoffstetter, Chief of the Garibaldian General Staff in 1849: A Jacob Hofstetter from Atting (!), so most likely this Giacomo Hofstetter from the Papal Army because of the place of birth, is noted instead – without any hint to a noble status – as student of theology at the University of Munich in the semester 1849/50. See *Amtliches Verzeichnis des Personals und der Studierenden an der Ludwigs-Maximilians-Universität zu München, Studienjahr 1849/50* (Munich: J. Georg Weiss, 1850), p. 36. The two brothers of Gustav von Hofstetter both had military careers instead; Gustav's brother Hugo von Hofstetter was a major in the Bavarian Army and died at the battle near Wörth in August 1870.

¹⁵³⁰ This individual does not seem to be related to Friedrich Johannes Kugler, a German painter present in Rome during the 1860s, because the names given for their parents do not match.

¹⁵³¹ Significant for our purposes is the fact that the von Cancrin had belonged to the immediate nobility of the Holy Roman Empire, and hence in Baden – where a part of the family settled – they were explicitly allowed to enter foreign military service after simply giving notice to the Grand Duke of Baden of their intentions. See the family entry, “Cancrin”, in *Neues allgemeines Deutsches Adels-Lexicon* (Leipzig: Friedrich Voigt, 1860), vol. II (“Bonzeponski-Ebergassing”), pp. 207-208.

¹⁵³² In all likelihood, this soldier was not a member of the noble family “von Zahn” from Sachsen, even because his father is noted in the matriculations list as “unknown”, which would have been very unlikely for a nobleman.

¹⁵³³ This individual was part of the Nobility of Bavaria since 1808, see the respective entry in *Neues allgemeines Deutsches Adels-Lexicon* (Leipzig: Friedrich Voigt, 1867), vol. VII (“Bonzeponski-Ebergassing”), p. 617. The father of this papal officer seems to have been Wilhelm Edler von Ruedorffer from Munich, noted in the matriculation list only as “Guglielmo”, therefore without the “von”.

Schmising Kersenbrock (N) ¹⁵³⁵	Saverio	18.03.1840	Schnellenberg	Prussia	Westphalia	Brincke	Prussia	Westphalia	26.03.1869	Second Lieutenant	
Neumüller (B) ¹⁵³⁶	Pietro	27.04.1831	Wattweiler	Bavaria	Rhenish Palatinate	Geneva	Switzerland		24.07.1869	Second Lieutenant	
Dietrich (B) ¹⁵³⁷	Corrado	26.03.1827	Kassel	Kurhessen		Oran	Algeria		26.07.1869	Second Lieutenant	
De Stolberg (N) ¹⁵³⁸	Giuseppe	13.09.1848	Westheim	Prussia	Westphalia	Westheim	Prussia	Westphalia	22.01.1870	Second Lieutenant	

¹⁵³⁴ The family von Clossmann belonged to the immediate nobility of the Holy Roman Empire, and therefore although they resided in Baden they could enter foreign military service without legal problems, see for this chapter 4.1 of the thesis. For the family see *Neues allgemeines Deutsches Adels-Lexicon* (Leipzig: Friedrich Vogt, 1860), p. 293.

¹⁵³⁵ On this individual, see appendix II.

¹⁵³⁶ This soldier does not seem to belong to the Austrian noble family von Neumüller due to his place of birth and the fact that members of a family Neumüller figure as peasants in Wattweiler.

¹⁵³⁷ There are no obvious connections to one of the many noble families with this name that mostly reside in Austria. See the entries in *Neues allgemeines Deutsches Adels-Lexicon* (Leipzig: Friedrich Vogt, 1860), vol. II (“Bozepolski-Ebergassing”), pp. 489-492.

¹⁵³⁸ Despite the first name “Giuseppe”, according to the date of birth (13 September 1848), the officer is Franz Ignatius Hubertus Maria zu Stolberg-Stolberg, son of the second born Joseph Theodor zu Stolberg-Stolberg. They belonged to the Stolberg-Stolberg branch of the old noble family of Stolberg; the heads of all of the various branches were “Standesherren” since 1829, according to the Act of Confederation of 1815 (art. 14). They and their families were exempt from the military duty under their new lords and were also free to take residence in any state of the German Confederation or any state at peace with the former. They also had the right to enter the military service of these states. From a legal point of view, hence, it was easy for Franz to join the Papal Army. See, for the privileges of the Standesherren, p. 165.

A1.5 German Officers in the Southern Army 1860

Table A1.30 Identified German Officers in the Southern Army

<i>Surname</i>	<i>First Name</i>	<i>Place of Birth</i>	<i>Place of Birth – State</i>	<i>Previous Military Engagement</i>	<i>Collocation Exercito Meridionale</i>	<i>Rank Exercito Meridionale</i>	<i>Later Military Engagement</i>
Bild	Enrico	Wenkheim	Baden	Bourbon Army	15th Türr, 2nd Eber, Foreign Carabineers	Second Lieutenant (“Sottotenente”) ¹⁵³⁹	
Cloudt	August		Prussia/Westphalia or Rhineland ¹⁵⁴⁰		17th Medici, 2nd	Second Lieutenant (“Sottotenente”)	
Fia ¹⁵⁴¹ /Fix	Ferdinando	Luxembourg (city)	Luxembourg	German Navy 1849-July 1852	19th, General Staff	Major	American Civil War, Northern States (Union); later on in the US military administration

¹⁵³⁹ In the entry of the soldiers’ registers’ the information that Bild had been “sergente furriere” before becoming an officer on 17 July 1860 was included as well.

¹⁵⁴⁰ Very probably August von Cloudt came from the Westphalian or Rhenish part of Prussia, because both branches of the noble family (branch von Cloudt and branch Pelden gen. von Cloudt) resided in these areas. For the family the entries, see “Cloudt, die Freiherren und Grafen von” in *Neues Preussisches Adels-Lexicon* [...] (Leipzig: Gebrüder Reichenbach), supplementary volume 5, p. 105; “Cloudt, v. Pelden” in *Neues allgemeines deutsches Adels-Lexicon* (Leipzig: Friedrich Vogt, 1860), vol. II (“Bozepolski-Ebergassing”), p. 294.

¹⁵⁴¹ Almost certainly the surname “Fia” in the matriculates of the Southern Army is a misspelling of “Fix”: the information given in the entry for the officer named “Fia” corresponds to the information available from other sources on the military rank and role of Louis-Ferdinand Fix, see the biographical entry “FIX (Louis-Ferdinand)” in *Biographie nationale publiée par l’Académie Royale des Sciences, des Lettres et des Beaux-Arts de Belgique*, vol. 35, Supplément, vol. VII (“Adrenatus-Hubert”) (Bruxelles: Établissements Émile Bruylant, 1969), col. 266-270; on Fix’s later role in the American Civil War and more information on his biography, see as well “Louis Ferdinand Fix. Vortrag des Herrn I. Loewenthal in dem Verein zur Erforschung der Geschichte der Deutschen in Maryland am 16. Mai 1893,” in *Seventh Annual Report of the Society for the history oft he Germans in Maryland*, 1892-1893, pp. 39-50.

Hoffman[n]	Ernesto	Breslau ¹⁵⁴²	Prussia/Province of Silesia	Prussian Engineering Corps; First Schleswig War (Schleswig-Holsteinischer Krieg)	18th, Engineering Corps	Major	Engineerign Corps oft he Italian army 1861; American Civil War, Northern States (Union) since 1861
Rüstow	Wilhelm	Brandenburg an der Havel	Prussia/Brandenburg	between 1838 and 1850 in the Prussian Engineering Corps, where he became officer in 1840; instructor in the Swiss Army since 1850	15th Türr	Colonel, Chief of General Staff	Colonel in the Swiss General Staff from 1870 onwards
Spraul	Carlo		Bavaria	Bavarian Infantry; British-German Legion Crimea 1853-1856	18th Bixio	Captain of General Staff	American Civil War, Northern States (Union)
Ulrich	Francesco	Crudin [sic]	Prussia	Prussian Army	17th Medici, 2nd Dünne	Sergeant	

¹⁵⁴² Breslau is the place of birth given in the biographical entry "Hoffmann, Ernst F." in: Wilhelm Kaufmann, *Die Deutschen im Amerikanischen Bürgerkriege, Sezessionskrieg 1861-1865* (Munich; Berlin: Druck und Verlag von R. Oldenbourg, 1911), pp. 512-514.

Wolff	Luigi Adolfo	Augsburg	Bavaria/Swabia	“Roman Army”; “Africa; Italia 1848-1849”	15th Türr, 2nd Eber, Foreign Carabineers	Major	
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A1.6 Ranks and strength of corps in the infantry of the Italian armed groups

Table A1.31 - Ranks in the Infantry of Italian armed groups

Generale (general, General, général) or – <i>Officer</i>
Colonnello (colonel, Oberst, colonel) <i>Officer</i>
Maggiore (major, Major, major) <i>Officer</i>
Capitano (captain, Hauptmann, capitaine) <i>Officer</i>
(primo) Tenente ([first] lieutenant, (Ober-)Leutnant, (premier-)lieutenant) <i>Officer</i>
Secondo Tenente (second lieutenant, Unterleutnant, sous-lieutenant) <i>Officer</i>
Primo sergente (first sergeant, Sergeant/Feldwebel, sergent [-chef]) – non-commissioned officer / “Unteroffizier” / “sottuffiziale” / “bass’uffiziale”
Secondo sergente (second sergeant, Sergeant/Feldwebel, sergent [-chef]) – non-commissioned officer / “Unteroffizier” / “sottuffiziale” / “bass’uffiziale”
Caporale (corporal, Korporal, caporal) – non-commissioned officer / “Unteroffizier” / “sottuffiziale” / “bass’uffiziale”

(Officers in grey)

Table A1.32 - Corps, number of people and commanders in the regular army of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies (around 1859)¹⁵⁴³

<i>Denomination of corps</i>	<i>Number of people</i>	<i>Commander</i>
Divisione (division, Division, division)	ca. 6,500	Maresciallo di campo (field marshall, Feldmarschall, maréchal du camp) - Officer
Reggimento (regiment, Regiment, Régiment) or brigata (brigade, Brigade, brigade)	842 (special branches) to 2,337 (infantry) to 2,526 (special branches)	Generale (general, General, général) or Colonnello (colonel, Oberst, colonel) – Officer
Battaglione (battalion, Bataillon, Bataillon)	900 (special branches) to 1,329	Maggiore (major, Major, major) – Officer
Compagnia (company, Kompanie, compagnie) Squadron (squadron, Eskadron, escadron) Batteria (battery, Batterie, batterie)	140 (special branches) to 160 (infantry) to 200 (special branches)	Capitano (captain, Hauptmann, capitaine) – Officer
Plotone (platoon, Peloton, peloton)	½ company = ca. 80	Tenente ([second] lieutenant, Leutnant, lieutenant) - Officer
Sezione (section, Abteilung, section)	½ platoon = ca. 40	Secondo sergente (second sergeant, Sergeant/Feldwebel, sergent [-chef]) – non-commissioned officer / “Unteroffizier” / “sottuffiziale” / “bass’uffiziale”
Squadra	½ section = ca. 20	Caporale (corporal, Korporal, caporal) – non-commissioned officer / “Unteroffizier” / “sottuffiziale” / “bass’uffiziale”

(Officers in grey)

¹⁵⁴³ This is my own elaboration based on the data from: *Almanach de Gotha* 1860, p. 435; Boeri/Crociani/Fiorentino, *L’esercito borbonico*, vol. 1, pp. 149-153; *Ordinanza di Sua Maestà pel governo*, pp. 189-285, 362-363.

Table A1.33 - Corps, number of people and commanders in the regular army of the Papal States (around 1859)

<i>Denomination of corps</i>	<i>Number of people</i>	<i>Commander</i>
Reggimento (regiment, Regiment, Régiment)	ca. 3,000	Colonnello (colonel, Oberst, colonel) – Officer
Battaglione (battalion, Bataillon, Bataillon)	ca. 1,000	Maggiore (major, Major, major) – Officer
Compagnia (company, Kompanie, compagnie) Squadron (squadron, Eskadron, escadron) Batteria (battery, Batterie, batterie)	140	Capitano (captain, Hauptmann, capitaine) – Officer
Plotone (platoon, Peloton, peloton) - foreseen only in some corps and especially for training new recruits for war	max. 140	Tenente ([second] lieutenant, Leutnant, lieutenant) or secondo tenente (second lieutenant, Leutnant, lieutenant)- Officer
Sezione (section, Abteilung, section)	ca. 10 (with only administrative functions)	Ufficiale di abbigliamento nel grado di tenente (lieutenant, Leutnant, lieutenant) - Officer

(Officers in grey)

APPENDIX 2 – German soldiers and officers on the Italian political sides – several sample

biographies

A2.1 Joseph Alois Bach – Papal Army

Joseph Alois Nikolaus Bach was born in 1838 in Rülzheim, in the part of the Palatinate that belonged at the time to Bavaria (Rheinpfalz). His father, born in Montbronn in Lorraine supposedly to a poor family: The father's father died early, and his father's mother was left to provide for her 5 – or 6, this remains unclear – children. The family, it seems, was very devoted to Catholicism: Jakob Knauber wrote in 1935 that it was intended that Bach's father become a priest, because he was sent to study at the minor seminary of Metz ("Knabenseminar" or "Kleines bischöfliches Seminar"). In the end, however, he did not become a priest but instead became a secretary in governmental service and eventually a tax collector in Klingenmünster; he married Bach's mother, the daughter of an innkeeper, and settled with her in Zweibrücken; Joseph Alois was one of their seven children; one of Bach's brothers did go on to become a priest and head of a Catholic orphanage. Joseph Alois was born in 1838, and when he reached school age, he was sent first to primary school and then to grammar school in Speyer, where he obtained his Abitur (university-entrance diploma). He continued with his studies and went to the university where he studied chemistry in Gießen. Here, he was a member of the student fraternity "Teutonia" (a duelling fraternity), where he learned the art of fencing. But Bach never finished his studies because his father called him back to Rülzheim to help him in his office. Shortly thereafter he left for Munich. It was clear that already here in the Bavarian capital he had decided to enter the Papal Army, insofar as he asked for and was granted permission to enlist in the Papal Army by the Bavarian government.¹⁵⁴⁴ Upon his arrival in Rome, he was assigned (on 26 March 1860 with the matriculation number 1109) to the corps of the "Foreign Carabineers" ("carabinieri esteri")¹⁵⁴⁵, where he is registered as a furir ("forriere"), and therefore, according to the traditional offices, was responsible for logistics; this was one of the higher ranks of the non-commissioned officers.¹⁵⁴⁶ Just several months later, in June 1860, he was promoted to caporal and then to sergeant furir in October of that same year. Just one month later, on 16 November 1860, Bach was transferred to the Papal Zouaves but apparently did not keep his

¹⁵⁴⁴ Carl Victor, *Lexikon Pfälzer Persönlichkeiten* (Edenkoben: Hennig, 1995), p. 169.

¹⁵⁴⁵ Less than one year later, Bach was transferred to the Papal Zouaves; it is of note that his former service in the Foreign Carabineers goes unmentioned in the biography written by Knauber and also in the biographical reference works. This is most probably because the Zouaves were considered to be more prestigious than the other corps (numerous publications contributed to the "myth of the Papal Zouaves", see for this p. 268) including the Foreign Carabineers.

¹⁵⁴⁶ ASR, Ministry of Arms, Matriculation lists of the non-commissioned officers and soldiers of the Foreign Carabineers.

previous rank, because it is noted in the records that he was promoted to corporal in the Zouaves only in 1863, to sergeant-furir in 1865, and then sergeant-major in April 1867.

Image A2.1: Photograph of Bach in his Zouave uniform



Source: Jakob Knauber, *Der päpstliche Offizier Joseph Alois Bach, (1838-1912) aus Rülzheim, Pfalz* (Landau-Queichheim: s. d. [1935]), insert between pp. 16 and 17.¹⁵⁴⁷

Some months after he had obtained the rank of sergeant-major, on 19 October 1867, Bach was appointed officer with the (first) rank of second lieutenant. Bach was quite deployed (13 October 1867) to fight in the battle of Montelibretti, some 30 kilometres from Rome; this was one of the first battles against the *Garibaldians* in their “Agro Romano Campaign” for the “liberation of Rome”. Bach continued to rise in the ranks of the Papal Army and was already appointed lieutenant by the end of November 1867. As “repayment” for his commitment to the papal cause – Bach was present and fought in the front lines of battles that broke out in 1860, 1867 and 1870 – papal medals were conferred upon him (i.e. the medals of

¹⁵⁴⁷ I am grateful to Joachim Specht for having sent me images of Knauber’s book.

Castelfidardo in 1860; Mentana in 1867). In 1871, Bach left the Papal Army and returned to Rülzheim in the Rhenish Palatinate together with his wife Emma Glanzmann who was originally from Baden; Bach had married Glanzmann in 1868 in Rome and had two children with her there. After his return, Bach became, like his father, a tax collector in Metz, and – according to the available sources – he became active in many Catholic circles and even founded the church choir of his parish. He is also said to have been involved in a duel in Metz: “When during an assembly at Metz a man allowed himself to express an improper remark about the Pope, the former Papal Zouave officer [Bach] approached this man and challenged him to a duel, so strong and determined were the feelings of this chivalrous man for the Pope and for whom he did not accept any denigration for whatever reason. The intervention of the Bishop of Metz was necessary to settle the cause in an amicable and orderly manner.”¹⁵⁴⁸ The episode demonstrates a loyalty that may be seen as a typical return gift in an asymmetrical gift exchange: Bach demonstrated his continued loyalty to the Pope even after his term of service in the Papal Army had ended, and hence gave a gift in exchange for having received the papal medals and crosses.¹⁵⁴⁹ After the turn of the century¹⁵⁵⁰, Bach was granted the second class (“Commendatore”) of the equestrian order of Pius IX; this second class of the order comprised personal ennoblement (hereditary nobility was instead reserved for the first class of the order), and hence Bach became a papal nobleman. For his work in the administration of Alsace-Lorraine he was also granted the Prussian Order of the Red Eagle. Bach died in Montigny near Metz in 1912, and according to a memoir written in 1935, “the hero of Montelibretti” was buried together with the “honorary sword” that his region sent to him while in papal service.¹⁵⁵¹

¹⁵⁴⁸ “Als in einer Versammlung zu Metz ein Herr sich eine unangebrachte Bemerkung gegen den Papst erlaubte, trat der ehemalige Zuavenleutnant an ihn heran und forderte ihn zum Zweikampf. So streng und entschieden fühlte der ritterliche Mann für den Heiligen Vater und duldet um keinen Preis eine Verunglimpfung desselben. Es bedurfte der Vermittlung des Bischofs von Metz, um die Sache in Güte und ordnungsgemäßer Weise beizulegen.“ Jakob Knauber, *Der päpstliche Offizier Joseph Alois Bach, (1838-1912) aus Rülzheim, Pfalz* (Landau-Queichheim: s. d. [1935]), p. 24.

¹⁵⁴⁹ In the previous century, this gift exchange between ennobled bourgeois officers and the Prussian King led to the formulas of courtesy, humbleness and loyalty that were used in the letters of the officers to the king, see for this Carmen Winkel, *Im Netz des Königs*, p. 107.

¹⁵⁵⁰ The Bavarian permission granting Bach the right to wear the cross of the order dates from 23 February 1906, see *Finanz-Ministerialblatt für das Königreich Bayern*, no. 4, 12 April 1906, p. 138.

¹⁵⁵¹ Knauber, *Der päpstliche Offizier*, p. 26.

Image A2.2: Photograph of Bach wearing different medals



Photograph of Joseph Alois Bach wearing the necklace and cross of the Order of Pius IX, and – among others – the papal medal of Castelfidardo from 1860 (the second of those on the right). Source: Jakob Knauber, *Der päpstliche Offizier Joseph Alois Bach (1838-1912) aus Rülzheim, Pfalz (Landau-Queichheim [1935])*, last unnumbered page.¹⁵⁵²

A2.2 Xaver von Korff, genannt Schmising-Kerssenbrock – Papal Army

Franz Xaver Graf von Korff zu Schmising-Kerssenbrock was born in 1838 in Schnellenberg in Sauerland in the south of Westphalia, and was educated in the Catholic colleges in Liège (Belgium) and Feldkirch (Austria). Korff and his two younger brothers Clemens and Adolf joined the Prussian Army in 1860 and became officers in the 1st Infantry Guards (1. Garde-Regiment zu Fuß). The three were the first Catholic officers in this Prussian regiment. When in 1863 Franz Xaver was challenged to a duel by a fellow soldier, he refused to duel because

¹⁵⁵² I am grateful to Joachim Specht for having sent me images of Knauber's book.

of the Catholic Church's condemnation of the practice. His father, Clemens August, however did not accept the proposal of the regiment's commander to transfer Franz Xaver to another regiment and instead initiated a general discussion on the duel and his son's refusal to partake. On 12 May 1864, the three Korff brothers were dismissed from the Prussian Army. Since the Infantry Guards were under direct command of the king, the situation led to a military scandal that was closely connected, as Horst Conrad has noted, to the relatively high rank of the Korff brothers in such a prestigious King's regiment and the Prussian constitutional crisis on military organization between 1862 and 1864.¹⁵⁵³

Korff was one of a group of seven nobles from Westphalia that joined the Papal Army in 1867 and 1868; the other members of the group came from the noble families Stollberg-Racklewitz, Stollberg-Westheim, Nagel-Ittlingen, Galen and Oer. Franz Xaver von Korff left in December 1867 to join the Papal Zouaves, where he became corporal in June 1868 and then sergeant in October of the same year. In 1869, Korff was promoted to the rank of second-lieutenant in the regiment of the Foreign Carabineers¹⁵⁵⁴ and as such faced the fall of Rome in 1870, after which he returned home.¹⁵⁵⁵


For Korff, joining the Papal Army, apart from being a way to continue a "brilliant" military career that had been interrupted in Prussia, was also an opportunity to visit holy sites and hence was another form of pilgrimage. Korff sent home many images of saints and of the Virgin Mary, which he collected in the various churches of the Papal States. He also recounted how he could be near the Pope when the latter inspected the troops, visited training camps, or paraded his troops on several occasions.

¹⁵⁵³ Horst Conrad, *Stand und Konfession*, pp. 142-144.

¹⁵⁵⁴ ASR, Ministry of Arms, soldiers' registers vol. 1635-1645, register No. 6350.

¹⁵⁵⁵ On Franz Xaver see Conrad, op. cit., and the obituaries: Julius Bertling, *Franz Xaver Graf Korff-Schmising-Kerßenbrock* (Rietberg i. W., s.d. [1914]); N. N., "Graf Franz Xaver von Korff, genannt Schmising-Kerssenbrock," *Die Welt* 22 (1911), no. 26, pp. 512-513 and N. N., "Le Lieutenant von Korff Schmising-Kerssenbrock," *L'Avant-Garde. Bulletin bi-mensuel des Zouaves pontificaux* 19(1911), no. 484, pp. 12-13.

Image A2.3: Photograph of Franz Xaver von Korff as an officer of the Papal Corps of the Foreign Carabineers



Graf Franz Xaver Korff-Schmising-Kerßenbrock Leutnant
im Regiment Carabinieri esteri Roma im Jahre 1869.

(Source: Julius Bertling, Paschalis Neyer, eds., *Franz Xaver Graf Korff-Schmising-Kerssenbrock. Mit e. Geleitw. d. Reichstagsabgeordneten M[atthias] Erzberger*. (Rietberg: Vahle 1914).)

Image A2.4: Franz Xaver Graf von Korff with other German Zouaves, ca. 1868



According to the handwritten information added by Franz Xaver's son or daughter, the other two Zouaves are Franz Graf zu Stolberg-Borlinghausen and Franz Graf zu Stolberg-Räckelwitz. (Source: *Die Welt* 22 (1911), no. 26 (25 March 1911), p. 513, in: Vereinigte Westfälische Adelsarchive, LWL MS, Personal Estates Franz Xaver von Korff, signature Bri. N. XVI-3).

A2.3 Hermann Kanzler – Papal Army

Hermann Kanzler¹⁵⁵⁶ was born 28 March 1822 in Weingarten near Karlsruhe in the Grand Duchy of Baden of a non-noble family. Not long after his birth his family went to live in the near Bruchsal, where his father became a civil servant given the responsibility of carrying out the county tax assessment ("Kreissteuerperäquator").¹⁵⁵⁷ Hermann began his schooling in the bi-confessional grammar school ("Vereinigtes Großherzogliches Lyzeum" / "Gymnasium") in Mannheim. Based on the information on his age and the various stages of his life, it seems that he most probably finished grammar school and obtained his "Abitur", which was

¹⁵⁵⁶ The best available summary of his biography is the entry "Kanzler, Hermann" in the *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani*, vol. 62 (2004), online via http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/hermann-kanzler_%28Dizionario-Biografico%29/ (last accessed: 24.08.2013); my reconstruction adheres to this summary, but adds information from historical sources that were not used.

¹⁵⁵⁷ See the notice on the conferment of a lower class of the civil medal of merit to Max Anton Kanzler in: *Staats-Anzeiger für das Großherzogthum Baden* 25 (1871), p. 233.

introduced as an obligatory university entrance qualification in Baden in 1823.¹⁵⁵⁸ According to a Mannheim lyceum programme from 1832, Kanzler received a sound “classical” neo-humanist education in Latin, Greek, Hebrew, in Geography and especially ancient history, with some excursions into the modern history of the Grand-Duchy itself.¹⁵⁵⁹ Kanzler's education in French must have been quite comprehensive given that the Baden grammar schools at this time placed heavy emphasis on this language.¹⁵⁶⁰ He may also have received his first lessons in Italian in the Baden schools: At least in 1834 some of the Lyceum's eldest pupils had requested to be taught Italian and were, hence, taught one hour per week by their “italophile” director, who introduced the basics of Italian grammar and “the first thirty stanzas of Tasso's *Gerusalemme*”.¹⁵⁶¹ After he finished his schooling, Hermann joined the Army of the Grand Duchy of Baden, and became an aspirant officer in the cadet-school. Based on the information available it seems that he entered the army not as a conscript (for which he would have had to have been older when he joined the army¹⁵⁶²), but – in formal terms – as a volunteer.¹⁵⁶³ He was educated at the “war school” at Karlsruhe, which was how the Baden cadet school was referred to in this period. Aspirant officers in order to progress had to pass the two-year cadet school. Here, they were required to attend both general and specifically military courses for 7 hours a day: German, French and Mathematics were general courses, and fortification, weaponry, tactics, surveying, map-making and the military regulations were specifically military courses.¹⁵⁶⁴ Kanzler when he completed the “war school” met with success because he was – as was usual for the new graduates of the school – immediately

¹⁵⁵⁸ Hans-Christof Kraus, *Kultur, Bildung und Wissenschaft im 19. Jahrhundert*, Enzyklopädie Deutscher Geschichte 82 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2008), p. 44.

¹⁵⁵⁹ Friedrich-August Nüßlin, *Programm des Großherzoglichen Lyceum in Mannheim für die Prüfung vom 9. Bis 11. Sept. 1834* (Mannheim: Druckerei von F. Kaufmann's Witwe, 1834), pp. 11-23.

¹⁵⁶⁰ Kraus, *Kultur, Bildung und Wissenschaft*, p. 44. French was also the only regularly taught language at the cadet school in Karlsruhe, but even here for only four hours per week. For the history of this cadet school and the courses taught therein, see Bernhard von Poten, *Geschichte des Militär-Erziehungs- und Bildungswesens in den Landen deutscher Zunge*, vol. 1, „Allgemeine Übersicht. Baden, Bayern, Braunschweig, Colmar“ (Berlin: Hofmann & Comp., 1889), pp. 19-50. On the social background of the cadets see the – otherwise quite disappointing in that it systematically fails to include important details – study of Karl-Heinz Lutz, *Das badische Offizierskorps 1840-1870/71*, pp. 252-279.

¹⁵⁶¹ Friedrich-August Nüßlin, *Programm des Großherzoglichen Lyceum in Mannheim für die Prüfung vom 9. Bis 11. Sept. 1834* (Mannheim: Druckerei von F. Kaufmann's Witwe, 1834), p.20. Director Nüßlin inserted an Italian citation of Silvio Pellico at the beginning of his report; perhaps this “Italophilia” of the schoolmaster had had some influence on the young Hermann Kanzler.

¹⁵⁶² For the differences between conscripts and “volunteers” in the Baden Army, see the “Großherzoglich Badisches Conscriptions-Gesetz,” *Großherzoglich Badisches Staats- und Regierungsblatt* 23 (1825), no. 10, pp. 67-87.

¹⁵⁶³ For the prerequisites and terms to enter the cadet school that were applicable in the case of Hermann Kanzler, see “Allgemeine Bestimmungen über die Ergänzung des Offiziers-Corps,” *Großherzoglich Badisches Regierungsblatt* 30 (1832), no. 37, pp. 332-344. For the subsequent changes of the rules regarding cadets and officers, see the information given in Lutz as well as in Poten, *Geschichte*.

¹⁵⁶⁴ Poten, *Geschichte*, p. 32.

nominated cadet sergeant (“Portepeee-Fähnrich”); in May 1841 he was promoted to the position of lieutenant.¹⁵⁶⁵

But already on 12 December 1843 he was dismissed from the Baden Army.¹⁵⁶⁶ In the little literature that is available on Kanzler, there are two different reasons advanced for why he left the 4th Baden Infantry Regiment. Both are related to Catholicism.¹⁵⁶⁷ In the first of these two “stories”, Kanzler left the army together with his superior as a form of protest on the part of the latter against the “anticlerical attitude” of the Baden government.¹⁵⁶⁸ In the second narration, instead, he left because he was challenged to a duel, which, due to his catholic faith, he could not accept. As in other states at this time, the status of the duel was also ambiguous in Baden: Although it was officially forbidden already at the beginning of the century, and especially for the officer corps, it nevertheless seems to have been accepted in many social circles and continued to be practiced, even if perhaps less than in other German regions.¹⁵⁶⁹

After he left the Baden Army, Kanzler seems to have dedicated himself to the study of languages; he is even said to have spent time in Great Britain; taking into account his modest social origin, the child of a civil servant at the regional level, and the fact that because of the duel his “career” in the Baden Army had come to a halt, it is even probable that he went there in search of a job. His travels eventually brought him to Bologna, where he joined the Papal Army as a cadet of the first foreign regiment (1° Reggimento Estero) on 1 September 1845.¹⁵⁷⁰ Already in March 1847 he was appointed second lieutenant of the corps; it was in this rank that he fought against Austria in 1848, “where he was lightly wounded and where

¹⁵⁶⁵ „Militär-Dienst-Nachrichten,” *Großherzoglich Badisches Staats- und Regierungsblatt* 39 (1841), no. 17, p. 157.

¹⁵⁶⁶ „Militär-Dienst-Nachrichten,” *Großherzoglich Badisches Staats- und Regierungsblatt* 42 (1844), no. 2, p. 9.

¹⁵⁶⁷ That Kanzler was Catholic is noted in his first appearance in the papal soldier registers, Archivio di Stato di Roma, Fondo Ministero delle Armi, soldiers' registers vol. 1371 (1° Reggimento Estero, Ufficiali), no. 36.

¹⁵⁶⁸ Julius Dorneich, *Franz Josef Buß und die katholische Bewegung in Baden* (Freiburg: Herder, 1979), footnote 12 on p. 349. Based on the information available, it was not possible to identify the exact reason Kanzler left or was dismissed.

¹⁵⁶⁹ On the duel in Baden and another case from 1843, which found its way into the German newspapers beyond Baden, see: Lutz, *Das badische Offizierskorps*, p. 346-349.

¹⁵⁷⁰ ASR, Ministry of Arms, matricules vol. 1371 (1° Reggimento Estero, Ufficiali), no. 36. Most probably he was educated “in situ” in the foreign regiment, because the official cadets’ corps of the Papal Army was only for papal citizens. For more on this, see Vittorio Adami, “Notizie e documenti sugli istituti di educazione militare negli antichi stati italiani,” *Rassegna storica del Risorgimento*, 1935, on the papal cadets especially see pp. 947-949. In 1855, the cadets’ corps was reorganized and an appropriate military college (“collegio militare”) was instituted. This last was at least at the formal level open to non-papal subjects as well, even if they ought to be from “distinct family or at least of civil condition” (whatever that meant in practice) and had to personally pay at least 7.50 scudi per month to the cadet school. See “Regolamento del Ministero delle Armi per I cadetti, 18th of March 1855,” *Raccolta delle leggi e disposizioni di pubblica amministrazione nello stato pontificio*, Rome 1856, pp. 58-93.

he, as only remaining officer, commanded his company until the end of the battle.”¹⁵⁷¹ For this he was decorated, on 14 October 1848, with the cross of the Pontifical Equestrian Order of St. Gregory the Great.¹⁵⁷²

After the Pope’s flight from the revolution in Rome in November 1848 to Gaeta in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, Kanzler, who was called back to Rome but arrived too late, eventually reached Gaeta. He was – as many other foreign papal soldiers – dismissed on 16 April 1849 by the triumvirate of the Republic. One day later, the Pope in exile promoted him to first lieutenant, and on 21 June he became captain in the (exiled) general staff at Gaeta. Four days later he was declared a knight of the Pontifical Equestrian Order of St. Sylvester Pope and Martyr. After the return of the papal administration to Rome, he held several different positions in the Ministry of Arms and in leading divisions and regiments. What is worth noting is the fact that he was called to command so-called “indigenous” regiments – hence regiments mainly constituted by papal subjects, whereas until 1848 his service kept him strictly within the bounds of the foreign papal corps.

In September 1860, Kanzler was involved in the repression of the revolts in the Marche, and one month later was promoted to the rank of general. After the fall of Ancona, he and his soldiers were captured by the Piedmontese Army. “Considered an Italian because the last command he held was over an indigenous regiment, he was not repatriated as were the other officers of foreign origin, and so was able to make his way back to Rome.”¹⁵⁷³

¹⁵⁷¹ Entry “Kanzler, Hermann,” *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani* 62 (2004), online via http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/hermann-kanzler_%28Dizionario-Biografico%29/ (last accessed: 24/08/2013).

¹⁵⁷² ASR, Ministry of Arms, matricules vol. 1371 (1° Reggimento Estero, Ufficiali), no. 36.

¹⁵⁷³ Entry „Kanzler, Hermann,“ *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani* 62 (2004), online via http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/hermann-kanzler_%28Dizionario-Biografico%29/ (last accessed: 24/08/2013).

Image A2.6: General Kanzler and the General Staff at Anzio, ca. 1862



(Source: Paolo Della Torre, *L'anno di Mentana*.)

On 15 October 1865, Kanzler was appointed the successor of Merode as the Commander-in-Chief of the Papal Army and the Pro-Minister of Arms: insofar as he was an “unfailing worker and good organiser”, he proved capable of acting as a mediating figure “between the two components” of the Papal Army, “the foreign and the indigenous one. He was foreign [...] but he had been in the command of indigenous corps for a long time and knew well how the military administration functioned.”¹⁵⁷⁴

Kanzler was involved in the measures taken against the “brigandage” in the Papal States as well as in the defence of the Papal States against the *garibaldini* in 1867, where he used the existing railroads (“the first case of tactical use of the railways in Italy”), he participated as well in the final battle of Mentana in the same year. In September 1870, having proposed an active defence to the Pope, he most likely pushed the military activities under his command further than requested by the Pope, who had written to him to lay down arms as soon as possible after the first bombings, hence surrendering only when the famous “breach” in the Porta Pia was opened. After 1870, Hermann Kanzler remained in the Vatican State with

¹⁵⁷⁴ Entry „Kanzler, Hermann,“ *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani* 62 (2004), online via http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/hermann-kanzler_%28Dizionario-Biografico%29/ (last accessed: 24.08.2013).

his family and was ennobled by the Pope. Even if large portions of the Papal Army were dissolved after 1870, he kept his rank and position, which, however, became nearly insignificant.

Image A2.7: Photograph: Hermann Kanzler



(Source: Piero Raggi, *La nona crociata: i volontari di Pio IX in difesa di Roma, 1860-1870. Seconda edizione accresciuta di immagini e documenti* (Ravenna: Libreria Tonini, 2002), p. 64.)

A2.4 Theodor Klitsche de Lagrange – pro-Bourbon campaigns 1860-1861

Theodor Klitsche de Lagrange was born in Magdeburg, Prussia in 1797 to the morganatic marriage of Prince Louis Ferdinand of Prussia (1772-1806) and the Catholic Countess Maria Adelaide de Lagrange and was baptized a Protestant. He joined the Prussian volunteer forces to fight in the 1813-1815 wars against Napoleon, where he immediately became an officer in 1813. During the war Klitsche was wounded near Ligny. In 1822, he converted to Catholicism and consequently lost the support of Frederic William II of Prussia. From 1826 to 1830 he was accredited to the likewise converted Duke Frederick Ferdinand of Anhalt-Köthen at the

Holy See. In Rome, Klitsche became a captain in the papal general staff in 1831. But it is clear that since 1855 he lived in Caserta and therefore it is most probably that already then he had joined the Bourbon Army. In September 1860, he helped to organize several columns for Francis II that were called the “Volunteers’ battalions brigade”¹⁵⁷⁵, and was appositely nominated as a colonel for this service. A note kept regarding his biography in the Archivio borbone, the archival material regarding the government of Francis II in the exile in Gaeta and Rome, summed up why Klitsche was most likely so interesting to the Bourbon king: “A soldier for 48 years, an officer for 46, and a leading officer for 30 years, he was present in more than twenty battles [...]”¹⁵⁷⁶

During the campaign in southern Italy of 1860, Klitsche made forceful requisitions that were used at times to sustain the troops and at others sent to Gaëta, a fact on which he was supposedly heavily criticized later on. He felt obliged to excuse himself for this issue, and explained – in a stamped report on the autumnal campaign – that his actions had been officially backed. On one specific requisition of cloth, for instance, he wrote: “I’ve been upbraided more than I could have imagined possible for the requisitions of cloth, which in exchange for royal coupons of the royal government I was forced to make. It was of the utmost necessity to provide the troops with winter clothes. Furthermore, I have acted strictly according to my orders, which for that very purpose were given to me.”¹⁵⁷⁷ Already during his campaign, Klitsche constantly complained about the lack of resources in terms of weapons and general equipment. In his report, he made a major argument out of what he saw as inadequate support from Gaëta. With the resources he had at his disposal, the maximum effect had already been produced, Klitsche wrote in defence of his honour as a military leader: “Reputation is for me a holy palladium, which I intend to transmit intact to my children.”¹⁵⁷⁸

After having surrendered and fled to the Papal States, Klitsche continued to be productive as a writer: Apart from religious works on the Council of Trento and on the theological necessity of celibacy, he continued to publish military works as he had been doing since the 1840s.

¹⁵⁷⁵ “Brigata Battaglioni Volontari”. The denomination was confirmed in a letter written by Klitsche de Lagrange to the adjutant of Francis II in Gaëta, on 27 September 1860, ASN, Archivio borbone, file 1262, no. 219.

¹⁵⁷⁶ “Soldato da 48 anni, Ufficiale da 46, e ufficiale Superiore da 30 anni, s’è trovato in più di venti fatti d’armi [...]” ASN, Archivio Borbone, file 1144, no. 31.

¹⁵⁷⁷ “Mi si è gridato contro a più non possa a motivo delle requisizioni di panno, che dietro Boni sul Regio Erario dovetto fare. Fu imperiosa necessità di provvedere la Truppa di vestiario d’inverno. D’altronde non ho agito che rigorosamente attaccato alle istruzioni, che a tal uopo mi erano state date.” Theodor Friedrich Klitsche de Lagrange, *Ragguaglio documentato sulla spedizione militare negli Abruzzi nell Ottobre 1860* (Rome: Tipografia delle Belle Arti 1861), p. 7.

¹⁵⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 23.

A2.5 Gustav von Hoffstetter – Garibaldi's Legion in Rome, 1849

Gustav von Hoffstetter was born in 1818 in Aschaffenburg in Bavaria into a noble family originating from Tirol, which traditionally provided officers. His father was a major in the Bavarian Army, and eventually Gustav's brothers both joined the same army too. Like his brother Hugo, Gustav in 1829 joined the Munich cadet school. He became an officer in 1841 in a contingent of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, where he expressed his desire to go to Algiers; he was, however, not granted permission, though he was given permission by the Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen authorities to join the Swiss Sonderbund War, where he fought in several battles, for instance at Gislikon. In 1848, by appointment of the Prince of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, Hoffstetter was placed in command of the country's national guard (*Bürgerwehr*). Following the suppression of the revolution in Baden by Prussian troops, Hoffstetter fled to Switzerland, where he unsuccessfully tried to find military employment. Within the context of Johann Philipp Becker's plans to build a German-Swiss Legion for the South of Italy and later Rome, he offered his service to the Triumvirate of the Roman Republic, where he fought for instance against the Neapolitans in May 1849 and was integrated into Garibaldi's General Staff, where he rapidly advanced in his military career. On 30 June 1849, the day of the capitulation of Rome, Hoffstetter became still Chief of Staff of Garibaldi's armed group, substituting the fallen Colonel Manara in organizing the retreat of Garibaldi's troops to the Republic of San Marino, where they surrendered. With the help of the Italian sides, he managed to escape French capture by fleeing to Chiasso in Switzerland. In 1851, Hoffstetter obtained his citizenship in Eggenwyl, the canton of Aargau in Switzerland, and engaged in military education and publication, becoming the senior instructor in the St. Gallen canton in 1852, cantonal colonel in 1859, federal colonel in 1860, and senior instructor of the Swiss Infantry in 1865. Hoffstetter died in 1874 in Thun, Switzerland.¹⁵⁷⁹

A2.6 Friedrich Wilhelm Rüstow – Garibaldian Southern Army 1860

Friedrich Wilhelm Rüstow was born in 1821 in Brandenburg an der Havel in Prussia, and was the son of a Prussian Army major. He began his studies in law in Heidelberg, though never finished them. Between 1838 and 1840 he was scholar of the Prussian "Joined School of Artillery and Engineering" (*Vereinigte Artillerie- und Ingenieursschule*) in Charlottenburg

¹⁵⁷⁹ „Hoffstetter, Gustav von,“ *Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz*, online; Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie, vol. 12 (Hense-Holste), Leipzig 1880, pp. 619-621.

near Berlin, after which he entered the engineer corps of the Prussian Army. A “convinced, but iridescent democrat” in Königsberg in Prussia (today’s Kaliningrad), he began to frequent democratic circles and participated in the revolution that broke out in March 1848, for which he was brought before military courts but not sentenced. He began to advocate the replacement of the standing armies with the democratic concept of militias and, based on this, to heavily criticize the Prussian Army and especially its role in suppressing the revolution. His December 1848 publication on this matter resulted in charges of high treason and Lèse-majesté being brought against him. But shortly before his definitive condemnation to more than 30 years of imprisonment in a fortress, he managed “an adventurous escape” from the fortress of Posen (today’s Poznan) and fled to Zurich in Switzerland.¹⁵⁸⁰ His dedication to the revolutionary cause interrupted a potentially “brilliant officer’s career”.¹⁵⁸¹

In Switzerland, he began his career as military writer – also very much for economic reasons – publishing on a wide array of topics in history, military history, more recent battles, on strategy and tactics as well as “military sciences”. Between the winter semester of 1852 and the winter semester of 1854-55 he taught military history and military sciences at the University of Zurich and began to work for the Swiss General Staff. In this context of particular note is his publication of a manual for the service of the General Staff in campaign from 1855¹⁵⁸², which not only continued to be used by the Swiss General Staff until the 1870s¹⁵⁸³, but that he brought with him to southern Italy in 1860, distributing it among the officers. Upon his arrival on 1 July 1860 in Genoa from Zurich, after the failure of the project of an expedition into the Papal States, he stepped into his role as Chief of Staff of the 15th Garibaldian Division of Stefan Türr. He left southern Italy at the end of November 1860 and returned to Zurich.¹⁵⁸⁴ Involved in several unrealized projects to form military corps for Germany and Italy in the 1860s, Rüstow continued to publish on military issues, among which his memoirs of the 1860 Garibaldian campaign, a more abstract work on the Italian wars of 1859 and 1860, and a piece on the general and not exclusively military history of Italy since 1860 among them.¹⁵⁸⁵ For his service rendered in the Garibaldian campaign, Rüstow was nominated “knight of the Military Order of Savoy” in September 1862. Only in the late

¹⁵⁸⁰ Moos, "Streiflichter auf Wilhelm Rüstows Beziehungen zu Italien," pp. 342-402

¹⁵⁸¹ Carlo Moos, "Wilhelm Rüstow und die Schweiz," in Hubert Foester, ed., *Actes du symposium 1987 : [symposium d'histoire militaire et rencontre franco-suisse, 6-7 novembre 1987, Pully]*, (Pully: Centre d'histoire et de prospective militaires/Pavillon de recherches Général Guisan, 1989), p. 65.

¹⁵⁸² Rüstow, *Anleitung für die Dienstverrichtung*.

¹⁵⁸³ Moos, "Rüstow und die Schweiz", p. 66.

¹⁵⁸⁴ Moos, "Streiflichter auf Wilhelm Rüstows Beziehungen zu Italien," p. 345.

¹⁵⁸⁵ See Rüstow, *Erinnerungen aus dem italienischen Feldzuge von 1860*, vols. 1 and 2.; Rüstow, *Der italienische Krieg 1860*; Friedrich Wilhelm Rüstow, *Annalen des Königreichs Italien. 1861 bis 1863*, 3 vols. (Zurich; Leipzig: Meyer & Zeller; K. F. Köhler, 1864).

1860s, does he seem to have been able to begin to move within the circles of the Swiss Army again, contributing first to the discussions on Swiss military organization, and secondly – after several unsuccessful earlier attempts – to become a Swiss colonel and member of the Federal General Staff as its chief of the “historical-statistical” section in 1870.¹⁵⁸⁶ After an unsuccessful attempt to be appointed to the top of the Swiss Infantry or Engineers in 1874, Rüstow, in the winter semester of 1875-76, taught a course on the “introduction to war sciences” at the Polytechnic Institute (the later ETH) in Zurich; not having been appointed, as he wished, for the regular chair in “war sciences” there, and deeply affected by economic problems, Rüstow shot himself in 1878 in his home near Zurich.

Image A2.8: Photograph: Friedrich Wilhelm Rüstow in the Garibaldian “Red Shirt”, 1860



(Source: Dichtermuseum Liestal/Switzerland.)

¹⁵⁸⁶ Moos, "Rüstow und die Schweiz," p. 67.

A2.7 Louis-Ferdinand Fix – Garibaldian Southern Army in 1860

Louis-Ferdinand Fix was born in the city of Luxembourg on 3 September 1829. Shortly after his birth his parents moved to Arlon – today in the Belgian Province of Luxembourg. Toward the end of his school years, he and his brother (who became a lieutenant general in the Belgian army) stayed in the capital of Luxembourg to finish school. Louis Ferdinand then entered the Maritime Academy of Antwerp¹⁵⁸⁷, where he attained, on 12 August 1848, the rank of a *civil* navy lieutenant. He then entered the German Navy: During the revolution, the National Assembly in Frankfurt on Main decided in June 1848 to form a German military naval force (“Reichsflotte” – Imperial Fleet), mainly to prepare for eventual naval warfare against Denmark in Schleswig-Holstein. Officers and soldiers were recruited from other European navies and merchant ships; among the latter was Louis Ferdinand Fix, who entered the German military navy as a “Seefähnrich” (naval fenrik).¹⁵⁸⁸ The Reichsflotte continued on for some time after the restoration in 1849, but was definitively abolished in March 1852, when Fix, along with the other men, was dismissed from service. After this, Fix worked as a civil officer on merchant ships for a new Belgian company of transatlantic steamships that went between Antwerp and New York. During this period of his life he worked in the crews of the four ships that this company lent to the British Navy to transport the British troops to China and India, before the company was liquidated in 1859. Upon his return to Brussels, Fix became a member of the freemasons. He was again offered the command of a Belgian ship, but “he gave up the sea and went to Italy with one of his friends [...]”¹⁵⁸⁹ Fix arrived at Palermo in June 1860, and he joined Garibaldi’s Southern Army as a captain of the General Staff, only to be transferred to the engineer corps shortly thereafter. According to a later biography on Fix, he was “seriously wounded on 1 October 1860 in the battle at the Volturmo,

¹⁵⁸⁷ Ecole supérieure de navigation d’Anvers; Hogere Zeevaartschool Antwerpen, founded by Napoleon Bonaparte, and refounded in 1834 as academy for the education of both the merchant and military Belgian navy.

¹⁵⁸⁸ Fix is mentioned to have had this rank by Max Bär, *Die deutsche Flotte von 1848-1852. Nach den Akten der Staatsarchive zu Berlin und Hannover* (Leipzig: Verlag von S. Hirzel 1898), p. 235, where he is presented as a former cadet of the Belgian navy.

¹⁵⁸⁹ “Bien qu'en ce moment on offrit à Fix le commandement d'un vapeur belge il renonça à la mer et partit pour l'Italie avec un de ses amis, le baron de Stein d'Altenstein, ancien officier allemand. Ils arrivèrent à Palerme en juin 1860, et Fix entra dans le corps du genie de Garibaldi, comme capitaine d'état-major.” « Fix, Louis F., » *Biographie nationale publiée par l'Academie royale des sciences, des lettres et des beaux-arts de Belgique* 35, supplement vol. VII („Adrenatius-Hubert“) (Brussels: Établissements Émile Bruylant, 1969), p.268.

and after his recovery he remained in the engineer corps.”¹⁵⁹⁰ Once the southern campaign came to a close, Fix entered the new Italian Army as a major in the engineer corps; in February 1862 he was nominated knight of the Military Order of Savoy (“Ordine militare di Savoia”).¹⁵⁹¹ Erroneously, some believed this honour had ennobled Fix,¹⁵⁹² but this Order was not limited to nobles nor was entry to the Order connected with an automatic (personal) ennoblement, as was the case with the higher order of Savoy, the “Order of Saints Maurice and Lazarus”¹⁵⁹³, or the first two classes of the Papal Order of Pius IX (hereditary nobility for the “knights with the collar”, personal nobility for the “knights commanders”). Despite having been transferred over to the Italian Army and of having been decorated by the Italian state, Fix left Italy in the spring of 1862 for North America. He is recorded as a captain at the head of a company in the 58th Ohio Infantry Regiment, and therefore on the side of the Northern Union from April 1862 onwards.¹⁵⁹⁴ Once when wounded and in hospital, he made the acquaintance of a “young American-German” who worked as a hospital nurse and was the “daughter of an old Hessian captain”; this woman would go on to be his wife. Fix was promoted to major in September 1864 and then lieutenant-colonel for the State of Missouri in October of that same year. After the Civil War was over, he worked first as the director of the military prison of Saint-Louis (Missouri), before joining the US War Department in Washington, where he worked almost until he died at 63 years, in Washington in 1893; he was buried at the Arlington National Cemetery in the state of Virginia.¹⁵⁹⁵

¹⁵⁹⁰ “Am 1. Oktober 1860 wurde er in der Schlacht am Volturno schwer verwundet und blieb nach seiner Wiederherstellung im Ingenieurcorps.” German translation of a letter undersigned by the commander of the engineer-corps, dated 1st February 1862, in: “Louis Ferdinand Fix. Vortrag,” p. 46.

¹⁵⁹¹ « Fix, Louis F., », p. 269.

¹⁵⁹² For instance the author of the talk on Fix before the Society for the History of the Germans in Maryland (USA) in May 1863, “Louis Ferdinand Fix. Vortrag”.

¹⁵⁹³ The Order was opened to non-nobles by King Carlo Alberto, who reigned from 1831 to 1849; from henceforth, the conferment of the Order was equivalent to a personal ennoblement.

¹⁵⁹⁴ Charles A. Poland, *Army register of Ohio volunteers in the service of the United States [...] for July 1862* (Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State Journal Printing Co., 1862), p. 53.

¹⁵⁹⁵ « Fix, Louis F., », p. 269, and the dedicated site <http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/lffix.htm> (last accessed: 29/12/2013).